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Abstract.
Schema theory suggests that people understand texts and experiences 
by comparing them with stereotypical mental representations of similar 
cases. This thesis examines the relevance of this theory (as developed 
in some Artificial Intelligence (AI) work of the 1970s and 1980s) to 
literary theory and the analysis of literary texts. The general 
theoretical framework is that of discourse analysis. In this approach, 
the usefulness of schema theory is already widely acknowledged for the 
contribution it can make to an explanation of 'coherence': the quality of 
meaningfulness and unity perceived in discourse. Building upon this 
framework, relevant AI work on text processing is discussed, evaluated, 
and applied to literary and non-literary discourse.
The argument then moves on to literary theory, and in particular to 
the 'scientific' tradition of formalism, structuralism and Jakobsonian 
stylistics. The central concept of this tradition is 'defamiliarization': 
the refreshing of experience through deviation from expectation. In 
structuralism, attention has been concentrated on text structure, and in 
Jakobsonian stylistics on language.
It is argued that whereas AI work on text pays little attention to 
linguistic and textual form, seeking to 'translate' texts into a neutral 
representation of 'content', the literary theories referred to above have 
erred in the opposite direction, and concentrated exclusively on form. 
Through contrastive analyses of literary and non-literary discourse, it 
is suggested that neither approach is capable of accounting for 
•literariness* on its own. The two approaches are, however, 
complementary, and each would benefit from the insights of the other.
Human beings need to change and refresh their schematic 
representations of the world, texts and language. It is suggested that 
such changes to schemata are effected through linguistic and textual 
deviation from expectation, but that deviations at these levels are no 
guarantee of change (as is often the case in advertisements). 
Discourses which do. effect changes through text and language are
- ill -
described as displaying 'discourse deviation*. Their primary function and 
value may be this effect. Discourse categorized as 'literary' is frequently 
of this type. Discourse deviation is best described by a combination of 
the methods of A1 text analysis with formalist, structuralist and 
Jakobsonian literary theories.
In illustration of these proposals, the thesis concludes with analyses 
of three well-known literary texts.
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Chapter One.
Schema Theory: its general principles, history and terminology.
1.0 Introduction.
Schema theory has its origins in the gestalt psychology of the 1920s 
and 1930s. Its basic claim is that a new experience is understood by 
comparison with a stereotypical version of a similar experience held in 
memory. The new experience is then processed in terms of its deviation 
from that structure or conformity to it. The theory applies both to the 
processing of sensory data and to the processing of language. After a 
long eclipse, schema theory has recently received an enormous amount of 
attention in the Artificial Intelligence <AI) work of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Here it has been developed for the help which it provides in the two 
crucial AI problems of visual recognition and the understanding of texts. 
(Some of the relevant AI work on language and text understanding is 
discussed in chapters 4 and 8.)
After a summary of the main argument of the thesis (1.1) and 
discussion of its interdisciplinary areas of inquiry (1.2), this chapter 
gives an outline of the general principles of schema theory applied to 
text processing (1.3), and discusses its history (1.4) and terminology 
(1.5). A more detailed account of one version of the theory (Schank and 
Abelson 1977) is given in chapter 4 and 5, together with a discussion of 
objections to the theory and an application of it to literary analysis.
1.1 Summary of the argument main areas of inquiry.1*
AI work on text understanding, inspired by schema theory, has in turn 
been seized upon by discourse analysis. This enthusiasm arises largely 
from the powerful insight which schema theory provides Into the problem 
of ‘coherence': how texts take on unity and meaning for their receivers. 
In discourse analysis, the theory has been joined with existing approaches 
to coherence, such as the study of cohesion, text structure and pragmatics 
(areas which have in turn attracted the reciprocal interest of AI). As 
such, schema theory forms an indispensable part of an emerging overall
* Notes can be found at the end of each chapter.
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theory of discourse. (Approaches to coherence in discourse analysis are 
discussed in detail in chapter 2.)
A theory of discourse must inevitably include an approach to that sub­
group of texts which are categorized as 'literary' (though which texts are 
included within that category will vary between individuals and social 
groups). It must also address the difficult problem of what it is which 
leads individuals and social groups to classify certain texts in this way. 
There is thus a considerable overlap between discourse analysis and 
literary theory, particularly those literary theories which, like discourse 
analysis, have taken their inspiration from linguistics. Our claim is that 
just as discourse analysis has benefited from the insights of schema 
theory, so linguistics-based approaches to 'literariness* may do the same. 
Just as purely formal linguistic accounts of discourse are unable to 
account for coherence, so literary theories which attempt to characterize 
'literariness' as deviation from or conformity to formal linguistic 
patterns have a number of notorious and widely known weaknesses. In 
particular, they are unable to account for the presence of supposedly 
'literary' linguistic features in texts which are usually regarded as 'sub- 
literary', and for their absence from other texts which are accorded 
literary status. This failure has led to a general abandoning of the 
search for a linguistic characterization of 'literariness'. Chapter 7 of 
this thesis examines some of the claims of these linguistics-based 
theories, and demonstrates their shortcomings by contrasting the stylistic 
analysis of an advertisement with that of a poem. It will be suggested 
that the failure of such theories to account for the classification of a 
given text as 'literary' results from its exclusive concentration on the 
linguistic levels of discourse, and that texts which achieve high social 
status for their 'literariness' may do so because of their patterning or 
deviation at the level of schemata. In this way it is hoped to 
demonstrate the relevance of AI work on schema theory to the analysis of 
literature, and to suggest that the search for a formal characterization of 
'literariness' need not be abandoned if the description of linguistic 
features is linked to a description of the reader's schemata and his or 
her processing of the text. Certain 'reader-centred' literary theories 
(also discussed in chapter 7) have already tried to do this, but in a 
vague way which would benefit from the rigour of the work in discourse 
analysis and AI. Their approach is also often marked by a vituperative
- 3 -
rejection of linguistics approaches rather than a more productive desire 
to build upon them.
The Influence and benefit of an interaction of schema theory and 
literary analysis Is by no means one way. There are many insights 
stemming from formal linguistic approaches to literature which could 
contribute to AI. There are also many interactions between linguistic form 
and schematic representation which AI theory overlooks.
Finally, building upon all of the above areas, we shall suggest in 
chapters 8 and 9 that certain texts (many of which are classed as 
'literary') may perform the important function2 of breaking down existing 
schemata, reorganizing them and building new ones. Others, though they 
may share some of the linguistic features associated with literature, only 
reinforce existing schemata.
AI has demonstrated how schemata are essential to text processing, and 
this idea has been accepted in discourse analysis as a partial explanation 
of coherence. Schemata are also, however, at times, a potential barrier 
to understanding. The mind must build new schemata and adjust existing 
ones if it is to adapt to new experience. It has been suggested that the 
main functions of human language are to manipulate the environment and to 
create and maintain social relationships (see chapter 3). Our thesis Is 
that a further function of language is to build new schemata and 'play 
around with' existing ones. The best time to do this is clearly not at 
moments of practical urgency or social delicacy, hence the need to 
withdraw from practical and social pressures for this purpose, and the 
existence of a type of discourse whose function is to promote this change. 
Schemata play a well-documented role in processing text, but certain texts 
may also play a role in building and adjusting schemata. Clearly, the 
two are complementary and, for an intelligent organism, equally important.
The Idea of a dynamic reciprocal interaction between experience and 
schemata is suggested by Bartlett (1932) (usually regarded as the 
originator of schema theory) when he writes of the need for the mind to 
"turn round upon its own schemata". In AI the Idea appears in Schank's 
(1982) theory of 'dynamic memory' which discusses how schematic memory 
may organize and reorganize itself through encounters with new experiences 
and discourses. Developing these Ideas (in chapter 8), we shall suggest 
that discourse may be divided into three major types: 'schema reinforcing', 
'schema preserving' and 'schema refreshing'. Discourse of the last type
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will deviate from schematic expectations. Linguistic deviation and 
structural deviation may be side-effects or causes of schematic deviation, 
but are not enough to disrupt schemata on their own. Our claim is that 
much discourse which is acclaimed as 'literary' is often of this 'schema 
refreshing' type, and that this accounts for the high value placed upon it.
1.2 An Interdisciplinary study.
As outlined above, our intention is to bring together (through the 
intermediary discipline of discourse analysis), insights from AI schema 
theory and from certain schools of literary theory, to investigate the 
points of contact which already exist between them, to indicate points of 
mutual interest, and to propose a theory connecting the two. The union 
of two such disparate disciplines poses a number of problems and demands 
some justification and discussion.
AI and literary theory may seem initially to be disciplines of very 
different kinds, epitomizing the traditional separation of the natural 
sciences and the humanities in academic study. The first, concerned with 
the replication in computers of human skills, of necessity draws heavily 
upon the applied natural sciences and mathematics, as well as on the 
'human sciences' of psychology and linguistics. Literary theory, on the 
other hand, concerned to elucidate the nature of literature, has often 
drawn its material from the 'arts', though It too has been attracted and 
inspired by psychology and linguistics. These differences between the two 
fields may well be reinforced by mutual ignorance, different educational 
backgrounds, and preconceptions of reciprocal Irrelevance among those 
involved. AI workers may regard literary theory as a subjective 
aesthetics, and literary theorists dismiss AI as a mundane applied science. 
The very different terminologies of the two fields can only serve to make 
matters worse.
Yet despite their differences, the two disciplines have one major 
concern in common: to understand the processing and production of texts. 
For AI this concern is central because the ability to produce and process 
texts for communication is so distinctive and substantial a feature of 
human Intelligence that it would seem hard to classify a machine which 
could not replicate it in some way as having more than extremely limited 
intelligence. That literary theory shares this concern is self-evident, 
even tautological, for whatever disputes may rage about the nature of
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literature' and whether that nature can be defined, few would deny that 
the object of study is a subclass of text, or a subclass of human 
interaction with text.3
In practice however, the texts studied by the two fields are radically 
different. Those used by AI are, by human standards, very simple, 
restricted to a subscribed area of a natural language, of the world 
referred to, or of language processing skills. Literary texts on the other 
hand are typically complex or provoke complex interpretation: so much so 
that many theories of literature imply that textual complexity, or a 
concomitant complexity in processing, are definitive features of literature. 
AI cannot at present approach such complex texts and, in general, does not 
seek to, being only interested in texts whose processing or production can 
be modelled by the existing level of technology. Yet this difference in the 
type of text analysed, and in the approach to textual complexity, does not 
preclude the relevance of the two areas of study to each other. Insights 
into the processing and production of simple texts may provide strong 
clues to that of more complex examples. Conversely, there are many 
insights in literary theory which could add to the AI understanding of 
texts. AI researchers, though they cannot yet replicate the complexities 
of human text processing and production, are much given to speculation on 
the subject. The texts which can be handled by computer, moreover, grow 
ever more and more sophisticated.
1.2.1 Iece6sary exclusions.
As the field is unavoidably a large one, it is necessary rigorously to 
exclude material which is not pertinent to the argument - even when that 
material is regarded as central in the work discussed. In particular, we 
shall have nothing to say about the computational modelling of theories of 
text processing and production in AI. Early schema theory, predating the 
modern computer, was a theory of human understanding only, and 
contemporary AI schema theory concerns both human and computer 
understanding. Schank and Abelson (1977:1,8) suggest that the 
construction of an artificial intelligence by humans is bound to share 
features of its intelligence with them, and to reflect the workings of the 
mind which created it. A source of inspiration for computer models of 
intelligence is thus theorizing about human intelligence, and it is this 
human (i.e. psychological) side of the theory in which we are interested.
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The testing of the theories in computer experiments is not our concern. 
Theories of human intelligence developed in AI remain hypothetical, and 
even a successful computer reproduction of human skills, though strongly 
suggestive, would not prove their accuracy as models of that intelligence, 
as similar results may be produced by different procedures (Searle [1980] 
1987)*.
Ve shall also exclude schema theory which concerns visual and other 
sensory perception, without any reference to language. This too is of no 
direct concern to a theory of text. It will only be mentioned where it is 
related analogically to theories of text processing or has helped to 
develop them.
Our argument will also necessitate taking sides in a field which is 
full of strongly held, irreconcilable beliefs. To suggest a correlation 
between AI and literary analysis is already to enter an emotionally 
charged area and to refute a view of literature as an area impenetrable by 
the methods of the applied sciences. In effect, any inclusion or exclusion 
may amount to taking sides, but it seems true to say that the omissions 
mentioned above - of AI work on computer modelling or sensory perception
- are rather less controversial than the exclusion we Intend to make of 
certain approaches to literary theory. In general we shall limit our 
discussion to those approaches which share some of the scientific 
postulates of linguistics, psychology, discourse analysis and A I, in that 
they are prepared to act as though analysis of language may be conducted 
through language by an observer behaving, for the purposes of the 
analysis, as someone outside the process rather than inherently a part of 
it. In this sense, though we shall take some account of contemporary 
literary theoretical critiques of the scientific method (such as those of 
deconstruction and other post-structuralist approaches) we shall proceed 
as though literariness were indeed objectively analysable, believing this 
approach to be the most fruitful, If not, ultimately, philosophically 
irrefutable.
1.3 Schema theory: general principles.
Pragmatic analysis of discourse assumes both shared knowledge and 
processing rules. Both are assumed in speech-act theory and discourse 
analysis based upon it, though there is considerable difference in
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emphasis among analysts. There are in effect two schools of (not 
incompatible) thought here, the one stressing inferencing rules, the other 
shared knowledge of the world. Levinson (1983), Leech (1983) and Sperber 
and Wilson (1986), for example, deal at length with inferencing, but less 
fully with shared knowledge of the world. Yet though there may be 
different emphases, it is widely agreed that both shared knowledge of the 
world and shared inferencing rules must apply if participants are to reach 
similar pragmatic interpretations of discourse. The approach here will 
dwell more upon the nature of shared knowledge of the world than upon 
inferencing rules, which, for the sake of our argument, we shall treat as 
constant and universal, though without implying that they are either.
A theory of knowledge in interaction with text is provided by the 
notion of 'schemata'. These are mental representations of typical 
instances, and the suggestion is that they are used in discourse 
processing to predict and make sense of the particular instance which the 
discourse describes. The idea is that the mind, stimulated either by key 
linguistic items in the text (often referred to as 'triggers'), or by the 
context, activates a schema, and uses it to make sense of the discourse. 
This is not to say that the mind does not also have representations of 
individual facts, perhaps stored along with the relevant typical instances 
which they most closely resemble (Schank 1982:37-47). In this sense 
schemata are 'norms' and individual facts are 'deviations'. This 
psychological view of 'norm' and 'deviation' will be of use to us later 
when we discuss the use of these terms in the analysis of literary 
discourse.
In this thesis, the term 'schema' (plural 'schemata'), when used alone 
and without qualification, refers to representations of knowledge of the 
world other than knowledge of text or language. Where there is potential 
confusion between this sense of 'schema' and others, we shall also use the 
term 'world schema' to mean the same thing. In the course of our 
argument, we shall also use the terms 'text schema' to refer to knowledge 
of typical text structures, and 'language schema' to refer to knowledge of 
typical subsentential structures.
The idea of schemata, though it has its roots in psychology, has been 
most fully developed in AI (see 1.4 below). It is suggested that if an 
intelligence is to process discourse, it will need language schemata, text
schemata and world schemata. The claim can in fact be made even more 
strongly: that schemata, and their efficient organization and use are 
intelligence (Schank 1980; Schank 1982:115)s. Quite how knowledge is 
represented in schemata, whether in natural language or some other form of 
representation, need not concern us for the moment, though it is the 
assumption of AI that the latter possibility is the true one, and that 
some means of translation backwards and forwards between natural language 
and a conceptual representation is needed in both artificial and human 
intelligence (see chapter 4). The assumption is based
upon the fact that the most successful attempts to model human-like 
intelligence on computer make use of some form of conceptual 
representation (for a survey, see XcTear 1987:15-39). The suggestion is 
that humans process discourse in a similar way - although the complexity 
of the interaction of human language competence and knowledge is as yet 
far greater than that of any existing computer programme.
Clearly, this theory needs to explain how knowledge structures develop, 
and to avoid the circularity of arguing that they both develop from 
encounters with text and the world and are necessary to process text and 
the world (Neisser 1976), but this interaction of experience and knowledge 
is a major issue, at the heart of the theory we wish to develop, and we 
shall return to it in chapters 4, 5, 8 and 9.
1.3.1 Examples demonstrating schemata in discourse processing.
How schemata operate in discourse is best illustrated by an example. 
Imagine a witness - for the sake of argument and ease of reference a 
woman - who is asked to tell the court about her movements during the 
morning. She is asked to tell the court everything: "the whole truth". 
She begins as follows:
1) I woke up at seven forty. I made some toast and a cup of tea. I 
listened to the news. And I left for work at about 8.30.
Such a description might well be enough to satisfy the court. But suppose 
the witness had said:
2) I woke up at seven forty. I was in bed. I was wearing pyjamas. 
After lying still for a few minutes, I threw back the duvet, got out of 
bed, walked to the door of the bedroom, opened the door, switched on the 
landing light, walked across the landing, opened the bathroom door, 
went into the bathroom, put the basin plug into the plughole, turned on
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the hot tap, ran some hot water into the wash basin, looked in the 
mirror...
Although this is also true, we might not be surprised if the Judge 
interrupted this witness and accused her of being facetious, or told her 
not to waste time. Why? How does the witness assess the amount of detail 
required? And if the court want to know "the whole truth", why are they 
prepared to allow some details to be omitted? There is in fact an 
infinity of extra detail that could be added, even to the second version. 
The witness did not mention every time she blinked, for example, or the 
fact that she was breathing - and even these actions can be broken down 
into constituent muscular movements, which can themselves be reduced to 
chemical changes.
Schema theory can explain omission by postulating that the 'default 
elements' of the schema activated can be taken as known. Thus it is not 
that the information in the second version of our example is not true, but 
rather that it is assumed - and that the witness can, and should, assume 
it is assumed. When she tells the court that she woke up and prepared 
breakfast, she assumes that the court assumes certain facts: that she got 
out of bed for example. When she says that she left for work, she does 
not need to mention that she has dressed for the outside world. This 
would not necessarily be the case if she were explaining what she does in 
the morning to the hypothetical (English speaking!) Martian; but people 
do have knowledge of a typical 'getting-up in the morning', and do, or at 
least can, use it to fill in missing details. This pre-existing knowledge 
could be called a 'getting-up schema'. (Here, I the writer am assuming, 
quite reasonably, that you the reader, and the court and the witness all 
have a similar schema to my own.) When a sender Judges an interlocutor's 
schema to correspond to a significant degree with his or her own, then it 
is only necessary to mention features which are not contained in it (the 
time of getting up and the contents of the breakfast for example); other 
features (like getting out of bed and getting dressed) will be assumed to 
be present by default, unless otherwise stated. (That is why it seems 
more reasonable to say "I went to work in my pyjamas" than "I went to 
work in my clothes".) In this light, the impossible demand for "the whole 
truth" should not be taken too literally.
Nevertheless, in any discourse, the sender will need to choose what we 
shall refer to as a 'level of detail': whether to say simply, for example,
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"I went to Paris" or to describe the stages of the journey. This is 
problematic, and lack of adequate explanation has been adduced in 
criticism of schema theory (Dresher and Hornstein 1976; Brown and Yule 
1983:244). We shall return to the issue more fully in 4.4.2. For the 
moment, we shall point out only that the argument of potential infinite 
reduction does not hold for interactants without a particular scientific 
training. Actions like blinking and breathing are irreducible as far as 
many people are concerned. It is also true that reduction to constituent 
detail may disguise the holistic event. There are many well-known 
literary narratives which emphasize this by presenting all the 
constituents of an act through the eyes of a character who, through some 
mental limitation, cannot abstract a characterization of the whole: 
Benjy's description of the game of golf in The Sound and the Fury * 
(discussed by Cluysenaar 1976:90f and Leech and Short 1981: 202-207), 
Lok's perception of the firing of an arrow in The Inheritors (discussed by 
Halliday 1973:103-138), the child Kaisie's limited understanding of a love 
affair in Vhat Malsle Knew6, . It may also be that schemata, in non- 
scientific practice, operate on a finite number of levels, perhaps
U V l C o -
something like the five levels of generality/(e.g. 'creature' - 'mammal' -
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'dog' - 'collie',(Brown 1958; Cruse 1986:145). If so, it is still true that 
schema theory needs to account in some way for selection of level; but to 
say this is to argue for an addition to the existing theory rather than 
for its abandonment.
An interesting exception to this rule occurs in narratives where, prior 
to recounting an extraordinary event, the narrator makes explicit reference 
to default elements of a schema - spells out, in other words, information 
which is already known to a receiver.
It was a day like any other. I woke up in the morning, got out of bed, 
washed, had breakfast and set off for work. Then something happened 
which changed my life forever....
Such introductions to the extraordinary are common in fantasy literature, 
and presumably serve the purpose of attaching the incredible, individual, 
deviant instance to a more familiar and typical series of events. This 
tendency is noted by Eco (1979:165-168) in his analysis of the James Bond
* Literary works referred to and their authors are listed in Appendix A. 
Those quoted, or referred to in detail are also in the bibliography.
Bill
novels of Ian Fleming. Fleming's narratives alternate between minutely 
accurate descriptions of 'the already known' (starting a car) and the most 
bizarre (an assault on Fort Knox) (op.cit.167). This cataloguing of 
default elements may even have become a 'device' (in the Russian formalist 
sense, see chapter 6) which signals to the reader by convention an 
impending strange event. It may also reflect the 'defamiliarization' 
(another formalist concept) of everyday experience which occurs at 
emotionally charged moments. People remember the routine events and 
familiar objects which accompany a disturbing experience. This fact is 
often reflected by the attention to detail in descriptions of such 
experiences. The following paragraph, for example, from The Last. E n e m y , 
occurs immediately after the narrator has helped rescue a mother and child 
buried in rubble during a bombing raid.
Very carefully I screwed the top onto the brandy flask, unscrewed it 
once and screwed it on again, for I had caught it on the wrong thread. 
I put the flask into my hip-pocket and did up the button. I pulled 
across the buckle on my great coat and noticed that I was dripping with 
sweat. I pulled the cap down over my eyes and walked out into the 
street. (1943:214)
Such descriptions, which are by no means confined to first person 
narratives, serve the dual purpose of indicating characters' emotions and 
informing the reader of the details of their life: their schemata.
In her weariness forgetting everything, she moved about the little tasks 
that remained to be done, set his breakfast, rinsed his pit-bottle, put 
his clothes on the hearth to warm, set his pit-boots beside them, put 
him out a clean scarf and snap-bag and two apples, raked the fire and 
went to bed. (Sons and Lovers (19131 1961:37)
1.4 Evidence for schemata.
There are a number of pieces of evidence that the mind does in fact 
employ schemata in the interpretation of discourse.
1.4.1 Recall of default elements.
One piece of evidence is the fact that people questioned about a text 
or asked to recall it, frequently fill in details which they were not 
actually given, but which a schema has provided for them (Bartlett 
1932:47-95; Bower, Black and Turner 1979; Graeser, Gordon and Sawyer 1979; 
Miller and Kintsch 1980). Our own informal findings confirm this. People
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shown the first version of the testimony above and asked what the witness 
ate for breakfast, replied that she ate toast, although this is not 
stated. She said only that she made some toast, but not that she ate it. 
Readers made an assumption: that when someone makes breakfast, it is 
eaten. As nobody else is mentioned we assume that the speaker ate the 
breakfast herself. But it does not say this. Ve should note that this 
conclusion cannot be reached by any logical inferencing rules operating on 
text without reference to specific knowledge.
The issue of providing details is particularly relevant to literary 
narrative, in which readers are given points of reference and left to fill 
in the gaps 'from imagination', or perhaps from schemata. The idea forms 
the basis of the 'reception theory' of literature developed by Wolfgang 
Iser and others (see 7.4) which significantly has its roots in the same 
phenomenological approach to psychology as the gestalt work on perception 
which is the origin of schema theory (see 1.5).
1.4.2 The definite article far default elesents.
A second piece of evidence is provided by certain uses of the definite 
article. Traditional pedagogic grammars give two main explanations of the 
use of the definite article rather than the indefinite article: the former 
is used before nouns "of which there is only one" or "before a noun which 
has become definite as a result of being mentioned a second time" (Thomson 
and Martinet 1969:3). Typical instances of the second of these rules are to 
be found in:
One afternoon a big wolf waited in a dark forest for a little girl to 
come along carrying a basket of food to her grandmother. (....) 'Are you 
carrying that basket to your grandmother?' asked the wolf. The little 
girl said yes, she was. (James Thurber quoted in Swan (1978:74))
But neither of these rules explain the use of the definite article in an 
opening such as:
I was late and we decided to call a taxi. Unfortunately, the driver 
spent a long time finding our house....
Here the use of the definite article with 'driver' seems quite appropriate, 
even though he is mentioned for the first time. Large-scale scholarly 
grammars both recognize and attempt to tackle this question (Kruisinga 
1932:242; Jesperson 1949:479-480), making some reference to the idea of
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shared knowledge in explanation, as do more recent grammars based on 
linguistics (Quirk et al. 1972:154-155; 1985:266-269)7. The usage can be 
accounted for by schema theory with particular elegance, however, simply 
by saying that our 'taxi schema'® contains a 'taxi driver', and we assume 
that a taxi that arrives at our house has a driver. It is as though he 
has already been mentioned. This can be tested by considering an 
alternative opening.
I was late and we decided to call a taxi. Unfortunately, the retired 
admiral spent a long time finding our house....
Now it might be the case that the taxi driver is a retired admiral; but 
the sender is unlikely to assume, without evidence, that the receiver 
already knows this. It would probably be necessary to say:
I was late and we decided to call a taxi. The driver, as it turned out, 
was a retired admiral and unfortunately he spent a long time finding our 
house...
Many literary narratives, especially in their opening sentences, do however 
use the definite article as determiner in noun phrases which neither refer 
to earlier indefinite noun phrases, nor are default elements of schemata.
L'avocat ouvrit une porte. (Th6r6se Desqueyroux)
(The lawyer opened a door.)
One effect of this is to make the reader process the discourse as though 
the relevant schema was shared with the narrator or characters when in 
fact it is unknown. This achieves both a degree of involvement, by 
assuming a kind of unwarranted intimacy, and also drives the reader 
forward to construct the necessary schema as quickly as possible. It also 
produces the sensation of entering into a mental world other than one's 
own, in which the reader is simultaneously both an outsider and intimately 
involved.
1.4.3 Interpreting honanyuy and polysemy: 'expectation-driven 
understanding*.
Further evidence for schemata is provided by interpretation of 
homonymy and polysemy in discourse. Lehnert (1979:80) gives as an
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example, among others, the Interpretation of the word 'seal' in the 
sentence
The royal proclamation was finished. The king sent for his seal, 
in which readers interpret the word 'seal' as "a device which produces an 
official stamp of some sort" rather than as an animal (although the king 
could well have had a pet seal, and no logical inferencing rule will 
conclude that he did not) presumably because the former meaning belongs 
to a schema containing kings and proclamations. Constant exposure to 
actual or described situations in which kings had pet seals would lead to 
a different interpretation. Examples of this sort are readily invented by 
way of illustration (see, for example, Widdowson 1983:36). An opening:
She's one of those dumb, pretty Marilyn Monroe type blondes. She spends 
hours looking after her nails. She polishes them every day and keeps 
them
generates an interpretation of 'nails' as "fingernails" rather than metal 
objects for knocking into walls, and a continuation such as
....all neatly arranged in little jam jars in the cellar, graded according 
to length, on the shelf above the hammers and the electric drills.
causes surprise, presumably because our 'Marilyn Monroe schema' is more 
likely to include fingernails than nails for knocking into walls. The 
schema activated by the opening leads to one interpretation of 'nails' and 
'seal' - a phenomenon referred to in AI as 'expectation-driven 
understanding' - and the schema is upset by an unexpected continuation, 
causing processing delays (as confirmed by Sanford and Garrod 1981:114- 
115 and Haberlandt and Bingham 1982).
Literary texts sometimes exploit the expectation-driven understanding 
of homonyms and polysemes to create surprise and 'jolt' the reader into 
re-processing.
You fit into me
Like a hook in an eye -
A fish hook
An open eye
Margaret Atwood: 'You fit into me'
Such processing delay is a feature sometimes considered characteristic of 
literature, and was described, for example, by the Russian formalist Victor
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Shklovsky, as the 'device of impeded form' (Eikhenbaum [1927] 1978:13), an 
idea again closely related to the formalist notion of 'defamiliarization' 
(Shklovsky [1917] 1965:13). It is also, however, a common feature of 
advertisements ("There's no such thing as the average citizen" - for 
Citizen watches), graffiti ("Repeal the banana") and jokes ("'Knock, knock.' 
'Who's there?' 'Euripides.' 'Euripides who?' 'Euripides, I smasha your 
face'."). We shall return to impeded form in 6.3.1.
The phenomenon of expectation-driven understanding applies at all 
linguistic levels and ranks. Unexpected phonetic sounds are heard as the 
expected phoneme (Warren and Warren 1970; Slobin 1979:37), while at the 
grammatical level, the formally ambiguous phrases, clauses and sentences 
of the kind much discussed by linguists who eschew context are unlikely to 
cause the activation of rival interpretations in context (Cruse 1986:101). 
Again this is not always true of all discourse types, including literature, 
where ambiguity may remain through the absence of sufficient 
disambiguating co-text or context®.
1.4.4 Ordering and selection.
Further evidence for schemata, and indeed for shared schemata, seems to 
be provided by instances in which people follow the same ordering of 
information. In a series of experiments, Linde and Labov (1975) showed how 
almost all subjects who were asked to describe the house or flat where 
they lived followed the order of describing the entrance, and then rooms 
branching off the entrance, returning to the hallway when they came to a 
dead end. Only after describing all rooms would they then proceed to 
detail their contents. Their descriptions, in other words, seemed to follow 
a set pattern, which we could describe as a 'Schema for describing one's 
home'. Van Dijk (1977:80) suggests a number of other general orders for 
description: that we tend, for example, to move from the general to the 
particular; the whole to the part; the including to the included; the large 
to the small; the outside to the inside.
Such observations, however, raise a number of complex and largely 
unresolvable issues concerning the nature of the schema in operation. Do 
such patterns reflect schematic organization of knowledge of the world or 
of certain text types - in this case description? (It is this latter kind 
of knowledge which we shall call 'text schemata'.) Though it might seem 
reasonable to suggest that world schemata and text schemata interact, and
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that, for example, descriptions of residences follow the order they do 
because that is how they are perceived and/or remembered, or because the 
speaker imagines conducting a visitor around his or her home, there is 
also the strong possibility that certain text types may impose their own 
organization upon information, and that this organization may be at odds 
with its storage prior to verbalization. Such a dichotomy is clear if one 
imagines narrating the events of a murder as evidence to the police or as 
a mystery story, where, in the latter case, the chronology of events would 
be disrupted by the demands of the genre (Todorov [1966] 1988:157-166), 
and the initial event, which in a chronological narrative would come first, 
would be displaced to the end. There is thus the possibility of a text 
schema being superimposed upon a world schema.
1.5 The origins of schema theory.
In philosophy, the use of the word 'schema' to mean:
any one of certain forms or rules of the 'productive imagination' through 
which the understanding is able to apply its categories to the manifold 
of sense perception in the process of realizing knowledge or experience. 
(S.O.E.D)
goes back to Kant (the German word is also 'schema'). As such it is 
closely related to 'scheme' in the sense of "a plan or map" and the two 
terms are often used interchangeably. One problem with tracing the 
history of the term is therefore the difficulty in separating rigorous 
philosophical or psychological uses of the term from casual uses as a 
high-flown synonym of 'scheme'.
The origin of schema theory in the current sense is most frequently 
attributed to Bartlett 1932 (e.g. by de Beaugrande and Dressier 1981:90; 
van Dijk and Kintsch 1983:3; Viddowson 1984:124; Atkinson, Atkinson, 
Smith and Hilgard 1987:275; Greene 1987:41; Garnham 1988:45), although 
Bartlett (1932:199-201) himself gives credit for the idea to Head (1920), 
referring to the notion as one which had been current for some time. 
Moreover, as Garnham (1988:45) points out, although Bartlett's ideas are 
"often cited as an inspiration for recent AI research on memory 
organization, they are not formulated in a way which can be directly 
translated into programming terms". Schank and Abelson (1977), whose 
theory we describe in detail below, ignore Bartlett and credit the seminal 
work to Lewin (1936).
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It in fact seems unlikely that the notion of schemata could be said to 
have a definite point of origin or to be the invention of any one 
individual. Bartlett was, as van Dijk and Kintsch observe (1983:3), a 
psychologist working "within the gestalt tradition" and his theories of 
memory, like Head's, must be seen against that background. As such, he 
shared the existing gestalt emphasis on an 'above down' approach to 
understanding, and belief that perception creates a whole from otherwise 
disparate parts (Hunter 1988:359). Like other psychologists with a 
gestalt approach to memory, he was concerned to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of theories of episodic memory relying on 'traces' of unique 
experiences (1932:204-205), and to stress the need for a theory of 
semantic memory instead (for a summary of the rival theories of episodic 
and semantic memory, see Loftus and Loftus 1976). Gestalt work in this 
vein owes much to the phenomenological approach to philosophy and 
psychology. The idea of schemata, and in particular the idea that 
discourse picks out new elements while leaving default ones to be filled 
in, may owe something to Husserl's theory of the 'manifold' ("the sum of 
the particulars furnished by sense before they have been unified by 
understanding" (S.O.E.D)), itself derived from Kant, an idea which through a 
different line of descent gave rise to Soman Ingarden's phenomenological 
theory of literature (Ingarden [1931] 1973:12), which has in turn 
profoundly influenced the 'reception theory' of the Geneva School of 
literary theory led by Wolfgang Iser (1974; 1978) (see 7.4).
A further reason for difficulty in fixing a point of origin for schema 
theory is that the notion that we interpret present experience in the 
light of organized past experience is both intuitively true - and a truism. 
As Bartlett himself observes:
All people who have at any time been concerned with the nature and 
validity of everyday observation must have noticed that a good deal of 
what goes under the name of perception is, in the wide sense of the 
term, recall (....) the observer (...) fills up the gaps of his perception 
by the aid of what he has experienced before in similar situations, or 
(...) by describing what he takes to be 'fit' or suitable for such a 
situation. <1932:14)
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So it Is difficult to be precise about the dividing line between this 
commonplace observation and its innovative scientific development. Yet 
it is not the idea of schematic memory which is radical, but its detailed 
explication.
15.1 Bartlett's r»g (1932).
Bartlett worked upon perception in general, but it is only his work on 
text which concerns us here. In Remembering (1932:63-95), he describes a 
series of experiments in which subjects were asked to recall material, 
either visual or textual, after ever longer and longer periods. In 
another series of experiments, referred to as 'serial reproduction' 
(op.cit.:118-186), a subject was asked to reproduce an original, and that 
reproduction handed on to another subject, to read and then later recall, 
and so on, in a process similar to the game of 'Chinese whispers'. 
Bartlett's aim was to study the changes which occurred in recall. He 
makes no particular distinction between textual and visual material, beyond 
noting the influence of certain narrative expectations on recall - such as 
the need for the weather to be 'sympathetic' to the plot in accordance 
with the so-called 'pathetic fallacy': "the attribution by writers of human 
emotions (cf, Greek pathos 'feeling') to inanimate objects or nature". 
(Vales 1989:342).
The text used is a translation of a native North American folk tale of 
a type which poses several comprehension problems for Europeans (the 
subjects were British). Bartlett notes the tendency of subjects to omit or 
rationalize details which they cannot tailor to their own expectations 
(such as supernatural events), to infer connections which are not stated, 
and to add detail which accords with stories they are familiar with (the 
time of death changes from sunrise to sunset for example, the setting of a 
frightening story becomes a "deep, dark forest"). He also notes how they 
remember details most relevant to their own experience: his subjects, who 
had all lived through the First World War, while forgetting many other 
details, all remembered that one of the characters in the tale is 
distressed to leave his relatives for battle. From this series of 
experiments, Bartlett proceeds to his 'Theory of Remembering' (Chapter 
10:197-215) in which he propounds the basic principle of schema theory:
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that text is interpreted with the help of a knowledge structure activated 
from memory, capable of filling in details which are not explicitly stated.
Ve should note, however, at this point some differences between 
Bartlett's schema theory and later versions. Firstly, there is no 
distinction made between the remembering of text and the remembering of 
sensory or kinesic data. Though texts were used in the experiments, 
language is treated as a transparent medium, and no distinction is drawn 
between remembering the supposed facts of the story and a verbal 
representation of those facts. Secondly, schemata are treated as serial: 
representations of data whose elements are in (chronological) order, and 
there is no proposed hierarchical rank structure of different types of 
schemata which would enable movement from one element to another without 
following through the original order (for further discussion see 8.2.1). 
There is thus no theoretical basis for explaining why certain details are 
omitted and others retained, either through failed recall or when 
deliberately summarizing, though both of these tendencies are noticed. 
Thirdly, prophetically, Bartlett several times (op.cit.:202-212) expresses 
concern that the theory can in no way explain how the mind creates, 
destroys and reorganizes schemata, though he does reiterate the need for 
the theory to explain this. It is our major claim, proposed in detail in 
chapters 8 and 9, that a major function10 of certain discourses, notably 
literary discourses, may be to effect exactly such changes.
1.5.2 The eclipse of schema theory.
As psychologists of the gestalt tradition, both Bartlett and Lewin 
relied heavily upon introspection concerning mental processes. Such an 
approach was soon to be eclipsed in cognitive psychology during the later 
30s, 40s and 50s by behaviourism, and more generally in the sciences by 
positivism, both of which forbade any appeal to the phenomenology of 
mental life. The linguistics of this period was keen to claim scientific 
status as defined by the intellectual norms of its time, and also adopted 
the behaviourist approach (Bloomfield 1935:21-41), limiting itself moreover 
to the analysis of sentences (see Lyons 1968:172). Work on discourse was 
rarely undertaken in this mould of linguistics (an exception is Harris 
(1952) - discussed in 2.2.1 below).
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Bartlett's work, as Kintsch and van Dijk (1983:3) point out, “only 
occasionally inspired psychologists during the [next] forty years". In 
effect, there is a lacuna in the development of the theory between Bartlett 
and the revival of the 1970s. Schachtel (1949), in a study of Freud and 
Proust, used the term 'schemata' to describe adult categorization of 
memories which block the intensity of childhood experience from recall. 
Gibson (1950) drew a distinction between 'schematic perception' and 
'literal perception', describing the former as casual and inattentive, and 
the latter as more detailed and precise (see Miller 1966:120). These uses, 
however, are rather different from that described above. Various attempts 
to trace the survival of the Bartlett's idea through the literature of the 
intervening decades only emphasize its absence. Van Dijk and Kintsch 
(1983:3), and Schank and Abelson (1977:10), for example, both give their 
own histories by listing a series of papers, but curiously, their lists 
have no single author in common, suggesting that the theory was indeed 'on 
ice'. Bor is this diversity of attribution a feature of these two sources 
alone. Slobin (1979:155), for example, in describing Bartlett's work, 
links it only with a work on the psychology of rumour (Allport and 
Postman: 1947), as do Edwards and Middleton (1987).
1.5.3 The revival of schema theory.
Figures of the revival are both more influential and more widely 
acknowledged to be so. The most widely cited are Charniak (1975), Minsky
(1975), Rumelhart (1975, 1977), Petofi (1976), Vinograd (1977), Rumelhart 
and Ortony (1977), Schank and Abelson (1977). As already noted, their 
work is of two kinds: speculation on the nature of human intelligence and 
experimentation on the modelling of that intelligence in computers, 
conducted in the belief that each illuminates the other. If their 
hypothesis is true - that these pursuits are of the same object - then the 
old debate between behaviourist and cognitive psychology is to some degree 
by-passed. A behaviourist approach to psychology must limit itself to 
behaviour (the external manifestations of intelligence) only when it 
asserts, as it did in the 40s and 50s, that the internal workings of an 
intelligence are impenetrable. In fact, this definition of behaviour rests 
upon the assumption that the mental processes behind behaviour are beyond 
analysis. One of the hopes of the strong AI approach to psychology is to 
render that distinction unnecessary by building intelligences whose mental
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processes are known and accessible, if only because they have been 
constructed by the analyst. (The leap from artificial to human 
intelligence still depends upon acceptance of an analogy between human 
and artificial intelligence). It is not that AI has rejected the 
behaviourist approach to intelligence, but rather that it claims to extend 
its frontiers. It is thus able to rehabilitate the ideas of Bartlett, while 
seeming in many ways akin to the more materialist views of his usurpers, 
sharing for example the essentially behaviourist view that similar 
behaviour indicates similar intelligence. The strong version of the AI 
thesis of course depends entirely upon the truth of the initial assumption 
of analogy, of which there are many opponents, most notably the 
philosopher John Searle (Searle [1980] 1987- see 4.1.1). And the debate, 
though stimulated by the emotive issue of AI, is essentially an old one, 
and well established in philosophy, leading back to the rival claims and 
methods of rationalism and empiricism.
Our own intention is to avoid this dispute, by treating current 
versions of schema theory as speculation about human intelligence, having 
the same status as any other theory of cognitive psychology whether nr 
not they are also reproducible in whole or part bv computer. In saying 
this, however, we do not preclude the possibility that they may at some 
future time be successfully modelled to human complexity and that such 
modelling may reproduce in whole or part the procedures of human 
intelligence.
1.6 The terminology of schema theory.
Ironically, the academic study of language often creates unnecessary 
confusion in its own terminology. This is endemic in linguistics, where 
theorists seem wilfully impervious to the fact that other scholars’ 
definitions will persist alongside and in spite of their own. The simpler 
solution would be always to employ a new term for a new concept rather 
than one which is already in use - but such an elementary insight into 
language seems beyond many who seek to explain its obscurer reaches!
Schema theory suffers from the same vice, and abounds in new usages of 
established terms, new terminologies which repeat old ideas, and 
redefinition of terms by those who coined them. The most favoured general 
term for knowledge structures seems now to be that adopted here: i.e. 
'schema', plural 'schemata', although some writers (e.g. Haberlandt and
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Bingham 1982) limit the term to certain kinds of knowledge structures 
only.
As already mentioned, the origin of /bhsj this sense of the term is 
usually attributed to Bartlett, although he himself attributes it to Head 
<1920:605-606), ironically describing it as a term "I strongly dislike... at 
once too definite and too sketchy" (1932:200-201)! Confusingly, Bartlett 
sometimes appears to use the word 'scheme' and 'schema' interchangeably 
(1932:305 and elsewhere). In AI, 'schema' seems rapidly to have become the 
most favoured general term: it was used, for example, by Rumelhart (1975) 
and Winograd (1977). Minsky (1975) in a highly influential paper, uses 
the term 'frame', though in this case he is describing visual perception. 
(As he was one of the earliest AI writers on the subject, he can hardly be 
blamed for subsequent confusion.) Minsky's usage is perpetuated in many 
places, for example by van Dijk (1977:159), and by Levinson (1983:241) who 
defines 'frame' as an "inferential schema"! De Beaugrande and Dressier use 
the term 'global concepts', confusingly defining 'schemas' (sic) as a sub­
class of these concepts relating only to "events and states in ordered 
sequences" (1981:90), a definition which is often used for 'scripts'. They 
then define 'frames' as another sub-class containing "knowledge about some 
central concept". (Their other sub-classes adopt the terminology of 
Schank and Abelson (1977: 91) which we describe in detail below; see also
D r t S S I e r  i q g i
de Beaugrande^l£&0: Chapter 6).) A further term in common use is Sanford 
and Garrod's (1981) 'scenario'. This is described as an "extended domain 
of reference", but is, in effect, a general term for knowledge structures. 
In Applied Linguistics the term 'schema' has gained currency following 
Viddowson (1983:54; 1984:106). In relevance theory, Sperber and Vilson 
(1986:138)8 refer to 'encyclopaedic entries' organized in chunks and 
mention 'scenarios', 'frames' and 'scripts' as terms referring to such 
chunks, without seeking to make any distinctions between them11. 
Elsewhere, as they point out, the term 'prototype' has been used in roughly 
the same way, although this now has another widely accepted and not 
totally unconnected meaning in semantics (see Rosch 1973, 1977; Cruse 
1986:22) (see 4.4.1).
Vhat is needed, in all this confusion, is firstly a general term, 
capable of referring to all types of postulated knowledge structures, and 
then a number of terms for sub-classes. Ve shall use the term 'schema'
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as the general term and adopt the sub-divisions of Schank and Abelson 
(1977), Schank (1982) and Schank (1986). These three works accept the 
term schema' (Schank and Abelson 1977:10, see also Abelson 1987:39), but 
introduce a large number of sub-categories ('scenes', 'scripts', 'planboxes', 
'plans', 'sub-goals', 'goals', 'themes', 'Memory Organisation Packets (MQPs)', 
Topic Organisation Packets (TOPs)1) which we shall be describing in 
chapters 4 and 8. Their terminology is considerably confused by Schank's 
use of some of the 1977 terms in new senses in 1982 and 1986, but we 
shall endeavour to clarify these when we encounter them, and to be 
unequivocal about which of the rival senses we intend.
In text generation theory, which has flowered in recent years as a 
necessary complement to text processing theory, the term 'schema' is 
sometimes used in a limited and rather different sense to mean 
"rhetorical techniques" (McKeown 1985:10) and defined as:
representations of a standard pattern of discourse structure which 
efficiently encodes the set of communicative techniques that a speaker 
can use for a particular discourse purpose. It defines a particular 
organizing principle for text and is used to structure the information 
that will be included in the answer. (op.cit.:20)
This use is also maintained in the influential work on text generation 
known as 'Rhetorical Structure Theory' (RST) (Mann 1984; Mann 1987).
To add further confusion, the term is sometimes used in the description 
of syntax. Thus Vinograd (1983:57-59,347) refers to 'sentence schemata'. 
(Sanford and Garrod (1981:34), who maintain the term 'frame' in preference 
to 'schema', use the term 'grammar frames' in much the same way.)
As already Indicated, we shall use the terms 'world schema', 'text 
schema' and 'language schema'. The large issue of the difference and 
interrelation between world schemata, text schemata and language schemata 
will become increasingly important as our argument develops.
1.7 The power of schema theory.
In this chapter we have attempted to give a rudimentary outline of 
schema theory, selecting those elements which will later be useful in 
developing a theory of discourse deviation and relating it to literary 
theory. Ve have talked about schema theory in terms of text production 
and processing. Ve shall shortly be narrowing the debate even further to 
certain aspects and types of text. Yet before curtailing our interests, we
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might note the extraordinarily wide applicability of the theory, and its 
power to generate interpretations of almost every field of human life. 
Emotion, personality, dreams, intelligence, language acquisition, second 
language learning, drug effects, madness, metaphor, art, music, political
revolution and reaction, aging.. Explanations of such diverse areas as
these could be attempted in terms of schema theory.
lotes to Chapter One.
1. Detailed references for the ideas introduced in this section are given 
in the relevant chapters.
2. Ve use the term 'function1 here to mean "function for the receiver" 
rather than "function for the sender". Thus our comments here refer more 
to the effect of a discourse - what it does - rather than the intention 
behind it - what its user wants it to do.
3. For discussion of our use of the term 'text', see 2.1.
4. For a fuller and further discussion of objections to AI, see 4.1.1
5. This view is similar to and compatible with connectionist theories of 
'Parallel Distributed Processing' which have recently gained wide currency 
in Cognitive Science (Rumelhart and McLelland 1986; Johnson-Laird 
1988:174-194). In this connectionist view of knowledge there are no 
separate 'stores' of rules or 'facts'. The knowledge and the rules are 'in' 
the connections of a neural network, and knowledge is thus distributed 
rather than localized. The strengths (or 'weightings') of connections are 
increased by exposure to data which activates them. The network thus acts 
"as though it knows the rules" (Rumelhart and McLelland 1986:32) though 
those rules exist only as an abstraction by an outside analyst. Schema 
theory is in general quite compatible with this view of cognitive 
processing, although there is debate about the degree to which language 
knowledge may be stored in this way (Lachter and Bever 1988; Pinker and 
Prince 1988.).
6. liie_Inheritors and What Maisie Knew are in the third person but
maintain the limitations of the character's perception.
7. Thus Jesperson writes that the definite article is used for something 
"already found in the consciousness of the speaker" and when "a thing is 
mentioned and then we simply use the definite article when talking about 
something connected with it."(op.cit.479). Quirk et al. (1972:154) write 
that it is used for something "whose reference is immediately understood 
by the users of the language..." and "things" which are "part of the 
cultural situation." This phenomenon is described in Quirk et al. 
(1985:267-8) as "indirect anaphora".
8. Whether a 'taxi schema' is used or some more general 'vehicle schema' 
will vary from individual to individual.
9. For a discussion of these terms, see 2.1.2.
10.'Function' is again used in the sense described in note 2 above.
11. Sperber and Wilson (1986), though they are slightly cursory in their 
summary of schema theory (op.cit.:138), taking 'context' to be "the set of 
assumptions used in interpreting an utterance" (op.cit.:15), define
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relevance (op.cit.:147) as "that which has the greatest contextual effects 
and requires the smallest processing effort". This view is not however 
incompatible with schema theory as described here. Schema theory could 
define 'relevance' as that which is not predicted by the schema, but will 
change it ("has the greatest contextual effects"); on the other hand the 
existence of a schema which can accommodate new information makes 
processing easier ("requires the smallest processing effort"). Sperber and 
Wilson's lists of 'assumptions' brought to bear on a situation (e.g. 
op.cit.:142), are, therefore, rather like schemata.
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Chapter Two.
Discourse Analysis 1: formal approaches and their capacity to characterize
'literariness'.
2.0 Introduction.
The aims of this and the following chapter are threefold:
1) to examine approaches to coherence in discourse analysis and
2) thus indicate the need for schema theory as a component of a theory of 
discourse;
3) to assess the capability of the approaches examined in (1) to account 
for 'literariness' without schema theory.
In this chapter, we shall look at attempts to extend grammatical and 
semantic approaches to language analysis above the sentence, and at their 
relevance to a characterization of 'literariness'. Thus we begin with 
latersententlal features. To give a full account of literary discourse we 
shall also need in due course to assess the role of silksentential 
linguistic features in creating literariness, but we shall delay a 
discussion of these until we deal with Jakobson's theory of the 'poetic 
function' in chapter 7. Eventually we hope to show that literariness can 
only be described as an interaction of all levels of discourse: from the 
subsentential, through the semantic and pragmatic, to the non-lingulstic 
representation of knowledge (i.e. schemata).
2.1 Definitions: 'text', 'context* and 'discourse'.
As the inclusion or exclusion of context with text to create discourse 
is of such importance to our argument, we shall require sharper definition 
of all these terms than we have given so far.
Ve shall define a 'text' as the linguistic forms in a stretch of 
language, and those interpretations of them which do not vary with 
context. Ve use the general term 'text' to mean language regarded in this 
way. In linguistics texts have often been discussed as though their 
meanings were constant for all users of the language at a given moment in 
time, i.e. synchronically. Valid objections may be raised to this notion of 
text as fixed for all users of the language. Firstly it may be 
generalizing to the point of distortion to talk of different speakers' 
language competence as homogenous. (Do a James Joyce and a six year old
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child really have so much in common?) Secondly, as many literary 
theorists have observed, it may be misleading to separate receiver and 
text in any way, since each comes into being through the other (Voloshinov 
[Bakhtin1 ] [1929] 1973:103,- Barthes [1970] 1974). Text is thus dependent 
on its receiver, and therefore variable. Neverthless, we shall use the 
term in "the sense defined above.
Text interacts with 'context', which in our definition is a form of 
knowledge. The ability to use a given language is a form of (tacit) 
knowledge too, yet there is an important distinction to be made between 
knowledge of the language and other knowledge. When we later emphasize 
the importance of describing the knowledge of a receiver as well as the 
text, we are not referring to linguistic knowledge.
Ve shall use the term 'context' in a broad and narrow sense. In the 
narrow sense it refers to (knowledge of) factors outside the text under 
consideration. In the broad sense it refers to (knowledge of) these 
factors and to (knowledge of) other parts of the text under consideration. 
These other parts of the text are often referred to as 'co-text' (Halliday, 
McIntosh and Strevens 1964:125; see also Wales 1989:100). 'Context' is 
thus both a superordinate and a co-hyponym of 'co-text'. (Occurrences of 
the same word at two levels of generality are a very common feature in 
word relations, see figure 1.)
Context', in the broad sense, may be considered to be either external 
to language users, composed of elements existing independently of them, 
or internal, composed of their knowledge of them (Dascal 1981; Cook 
1990 )2. In practice, the two will usually be the same, and the 
distinction may be felt to be pedantic. Yet there are times when the 
distinction is important - when interactants distort, Ignore or fall to 
perceive elements of the context (as it is judged to exist by the analyst). 
We shall favour the second interpretation of context and define it as 
knowledge Df relevant features of the world and co-text, rather than the 
world and co-text themselves. As such, context in the broad sense, 
consists of knowledge of:
1) co-text;
2) paralinguistic features;
3) other texts (i.e. 'intertext');
4) the physical situation;
5) schemata representing any of the above, or the social and cultural
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situation;
6) the knowledge of interlocutors (knowledge about other people's 
knowledge).
•Discourse', as opposed to text, is a stretch of occurring language in 
use, taking on meaning in context for its users. We shall define 
'discourse' as a stretch of language perceived as purposeful, meaningful 
and connected, and 'coherence' as exactly this quality of perceived 
purpose, meaning and connection. 'Discourse analysis' is the study and the 
explanation of this quality of coherence. A discourse is. a coherent 
stretch of language.
Defined in this way as a 'perceived' quality, the coherence of a given 
stretch of language will vary with its perceiver and its context. 
Discourse analysis must therefore be both a study of the formal linguistic 
qualities of stretches of language (texts), aa& a study of the variable 
perception of these stretches of language by individuals and groups of 
individuals.
The term 'discourse' thus also exists at two levels, one as distinct from 
text} one subsuming it (see figure 1). We shall call these respectively the 
'narrow' and 'broad' definitions of discourse.
c^ontext^  dog train discourse
context co-text dog bitch train carriage text^^discourse 
Figure 1. Broad and narrow definitions.
2.1.1 Discourse analysis and linguistics.
From the 1930s to the 1970s a good deal of Anglo-American linguistics 
concerned itself with the study of language in isolation from context, and 
considered the sentence as the highest unit of analysis (Lyons 1968:172ff; 
see also 1.5.2 above). Its data were either invented by the analyst 
(Lyons 1968:154); idealized (Lyons 1977:586-589); or written language which 
was already generally of the standard variety and divorced from any 
particular situation. The field of study, in other words, was phonology 
and grammar3 with varying degrees of emphasis on semantics, and indeed 
this self-imposed limitation might well be considered to be many people's
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definition of 'linguistics'. We shall however refer to this approach to 
language as 'sentence linguistics'.
Though this approach was dominant during the 1940s, 50s and 60s, many 
other traditions of linguistics persisted in studying language in context, 
most notably that continuing the work of anthropological linguistics begun 
by Boas in North America (see Bolinger 1975:506-514); that associated with 
the work of J.R. Firth in Britain (see Firth 1957) and continued by the 
neo-Firthians (see Halliday 1973:50-51; 1978:51); the functional approach 
of the Prague School (see Vachek 1964; Bolinger 1975: 514-524); and, in 
Russia, the linguistics initiated by Bakhtin, which insisted on the 
impossibility of divorcing a description of language from a description of 
its users (Voloshinov [Bakhtin] [1929] 1973:86). All of these approaches 
have had an influence on literary theory, and have also been drawn upon by 
the resurgent interest in discourse analysis from the 1970s onwards. This 
is because discourse analysis can only account for coherence by describing 
language in context and not by confining itself to sentence grammar in 
isolation. Its object of study, moreover, is sometimes stretches of 
language which fail to conform to the rules of sentence grammars and are 
therefore not analysable as sentences or parts of sentences at all.
2.1.2 •Scientific' and •post-scientific* approaches to discourse.
The approaches outlined above have in common a 'scientific' approach to 
the study of communication. They imply that the scientist and scientific 
discourse can somehow stand apart from the process, observe it and assess 
it. They also all subscribe to the view that meaning is constructed 
through the interaction of some existing mental representation and the 
text itself, and that this mental representation can be formulated and 
understood. To talk of coherence, as we have done, as constructed through 
links which have no manifestation in the text, implies their Independent 
existence in the mind. These views unite these approaches, despite their 
differences.
Three philosophical movements which have influenced contemporary post- 
semiotic views of text processing, but which are not compatible with the 
scientific views outlined above, and largely ignored by them, are 
deconstruction, hermeneutics and phenomenology. As all of them have 
exerted a substantial influence on literary theory, we shall need to take 
account of them in the development of our argument.
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Deconstruction, largely associated with the work of the philosopher 
Jacques Derrida, has attacked, as part of a larger critique of the 
scientific method and western philosophy, both the Saussurean view which 
is the basis of linguistics (Derrida [19671 1976) and the Austinian view 
which is the basis of pragmatics (Derrida [1972] 1982) (see 3.3). In the 
Derridean view, 'meaning', like concepts such as 'god', 'matter', 'the self' 
and nature is yet another instance of an assumed but unproved 'centre' 
for belief, the questioning of whose existence leads to the collapse of the 
theory based upon it. At the heart of the linguistic sciences, according 
to Derrida, lies the division of signifier and signified, text and meaning, 
which whether reached through decoding or through inference, is an 
instance of the binary divisions which plague western thought. Picking 
upon minor, 'marginalized' points in the arguments of Saussure and Austin, 
Derrida seeks to 'deconstruct' their texts, and make them contradict 
themselves. As the attack itself can also be deconstructed, the process 
becomes one of infinite regression, and defers any conclusion. (This, 
however, only bears out Derrida's point, that there is no 'telos' - no end 
and no beginning.) Language, according to Derrida, is a similar process of 
infinite extension: if signs mean by virtue of their difference, then each 
sign leads to another, and meaning is eternally both different and 
deferred (which is in part what Derrida means by his term 'diff6rance') 
(see Culler 1983:97). The scientific study of discourse creates its own 
discourse which in turn demands study, and so on. Again the process is 
infinite, and there can never, in Derrida's view, be a conclusion of the 
kind sought after by science.
Two further self professed 'post-scientific' philosophical movements 
which have influenced contemporary literary theoretical views of 
communication are hermeneutics and phenomenology. The former, following 
the opinion of Heidegger that techniques of interpretation of human 
behaviour are necessarily different from those of the natural sciences, has 
been profoundly influential, largely through the works of Gadamer (1960), 
in shaping the critical approaches of reception theory and reader-response 
(to which we return in 7.4). A similar influence has been exerted by the 
phenomenological philosophy of Husserl - who was himself an Influence on 
Heidegger - which has been absorbed by the same movements through the 
literary theoretical writings of Roman Ingarden ([1931] 1973) (see 7.4.1). 
Phenomenology, while it shares the view that meaning results from the
- 31 -
constructive interaction of mind and text, both stresses individual 
variations in interpretation and "argues that there is an ultimate 
limitation to the power of formalization and that the most important 
aspects of language lie outside its limits" (Vinograd 1983: 21). A similar 
argument is voiced by many scientific critics of AI text theory (see Bom 
1987, and further discussion in 4.1.1).
Ironically, many of the views expressed by the adherents of these two 
approaches are compatible with some of the 'scientific' tenets of schema 
theory which we examine in the next chapter, and both Heidegger and 
Husserl regarded the achievement of meaning as a creative act involving 
the marriage of existing knowledge with information from the text or from 
the senses (Holub 1984:41). We shall return to these views, and to some 
of the literary theories which derive from them in 7.4.
The deeper incompatibility of the 'scientific' approaches to language 
with 'post-scientific' approaches is illustrated by their failure even to 
engage in debate, despite attempts to bring the two sides together (Fabb, 
Attridge, Durant and MacCabe 1987). The evidence for this lack of contact 
is an absence rather than a presence: books on either side of the divide, 
though mutually concerned with human interaction with texts, often simply 
fail to acknowledge the existence of the other.
2.2 Acceptability above the sentence.
A first problem for discourse analysis is to consider the possibility 
that there are rules and constraints on the selection and ordering of 
elements above the sentence - in other words, whether grammar can be 
extended upwards.
It is not difficult to think up a string of sentences which seem odd 
to competent speakers of the language. Writing of narrative, Rumelhart 
(1975:211-213) puts the case succinctly, as follows:
Just as simple sentences can be said to have an Internal structure, so 
too can stories be said to have an internal structure. This is so in 
spite of the fact that no one has ever been able to specify a general 
structure that will distinguish the strings of sentences which form 
stories from the strings which do not. Nevertheless, the notion of 
'well-formedness' is nearly as reasonable for stories as it is for 
sentences. Consider the following examples:
(1) Margie was holding tightly to the string of her new balloon. 
Suddenly, a gust of wind caught it. The wind carried it into a tree. 
The balloon hit a branch and burst. Margie cried and cried.
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(2) Margie cried and cried. The balloon hit a branch and burst. The 
wind carried it into a tree. Suddenly a gust of wind caught it. Margie 
was holding tightly to the string of her beautiful new balloon.
Here we find two strings of sentences. One, however, also seems to form 
a sensible whole, whereas the other seems to be analyzable into little 
more than a string of sentences. These examples should make clear that 
some higher level of organisation takes place in stories that does not 
take place in strings of sentences. (Rumelhart 1975:211-212)
There are a number of points which might legitimately be raised in 
objection, or at least in qualification of Rumelhart's reasoning.
Firstly, what is said here applies to narrative, and perhaps to 
narrative only. Indeed, an excessive concentration on narrative, to the 
exclusion of other discourse types, is a limitation of much discourse 
analysis (especially in AI (see 3) and many branches of literary theory 
(see 6.4). Whatever rules may be formulated concerning the relationship 
of sentences in narrative may not be applicable to other discourse types. 
It might be that ordering rules for sentences can be formulated for 
narratives, but that this formulation can not be generalized to other 
discourse types. This particular narrative, moreover, is one which follows 
a strict chronological sequence. In the terms of the Russian formalists 
its 'fabula' and 'syu^ et1 coincide (see 6.3.4). There are many other 
principles for the ordering of sentences other than iconic chronology*.
Secondly, it might be argued that the rules governing the ordering of 
sentences in Rumelhart's example are dependent on knowledge of the world 
rather than any kind of 'text grammar'. One has to consider whether the 
oddity of the second version is really of the same kind as a departure 
from sentence grammar, such as:
* Tantamount she under am were cabbage sudden how he.
One of the major factors in the coherence of Rumelhart's story derives not 
from formal co-occurrence restrictions, but from belief about the nature of 
time, continuity and reversible as opposed to irreversible change. Given 
the co-reference of every mention of the balloon (indicated by various 
cohesive devices, see 2.3), it cannot, competent speakers believe, both 
"have burst" and "be carried by the wind". Another source of coherence is 
our knowledge of children: they like balloons and are upset when they 
burst. (Rumelhart makes similar points himself.) Though these facts may 
always hold in our present experience, one can imagine worlds in which 
they would not. Science fiction, by definition, describes worlds about 
which our beliefs are significantly different, necessitating both an
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increase in the amount of explicit reference to background knowledge 
needed for interpretation, and the creation of coherence in texts which, 
interpreted through knowledge of the real world, would appear incoherent 
(Pitrat C1985] 1988:8). The same is true to some extent of any fictional 
world. Schematic expectation can be broken in fiction without destroying 
coherence. Rumelhart's second story might well be coherent in chapter 2 
of Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking r,iagR (in which time is reversed) 
or in the film Superman6 , in which the villain wins, only to be outwitted 
when Superman flies so fast anticlockwise around the earth that its orbit 
is reversed. Time returns to an earlier point in the story and the 
denouement is repeated, this time with a victory for Superman. The 
oddity of Rumelhart's second sequence is thus in our view not textual but 
relative to a given context, i.e. discoursal.
Thirdly, there are strings of sentences which, though they may 
initially appear unacceptable, can be made to appear 'well-formed* by a 
change of context. This point is cogently argued by Viddowson (1979:130) 
against Krzeszowski (1975:41) who had claimed that the following two 
sentences selected from a corpus at random could not be combined into a 
coherent sequence:
1) The men and women eat breakfast together.
2) The nomads become restless in the big town.
Viddowson observes that in a particular context they could, and suggests 
by way of example that the event described in (2) may arise from a 
prohibition of the sexes eating together in the nomads' culture. 
Viddowson however stops short of the view that any pair of sentences 
could be combined in this way®. Yet one might in fact argue that given 
sufficient ingeniuity and imagination any pair of sentences could be 
regarded as coherent7. If this is the case, then any assessment of well- 
formedness must be relative to the context: that is, in our sense, to the 
relevant knowledge of the participants. Discourse analysis, in other 
words, demands a description of the knowledge of a specific receiver, of 
the kind which can be provided by schema theory. The suggestion that any 
sequence may be coherent is open to empirical testing, although given the 
infinite generative power of grammar, no tests could be said to be 
conclusive. An interesting example of coherence being established
between sentences through context is widely believed to occur in F i n n e g a n s
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Xafca. in which the word 'Entrez' is supposed to have been mistakenly 
included by Joyce's amanuensis (Samuel Beckett) when somebody knocked at 
the door during dictation (Ellman [1959] 1982: 649; Kennedy 1971: 207). 
Knowledge of this anecdote - whether true or not - would be one way of 
making this sentence coherent with its co-text when encountered®. Again, 
a literary example defies the general rule.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that discourse does 
not have to consist of strings of sentences, and that therefore a 
statement of combination rules for such sentences would not be enough, 
even if it were possible. Take, for example, the following:
Playback. Raymond Chandler. Penguin Books in association with Hamish 
Hamilton. To Jean and Helga, without whom this book could never have 
been written. One. The voice on the telephone seemed to be sharp and 
peremptory, but I didn't hear too well what it said - partly because I 
was only half awake and partly because I was holding the receiver 
upside down. (Playback [1958] 1961.)
Here, an application of knowledge about the layout and conventions of 
novels, will make this a coherent discourse (Just as knowledge about 
balloons, wind, and children makes Rumelhart's example coherent) despite 
the fact that of the six units marked orthographically as sentences, only 
one conforms to the rules of sentence grammars. In this example it is 
true that we have run together a number of quite separate functional parts 
of the same discourse (distinguished by typography, page position and the 
spaces between them) but we do not have to cut across discourse parts 
(title page, dedication etc.) so radically to find discourses which are not 
composed of sentences. Many literary texts, including narrative, contain 
sequences which do not conform to the usual rules of sentence grammars. 
(The orthographic sentences of the opening of Bleak House, for example, are 
without main verbs (Leech and Short 1981:138), and Blake's poem Ah.
Sunflower and Browning's Meeting_at Ifight are without main verbs (see
6.4.2).) Whatever rules there may be for well-formed sequences, in other 
words, they cannot only be regarded as rules for combinations of 
sentences. AI has a habit of making the rather naive assumption that they 
can, and Rumelhart's approach is in this way typical.®
With these reservations, however, it does seem possible to make 
predictions about the well-formedness of strings of sentences. The 
question of whether such Judgements may ever be made without reference to
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context, as Rumelhart seems to suggest, is best answered by returning to 
the paper from which discourse analysis takes its name, published by 
Zellig Harris in 1952 (Harris 1952).10
2.2.1 Zellig Harris' (1952) investigation of discourse.
Historically, Harris is well placed to give a verdict on the possibility 
of extending the techniques of sentence linguistics beyond the level of the 
sentence. Trained in the methods of the Bloomfieldian structuralist 
linguists of the thirties, he was also a seminal researcher in 
transformational grammar, and, as the mentor of Noam Chomsky, exerted a 
profound influence on Chomsky's later development of transformational 
generative grammar. He thus stands between the two main schools of 
sentence linguistics, and his conclusions on their application to discourse 
may be said to hold true for both approaches.
Given this background, it is not surprising that Harris makes the 
following assumptions, the first implicitly, and the second explicitly:
1) that the perception of the presence or absence of well-formedness in 
a given string of sentences will be consistent for all native speakers 
(Just as this approach implicitly assumes perceptions of the 
grammaticality of sentences to be common to speakers with native speaker 
competence - and Indeed definitive of that competence);
2) that the reasons for well-formedness, to be stated in terms of 
constraints and predictions as to the sequencing of sentences, can be 
found within the text without reference to the variables of context.
The first of these assumptions is in fact absent from Harris's 
discussion, and it seems reasonable to assume that absence of discussion 
implies that the issue is not perceived as problematic.
Harris's paper is a test analysis of a coherent discourse (an 
advertisement for hair tonic) in which an attempt is made to find 
grammatical links between one sentence and another. The text analysed is 
as follows:
Millions Can't Be Wrong!
Millions of consumer bottles of X--- have been sold since its
introduction a few years ago. And four out of five people in a nation­
wide survey say they prefer X---to any hair tonic they've used. Four
out of five people in a nation-wide survey can't be wrong. You too and
your whole family will prefer X--- to any hair tonic you've used!
Every year we sell more bottles of X---to satisfied customers. You
too will be satisfied! (Harris E19523 1964:364)
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The title and each of the six sentences of the advertisement is well 
formed, so the problems outlined above with reference to sequences whose 
units are not sentences does not arise. The details of Harris' analysis 
need not concern us here, but his conclusions are highly relevant. At the 
beginning of his paper, Harris observes that there are two possible 
directions for discourse analysis. One is:
continuing descriptive Linguistics beyond the limits of a single 
sentence at a time (Harris [1952] 1964:356).
This was what he aimed to test. The other is:
correlating culture and language (i.e. non-linguistic and linguistic 
behaviour) (ibid.)
At the end of the article, having weighed up the two options, Harris 
concludes:
..in every language it turns out that almost all the results lie within a 
relatively short stretch which we may call the sentence.... Only rarely 
can we state restrictions across sentences, (ibid.)
If the analysis of language, in other words, is to extend beyond the level 
of sentence, it will cease to be a purely formal analysis of the relations 
of syntactic units and incorporate variable factors of the context. This 
(despite his stated lack of interest in pursuing the issue further) is in 
fact suggested by Harris himself.
This is not to say, however, that the rules of sentence grammars are 
of no relevance to discourse analysis, but only that whatever units exist 
above the sentence are different in kind. Nor is it to say that sentence 
grammar and context do not mutually affect each other. In 3.6 and 3.6.1 
below, we describe how syntactic ordering is affected by knowledge of the 
knowledge of an interlocutor. Vhen we come to examine the relationship 
between 'deviant' linguistic choices in literature, of the kind emphasized 
by Jakobsonian stylistics, and 'deviant' conceptual representations in 
terms of the schemata of a given reader, one of the main points of our 
argument will be the futility of examining either in Isolation (see chapter
7). A purely formal stylistics approach to literature is in many ways 
analogous to Harris' approach to discourse. Description of linguistic
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choices at the level of grammar Is undoubtedly important, but is 
significant only when related to a description of the receiver.
2.3 Cohesion.
Harris concluded that formal links between sentences were negligible, 
and that any explanation of discourse was to be formulated with reference 
to factors other than the text. In reaching this conclusion he had, 
however, explicitly excluded semantic factors, and thus paid no attention 
to what may be regarded as an exception to his conclusion: cohesion.
Cohesion is the formal linguistic realization of semantic and pragmatic 
relations between clauses and sentences in a text (Quirk et al. 1985:1423). 
The most influential and catholic work on cohesion is Halliday and Hasan
(1976), summarized and slightly modified in Halliday (1985: Chapter 9). In 
both these works, cohesion is viewed as primarily a semantic phenomenon:
The concept of cohesion is a semantic one; it refers to relations of 
meaning that exist within the text and that define it as text. (Halliday 
and Hasan 1976:4)
The organization of text is semantic rather than formal and (at least as 
far as cohesion is concerned (....)) much looser than that of grammatical 
units. (Halliday 1985:290)
The Hallidayan approach to language regards the clause as a more central 
unit than the sentence. (The latter is regarded as an orthographic unit 
and the term 'clause complex' preferred (Halliday 1985:193).) The 
description thus deals with words and phrases which provide semantic 
links between clauses, either by indicating:
1) co-reference11 of elements in different clauses, expressed by 
referring expressions, substitution, ellipsis, or semantically related 
lexical items such as synonyms, antonyms, supernyms, hyponyms and 
meronyms; or
2) logical, causal, temporal or attitudinal connections between clauses 
expressed by conjunctions12.
In the following subsections (2.3.1 to 2.3.7) we shall briefly describe 
the main types of cohesive devices. Vith regard to our later argument, we 
shall pay particular attention to the way in which the use of cohesive 
devices varies between discourse types and the degree to which they may 
characterize 'literariness'.
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
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2.3.1 Parallelism.
Despite Halliday and Hasan's definition of cohesion as 'semantic1, we 
may - If we define a cohesive device as a formal feature capable of 
creating a connection between sentences - validly begin a catalogue of 
cohesive devices with a connection which is purely syntactic, and which is 
not included in Halliday and Hasan's formulation. This is 'parallelism': a 
device frequently used in literary and related discourses. It is in fact 
an Instance of the kind of formal, noa-semantic link between sentences 
sought by Harris. It is also of great importance to our later discussion 
for two reasons. Firstly, It is largely ignored by AI theories of 
conceptual representation (see chapter 4). Secondly, it is central to the 
Jakobsonian and stylistics attempts to associate literariness with formal 
linguistic features (see chapter 7).
Syntactic parallelism occurs when the form of one sentence or clause 
repeats the form of another13 . This suggests a connection to the reader, 
through isomorphism. It occurs frequently in speeches, prayers, poetry and 
advertisements. It can have a powerful emotive effect; it is also a useful 
aide n6noire. Here, for example, is part of a Christian prayer in which 
three subordinate clauses are syntactically parallel, following the 
structure1"*:
[ ^(TeachP'Vus) ^ (good LordP4 [ ^  ( ) ] (and) [ not ^  ( ) )] >
MCI VP NP NP NCltVP cj NClt VP NP
Teach us, Good Lord, to give and not to count the cost, to fight and not 
to heed the wounds, to toil and not to seek for rest, to labour and to 
ask for no reward, save that of knowing that we do thy will.
And here is an extract from a children's book in which sentences are 
syntactically parallel following the pattern (with or without 'vastly' or 
additional postmodification in the second noun phrase).
(St. Richard's Prayer)
S A P
[ (He) (vastly) (enriched)
MCI NP AvP VP
Od A o
( ) (by ( )) ]
NP PP NP
He vastly enriched the world by his inventions. He enriched the field 
of knowledge by his teaching. He enriched humanity by his precepts and 
his personal example. He died on December 17, 1907, and was buried in
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J£?IB«*iSS“r Abbey Wlth the honours due to a prince of men... (Mee 1914:127)
That syntactic parallelism is a purely formal feature may be illustrated 
by its frequent loss in translation. There is, for example, syntactic 
parallelism in the following
Le G6n6ral de Gaulle est mort. La France est veuve.
(General de Gaulle is dead. France is a widow) 
(President Pompidou: television address.)
in which the repeated structure is:
S P C
C (DEFINITE ARTICLE + PROPER BTOUIT) (est) ( ) ]
MCI NP VP AjP/NP
This, however, does not entirely survive translation into English where 
neither definite article is needed, but an indefinite one is.
Ve have described syntactic parallelism, which suggests a connection of 
meaning through an echo of form, but the term 'parallelism' may validly be 
extended to sound, on the one hand, and to semantics on the other. The 
former is manifest in the rhyme, rhythm and other sound effects of verse 
when they create links across clause and sentence boundaries. The latter 
exists where two sentences are linked through lexico-semantic connections.
In all the above examples, the syntactic parallelism is reinforced by 
semantic parallelism. In the prayer for example each of the direct objects 
of the second clause ('cost', 'wounds' and 'rest') denotes a frequent 
outcome (respectively concomitant, consequence and reward) of the verb in 
the first clause ('give', 'fight' and 'toil'). In the French example, the two 
syntactically parallel sentences are further linked by the contrasted 
masculine and feminine genders reinforcing the metaphor of deceased 
husband and bereaved wife. Vidowhood, moreover, is a consequence of a 
death.
It should be clear from the above examples (a prayer, a biographical 
sketch and a piece of political rhetoric) that syntactic parallelism, 
though it is made much of in Jakobsonian stylistics, is by no means 
exclusive to literature. (For an elaborate demonstration of this see Verth 
1976,s). Ve shall return to this point in more detail in Chapter 7.
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2.3.2 Verb form.
Parallelism is, as it were, a luxury, available for rhetorical effect to 
add or create links between sentences, but in no way obligatory. A 
second, and more rigorous, kind of link (also strangely ignored by 
Halliday and Hasan in an otherwise comprehensive survey1 s ) is effected 
by the constraints upon verb form determined by preceding clauses and 
sentences. This is as much of a constraint at the intersentential level as 
the rules of grammar are at the subsentential level. The form of the verb 
in one sentence can limit the choice of the verb form in the next, and we 
may be justified in saying that a verb form in one sentence is 
'unacceptable', or perhaps even 'deviant', because it does not fit with the 
form in another. To classify this phenomenon as syntactic or semantic is 
difficult. In some instances, as between conditional clauses and main 
clauses in English, whether intra- or inter-sententially, it might well be 
regarded as purely formal. ('If you do that you will be arrested. Then 
you will probably be tried and found guilty.') In others, as in the 
repetition of the present tense in either the original or the translated 
quotation from President Pompidou above, it might validly be regarded as 
semantic. The existence of constraints on verb form operating across 
clause and sentence boundaries is perhaps best illustrated by striking 
deviations, for example:
Before Abraham was, I am. (John 8: 58) 
or, across sentence boundaries, by the following passage from The Bar rat. 
Agent:
But Mr. Verloc did not see that. He was lying on his back and staring 
upwards. He saw partly on the ceiling and partly on the wall the 
moving shadow of an arm with a clenched hand holding a carving knife, 
It flickered up and down. Its movements were leisurely. They were 
leisurely enough for Mr. Verloc to recognize the limb and the weapon.
They were leisurely enough for him to take in the full meaning of the 
portent, and to taste the flavour of death rising in his gorge. His wife 
had gone raving mad - murdering mad. They were leisurely enough for 
the first paralysing effect of this discovery to pass away before a 
resolute determination to come out victorious from the ghastly struggle 
with the armed lunatic. They were leisurely enough for Mr. Verloc to 
elaborate a plan of defence, involving a dash behind the table, and the 
felling of the woman to the ground with a heavy wooden chair. But they 
were not leisurely enough to allow Mr. Verloc the time to move either 
hand or foot. The knife was already planted in his breast.
<[19071 1965:212)
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Leech and Short Ciill si!?) use this passage to Illustrate "the handling 
of psychological time" in a way which "anticipates the slow-motion 
effects of the cinema":
The reel, as it were, is wound back: we experience again, as in a 
temporal vacuum, the last moments of Mr. Verloc's living consciousness.
This effect is achieved in part through the disruption of verb form 
expectation. Again the non-literary biblical example belies the claim that 
departure from expected tense sequences is an exclusive feature of 
literature. (One may argue of course for the literary quality of certain 
translations of the Bible, but in this case the argument becomes circular.)
2.3.3 Referring Expressions.
Referring expressions are words or phrases whose meaning can only be 
determined by reference to other words or to elements of the context. The 
former are classifed as 'endophoric' and the latter as 'exophoric'. 
Examples of referring expressions are third person pronouns and deictic 
uses of 'here', 'there*, 'this* and 'that'. Endophoric referring expressions 
may be divided into 'anaphoric' referring expressions where the nominal 
precedes the referring expression, and 'cataphoric' where it succeeds it.
Description of the interpretation of referring expressions is 
notoriously difficult, and an issue to which much attention is devoted in 
computational linguistics (see for example: Reichman 1985; Appelt 1985: 
118-121; Alshwani 1987; Dale 1988). Any theory capable of predicting 
interpretation will need to take account of far more than linguistic form, 
and deal with such issues as topic, focus, saliency and schematic 
knowledge. This applies to both endophoric and exophoric instances. 
Consider for example the likely interpretations of pronouns in the 
following examples:
1) There was a pineapple on the table. So I ate it.
2) The teacher sent the class dunce to the headmaster because he wanted to 
throw pellets. (Pitrat [1985] 1988:7)
3) A man arrives at the door carrying a sack of coal and holding a pencil 
between his teeth. He says: "Vhere shall I put it?"
4) Two people are discussing a car to which they are referring as 'it' 
when a live hand grenade is thrown through the window and lands at their 
feet. One says: "Vhat shall we do with it?"
- 42 -
5) She Gotta Have It. (Title of Spike Lee film)
All these examples suggest that the interpretation of referring 
expressions is at least as pragmatic as it is semantic. It demands a 
description of the relevant context. In our terms this means a 
description of the knowledge of interlocutors. Such a description can be 
provided in terms of schema theory.
2.3.4 Repetition, 'elegant repetition', reduction and lexical chains.
The use of repeated endophoric anaphoric pro-form referring expressions 
in discourse creates a 'chain', for example: 
the car... it.... it... it.... it.... it.... it 
Such chains have the triple advantage of being, in most cases, syllabically 
economical, of emphasizing the continuity of topic, and of indicating co- 
reference. Ve shall regard such chains as the unmarked means of repeated 
reference to the topic of discourse.
Repetition of the original nominal can create the same sort of chain, 
conveying the same semantic content, though with a different stylistic 
effect. Such repetition may be more freqent in certain discourse types 
than in others. Advertisements, for example, often repeat the brand name, 
and other words, which - we might hypothesize - they wish to associate 
with it, for example:
Timotei is both mild to your hair and to your scalp - so mild you can 
wash your hair as often as you like. Timotei cleans your hair gently, 
leaving it soft and shiny, with a fresh smell of summer meadows.
Legal discourse often avoids referring expressions, as in the following:
This Schedule and Policy shall be read together as one contract and any 
word or expression to which a specific meaning has been attached in any 
part of the said Schedule or Policy shall bear such specific meaning 
wherever the word or expression may appear.
It is often argued that this diminishes possible ambiguity, though this is
disputable. It may also contribute to the elevation of legal language from
everyday uses, and thus to the status of the legal profession. Instruction
manuals favour repetition to avoid ambiguity. Literary discourse may
favour repetition over pro-forms too, as in Robert Burns' A Red. Red Rose.
0 my luve's like a red, red rose 
That's newly sprung in June;
0 mv luve's like the melody... (our underlining)
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Here once again, as the non literary texts reveal, literature holds no 
monopoly.
An intermediate form between pro-form reference and repetition is the 
use of a reduced form of a noun phrase. Thus 'a small boy' becomes 'the 
boy', 'the river Alma' becomes 'the river'; 'the door on the right' becomes 
'the door' and so on. This too may be exploited for literary effect, as it 
is in the following extract from The I.nng Onnrihyo-
Back from the highway at the bottom of Sepulvada Canyon were two 
square yellow gateposts. A five-barred gate hung open from one of them. 
Over the entrance was a sign hung on wire: PRIVATE ROAD. NO 
ADMITTANCE. The air was warm and quiet and full of the tomcat smell of 
eucalyptus trees.
I turned in and followed a gravelled road round the shoulder of the 
hill, up a gentle slope, over a ridge and down the other side into a 
shadow valley. It was hot in the valley, ten or fifteen degrees hotter 
than on the highway. I could see now that the gravelled road ended in a 
loop around some grass edged with stones that had been lime-washed. 
Off to my left there was an empty swimming pnnl. Around three sides of 
it there was what remained of a lawn dotted with redwood lounging 
chairs with badly faded pads on them. The pads had been of many 
colours, blue, green, yellow, orange, rust-red. Their edge bindings had 
come loose in spots, the buttons had popped, and the pads were bloated 
where this had happened. On the fourth side there was the high wire 
fence of a tennis court. The diving board over the empty pool looked 
knee-sprung and tired. Its matting covering hung in shreds and its 
metal fittings were flaked with rust.
([1953] 1959:101 our underlining)
Here the marked failure to fully reduce the noun phrases 'a gravelled road' 
and 'an empty swimming pool' lends the passage an air of attention to 
detail which may suggest timelessness, sinister significance, heightened 
sensation and vivid memory.
An alternative to chains of anaphoric referring expressions and to 
repeated or reduced nominals is the use of semantically related nominals, 
such as superordinates, hyponyms, synonyms, meronyms and even antonyms. 
By this criterion, all of the following, could be cohesively linked
my family .. my daughter., my girlchild .. my blue eyes .. my son
Links through meronymy are difficult to distinguish from links through 
membership of a single schema. In later chapters when we come to list 
the contents of schemata, we shall include items which are meronymically 
related to the central item (thus 'feather', for example, is an item in a 
schema for a 'bird'). We may note in passing that cohesion through
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meronymy is intimately connected to the device known in poetics as 
metonymy. Metonymy, in literary theory, has often been discussed in 
partnership with metaphor (see Vales 1989:297), a semantic relationship 
which we might add to those listed above. Expressions such as:
'my support' or 'my refuge from the storm' 
could thus be added to the list above.
Halliday and Hasan (1976:284-291) list one other type of lexical 
cohesion which they term 'collocation'. (This concept is reiterated in 
Halliday 1985:312-313). This is a kind of cohesive link created by the 
use of different words or phrases which, as Halliday rather vaguely 
says, "do not depend on any general semantic relationship of the types 
just discussed, but rather on a particular association between the items in 
question - a tendency to co-occur." Examples given are 'smoke' and
'pipe', 'white' and 'snow'. Though there are tighter and more rigorous 
definitions of collocation (for example Cowie 1981) in which the 
likelihood of lexical co-occurance is predicted, what Halliday and Hasan 
seem to be suggesting is not only a tendency of words to go together but 
also to link with other words across sentences and substantial portions of 
intervening text:
There is always the possibility of cohesion between any pair of lexical
items which are in some way associated with each other in the language.
(Halliday and Hasan 1976:285).
This will, they say, include such associations as those between 'garden' 
and 'dig', 'doctor' and 'ill', 'sunshine' and 'cloud'. In our opinion, such 
links are too dependent upon individual experience and knowledge to be 
treated as an instance of cohesion. Ve shall regard the effect of such 
links as dependent upon the contents of schemata.
2.3.5 Substitution and ellipsis.
Another formal link between sentences is the substitution of do or so 
for a word or group of words which have appeared in an earlier sentence. 
Another is ellipsis: the omission of an element on the assumption that it 
can be reconstructed succesfully. Neither of these play a major part in 
the subsequent argument, but are menitoned in this summary of cohesion for 
the sake of completeness.
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2.3.6 Conjunction.
Yet another type of formal relation between sentences is provided by 
conjunctions. In Halliday's 1985 description these words are categorized 
as having a number of functions (Halliday 1985:303-309)1S. They may 
simply add more information to what has already been said ('and', 
'furthermore1, 'add to that') or elaborate or exemplify it ('for instance', 
'thus', 'in other words'). They may contrast new information with old 
information, or put another side to the argument Cor', 'on the other hand', 
'however', 'conversely'). They may relate new information to what has 
already been given in terms of causes ('so', 'consequently', 'because', 'for 
this reason') or in time ('formerly', 'then', 'in the end', 'next') or they 
may indicate a new departure or a summary ('by the way', 'well', 'to sum 
up', 'anyway'). Categorized in this way, they indicate the relationship of 
utterances within the overall discourse structure. They are in many cases 
optional and will be dictated by communicative function, discourse type or 
assumptions about the receiver's knowledge.
2.4 The role of cohesion in discourse.
Some writers (e.g. van Dijk and Kintsch 1983) regard cohesion as an 
instance of coherence. Others (Brown and Yule 1983:191-199; de 
Beaugrande and Dressier 1981:48-111) regard the two as distinct. They 
regard cohesion as an element of text, explicable in terms akin to those 
of formal linguistics, and coherence as a result of the interaction of text 
and receiver, which, though it may be aided by cohesion, is distinct and 
independent from it. It is true that in principle cohesion is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to create coherence, yet in practice, any 
discourse of length will employ it. That most coherent texts are also 
cohesive, however, does not imply that coherence is created by cohesion. 
Contrast, for example, the following two pairs of sentences:
- It's a mystery to me how the conjuror sawed that woman in half.
- Veil, Jane was the woman he did it to. So presumably she must know, 
and:
- It's a mystery to me how the conjuror sawed that woman in half.
- Veil, Jane was the woman he did it to. So presumably she must be 
Japanese.
The first, even without a context, is both cohesive and coherent. In the 
last sentence of the second pair, though there is cohesion ('So', 'she'), it
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is not clear how the sequence makes sense. It might form part of a 
discourse, but this would not be by virtue of cohesion, but because of some 
other information about the context. This is an invented example, but if 
an actual sequence of cohesive sentences is divorced from its context the 
same incoherent effect may result:
She thought, I'm becoming like other people. I'm getting fear and letting 
the present dim. But it had to happen Mary. Life is made of fear.
(Other People!19811 1982:89)
Such texts, though cohesive, are not coherent without some specific 
knowledge on the part of the receiver (Bransford and Johnson 1973). A 
reader will assume however that there is coherence, and read on, or seek 
elsewhere to find it. In fact, the absence of coherence is often an 
incentive to read further and thus deliberately courted in literary 
disocurse, whose readers' only motivation to proceed will often be interest 
or pleasure. The only alternative to this faith in coherence is to label 
the sender as insane.
Conversely, there are short discourses which are coherent without 
cohesion (see next section). Such instances have been major factors in 
pointing to the inadequacy of discourse analysis conducted in purely 
formal terms and in instigating a search for other sources of coherence. 
This search has led to investigation of the role of pragmatic 
interpretative processes (see 3.2 and 3.3), of knowledge of textual 
structures (see 3.4 and 6.4), and of knowledge of the world in general (see 
chapter 4). Our argument will be that although awareness of the 
interaction of knowledge and text in the creation of coherence has now 
become a commonplace in discourse analysis and AI, it has not yet made a 
substantial impact on literary theories describing the effect of 
defamiliarization (see chapter 6). Yet without a sense of this 
interaction, any analysis of literary effect in purely formal terms is left 
stranded and easily flawed.
Cohesion is a manifestation of certain aspects of coherence, and a 
pointer towards it, rather than its cause or necessary result. Cohesion is 
never more than a partial textual realization of coherence which is a 
feature of the perception of text rather than of text itself. Even in 
texts with a density of cohesive ties, many links of co-reference, cause,
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sequence and logic, though recoverable by the reader or listener, remain 
unstated and have no textual manifestation whatsoever. Though an increase 
in cohesion may, to a certain point, make a text clearer, less ambiguous 
and more coherent, there is a point beyond which it may make it duller, 
and less readily processible. This is, for example, particularly evident 
in legal texts.
In short, in any text, there is a great deal of information which is 
omitted, not only connections which could be indicated with cohesive 
devices, but also intermediate and component events, and the motives, 
plans, feelings and reasoning of actors. If this were not so, any 
discourse would grow to an unwieldy (even perhaps infinite) length. It 
would also become pedantic and boring.
Though we are describing these unstated connections as 'omitted' this 
does not necessarily imply that they were present at some stage in the 
formulation of the discourse and have since been deleted. Vhen 
communication takes place and discourse is perceived as coherent, these 
missing elements can be constructed if necessary by people processing the 
text, just as they could have been included if necessary by the sender. 
This is precisely why they are not needed. Vhen seeking to make coherence 
explicit however, these missing links may need overt statement. Schema 
theory provides a means of doing just this.
Ve shall consider a brief invented example:
The guard dog died when one of the prisoners threw it poison meat. The 
handler cried all night, though we had always thought of him as 
heartless.
This potentially coherent sequence contains a number of cohesive devices: 
pro-forms and conjunctions, and verb forms relating across clause and 
sentence boundaries. One might also argue for a degree of semantic 
relation between the words 'guard dog', 'prisoners' and 'handler', between 
'poison' and 'died' or between 'cried' and 'heartless': they might well be 
found close together in a semantic network for example (Quillian 1968; 
Norman and Rumelhart 1975; Garnham 1987: 22-25). The coherence, however, 
rests on more than these textually realized relations. In terms of 
causality, for example, neither the causal chain which links the throwing 
of the meat to the death of the dog, nor the death of the dog to the 
weeping of the handler, nor the weeping of the handler to the
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presupposition that he is heartless, is explicitly stated. Readers suppose 
that the dog ate and digested the meat; that the poison entered its cells; 
that this created various medical effects which led to its death; that its 
death was perceived by the handler; that this perception caused various 
emotions to arise in his mind; that these emotions caused him to cry; that 
this crying was perceived by the prisoners, and judged by them to be a 
sign of compassion, disrupting their previous assessment of the handler. 
Needless to say, the chain of cause and effect here is further reducible to 
a level of detail where causes are unknown. Though we talk loosely of 'a 
cause of death1 or 'a cause of tears', it is hard to be precise about 
either. Motives, too, are unstated. Ve do not need to know why the dog 
ate the meat or why the prisoners wanted it to do so. The temporal 
relation between the events depicted in the two main clauses can also be 
assumed. In the absence of contrary indication19, the linear development 
of discourse is presumed to represent iconically the sequence of events in 
time (Leech and Short 1981:235).
Coherence, then, while reinforced by cohesion, is also created by 
elements which have no textual realization, but can be provided by someone 
processing the text when necessary. Given the human predilection to 
perceive coherence wherever possible, there may well be instances where 
the links will be different when provided by different individuals. Such 
may often be the case in the literary juxtaposition of clauses or 
sentences. The following opening of a poem by Villiam Empson (though 
also possibly about poisoning) may meet with less consensus.
Slowly the poison the whole bloodstream fills.
It is not the effort nor the failure tires.
2.4.1 Meaning as encoding/decoding versus meaning as construction.
To say that the links which create coherence are only very partially 
realized in the text has severe implications for any merely semiotic 
theory of language which views communication as the encoding and decoding 
of thoughts. Although this view has very deep roots in the Vestern 
tradition, continuing from the Aristotelian to the Saussurean models of 
communication, it is one which has been discarded in contemporary views 
of language, in favour of a view of meaning as actively constructed by the 
mind through the interplay of the text with knowledge and reasoning
- 49 -
(Sperber and Wilson 1986:1 64). In this post-semiotic paradigm, there are 
a number of approaches, each placing different emphasis upon elements in 
the construction of meaning. Thus linguistics focuses upon grammar and 
semantics. Pragmatics, often taking this linguistic part of processing for 
granted, devotes most of its attention to the principles and reasoning 
procedures which enable speakers to infer intention, function and facts 
with no overt textual realization, AI, while embracing linguistics and 
pragmatics, has devoted a large proportion of its attention to the nature 
and organization of knowledge of the world. Discourse analysis has tried 
eclectically to draw on all these approaches, sometimes seeking for an 
extension of the rules of grammar to higher units than the sentence (see, 
for example, Harris 1952, discussed above, also Werlich 1976, Longacre 
1983), sometimes examining the processing strategies which language users 
employ and the textual features which help orientation within discourse.
All of these approaches have in common a 'scientific' approach to the 
study of communication. They imply that the scientist and scientific 
discourse can somehow stand apart from the process, observe it and assess 
it. They also all subscribe to the view that meaning is constructed 
through the interaction of some existing mental representation and the 
text itself, and that this mental representation can be described and 
understood. To talk of coherence, as we have done, as constructed through 
links which have no manifestation in the text, implies their independent 
existence in the mind. These views unite these approaches, despite their 
differences.
2.5 Conclusion.
In this chapter, we have discussed the inadequacy of a description of 
formal links in discourse to account for coherence. This indicates a need 
for a description of the knowledge of participants in discourse analysis, 
in addition to a description of the text. We have also illustrated the 
inadequacy of a description of formal intersentential links to account for 
'literariness'. Later, in chapter 7, by examining Jakobson's theory of 
literariness, we shall advance the same argument with regard to 
subsentential features. In this chapter, we have also indicated our 
allegiance to a broadly 'scientific' approach to discourse analysis.
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Votes to Chapter Two.
1. Ve follow Clark and Holquist (1984:146-171) In believing that Bakhtin 
was the author of the book published under the name of his colleague 
Voloshinov. This is also now the official view in the Soviet Union. See 
also Terras (1965:34-36). For the alternative view see Matejka and Titunik 
(1986:vii-xii).
2. Sperber and Wilson (1986), for example, use the term in the latter 
sense.
3. Lexis, viewed as the formal relationship of lexical items in collocation 
and sets was a further descriptive level recognized by the neo-Firthians.
4. For an analysis of the iconic representation of time in the sequencing 
of text see Leech and Short (1981:233-236).
5. Films referred to are listed in Appendix B
6. This echoes Widdowson's own earlier claim (Viddowson 1978:1), ironically 
rather similar to Krzeszowski's, that the utterance 'The rain destroyed the 
crops' is not an 'appropriate' answer to the utterance 'Can you tell me the 
way to the railway station please?'. Clearly one can play Viddowson at 
his own game with these utterances and think of contexts in which they 
might be coherent. The second speaker may be a farmer so distraught at 
the financial ruin brought about by the weather that he or she considers 
this plight more important than the petty needs of a tourist. More co­
operatively, the first speaker may be going to the station to collect a 
delivery of corn, making the second utterance interpretable through 
conversational inference as implying that the delivery will not arrive.
7. Our own experience, teaching a grammar course to English native 
speakers bears this out. Asking students to invent pairs of sentences 
which could never go together, and other students to think of contexts in 
which they could, has always resulted in the ingenious invention of some 
extraordinary - often fantastic - context which makes them coherent: even 
for such semantic anomalies as 'Today is Monday. Tomorrow is Friday.' It 
is worth observing, however, that the debate raised by Krzeszowski and 
Widdowson is applied only to pairs of sentences. Our case for contexts 
which make sense of any pair might be much harder to maintain for threes, 
or fours, or larger groups of sentences.
8. In fact neither the words 'Entrez' nor 'Come in' occur in Elnaegans. 
Wake. (Richard Brown, Leeds University: personal communication.)
9. AI takes no account of the utterance/ sentence distinction employed in 
linguistics (Lyons 1968:423; Crystal 1985:277,322).
10. This paper is often cited as the origin of discourse analysis: for 
example by Barthes ([1966] 1977:83B) and Coulthard (1985:3-6). Coulthard 
also cites as an equally seminal article Mitchell ([1957] 1975).
11. Following Lyons (1977:642-8), we shall use the term 'referring 
expressions' for terms which have 'co-reference' (see also Leech 1981:158). 
Halliday and HasanW use the term 'reference', although this often has a 
different meaning in semantics (Lyons 1977: 393,438; Leech 1981:12.)
12. Halliday's use of the term 'conjunction' is more catholic than many 
others, see for example Quirk et al. (1985:440-444)
13. The use of the term in this sense goes back to the eighteenth century 
when it was applied to the phenomenon in Hebrew poetry (SOED:1429). In 
the nineteenth century it was used in the analysis of poetry by both 
Matthew Arnold (ibid.) and Gerard Manley Hopkins (House and Storey 1959: 
108-114).
14. Our notation system (based on Cowie 1987) is given at the beginning of 
this thesis.
15. Verth describes parallelism in a Sunday Times article on pest control.
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16. Though It is dealt with by the Hallidayan approach under other 
headings, see Halliday <1985: 192-227).
17. The passage is also cited by Cluysenaar <1976:77-80).
18. For an alternative and in many ways more satisfactory description of 
lexical cohesion, see Quirk et al. <1985:1438-1444).
19. In this example, the use of the past perfect 'had always thought' 
indicates an event prior to that preceding it in a purely linear way.
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Chapter Three.
Discourse Analysis 2: Pragmatic approaches and their capacity to 
characterize *1 iterarlness'.
3.0 Introduction.
In brief spoken exchanges it is quite common to encounter sequences of 
utterances that are almost entirely bare of cohesion. The following words, 
for example, uttered by an elderly woman when she knocked on a male 
neighbour's door, may with reason be regarded (together with the man's 
non-verbal response in following her) as a complete, coherent and readily 
comprehensible discourse.
Sorry love. I saw you were home. There's a cat stuck under the gate at 
number 67.
Arguably there are no cohesive ties between the three utterances. (Against 
this it could be said that 'love' and 'you' are co-referential, as are 'I' 
and a possible ellipted #  in the first utterance1.) There are certainly 
none which account for the interpretation of the utterances as coherent 
and meaningful in the way suggested by the neighbour's behaviour.
One way of accounting for the coherence of such a discourse is to look 
behind the literal meaning and linguistic form of what is said or written, 
and to consider what the sender of a message intends to achieve with it, 
to try to understand its function. Let us suppose, in the above example, 
that the old woman at the door hoped to change her environment, and in 
order to do so intended to invoke and make use of a social relationship. 
To realize these broad intentions, she set out 'to establish contact', 'to 
apologize' for disturbing someone, 'to explain' why she had chosen this 
door to knock on, 'to ask for' assistance in freeing the cat and 'to 
report' information. That this was correctly interpreted is strongly 
suggested by the fact that she was not surprised by her neighbour's 
behaviour. We may surmise that if he had simply interpreted her remarks 
as having the referential function of imparting information and replied: 
"Oh how interesting. Thanks for telling me", she might, quite Justifiably, 
have been offended.
3.1 Functional views of discourse.
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To discover how such inferences are made, it is necessary firstly to 
examine the range of possible functions of language, and secondly to try 
to understand how people correctly interpret them. We shall deal with 
'function' on two levels: the first concerning the broadest descriptions of 
the purpose of language in general, the second concerning the more 
specific acts performed by individual utterances. The two levels are, 
however, related, as we shall show below. As we examine these approaches 
language function and the contribution they may make to an explanation 
of coherence, we shall simultaneously consider the issue of the function of 
literary discourse, and whether the approaches described are applicable to 
it. We are using the term 'function' as we have already noted2 to describe 
both what the sender intends to do and what is actually done: the effect 
on the receiver. When discussing the function of literary discourse, we 
shall be concerned with the latter sense.
3.1.1 Macro- functions.
There have been many, sometimes conflicting, attempts to classify the 
main functions of language. Among the most frequently cited in 
linguistics are those proposed by Biihler (1934); Jakobson (I960); Searle 
(1969, 1975b); Halliday (1973, 19753); Robinson (1972); Popper (1972); 
Hymes (1972). (For summaries and comparisons of functional descriptions 
see Leech (1983:46-58), Stern (1983:221-229); Wales (1989:195-199).) In 
general, and with one major exception which we discuss below, the 
functions these writers suggest can be grouped under four main headings: 
those concerned with expressing inner states*, those concerned with 
communicating information®, those concerned with creating and maintaining 
social relationships6, those concerned with affecting the behaviour of 
others7. In the theories of Jakobson, Robinson and Popper there is also 
fifth category: the metalinguistic function in which language describes and 
regulates itself. With reason, however, we may reduce this fivefold 
generalization even further. If we regard the expression of inner states 
and the discussion of the language itself as communicating information, 
and if we regard attempts to affect the behaviour of others as part of the 
regulation of the social world, then we may say that language has, in all 
these theorists' views, two main functions:
1) the communication of information about the world;
2) the creation and maintenance of social relations.
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This generalization echoes part of Halliday's categorization of the 
functions of language. The two major functions above are equivalent 
respectively to Halliday's
1) ideational function
2) interpersonal function. (Halliday 1973:22-46;1976:19-27) 
(Halliday's third 'textual' function (1973:42; 1976:28) in which language 
creates cohesive text - in the ways described in chapter 2 - is quite 
unlike any of the functions described by the other theorists, and need not 
concern us here. Indeed, its inward looking self-reflexive nature makes it 
seem more formal than functional, being more concerned with the internal 
workings of language than with the relation of language to the minds of 
its users or the world in which they live. As Leech (1983:57) remarks: 
"there is something back to front about saying that language has the 
function of producing instantiations of itself".)
From among the functional theories listed above, we shall concentrate 
on the classification put forward by Jakobson (1960). Ve make this 
choice because Jakobson's classification is distinctive in suggesting a 
'poetic' function for language, and for making this function its main focus 
of attention. Other classifications either include no such function or 
(having adopted it from Jakobson®) pay it less attention. This is the 
'major exception' to our broad generalizations. This function does not, 
however, fit easily into either of the two general categories described 
above. It is also of particular importance to our later argument, as it is 
the basis of Jakobson's case for a linguistic characterization of 
literariness and, as such, the origin of stylistics.
Jakobson's argument is well known, but we shall outline it briefly here. 
Ve shall return to it again, more critically and in more detail, in chapter
7.
Jakobson proceeded by first identifying six elements in communication:
- the addresser: not necessarily the same as the sender;
- the addressee: usually but not necessarily the same as the receiver;
- the context: in his terms the referent or information;
- the message: the particular linguistic form;
- the contact: the medium or channel;
- the code: the language or dialect.
Corresponding to each element is a particular function of language, 
respectively:
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the emotive: communicating the inner states and emotions of the 
addresser;
the conative function: seeking to affect the behaviour of the 
addressee;
- the referential function: carrying information;
the poetic: in which the message (i.e. form) is dominant;
the phatic: opening the channel or checking that it is working, 
either for social reasons or for practical ones;
the metalingual (sic): focussing attention upon the code itself, to 
clarify it or renegotiate it.
Vith the exception of the poetic function these categories may be 
related to the two main categories of function suggested above. Together, 
they allow human beings to:
1) undertake the co-operative manipulation of the environment (the 
referential, conative and metalingual functions);
2) create and maintain social relationships (the emotive and phatic, 
and - again - the conative function);
(It could be argued that the successful human manipulation of the 
environment is made possible by social relationships and that therefore 
the second of these categories derives from the first.) The poetic 
function, however, fits neither of these categories, and must be listed 
separately. What it enables human beings to do is:
3) something unknown (the poetic function).
For although Jakobson talks of literary language as having a poetic 
function, he nowhere gives an explanation of what that function is, in 
terms of what it does or is intended to do. The emotive function 
expresses inner states and feelings, the conative function seeks to affect 
the behaviour of others and so on. These are explanations as well as 
descriptions. But what is it that language with a poetic function does?® 
To say that the poetic function focusses attention on the message, and to 
describe this with great perception and detail as Jakobson does: this is 
description, but not explanation.
Significantly, the first two general functions of language are guarded 
by social sanctions, from which the poetic function is exempt. To send 
false information is regarded as wrong, and in certain circumstances, 
illegal and punishable. To ignore the need for phatic communion, or to 
attempt to direct the behaviour of others without authority is considered
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rude and can lead to social isolation. The poetic function is sanctified 
institutionally as 'art' and, as such, exempted from these restrictions 
imposed on the other two: artists are often forgiven for being 'rude', 
'untrue' or breaking taboos. (In Britain, for example, the argument of 
artistic merit' can be used against charges of pornography.) The high 
social esteem for those functions of language which enable efficient co­
operation and those which create social relationships is easy enough to 
understand. Human life and prosperity depend upon them. Yet the high 
social estimate of the poetic function is more mysterious. In chapters 8 
and 9, by bringing Jakobson's theories together with schema theory, we 
shall attempt to give our own explanation of this esteem.
Ve also note at this stage that fundamental to functional approaches to 
language "is the belief that uses of language shape the system" (Vales 
1989:198)10. In Jakobson's view, when the poetic function is dominant, 
there is deviation from the norms of the linguistic system, and 
patterning of what are otherwise random elements. Again there is comment 
that this is the case, but no attempt to explain why.
3.1.2 Kicro-functions.
If we accept Jakobson's - or any similar - categorization of language 
into a small number of 'macro-functions', we might then go on to subdivide 
each function and specify more delicate categories, or 'micro-functions'. A 
breakdown of Jakobson's conative function, for example, might look 
something like figure 2.
QUESTIONS
FUNCTION
CONATIVE
requests for action 
requests for information 
requests for help 
requests for sympathy
PRAYERS
Figure 2. Hacro-functions and micro-functions.
Figure 2 follows through only one function in each column, but a similar 
division and re-division could be made of the other five macro-functions. 
The result would be a systemic diagram of increasing delicacy, showing a
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number of narrowly defined functions on the right-hand side. This 
classification is similar to Searle's (1975b) attempts to catalogue speech 
acts by relating them to one of five major families of acts, which we have 
already refered to as a catalogue of macro-functions. Searle's suggestion 
is that the acts performed by individual utterances are all either 
representatives, directives, commissives, expressives or declarations11. 
(Ve shall discuss the interpretation of speech acts further in 3.3.1 
below.) Whether an exhaustive list is possible is a matter of debate.
Such classifications contribute significantly to explanations of 
coherence. Once the speech-act function of an utterance has been 
ascertained, it may be possible to formulate sequences of such acts. (An 
attempt to do this is decribed in 3.4 below), Thus in explaining the 
coherence of a sequence such as
The window is open.
Don't worry.
we might first interpret the speech act function of each utterance by 
examining it in context (as discussed in 3.3 below) and secondly interpret 
the relationship of the two acts to each other. Here the first utterance, 
for example, if said by one of two people in bed together in the middle of 
the night, might function as an expression of worry. (In other 
circumstances it might have functioned differently. Said by a headteacher 
to a pupil, for example, it might be an order, by Sherlock Holmes to Dr. 
Watson an interpretation.) But as an expression of anxiety it may 
appropriately be followed by a reassurance:
The window is open. <* Don't worry.
(= 'expression of anxiety') -* (= 'reassurance')
There may be expected sequences of functions: 'request' -» 'refusal'; 'plea' -* 
'offer' and so on. Attempts to draw up such sequences are found in 
Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) (discussed in 3.4. below), and theories of 
preference organization in conversation analysis (see Levinson 1983:332- 
345). This is not only the case when a discourse is constructed by two 
people interacting face to face, It may also hold within the words of a
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single speaker. The old woman's utterances (see 3.0) may follow more 
coherently if we construe them as:
Sorry Love. I saw you were home. There's a cat stuck under the gate... 
apology1 = 'explanation' = 'request/report'
There are problems with this procedure, for not all functions can be so 
neatly labelled, nor is there always such an exact correspondence between 
a single utterance and a single function. An utterance may perform more 
than one function at once. Hor is it explained quite why one given act 
follows another. Nevertheless the important principle remains, that 
coherence may derive from interpretations of functions and that these 
interpretations derive from context.
Two unanswered questions remain, however, about the divergence of 
function and form. If the meaning of an utterance does not wholly reside 
in the referential meaning, and if people can mean quite different things 
with the same words, how do human beings interpret - usually quite 
accurately - what is meant from what is said? Vhy does this divergence 
of function and form exist at all when there are linguistic resources for 
stating the function more directly?
3.2 Interpretation of function 1: conversational principles.
Pragmatics theories of conversational principles and speech acts (see 
3.3) may go some way towards providing an answer to this last question. 
They were developed, as their names suggest, with spoken language in 
mind, but are applicable to written discourse too.
3.2.1 The co-operative principle.
The idea that conversation proceeds according to a principle, tacitly 
known and applied by all human beings, was first proposed by Grice 
([1967] 1975). He posited the existence of a 'co-operative principle', 
according to which we interpret language on the assumption that its sender 
is observing four maxims (op.cit: 45-46). We assume he or she is 
intending to:
- be true (the maxim of quality);
- give as much information as necessary, no more or less (the maxim of 
quantity);
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be relevant (the maxim of relation);
be clear, by avoiding obscurity and ambiguity, and being orderly (the maxim of manner). J
Using this assumption, combined with general knowledge of the world, the 
receiver can reason from the literal, referential meaning of what is said 
to the pragmatic meaning - and induce what the sender is intending to do 
with his or her words. Consider our own example:
There's a cat stuck under the gate at number 67 
The receiver is likely to have started with the knowledge, from experience 
of the world: that a cat will be unhappy at being stuck under a gate; that 
a human, by virtue of greater intelligence and manual dexterity is likely 
to be able to free such a cat; that humans generally like to alleviate the 
suffering of pets; and that old women in British society frequently have 
an - often misplaced - belief in the practical abilities of men. (The 
organization of such information is the domain of schema theory to which 
we turn in detail in chapter 4.) By virtue of the co-operative principle, 
the neighbour will also have assumed that the old woman was telling the 
truth (there was no evidence that she was lying, hallucinating or playing 
a practical Joke). He will also have assumed she was being relevant. If 
she had come and said, 'There's a flower growing in the garden at number 
67', though this would also be true, it would be hard to see its 
relevance12. Assuming all this, it is possible to explain how he 
interpreted this utterance as a request for help in freeing the cat - as 
having a pragmatic meaning roughly paraphrasable as
Come and free the cat which is stuck under the gate at number 67.
If we also assume that the speaker tacitly assumed that her addressee 
knew these facts about the world, and that he would interpret her words 
according to the co-operative principle, then we can also see why the way 
she actually phrased her request is not only true and relevant, but also 
brief and clear. That he did in fact think this way, and that her 
assumptions about his assumptions were in fact correct, is suggested by 
the fact that her words were so interpreted, and that she seemed perfectly 
satisfied with this interpretation. (The potentially infinite extension of 
the need for assumptions about assumptions, and thus for assumptions 
about assumptions about assumptions, and so on ad Infinitum, has often 
been dealt with in pragmatics (see, for example, Sperber and Wilson 1982; 
1986:17; Garnham 1987:46). We shall ignore it here, partly for reasons of
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space, but also because it seems to us to be an unnecessary 
distraction’3,)
The interpretation of discourse is thus the interaction of three levels: 
the linguistic, the functional and that of world knowledge. These three 
levels correspond to three types of description: linguistic, pragmatic and 
schematic and are closely related to the three types of schema we have 
already suggested in chapter one: language schemata, text schemata and 
world schemata1 ■». The interpretation of the examples we have given in 
this chapter can only be interpreted as an interart.Inn of these three 
levels, and not at one level of description alone. This will be an 
important principle in our theory of discourse deviation in chapter 8.
3.2.1.1 Departure from the maxims of the co-operative principle.
In the above example, the speaker was able to obey all four maxims at 
once, and, on the assumption that all four were in operation, the receiver 
could interpret what she said correctly. But there are cases, when the 
demands of the four maxims do not fit so happily together. Brevity and 
truth often pull in opposite directions, and a short utterance is often 
simplified to the point of distortion. 'Water boils at 100* Centigrade' is 
brief and considered to be true but is not as true - if one can talk in 
degrees of truth - as the longer 'Water boils at different temperatures 
depending on altitude'. Legal discourse and scientific discourse often 
sacrifice the maxim of quantity to the maxim of quality. The maxims of 
quantity and manner are often at odds too: clarity may demand length.
There are also times when meaning derives from deliberate violations - 
or 'floutings' as Grice calls them (op.cit.:49) - of the cooperative 
principle, always provided that the sender intends the receiver to perceive 
them as such, and that this is how, in fact, the receiver does perceive 
them. If the sender does not intend violations of the principle to be 
perceived as such, or if the receiver does not realize that they are 
deliberate, then communication degenerates into lying, obfuscation or 
simply breaks down altogether. It is possible, for example, to flout the 
quality maxim without lying. Utterances like 'I've got millions of beer 
bottles in my cellar' or 'My car breaks down every five minutes' are 
likely to be perceived as figures of speech: as hyperbole, rather than as 
lies. The same holds for metaphor ('Queen Victoria was made of iron') and 
irony and sarcasm Cl love it when you sing out of key all the time')
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which depend upon the assumption that they will be interpreted as 
deliberate floutings of the charge to 'be true- rather than as untruths 
intended to deceive. In such cases, the crucial condition is the sender's 
correct estimation of the receiver's state of knowledge. These figures of 
speech work only if the sender knows that average house cellars will not 
hold millions of bottles, women are not made of iron and so on - a fact 
which suggests that their succesful use in literature is as much 
contextual as textual. Through misjudgement of an interlocutor's knowledge 
of the world, metaphor becomes a lie. Children or people unfamiliar with 
a given context, for example, may take figures of speech literally CVas 
Queen Victoria really made of iron, Mummy?' / 'You English people must have 
very big houses'). This leads to the disturbing conclusion that the truth 
of a message is something constructed by sender and receiver, and not only
as is popularly held to be the case - a quality of the sender's 
intention or the message itself. Interpretation and coherence are
constructed not only through language knowledge and knowledge of 
pragmatic principles, but through the interaction of these two kinds of 
knowledge with more general knowledge of the world. Again we are pointed 
towards the need for a description of such knowledge in the analysis of 
coherence. Such a description is provided by schema theory.
Just as the quality maxim can be flouted for effect, so can the other 
three. The quantity maxim is violated in both directions: creating 
prolixity if we say too much and terseness if we are too brief. Prolixity 
may mark a sense of occasion, or respect; terseness may be judged as rude, 
or blunt, or forthright. The flouting of the relevance maxim may signal 
embarrassment or a desire to change the subject. Lastly, the maxim of 
manner is violated either for humour, as in the case of puns and doubles 
entendres, where rival meanings are deliberately tolerated, or in order to 
establish solidarity between speakers and exclude an overhearer from the 
conversation.
3.2.1.2 The co-operative principle and literariness.
The co-operative principle mediates between world knowledge and 
language knowledge and can go some way towards explaining the 
construction of coherence: how text becomes discourse in the mind of the 
receiver (Leech and Short 1981:295; Brown and Yule 1983:31-33; Viddowson 
1984:109-110). It is worth noting, however, the rather strange
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relationship which exists between this principle and discourse which is 
classed as literature. Consider, for example, the relationship of 
literature to the quality maxim. Writing commonly categorized as literary 
ranges from that presented as true (Homage to Catalonia), to the fantastic 
(XilS Tempest). in between these two extremes, there are many kinds of 
relationship between fiction and fact: works which interweave fact and 
j j P ( W a r — and.— Eeace, Ills— First— Circlg) or are loosely based on fact 
(Sons and Lovers); works which are allegorically factual (La Pest.e. Animal 
Earn) or which, though fictional, may be interpreted as 'the kind of thing 
which might happen' (less Of the D'Urbevilles, Thferfese Desqn p v r n n v ) iD 
the case of individual utterances, the degree of truth seems singularly 
irrelevant. To ask whether opening lines like
I was born in the year 1632 in the city of York... (Rnhlnsnn r.nicno>
I went to the Garden of Love (The Garden of I.ovp)
are true, is quite beside the point. It is the case, however, (Barthes 
C19663 1977:102; Eco 1979:166; Pitrat [1985] 1988:8-9) that even in the 
most fantastic literature the connections of minor constituent detail must 
be perceived as possible in the real world, however fabulous the overall 
effect. It is also the case, as Short (1989) argues in an analysis of 
drama, that the presuppositions in fictional utterances build up a world 
against which the truth value of subsequent utterances can be measured. 
Nevertheless, the operation of the quality maxim is in literature very 
different in kind (Searle 1975c).
Similarly, the quantity maxim is difficult to apply to literary 
discourse. What is the appropriate length for something which has no 
apparent practical or social function? By any practical criterion any 
work of literature is too long. Yet, conversely, the compression of meaning 
is also a feature of literature, and often perceived as a virtue. The 
kind of linguistic inventiveness so amply detailed in the literature of 
stylistics often effects a degree of economy, which is implicitly praised. 
Widdowson (1975:15), for example, cites Shakespeare's word class 
conversion of the noun 'boy* to a verb in the line
And I shall see some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness 
observing that this enables a number of ideas to be brought together 
simultaneously, which in paraphrase would take many more words. In fact, 
the implicit claim of any school of literary criticism which devotes its
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time to explicating the meaning of texts at much greater length than the 
text does itself, implies both the existence of compression and a positive 
assessment of that compression. This flouting of the quantity maxim in 
literary texts, however, creates quite different effects than the terseness 
it might create elsewhere. Similarly, the maxim of relevance is hard to 
apply to texts with no immediate practical or social effect. Lastly the 
flouting of the maxim of manner, like that of the flouting of the maxim of 
quantity, is often regarded as a virtue in literary writing. The Russian 
formalists referred to this as 'impeded form': a common feature of literary 
writing (see 6.3.1).
It is also worth noting that co-operative principle does not always 
apply easily to either intimate or belligerent interactive discourse. Here 
frequent repetition infringes the quantity maxim and sudden unexpected 
topic switches infringe the relevance maxim. This tallies with the 
suggestion by Volfson (1988) that discourse between people in a clear 
power relationship is often very similar to that between people on 
intimate terms.
when we compare these behaviours in terms of the social relationships 
of the interlocutors, we find again and again that the two extremes of 
social distance - minimum and maximum - seem to call forth very similar 
behaviour, (op.cit: 32).
Between these two extremes is what Volfson terms 'the bulge': the great 
majority of relationships which are neither. Grice's maxims apply most 
successfully to this bulge - the civil interaction of acquaintances - 
rather than to closer and more emotional intercourse. The similarity of 
literary communication to the two extremes suggests that it too suspends 
social niceties. The literary voice is both the voice of power and the 
voice of an intimate.
In non-literary discourse, however, of the kind to which Grice applied 
his principle, the meanings created by these floutings are often social, 
signalling the attitude of the sender to the receiver of the message, and 
the kind of relationship which exists or is developing between them. 
Grice viewed these attitudinal meanings as being created by departures 
from the co-operative principle. An alternative way of looking at this is 
to posit another principle also universally present in human intercourse: 
the politeness principle.
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3.2.2 The politeness principle.
The politeness principle, like the co-operative principle, may be 
formulated as a series of maxims which people assume are being followed 
in the utterances of others. As with the co-operative principle any 
flouting of these maxims will take on meaning, provided it is perceived 
for what it is. Although Grice had suggested the existence of such a 
principle, he had not developed it in detail. The idea was, however, 
considered by Lakoff (1973), and by Leech <1983:132)1S.) Lakoff 
formulated the maxims of a politeness principle as follows:
- don't impose
- give options
- make your receiver feel good
These maxims of the politeness principle explain many of those frequent 
utterances (excluding literary ones) in which no new information is 
communicated about the world. The words 'I'm sorry. I saw you were home.' 
are an attempt to mitigate an imposition. In English, requests, order and 
pleas are often interrogatives ('Would you mind/ Could you possibly/ May I 
ask you to’) which give the option of refusal; apologies ('I'm sorry to 
bother you'); and add praise to make our hearer feel good ('You know much 
more about car engines than I do'). Clearly the politeness principle and 
the co-operative principle are often in conflict with each other. 
Politeness and truth are often mutually incompatible (a fact acknowledged 
in the popular expression 'a white lie') and so are politeness and brevity.
The co-operative and politeness principles, and the tension between 
them, like the functional theories of language discussed in 3.1, again 
reflect a dual purpose in human intercourse: to act efficiently together 
with other people, and to create and maintain social relationships. There 
are situations, and there are types of relationships, in which one of these 
purposes becomes dominant, and the other hardly matters at all. In 
emergencies, when there is a need for immediate action, it is hardly 
appropriate to follow the politeness principle. When commenting on 
someone's new hairstyle, on the other hand, the truth of the assessment 
may seem unimportant.
3.2.2.1 The politeness principle and literariness.
Like the co-operative principle, the politeness principle seems 
singularly irrelevant to much literary discourse, and it would be hard to
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answer a question, after reading a novel or poem, as to whether the 
sender had been polite. Leaving aside the obligations imposed on students 
to read for examination, it might also be said that literary texts are 
typically ones which, as they serve no immediate practical purpose, may be 
taken or left as the receiver wishes. Despite this, they often take up a 
great deal of time. As such they both keep and break the maxim: 'Don't 
Impose'. As non-reciprocal discourse, they give no options in the sense 
that their development cannot be affected by the reader; on the other hand, 
they give the receiver an option par excellence: to cease receiving 
altogether, by closing the book or walking out of the theatre. Whether 
literary discourse makes its receivers 'feel good' is a similarly moot 
point, varying wildly from text to text and reader to reader, and 
considerably complicated by the deliberate seeking out of literature which 
causes sadness and pain.
Brown and Levinson <1978, 1987) suggest that the origin of the co­
operative and politeness principles is the same in all societies. All 
human beings need to manipulate the environment. To do this successfully, 
they need to co-operate, and to enter into social relationships in which 
they must acknowledge the 'face' of other people. They avoid intruding 
upon each other's territory - physical territory, a particular field of 
knowledge, a friendship - and also seek to enlarge the territory of others
- make the other person feel good in Lakoff's terms - presumably on the 
assumption that the same will be done to them. (Literature, we might note, 
intrudes very much upon face, in the sense that it often concerns the most 
intimate of subjects.) The specific nature of face varies from society to 
society. In some societies, parents have more rights to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of adult children than in others. In some cultures, a 
bedroom is private and cannot be entered without permission, while in 
others it can. Moreover the precise way of indicating respect for face 
may be culture specific, and not subject to direct translation. In some 
cultures, initial refusal of an offer may be merely polite, and invite 
repetition, in others the opposite may be true. Though their realizations 
differ, the two, often conflicting aims of communication - to co-operate 
and to maintain social relations - are universal. Brown and Levinson's 
theory also goes some way towards answering the question of why people 
speak indirectly. It enables them to give options, and also to retreat, to 
save their own 'face', behind the literal meaning of what is said.
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3.2.3 A third principle: of cognitive change.
The co-operative and politeness principles, then, reflecting a universal 
need to act together and to maintain social relationships, have been seen 
as a source of functional interpretation. Yet, on their own, they are 
inadequate in dealing with certain types of discourse, including literary 
discourse. In our last two chapters we shall argue that some discourse 
(including many literary texts) is motivated by neither of these 
principles and demands Interpretation by quite some other principle ye 
shall call this other principle the 'Cognitive Change Principle'. According 
to this principle, some discourse is best interpreted as though it followed 
a maxim: 'change the receiver'. Such discourse fulfils the need to 
rearrange mental representations: a process which can be best effected in 
the absence of pressing practical and social constraints. Certain types 
of discourse may aid this rearrangement, but in so doing, they demand 
suspension of both the politeness and co-operative principles. This is a 
major claim which we develop in chapter eight.
3.3 Interpretation of function 2: speech acts.
A further relevant approach from pragmatics is speech-act theory. This 
was first formulated by Austin (1962) and further developed by Searle 
(1969, 1975, 1975b), who both added to Austin's original ideas and 
presented them more systematically (see note 11). These ideas have 
subsequently been developed by other thinkers, but for the sake of clarity 
and brevity, we shall treat them as a single body of thought. The 
terminology we use is from Searle (1975b). Speech-act theory is advanced 
in discourse analysis to explain how knowledge is brought into play in the 
construction of coherence (Labov and Fanshel 1977; Widdowson 1979:97-98; 
Leech and Short 1981:290-294; Brown and Yule 1983:231-234).
Speech-act theory observes that there is a class of highly ritualistic 
utterances which carry no information about the world at all, because they 
refer only to themselves. Examples of such utterances are swearing an 
oath, sentencing a criminal, opening a building, arresting a felon, naming 
a ship. They are utterances in which saying the words and doing the 
action are the same thing: the function is created by the form. Such 
utterances are 'declarations'. The utterance 'I sentence you to death', for 
example, performs the function of sentencing someone to death, and this 
function is only performed (within certain legal systems'®) by this
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utterance. However, the utterance only succeeds in having this function if 
certain external conditions are fulfilled. The words must be uttered by 
someone with the necessary authority, in a country in which there is a 
death penalty, to a person who has been convicted of a particular crime; 
they must be spoken, not written, at the right time and in the right 
place. For the words to function as a death sentence, all these conditions 
must be fulfilled. Such conditions are 'felicity conditions'.
Declarations, however, are only a special case of a much commoner group 
of utterances, performatives. These are also utterances in which saying is 
doing, and they too are only successful if certain felicity conditions are 
fulfilled, but, unlike declarations, their related verbs ('vow', 'arrest', 
'declare' etc.) are not always actually said. A good, and often cited 
example, dealt with in detail by Searle (1975), is the act of ordering 
someone to do something. To do this it is possible to use the verb 
order* or use the imperative form, which is often associated with 
ordering. Yet, as with declarations, such utterances will only be 
perceived as orders if certain conditions are in operation and known to be 
in operation by both the sender and the receiver. The felicity conditions 
for an order are:
1) The sender believes the action should be done
2) The receiver has the ability to do the action
3) The receiver has the obligation to do the action
4) The sender has the right to tell the receiver to do the action
If any one of these conditions is not fulfilled, the utterance will not 
function as an order. Consider a situation in which a speaker tries to 
order a hearer to clean a pair of boots. For the speaker's utterance to 
function as an order, all of the above conditions must be fulfilled. If 
the speaker does not really believe that this should be done, then the 
order is insincere, and flawed (Condition 1). The speaker can order the 
hearer to clean the boots, but not to eat the Eiffel Tower - the hearer 
will not have the ability (Condition 2). The order will not succeed as 
an order unless the hearer is obliged to clean the boots (Condition 3), 
and the speaker has the right and the power to make them do so (Condition
4), Conversely, we can see that if the conditions do hold, then any 
reference by the sender to the action will be perceived as an order, even 
without an explicit form like 'I order you to...' or the imperative.
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Developing this description of performatives, speech-act theory 
formulates felicity conditions for other 'families’ of acts, each member of 
the family sharing felicity conditions with other members (Searle 1975b). 
The family of 'expressives' includes the acts of congratulating, 
welcoming, thanking, and apologizing; the family of 'commissives' the acts 
of promising and contracting; the family of 'directives' the acts of 
threatening, ordering, praying, advising and warning; the family of 
'representatives' the acts of asserting, claiming and stating. As the verb 
related to a particular act need not be said, but can be inferred if all 
the felicity conditions hold and are known to hold, then various layers of 
meaning can be identified. The formal literal meaning of the words is the 
'locution'; the act which is perfomed by saying it the 'illocution'; a third 
iayer is the perlocution' or overall aim of the discourse (Searle 1975), 
An utterance is said to have 'illocutionary' and 'perlocutionary' force. 
Meaning becomes more and more slippery as we move from one layer to the 
next. This is something which human beings exploit to their advantage. 
It enables them to avoid committing themselves and to retreat in front of 
danger; and this is one of the major reasons why people speak indirectly. 
'Are you busy?' is a more avoidable request than 'Sit down and talk to me'. 
Quite often, people explicitly discuss, or try to clarify the illocutionary 
and perlocutionary force, to formulate the 'upshot' of what is said. This 
is often a major concern of legal discourse. Even in more casual 
situations people often try to get at the upshot of what is being said, 
through utterances such as 'What are you trying to tell me?'.
Speech-act theory, which relates the function of utterances to sets of 
felicity conditions and the knowledge of participants that these 
conditions exist, may, like the theory of conversational principles, 
provide a partial explanation of coherence. It provides a means of 
probing beneath the surface of discourse and establishing the function of 
what is being said. This in turn may help in the formulation of 
structures beneath the surface, sequences and relations of acts.
3.3.1 Speech—act theory and literariness.
Yet like the conversational principles of co-operation and politeness, 
speech-act theory encounters problems when applied to literature, and 
indeed to non-reciprocal discourse in general. Firstly, and most 
obviously, the inference of an illocution, when a related verb is not used
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in its expression, depends upon the sender's correct assessment of the 
receiver's knowledge. Yet literary texts have, along with other written 
texts for unspecified receivers, a degree of uncertainty about the 
knowledge of the receivers; they are also very frequently severely 
displaced in time and culture. What judgements, for example, could Homer 
have made about the knowledge of his readers in the twentieth century? 
Secondly, although perlocutionary force is, as we have observed, at the 
best of times elusive, it seems likely, in the case of literature, that 
there is often, in the sense that literary works lack an overt purpose, no 
perlocutionary force. Thirdly, if interpretation relies upon mutual 
knowledge of relevant context, then in a fictional work, it is often 
difficult to say what the implied elements of relevant context are. On the 
other hand, relevant features of the context are often explicitly stated. 
They may also be constructed from the inferred presuppositions of 
utterances (Short 1989).
3.4 Discourse structure.
Pragmatics provides us with a means of relating stretches of language 
to representations of the physical, social and psychological world in 
which they occur. Discourse, indeed, might be defined as the totality of 
all these elements interacting. Yet pragmatics tends only to examine how 
meaning develops at a given point. Some means is needed to describe the 
linear development of discourse too.
One way of representing the relationship of parts in discourse is as a 
rank structure, analogous to the rank structure proposed for grammar. As 
each element may consist of one or more of the elements of the line below, 
it is possible for a discourse to consist of a single utterance, just as it 
is possible for a sentence to consist of a single clause which consists of 
a single phrase which consists of a single word. ('Go!', for example). 
Thus, if we regard a three volume series of books as a complete discourse, 
for example, we can render its structure as in figure 3. Similarly the 
structure of a trial might be rendered as in figure 4.
Vhat is proposed is not a rank structure applicable to all discourse in 
the way that the grammatical rank structure is applicable to all 
sentences, but a structure specific to a particular discourse type. For 
these structures rules of 'grammar' may be drawn up. In the discourse 
type 'trial', for example, if the token paradigmatically selected from the
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Ranks:
Series
volume (=vol) 
part (=pt) 
chapter(=c) 
paragraph(=p)
Figure 3. Rank structure of a discourse type <1).
Trial
Case
Indictment Plea Prosecution Defence Prosecution Defence Verdict Sentence
a^se Summary Summary
testimony testimony testimony 
/ \question answer (.... )
Figure 4. Rank structure of a discourse type <2>.
closed set {'guilty'/‘not guilty*/ no plea) is 'guilty' then every subsequent 
syntagmatic selection element up to the verdict is omitted.
In many discourse types, the boundaries of units are clearly marked. 
Volumes are physically separate; parts and chapters are labelled as such; 
paragraphs are marked off by indentation and are visible without reading 
the words. Similarly the stages of a formal spoken discourse are also 
often clearly marked with utterances such as *1 rest my case', 'Let me ask 
you another question' or 'Next witness'. Other discourse types do not have
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such overtly marked units; but they may also be susceptible to the same 
representat ion.
An influential study in this field was carried out by Sinclair and 
Coulthard (1975) and we shall use it here to introduce the concept of 
discourse structure. The discourse chosen by Sinclair and Coulthard was 
primary school lessons, a number of which were recorded and transcribed. 
With minor exceptions like reference to the raised hand of a pupil, the 
analysis was carried out on these transcripts only, and the situation, in 
terms of what could be seen by the participants, was ignored. On the
basis of this data the authors proposed a rank structure for these lessons 
as follows:
— Lesson
Transaction
Exchange
Move
Act
Acts, the lowest rank in this scale, are examples of speech acts (see 3.3). 
It is not clear quite what the felicity conditions for establishing these 
acts were. To have spelt out these conditions might in fact have revealed 
an important absence of rigour, despite the apparently scientific approach 
of the study; for felicity conditions demand access to the inner intentions 
and beliefs of participants which, though they may be stated reasonably 
enough in invented philosophical examples, are hard to come by in actual 
discourse. (For a discussion of the problems inherent in analyging actual 
discourse into acts see Labov and Fanshel 1977). Sinclair and Coulthard 
did, however, posit a finite number of acts used by the teachers and 
pupils in their data and gave each one a code as in table 1.
Rules were drawn up, based on the data, showing how these acts combine 
together to form moves and how moves combine to form various kinds of 
exchange. These rules are analogous to grammatical rules describing how 
words combine into phrases, or phrases into clauses. One kind of 
exchange, for example, called a Teaching Exchange, consists of between one 
and three moves:
Opening (Answering) (Follow-up)
(An element within brackets is optional.) Going down to the next layer, 
each of these moves consists of specified acts, as in figure 5.
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Code
acc
ack
z
b
ch
c
cl
com
con
d
el
e
i
1
m
ms
n
P
rea
rep
Act
Accept
Acknowledge
Aside
Bid
Check
Cue
Clue
Comment
Conclusion
Directive
Elicitation
Evaluation
Information
Loop
Marker
Function
shows T has heard correct information 
shows P has understood .intends to react 
T talking to himself/herself 
signals desire to contribute 
checks progress 
evokes bid
gives extra Information 
exemplifies/expands/Justlfies 
summarises 
requests action 
requests answer 
evaluates
provides information 
returns to point before P's answer 
marks boundary in discourse
Metastatement explicitly refers to development of lesson
Nomination 
Prompt 
React 
Reply 
Silent Stress
tells or permits a P to contribute 
reinforces directive or elicitation 
provides appropriate reply to directive 
provides appropriate reply to elicitation 
highlights marker.
Starter provides information to facilitate response
Reallzat.inn la g j 
'yes’, 'good', 'fine'
•yes', 'ok', 'mmhm', 'wow' 
Statement/question/command 
’Miss!' 'Sir!' Raised hand 
'Fin ished?1 'Ready?1 Questions 
'Hands up!' 'Don't call out!' 
Statement/question/command 
Statement/tag question 
'So,what we've been doing Is..
Imperative 
Question 
'Interesting.' 'Yes.'
Statement 
'Pardon?' 'Again?' 
'Well.' 'ok* 'Right' 
Statement 
'You.' 'Yes.' 'Jane.*
'Go on.' 'Hurry up.' 
non-linguistic 
Statement/question/nod 
pause
Statement/quest ion/command
•Good!'
(based on Sinclair and Coulthard 1975:40-44 (P = pupil; T = teacher)
Table 1. Acts in classroom discourse.
An Opening Move consists of the following Acts < / = or): 
+ (s)Cm)
I + el/d/i/ch + (p/cl) + (c/b/n) + (s)I I I I
e.g. (Right) (we're going What's the (You can (Angela) (It begins
to continue our longest river remember if with M.) 
study of rivers) In the world? you try)
an Answering Move of
(ack)
I
e.g (Yeah yeah, hold 
on a minute)
+ rep/rea/ack + I
That funny one. Missis 
..er.. Mlsslsslpl
(com)
I
(That was easy 
that was!)
e'B
and a Follow-up Move of
+ (e)
I
+ (Good)
(acc)
I
(That's right)
(com)
(I'm very pleased with you)
(Invented example based on Sinclair and Coulthard 1975)
Figure 5. Moves in classroom discourse.
Ve have described the Birmingham School approach as an influential, and 
seminal approach to the analysis of structure in discourse analysis. It 
does however have a good deal in common with much earlier structuralist 
descriptions of various text types, such as those by Propp ([1928] 1968) 
and Todorov ([1971] 1977) (to which we return in 6.4.) As such it reveals 
that the concerns of discourse analysis and literary theory are not so 
distant as might at first appear. If, as this chapter argues, the former 
would benefit from a more rigorous analysis of the knowledge 
representations used in the construction of coherence, then so too, it 
seems reasonable to claim, would the latter.
The Birmingham School approach has since been applied to many 
different discourse types: for example medical consultations (Coulthard and 
Montgomery 1981) and television quiz shows (Berry 1981). Those discourse 
types to which this approach is most easily applied tend to have certain 
features in common. They are all rather formal and ritualistic, and 
feature one participant with the institutional power to direct the 
discourse. This person may well plan the development of the discourse in 
advance, operating within the fairly narrow limits of the social 
conventions for that discourse type. There are cases where participants 
depart from the plans and conventions. Such 'deviation' from the expected 
structure is interpreted in varying ways. Vhen it is assumed that such a 
structure is known and deliberately flouted, the deviation may be 
interpreted as insubordination, crime or madness - or, if Judged more 
positively, as radical political action. If the deviation is assumed 
simply to arise from ignorance then it may be put down to immaturity or 
perhaps to the fact that the perpetrator is from a different culture. But 
again, as with the flouting of conversational principles, deviation from 
the predictions enabled by a discourse structure in literature, sppths t.n 
produce quite different effects. In many ways, as we have said, the 
Birmingham School description simply assigns to spoken discourse the kind 
of 'story grammar' beloved of structuralist literary theory (see 6.4) and 
later taken up in AI (Rumelhart 1975) though it is true that these are 
more textual than discoursal. In such descriptions there is analysis both 
of conformity to type and departure from it. Deviations are, moreover, 
often judged positively. The Birmingham School analysis simply cannot cope 
with deviant though coherent discourse. Fortunately for the analysts, the
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transcripts contain no instances of creative misbehaviour: the classroom 
equivalent, from a structuralist viewpoint, of art.
3.5 Discourse as process.
Dialogue in the narrow sense of the word is of course only one of the
forms - a very important form to be sure - of verbal interaction. But
dialogue can- also be understood in a broader sense, meaning not only direct. i-j i ___  . . . .j. . _ , , . —  ~ ocuoc, iuwauiiig nox onlydirect, face to face, vocalized verbal communication between persons, but 
also verbal communication of any type whatsoever. A book, i.e., a verbal
1B I?riT)-t’ ls also an element of verbal communication. (Bakhtin iVoloshinov] [1929] 1973:95)
The Birmingham School approach examines spoken discourse, seeking to 
interpret it in terms of a rank structure and showing that when it is 
analysed after the event, it is more rule governed than might at first be 
apparent. Knowledge of a particular structure presumably enables 
participants to relate utterances to each other and perceive them as 
coherent. Ve have compared this approach to structuralist analyses, and 
despite some obvious differences the comparison seems to be a valid one. 
Against this, it might be argued that the discourse of a primary school 
lesson is fundamentally different from that of, say, a novel or story, in 
that it is the creation of several people in interaction, and thus only 
partly under the control of one individual. It might also be observed 
that it is spoken rather than written and that these are fundamentally 
different parameters in discourse typology. In the remainder of this 
chapter we shall advance several arguments against these typological 
parameters: dialogue versus monologue; written versus spoken.
The traditional division of language into the spoken and the written is 
clearly and sensibly based on a difference in media and perception, the 
means of production and reception. There are many other differences too 
(Gregory 1966; Halliday 1985:xxiii-xxv). Yet in terms of discourse 
structure and typology the difference may not be so fundamental. Spoken 
discourse is often considered to be less planned and orderly, more open to 
intervention by the receiver. There are some kinds of spoken discourse, 
however, (like lessons, lectures, interviews and trials) which have 
significant features in common with typical written discourse. As we have 
seen in our summary of the Birmingham School approach, these kinds of 
spoken discourse are also planned, and the possibilities for subordinate 
participants can be severely limited. It is clear that in reading a novel
one cannot influence its development (that can be the pleasure or pain of 
reading), but it is almost equally hard for a criminal to influence the 
direction of a trial, or a primary school pupil to prevent the lesson 
progressing as the teacher intends.
An important alternative view of spoken discourse is provided by the 
conversation analysis of ethnomethodology, This reveals that even 
conversation, which is apparently the least structured type of discourse, 
yields a surprising degree of patterning to analysis (Levinson 1983:284- 
370). It also provides a fundamentally different approach to that of the 
structuralists and the Birmingham School. Rather than trying to impose 
large structures on what is happening from the outset, it begins at the 
most local level, trying to see how participants in interaction handle 
conversation: how they judge who can speak, and when. Indeed conversation 
analysts regard work like that of Sinclair and Coulthard as over-hasty, 
calling it 'premature theorizing' (Levinson 1983:287). Rather than wait 
until a discourse is finished, and then analyse it as a whole, from outside 
and with the benefit of hindsight, the ethnomethodologists try to 
understand how it unfolds in time. They view discourse as a developing 
process, rather than a finished product; and this, after all, is how the 
participants must be handling it and making sense of it, without the 
benefit of transcription and post hoc theorizing. The difference is 
analogous to that between process grammars and product grammars (see 4.1 
below). It is also analogous to the schism in literary theory between 
the work of the structuralists (see 6.4) and the work of reader-response 
and reception theorists (see 7.4).
It is worth remarking at this point that conversation, apparently so 
far removed from writing in its casual haphazardness, shares many features 
with literature. Therefore the kinds of process models used in its 
analysis may be highly relevant to literary theory. Conversation analysis 
in fact shies away from the issue of definition. But let us assume that 
this rarely defined, but intuitively recognizable kind of talk may be 
characterized as follows:
1) It is not primarily motivated by a practical task
2) Any unequal power of participants is partially suspended
3) The number of participants is small
4) Turns are quite short
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5) Talk is primarily intended for the participants and not for an 
outside audience
These definitions are imprecise - as imprecise as any working definition 
of literature. The boundary between conversation and other discourse 
types, like that between literary and non-literary discourse, is a fuzzy 
one, and there are many intermediate cases. Yet this resistance to 
definition is not the only feature conversation shares with literature. 
Literature is also unmotivated by practical need, marked by an intimate 
relationship between sender and receiver: the act of reading is perceived 
as a private experience, a direct communication with the author. Both 
literature and conversation are at once predictable and unpredictable. 
Conversation may serve the purpose of refreshing and changing schematic 
knowledge (Edwards and Middleton 1987) in a similar way to literature. 
These features may make some of the observations of conversation analysis 
as a discourse type pertinent to the analysis of literature.
3.6 Discourse as dialogue.
This chapter has argued for the construction of coherence as the 
interaction of text and knowledge. Text (which is itself the product of 
the tacit language knowledge of the receiver in interaction with 
substance) must enter into further relationships with pragmatic knowledge 
(3.2, 3.3), structural knowledge (3.4) procedural knowledge (3.5), and 
knowledge of the world. The next chapter will examine the issues of the 
representation and organization of world knowledge (schema theory) as a 
prelude to relating the latter to literature and literary theory. Yet it 
would be wrong to regard these elements in the construction of coherence 
as discrete and mutually impenetrable. In later chapters we shall argue 
that, contrary to some of the theories advanced in AI, text and world 
knowledge both constantly affect each other, and that this dynamic 
interaction is particularly true of a certain type of discourse (to be 
defined in Chapter 8) including many literary discourses.
It is pertinent at this point in the argument to draw attention, in 
illustration of this, to a phenomemenon extensively studied in linguistics: 
'Functional Sentence Perspective' (hereafter FSP) (a term often attributed 
to Mathesius*7). This refers to the different linguistic forms 
(specifically the different syntactic arrangements) which may realize the 
same conceptual content. This phenomenon can be explained in terms of
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the interaction of form and knowledge: more specifically in terms of the 
interaction of form with the sender's knowledge of the knowledge of the 
addressee.
As such the issue is profoundly connected with the role of dialogue in 
discourse and with the effect of an author's presuppositions about readers. 
These are issues which are much discussed in literary theory. Formalists, 
structuralists and new critics argue for an examination of the text as an 
autonomous object unsullied by consideration of authorial intention or 
reader variation, while phenomenologists, reader-response and reception- 
theory critics argue for the necessity of including a description of the 
individual reader (see 7.4). Bakhtin (Voloshinov ([1929] 1973:83-99)) 
argues that dialogue is one of the fundamental structuring principles of 
all discourse, written and spoken alike. The phenomenon of FSP, gives 
weight to this hypothesis even at the level of the clause, and thus 
penetrates far into the territory of sub-sentential linguistics. 
Paradoxically, this domination of the 'dialogic principle' is as true in 
discourse - like literary discourse - which appears to be created by one 
person alone, as it is in discourse which is created by two or more. It 
is also arguably true - we may note in passing - that dialogue precedes 
monologue in both ontogenetic and philogenetic language development, and 
this gives further weight to arguments for its predominance in human 
discourse in general.
FSP is also important in our argument as it suggeslj a limitation to the 
representation of discourse in formal languages by AI (see next chapter).
3.6.1 Reciprocity In discourse.
As a prelude to examining the influence of dialogue on monologue, let 
us suppose that there are two fundamental types of discourse: reciprocal 
and non-reciprocal. Discourse is reciprocal when there is at least a 
potential for interaction, when the sender can monitor reception and adjust 
to it - or, to put it another way, when the receiver can influence the 
development of what is being said. In non-reciprocal discourse, sender 
and receiver may have no opportunity for interaction. The prototype of 
reciprocal discourse is face-to-face conversation. The prototype of non- 
reciprocal discourse is a book by a dead author. The distinction, however,
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is misleading. Suppose reciprocal and non-reciprocal discourse are 
considered to be opposite poles of a cline.
RECIPROCAL NOS-RECIPROCAL
If we try to assign positions to particular instances of discourse we find 
firstly that there are many intermediate cases, and secondly that 
absolutely non-reciprocal discourse is unlikely. Even writers working in 
solitude try to form some idea of the receiver of their work and adjust to 
it the meaningfulness of what they say can be viewed as a measure of 
the success of that prediction and adjustment.
All discourse is more or less reciprocal, if only because it is based 
upon assumptions about receivers. It should also be clear that although 
there is a general tendency for speech to be more reciprocal and writing 
to be less so, this is by no means necessarily true, and the 
reciprocal/non-reciprocal cline, like the formal/informal cline, cuts across 
the distinction between speech and writing. A church liturgy, though 
spoken, is far from the reciprocal end of the scale, but a scribbled memo, 
though written, may trigger off a series of replies and counter replies, 
and is thus highly reciprocal.
3.6.2 Functional sentence perspective (FSP).
So far we have described the reciprocity of all discourse in the 
vaguest of terms, connecting it to the mechanisms of dialogue only 
generally by saying that monologues are often constructed with the 
receiver in mind. Yet this structuring of discourse along the patterns of 
dialogue has an effect at the most detailed, grammatical level.
Chapter 2 examined the details of formal lexical and grammatical 
connections between clauses and sentences in monologue. Another kind of 
formal connection in monologic discourse is very intimately related to 
dialogue with an imagined receiver. One could even regard the end of each 
clause as the point at which the sender assesses the effect on a potential 
receiver, imagines a reply, and adjusts the next sentence accordingly.
If we want to tell somebody a fact about the world - let's say that 
Jane ate fish and chips - we have a number of ways in which we can put 
this into a sentence. We could say simply:
- Jane ate fish and chips 
but there are many other ways of saying the same thing:
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- It was Jane who ate fish and chips.
- Vhat Jane did was eat fish and chips.
- The person who ate fish and chips was Jane.
- Fish and chips were eaten by Jane.
- Bating fish and chips is what Jane did.
- Fish and chips Jane ate.
- Fish is what Jane ate - and chips.
In a discourse consisting of a succession of sentences each one will 
make a choice between the kind of grammatical options illustrated above. 
The strange thing about these choices, however, is that while each sentence 
apparently means exactly the same thing, the aptness of choices, from the 
reader's viewpoint, may aid or disrupt the construction of coherence. This 
is best demonstrated by example. Consider the following two versions of 
the biographical sketch of Ernest Hemingway which appears on the inside 
cover of the Penguin edition of For Vhrmi the Rail Tolls:
1) It was in 1899 that Ernest Miller Hemingway was born in Oak Park, a 
highly respectable suburb of Chicago. Being a doctor was the occupation 
of his father, a keen sportsman. Of six children, Ernest was the second. 
A lakeside hunting lodge in Michigan, near Indian settlements, was the 
place where holidays were spent by the family. Although in school 
activities Ernest was energetic and successful, twice he ran away from 
home before the Kansas City Star was joined by him as a cub reporter in 
1917. The Italian front was the place where he volunteered to be an 
ambulance driver during the next year. Somebody wounded him. Features 
were written by him for the Toronto Star Veekly when he returned to 
America in 1919. 1921 was the year he married. As a roving 
correspondent he came to Europe, and several large conferences were 
covered by him.
2) Ernest Miller Hemingway was born in 1899 at Oak Park, a highly 
respectable suburb of Chicago, where his father, a keen sportsman, was a 
doctor. He was the second of six children. The family spent holidays 
in a lakeside hunting lodge in Michigan, near Indian settlements. 
Although energetic and successful in all school activities, Ernest twice 
ran away from home before Joining the Kansas City Star as a cub 
reporter in 1917. Next year he volunteered as an ambulance driver on the 
Italian front and was badly wounded. Returning to America he began to 
write features for the Toronto Star Veekly In 1919 and was married in 
1921. That year he came to Europe as a roving correspondent and 
covered several large conferences.
A reader (and such Judgements must always be reader-specific) may Judge 
which of the two versions is more easily perceived as coherent. This 
reader (i.e. the present writer), who re-wrote the original (2) as (1) 
would imagine, on the assumption that he shares many assumptions with 
other readers, that (2) is the more readily coherent. In fact, contrary to
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opinions expressed in reader-response literary theory, there is evidence 
from empirical studies to support the view that there is more uniformity 
of Judgement among readers than might at first appear (see van Peer 1986, 
Short and van Peer 1989, Short and Alderson 1989).
If coherence is affected by such choices of FSP, then it is possible 
that the choice is being dictated by the sentence before, each one having 
a 'knock-on* effect on the structure of the next. If this, and only this, 
were the explanation, then FSP might Justifiably be regarded as another 
instance of context-independent formal connection between sentences (like 
endophoric cohesion). FSP, however, is contextual as well as formal, 
dictated by the assumptions of the sender about the knowledge of the 
receiver. Monologic discourse, in fact, may be viewed as a succession of 
answers to imagined and unspoken questions by the receiver (Viddowson 
1978:25-26). In this light, all discourse seems to proceed dialogically, 
even if the other voice, is only present as a ghost.
- (Vhere and when was Ernest Hemingway born?)
- Ernest Hemingway was born in 1899 at Oak Park, a highly respectable
suburb of Chicago
- (Vhat did his father do?)
- where his father, a keen sportsman, was a doctor
- (Vhat was his position in the family?)
- He was the second of six children
- (Vhere did the family spend their holidays?)
- The family spent holidays..
and so on. The order of information in each answer is dictated by the 
question, in that, as a general rule, known information is fronted and 
unknown information forced to the end, following the principal of 'end 
focus' (Quirk et al. 1985:1360-1362).
It is not our intention here to examine in all their complexity the 
many different analyses of this phenomenon, and in particular we shall say 
nothing about the interaction of phonetic focus (which is the central 
concern of many studies) and that achieved by syntactic reordering. 
Suffice it to say that in all the varying interpretations and their 
different terminologies, there is agreement that the clause has a bi­
partite structure, and the function of choices is to enable different 
information to be brought into different degrees of prominence.
One widely accepted explanation is that the ordering of the discourse 
is determined by the sender's hypotheses about what the receiver does and
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does not know (Halliday 1976:174-188; Halliday 1985:278-281; Quirk et al. 
1985:1360). Information divides into two types - that which the sender 
thinks the receiver already knows, and that which the sender thinks the 
receiver does not already know - 'given' and 'new' information 
respectively. Any unit of information may change status as the discourse 
proceeds, and what was new in one sentence become given in the next, 
precisely because it has Just been said. Indeed communication might be 
defined as the conversion of new information into given information, and a 
successful communicator as a person who correctly assesses the state of 
knowledge of his or her interlocutor. If the sender misjudges, and treats 
what is given as new, the discourse will be boring; in the reverse case, 
when the new is assumed to be given, discourse becomes incomprehensible. 
In this sense it can be said that the structuring principle of all 
discourse is dialogue.
A typical discourse then, proceeds roughly as follows:
- Given..Hew. Given..Hew. Given..New.
each given unit being already known by the receiver, or deriving from a 
preceding piece of new information. The boundary between each pair may 
well coincide with, or indeed define, the boundary of a language unit: a 
sentence or a clause. Ve can analyse the biographical sketch of Ernest 
Hemingway in this way, and explain why the second version 'felt right' and 
the first version 'felt wrong'. The first clause can be divided as follows:
GIVEN NEV
Ernest Miller Hemingway was born I in 1899 at Oak Park, a highly
respectable suburb of Chicago
This of course is relative to the knowledge of a particular receiver. The 
writer may well have assumed that most book buyers already know of the 
existence of an author called Ernest Hemingway, and even if they did not 
before they picked up the book, they would already have seen his name on 
the cover before turning to read this biographical sketch inside. Even 
without previous knowledge or the sight of a cover or title, people often 
have to begin a discourse with new information, though this is often 
mediated by a 'dummy', like 'there was' in the 'given slot' at the beginning
GIVEN NEV
There was • a man called Ernest Hemingway
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The fact that Hemingway was born can be treated as part of the given 
information because all human beings are born (with disputable mythical 
exceptions). The next part, however, "in 1899 at Oak Park" might 
reasonably be treated as new. In the opening clause, however, one piece 
of new information is Inserted into the given information. It is unlikely 
that most readers already know Hemingway's middle name'®.
GIVEN jjgy
where his father I a keen sportsman, was a doctor
Readers will know that he must have had a father, from knowledge of the
world, but are not assumed to know what that father was. (The stock
opening 'X was born' excludes the main protagonist in this universal 
biographical event: the mother.)
GIVEN JTEV
he was I the second of six children
It is known that Ernest existed but not his position in the family.
GIVEN NEV
the family I spent holidays in a lakeside hunting
lodge in Michigan near Indian settlements
At this point it is known that he had a family - seven of them have 
already been mentioned - but not whether they went on holiday nor where; 
although here we may make an important cultural assumption: if we assume 
it as a norm that families go on holiday (a fact of life as inevitable as 
having a father) we might divide it into:
GIVEN NEV
the family spent holidays I in a lakeside hunting lodge in
Michigan near Indian settlements
The ordering of given and new information is not always as 
straightforward as this however. In the very next sentence:
Although energetic and successful in all school activities, Ernest twice 
ran away from home before joining the Kansas City Star as cub reporter 
in 1917.
new information is forced to the front as though it can be assumed that a 
famous writer is naturally energetic and successful at school.
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(Alternatively we can read this as beginning with a clause in which the 
given information is ellipted: 'although he was energetic and successful')
The phenomenon of FSP reveals the futility of an account of grammatical 
choice, or of the relationship between grammatical choice and coherence, in 
isolation from a description of the knowledge of a specified receiver or 
group of receivers. In their approach to discourse, however, AI and 
linguistics-based literary theories, have a tendency to err in opposite 
directions. The former seeks to account for knowledge independently of 
linguistic choice, the latter to describe linguistic choice without 
reference to the knowledge of specified receivers.
3.7 Conclusion.
In this chapter, we have discussed the relationship of linguistics and 
discourse analysis, and the view that a formal decontextualized approach 
is incapable, on its own, of accounting for coherence. Ve have rehearsed 
the arguments for integrating descriptions of pragmatic knowledge with 
linguistic knowledge, but noted their inadequacies in dealing with certain 
discourse types, including those which are regarded as literary. Ve have 
glanced at descriptions of discourse structures, both as products and as 
processes - a knowledge of which may also aid the construction of 
coherence. In all of this we have observed the need for a description of 
world knowledge to be added to one of pragmatic and linguistic knowledge, 
and held out the possibility that such a description may compensate for 
the inadequacies of linguistic and pragmatic description in accounting for 
literariness.
Our last section on FSP (3.6) has demonstrated the potential and actual 
interaction of levels, illustrating that they are in no sense discrete, and 
warning against any atomistic or reductionist approach to discourse. For 
this reason we shall make frequent reference to it in the chapters which 
follow: in our analysis of AI descriptions of the relationship of 
conceptual to linguistic representations (Chapters 4 and 5), in our 
examination of theories which seek to define literature at one level and 
one level only (Chapters 6 and 7), and in our own theory (Chapters 8 and 
9).
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Votes to Chapter Three.
1. In Halliday's terms (see 2.3.4) 'home* 'gate* and 'number 67* could be
treated as collocations. As already indicated, we do not accept this kind
of connection as semantic. They might also be related in a semantic
network. Ve prefer to regard them as linked through inclusion in the same 
schema.
2. See chapter one, note 2.
3. Halliday's (1975) list of the functions of language for an infant, 
though it is often discussed along with other functional theories, is not 
included here on the grounds that it is a description of child functions 
which are then mapped' on to and absorbed into the adult functions.
4. Under this heading we include Biihler's 'expressive' function, Jakobson's 
emotive' function, Searle's ‘expressives', Robinson's 'expression of affect' 
and Popper's 'expressive' function. (Hymes' functions are not included in 
this and the following two notes as they are so close to Jakobson's.)
5. Under this heading we include Biihler's 'representational' function, 
Jakobson's 'referential' function, Searle's 'representatives', Robinson's 
'reference to non-linguistic world', Popper's 'descriptive’ function
6. Under this heading we Include Jakobson's 'phatic' function, Searle's 
'commissives' and Robinson's 'role relationship marking encounter 
regulations'
7. Under this heading we Include Biihler's 'conative' function, Jakobson's 
'conative' function, Searle's 'declarations' and 'directives', Robinson's 
•regulation of self and others', Popper's 'signalling' function.
8. Both Robinson's and Hymes' lists of functions develop and add to 
Jakobson's. Neither makes the poetic function a centre of attention.
9. Newman (1986), citing evidence from neurology, advances the 
extraordinary view that linguistic and prosodic patterning affects the 
brain
enhancing neurotransmitter synthesis among otherwise dormant neurons in 
both propositional and prosodic left- and right-brain linguistic areas, 
causing new neural circuits to be constructed, perhaps bridging the 
hemispheres, perhaps facilitating integration of the neocortex, perhaps 
facilitating evolution.
This view, as he points out, need not be as 'far fetched' as it at first 
appears.
10. These words are used about Hallidayan functionalism, but it seems 
reasonable to apply them to any functional theory of language.
11. Ve treat broad classifications of speech acts as descriptions of the 
major functions of language (see Vales 1989:196). Ve shall use Searle's 
taxonomy of speech acts rather than Austin's. The best summary of the 
relationship of Searle's description of speech acts to that of Austin is 
given in Searle (1975b).
12. It is possible of course, in keeping with what we have said in 2.2, to 
imagine contexts in which this utterance would be relevant and meaningful: 
if, for example, both speakers had mutual knowledge of the unusually late 
arrival of spring, or earlier failures to grow flowers in this garden.
13. The argument seems to us to be a misguided intrusion of mathematics 
into the analysis of language. Vhile it is true that, in order to 
interpret an utterance pragmatically, the Sender (S) must know the 
relevant context but also know that the Receiver (R) knows it, and that R 
knows that S knows it, and that R knows that S knows that R knows it, it 
seems to us, through introspection into our own thought processes, that
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this proliferation is in practice taken no further. There are limits to 
the capacity of the mind. Similarly, though I am thinking, and I can think 
about the fact that I am thinking, and think about the fact that I am 
thinking about the fact that I am thinking, it is hard to take it further.
14. Ve do not imply by this that there are no individual facts stored in 
memory as well as schematic representations. These may be attached to 
the most relevant schema, however and thus described along with them* see
1.3 and 8.1.2.
15. Leech, not only formulates the politeness principle in more detail than 
either Lakoff or Grice, he also adds to the co-operative and politeness 
principle an 'irony principle', and, under the heading of textual rhetoric 
principles of 'processibility', 'clarity', 'economy' and 'expressivity'.
16. The death penalty is still in force in some English-speaking 
countries, for example, in the U.S.A. and Jamaica.
17. This attribution is made, for example, by Lyons (1977:509) and Vales 
(1989:199). Essays by Mathesius can be found in Vachek (1964).
18. Though this insertion is innocuous enough in this example, the 
treatment of new information as though it were new is used in more 
sinister way in propaganda and journalism.
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Chapter Four.
Schema theory 1: conceptual representation; one version of the theory.
4.0 Introduction.
Chapters 2 and 3 have examined various approaches to discourse and 
their capacity to explain coherence. All of these approaches point 
towards the need for a theory of the organization of pre-existing 
knowledge as a necessary addition to a successful explanation of the 
construction of coherence. It is also clear that factors effecting 
coherence behave differently in literary discourse, and for this reason we 
may expect the role of knowledge to be different too. In this chapter we 
shall examine some specific suggestions about the nature and organization 
of knowledge in discourse processing, and thus prepare the ground for 
subsequent discussion of the relation of knowledge and literary discourse.
The particular theories of knowledge organization examined in this 
chapter are from AI. Like all AI, and a good deal of current linguistics 
work on language, they assume that the mind abstracts a semantic or 
conceptual representation of 'facts* from language1. Representations of 
single facts2 are organized into larger knowledge structures. In 
examining this approach we shall concentrate upon one particular theory as 
representative of many others (for a summary and comparison of different 
systems see Garnham 1988:24-57). Eventually, we shall seek to qualify and 
modify the AI view, especially when applied to discourse of a particular 
kind (which for the moment we shall continue to call 'literary').
The chapter, therefore, proceeds as follows. As a prelude to detailed 
discussion of one version of schema theory in 4.5, we shall:
1) examine in general the computational and AI approach to language and 
text (4.1);
2) describe one system for representing 'facts' in natural language (4.2);
3) discuss some of the problems Inherent in such formal representations of 
the 'content' of a natural language text (4.3 and 4.4).
4.1 The computational paradigm of language.
Making use of Kuhn's well-known characterization of the development of 
scientific thought as a succession of 'paradigms' (Kuhn 1962) in which 
periods of 'normal science' are disupted by 'revolutions', Vinograd (1983)
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identifies what he considers to be a major 'paradigm shift* in the 
linguistic sciences during the 1970s. He terms the new paradigm ‘the 
computational paradigm' and regards it as having replaced the 
'generational paradigm' as the most widely accepted and fertile framework 
for research into language. AI work on text was both Instrumental in 
shaping this paradigm and continues to operate within it. (For further 
summaries of the computational paradigm see also, among others, Fodor 
1978:27-53 and Greene 1987:59-99).
The computational paradigm, in Winograd's view, is based upon a 
metaphorical comparison of the mind with the operation of a computer, and 
as such replaces other metaphors of language (as law, chemistry, biology 
or mathematics) which were the basis of earlier paradigms. ('Strong' 
versions of AI, which contend that the computer 'really is a mind' (see 
Searle [1980] 1987), reject this view of the comparison as merely 
metaphorical, but this dispute will not affect our description at this 
point.) The paradigm, in the opinion of both its supporters and 
opponents, is dualist, concerning itself with the mind rather than the 
brain, or - in the terms of the metaphor - the software rather than the 
hardware (Fodor 1978:9,17; Vinograd 1983:13; Searle [1980] 1987:39).
The computational paradigm views language as "a communicative process 
based on knowledge" (Vinograd 1983:13). In terms of the computer 
metaphor, the processes may be regarded as analogous to computer programs 
and the knowledge as analogous to data structures (Simon 1979). It may 
be represented in more detail by a stratificational model in which input 
at one level is processed in the light of a discrete body of knowledge and 
produces an output of assigned structures which then form the input for 
the next level up. A version of such a model Is given in figure 6. Such 
a model, which conceives of comprehension as a bottom-up process and 
production as a top-down process, has the virtue of modularity, allowing 
input to be dealt with stage by stage, but it has certain drawbacks too. 
Most obviously, it is 'brittle' and failure at any stage in the hierarchical 
progression will bring it to a standstill. It also takes no account of 
means by which levels may be by-passed. The use of stock phrases or 
Idioms, for example, may dispense with the grammatical level; top-down 
processing may employ general impressions concerning meaning, intention or 
text type to interpret lower levels. It is also true that the 
Identification of an exponent at one level must always involve reference
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todel of language comprehension. (V inograd
to others and that therefore there can be no isolation of one level from 
the others. Thus description must always be 'shunted' from one level to 
another (Halliday 1976:59)3. Such shortcomings, however, do not negate the 
validity of the stratificational model, but only point to a need for 
adjustment and supplementation. Schema theory is an instance of such a 
supplementation.
A central difference between this paradigm and its predecessors lies in 
the emphasis it places upon process rather than result. In contrast to 
the semiotic model which separates langue from parole or the generative 
model which separates competence from performance, it views the operation 
of language knowledge as its area of enquiry, believing that the "structure 
of language is derived from the structure of processes" (Vinograd 1983:21). 
The effects of this shift in emphasis can be most clearly seen in the
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computational paradigm's approach to grammar. Earlier models which 
analyse data post hoc as a given whole, have been replaced by grammars, 
such as the widely used augmented transition networks (ATJs), which are 
concerned with the processes of classification and analysis 'on line' (see 
for example Wanner and Xaratsos 1978; Winograd 1983:195-267; Bower and 
Cirillo 1985; Pitrat [1985] 1988:67-84). The recent and influential theory 
of connectionism (Rumelhart and McLelland 1986, see chapter 1, note 5 
above) in which rules and knowledge are seen as being 'in the connections', 
and thus epiphenomena rather than phenomena, can in many ways be seen as 
a further extension of this emphasis on process. In this view it is as 
though there are no data structures, but only programs. What appear to be 
Independent 'knowledge' and 'rules' are by-products of paths through the 
connections and thus in a sense pure procedures.
Procedural views emanating from the computational paradigm are 
compatible with the approach to discourse analysis which emphasizes 
process rather than product (see 3.4. and 3.5), and with those reader- 
centred literary theories which emphasize the ongoing experience of 
reading rather than structures derived after the event (see 6.4 and 7.4 
below).
4.1.1 The AI approach to text.
The computational paradigm, as we have described It above, does not 
view language understanding as a process of decoding, but rather one of 
construction. In other words, the mental representation which is at the 
end of the chain of processing has not been merely transferred. Any 
features it may share with the mental representation of the interlocutor 
are present by virtue of the fact that shared knowledge and shared 
processing strategies have interacted with text to produce similar results. 
As such, this view of language processing is compatible with work in 
pragmatics, which may be viewed as concentrating attention upon the strata 
which derive representations from assigned semantic structures through the 
application of deductive and inferential rules (reasoning). In a similar 
way, work which goes under the traditional headings of phonology, 
linguistics and semantics concentrates attention upon the earlier stages 
of this stratificational computational paradigm.
AI, on the other hand, concentrates its attention on the mental 
representations which are the beginning (in production) and end (in
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comprehension) of this hierarchy. In the view of AI, however, they are not 
only the result of that assignment of structures to the text. Existing 
representations (i.e. schemata) are also used. It is a two way interaction. 
Schemata may be related to the assigned structures derived from text via 
reasoning, which is the focus of research in pragmatics, or more directly, 
through comparison of their contents with those derived directly from 
text.
Initial work in AI concentrated almost exclusively on text 
comprehension rather than generation, sometimes with the vague and naive 
assumption that human text generation is simply comprehension in reverse 
(Pitrat [1985] 1988:93). In the eighties, this imbalance has been 
redressed slightly with a number of publications and projects on text 
generation (see for example Appelt 1985; McKeown 1985; Mann 1987; Danlos 
1987; Patten 1988; Dale 1988). Ve shall use the term 'communication' to 
cover both, though because of the work we shall be looking at, both in AI 
and literary theory, our bias too will be towards comprehension.
Two points about the AI approach to mental representation need to be 
made very clearly:
1) mental representations are considered to exist in some language other 
than a natural language.
2) such representations may be derived either from a natural language 
representation (i.e. a discourse) or from events themselves. (This tenet 
is referred to by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983:5) as the 'constructivist 
principle' of the computer paradigm.)
Both of these ideas have been arrived at practically rather than 
theoretically (Schank and Abelson 1977:11). That is to say, in attempts to 
simulate text processing by computer, the use of a data base representing 
knowledge in a formal language has proved most successful in the 
handling of natural language texts. The fact that human memory of texts 
does not usually include the linguistic form of the original suggests the 
use of similar representations in memory by people. In psychological 
experiments on recall, subjects confuse sentences with different syntactic 
structures but similar meanings (Johnson-Laird and Stevenson 1970); they 
do not remember whether sentences were active or passive (Sacks 1967); 
they do not remember whether information was presented in one or more 
sentences (Bransford and Franks 1971). Interestingly, literary language, 
particularly that of poetry, is an exception to this. People also
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remember verbatim chunks* of certain other discourse types, especially 
advertisements and prayers, as well as words which were used at 
emotionally charged moments such as separation, declarations of love, and 
news of death.
It is important to note that in literary analysis even limited 
acceptance of the constructivist principle would be a considerable blow to 
formalist dismissals of positive evaluations of 'realism' in fiction. For 
though a narrative may be fictional as a whole, the non-linguistic 
representations of the units which compose it® may correspond to 
representations of non-fictional events, and this may give a theoretical 
basis to evaluative judgements based on the match between the two. To 
take an example: in Paul Scott's The Towers of Slloncp ([19711 1973:327) a 
male character, going to the lavatory, decides to urinate against the 
porcelain on the inside of the lavatory bowl so that the sound of his 
action will not embarrass people in the next room. (This rather crude 
example is a felicitous one as - because of the private and taboo nature 
of urination - this strategy to avoid embarrassment is known by male 
readers but is unlikely to have been verbalized.) A positive Judgement of 
this detail as 'realistic' may result from comparison of the representation 
of the 'fact' derived from its verbal realization in the novel with its 
representation from non-verbal experience in the mind of the reader. 
Linguistic choices such as those between synonyms ('piss', 'urinate','pee') 
(see 2.3.4) or different FSPs ('What he did was...', 'The side of the bowl 
was the place where....' etc.) (see 3.6.1) will also make no difference.
4.1.2 Objections to AI text theory.
The AI approach to text is open to challenge from a number of 
directions. Sot only is it incompatible with approaches such as 
deconstruction and hermeneutics which challenge the scientific approach in 
general, it has also been hotly disputed by philosophers and psychologists 
who da share AI's scientific assumptions (Searle [19801 1987; Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1986; Born 1987; Boden 1987, 1989). AI simulation, it is argued, 
has not succeeded in approaching human capacities for text handling 
(Shanker 1987), and even if it had, similar results would not necessarily 
indicate similar processes (Searle [19801 1987). Successful symbol 
manipulation, argue AI's opponents, does not entail understanding or 
intentionality, and human beings may employ quite different, more intuitive
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and heuristic strategies (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). It is not the 
machine which thinks but the programmer with the aid of the machine 
(Seumaier 1987; Kobsa 1987). False premises, incorrect knowledge, 
mistaken inferences and inbuilt bias may make artificial intelligence 
unreliable (Boden 1989)6. AI strengthens the mechanist metaphor and 
ignores the moral significance of language (Harris 1987). There is, in 
short, in the view of some scholars, inadequate evidence for making the 
leap from the partial abilities of AI programs to conclusions about the 
human mind. (For an AI answer to these kinds of objections to its claims, 
see Schank 1986: 1-24.)
In what follows, we shall attempt to explore some AI ideas about 
conceptual representations and their interaction with text, though without 
implying any wholesale acceptance of those ideas as theories of human 
psychology. Ve shall also examine problems and objections. Ve should say 
at this point, however, that it seems to us counterproductive to see these 
views as either wholly 'right' or wholly 'wrong'. They may simply be 
helpful in progressing further. Certainly the strong emotional reaction 
to any hint of an end to the human monopoly of intelligence, or to any 
suggestion that research in AI may provide insights into human thought, is 
not helpful. Ve rather take the view that the AI approach may provide a 
starting point on which a more complex model of human interaction with 
text may be built. The kind of text-handling strategies developed in AI 
do not have to be tlfi. strategies used by humans, or not. Human beings, as 
van Dijk and Klntsch point out in their complex model of discourse 
comprehension, may use many strategies simultaneously (van Dijk and 
Kintsch 1983).
For the moment, however, we shall provisionally accept the AI approach 
as a plausible theory of human communication. One of the strongest 
versions of this belief in the applicability of AI to human psychology is 
to be found in the work of Roger Schank and his colleagues. This, 
together with the power of his theory, and its extraordinarily widespread 
influence and citation (almost every contemporary introduction to 
discourse analysis, psychology and AI has a section devoted to his 
theories), is our reason for concentrating on his work.
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4.2 One system of conceptual representation: Conceptual dependency 
theory (CD).
We regard language as being a multi-leveled system, and the problem of 
un ers an ng as being the process of mapping linear strings of words 
into well formed conceptual structures. A conceptual structure is 
defined as a network of concepts, where certain classes of concepts can 
be related to other classes of concepts. The rules by which classes of 
concepts combine are called the conceptual syntax rules. Since the 
conceptual level is considered to underlie language it is also considered 
to be apart from language. Thus the conceptual syntax rules are 
organizing rules of thought as opposed to rules of language.
Schank (1975:268)
Conceptual dependency is based on the theory that language is used to 
describe events that take place in the world and that these events 
consist of actions which can be represented as conceptualizations. The 
emphasis is on the content of information and not on its form. Thus 
the level at which actions are represented is language-independent and 
any two sentences which describe the same action and are therefore 
identical in meaning will have a single representation for that meaning.
McTear (1987:33)
AI text theory, as we have stressed in the previous section, is based 
upon the disputable premises that concepts are represented by the mind in 
some formal system, and that this representation can be derived either 
from events in the world or from linguistic representations of those 
events. Linguistic representations which 'mean the same' but are different 
in form will also give rise to the same formal conceptual representations. 
These large claims - if accepted - immediately raise two practical 
questions. What is the nature of the formal representation? How is it 
derived from and translated into natural language?
Most importantly, from the point of view of discourse analysis, the 
theory must account for the function of variations in natural language 
representation: different types of cohesive tie, for example, or different 
FSPs (see 2.3 and 3.6.2). A third question which arises from the claims 
outlined above is therefore: what are variations in natural language 
representation for, if they are to be so readily discarded, and the 
beginning and end of communication is a formal representation in 'another 
language'? It would seem strange if such intricate structures were 
assembled only to be dismantled.
This section will outline one AI approach to the two practical 
problems; the broader third question is one which will become increasingly
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prominent as our argument develops, and feature more prominently in our 
attempts to apply schema theory to literary texts. For the moment, it 
should be said that AI text theorists are well aware of the more obvious 
omissions from their approach and also of its simplification of complex 
issues. Early work on text was limited to straightforward narratives 
admitting little stylistic variation or sophistication; but this limitation 
does not preclude its potential as the basis for a more capable model.
In order to consider the proposal that discourse is processed via 
conceptual representations, it is essential, though problematic, to 
address a description of the nature of those representations, even if that 
description is to be considerably modified at a later stage. From among 
various systems proposed in AI we shall concentrate on one as 
representative of the general approach7. This is conceptual dependency 
(henceforth CD), as developed by Schank (1972), and described in Schank 
(1975:268-271), Schank and Abelson (1977:ll-17;30-32); Barr and Fiegenbaum 
(1981:300-305); Winograd (1983:402); McTear (1987:33-39); Pitrat ([1985] 
1988:26-29) and many other places. It is a system of conceptual 
representation for which large claims have been made concerning its 
applicability in human psychology (Barr and Fiegenbaum 1981:211), and for 
this reason is more relevant to our present concerns than comparable 
systems whose interest is limited to purely artificial intelligence. It 
has been widely used in AI and frequently referred to in text linguistics 
and discourse analysis (de Beaugrande and Dressier 1981:44, Brown and Yule 
1983:241ff; Sperber and Wilson 1986:259) as a partial explanation of 
coherence. It is also a necessary prerequisite to our description of 
Schankian schema theory in the following sections. We shall first review 
the theory, and then consider some of the problems which CD (and 
comparable systems) raise in relation to discourse.
4.2.1 CD: basic principles.
CD was originally conceived as a system for representing the meaning 
of sentences and deriving inferences from them. It was then developed 
further to describe texts. Its building blocks are events, which are seen 
as the results of earlier events and the causes of subsequent events. Its 
importance for a theory of coherence is, that by inferring and 
representing explicitly events that are omitted in a discourse (see 2.4), 
it can present coherence as an unbroken chain of causes and effects. Some
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of the events represented are events in the world, others are events in 
the mind (such as the transfer of information from short term to long 
term memory). They are not regarded as different in kind. Sections of 
the causal chain may take place 'within' the mind, with one 'mental event- 
causing another. The moving of information from one 'part of' the mind to 
another, for example, is placed on a par with moving an object from one 
place to another. This strange mixture of positivism and mentalism is a 
potential source of confusion and misunderstanding to anyone who is used 
to regarding these two approaches as mutually exclusive.
In its representation of individual sentences, CD reduces a word 
denoting an action to a series of constituent primitive acts. Xost 
commonly, these acts will be the constituents of the meaning of a verb, 
but they can also be associated with other grammatical classes. (The 
relevant acts entailed in a particular word are part of the knowledge 
about that word, so in terms of artificial - as opposed to human - 
intelligence, there are clearly problems concerning the building up of 
vocabulary, recognition of different senses and functions and so one.)
In the orginal (1972) formulation, 11 primitive acts were postulated as 
in table 2 .
act coding
1 . the transfer of abstract relationship such as
possession or control (ATRAHS)
2. the transfer of the physical location of an object (PTRANS)
3. the application of physical force to an object (PROPEL)
4. the moving of a body part of an animal by that
animal (XOVE)
5. the grasping of an object by an actor (GRASP)
6. the taking of an object Inside an animal
by that animal (IHGEST)
7. the expulsion of an object by an animal (EXPEL)
8. the transfer of mental information between animals
or within an animal (MTRAIS)
9. the construction by an animal of new information
from old (JCBUILD)
10. speaking (SPEAK)
1 1 . the action of attending or focussing a sense organ
towards a stimulus (ATTEND)
Table 2. CD acts.
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Many actions denoted by a single lexical item are thus represented by a 
number of acts, give and 'gift' for example involves both 'ATRABS' and 
PTRASS , buy and 'purchase', whether as nouns or verbs, will involve the 
ATRAFS and the PTRASS of both money and an entity. Bach primitive act is 
related optionally or obligatorily to entities performing particular roles: 
agent, object, instrument and so on®. From this representation, various 
inferences can be drawn and made explicit. 'Buy' for example must involve 
two agents (buyer and seller) and two patients (goods and currency). Each 
act will additionally entail other inferences. An inference to be drawn 
from 'PTRAIS', for example, is that its object is not where it was. An 
inference from 'IFGEST' is that the patient is inside the agent. Clearly, 
there are enormous problems involved in associating the correct acts with 
the occurrence of a particular word in natural language. Even in the 
apparently straightforward example of 'give' and 'buy' there are many 
complications. There are non-literal uses of words. 'Giving advice' will 
involve quite different acts ('SPEAK'; 'ATTEFD'; 'MBUILD') from 'giving a 
present'. There are complex variations on standard meanings. It is hard 
to say what exactly is 'PTRABS-ed', to whom and by whom when somebody 
buys something by credit card.
There is also a need to represent stative relations. Ve shall use the 
following abbreviations for those used in subsequent analyses: BE (for 
projected complementation), IS or ARE (for actual complementation) , HAS 
(denoting inalienable possession), SOC-CONT (denoting the state of having 
social control over something), KFOV (know), VAFT (want).
4.2.2 CD: two examples.
Thus far, CD allows inferences to be made explicit, though it cannot 
evaluate which of those inferences will be important in discourse. The 
relations between actions and entities may be related diagrammatically as 
in the representation of a sentence in figure 7. Here various inferences 
have been drawn from knowledge activated by the encounter with the word 
'eat' in conjunction with 'with a spoon'. (For a start the spoon is 
assumed to be the instrument, not a companion! (see Rich 1983:326-8)) 
These inferences will include such facts as 'the spoon contains ice cream', 
'John moves the spoon backwards and forwards to his mouth' and so on. 
Schank (1984:78-81) compares the information in such a diagram to that 
which would be necessary in explaining how to eat to someone who had
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never done it before. Note, however, that different FSPs (for example
'Vhat John did was eat ice cream with a spoon') would all be represented 
by the same diagram.
John • INGEST. O - ice 
cream
ice cream
CONTAIN
(spoon)
i— John j0hn
D I I tt
■  I----  U
■—  spoon M O VE
spoon
I
ice cream mouth
(D = direction I = instrument 0 = object).
Figure 7. CD diagram of 'John eats ice cream with a spoon.' (Barr and 
Feigenbaum 1981:302).
cause coding
1 . an act results in a state tr
2. a state enables an act TE
3. a state or act initiates a mental state Tl
4. a mental act is the reason for a physical act tR
5. a state disables an act tdE
Vhen the separation of (1) and (2) , and of (3) and (4) has no 
consequence for inferences, they may be paired together as follows:
6. an act results in a state which enables an act tRE
7. an act or state initiates a thought which the reason for an act tIR
Table 3. CD causes and effects.
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The next stage in CD, once all inferences have been made explicit, is to 
establish links between events in terms of cause and effect. These too are 
often omitted in human discourse. Very frequently, for example, as Schank 
and Abelson observe (1977:23), the MBUILD act which is the intermediate 
between manifestations of mental activity is omitted, because inferred. In 
the following, for example:
John cried because Mary said she loved Bill, 
the mental representation which links the two is omitted. John, in other 
words, did not cry as a direct result of Mary's words, but as a result of 
a mental construction caused by them. For potential causes and effects, 
as for each primitive act, specific rules concerning which acts can cause 
which states in which circumstances are assumed to be part of human 
knowledge and need to be programmed in to the knowledge of an artificial 
intelligence. A finite set of possibilities can be used as in Table 3.
To this is appended a set of scales concerning attributes of states 
marked numerically from —10 to +10. These are used "only suggestively" 
(Schank and Abelson 1977:15) and the set is an open one. Examples of 
scales are
HEALTH (dead, diseased, under the weather, tolerable, in the pink)
AJTTICIPATIOJf (terrified, nervous, hoping, confident)
MEMTAL STATE (broken, depressed, all right, happy, ecstatic)
PHYSICAL STATE (end of existence, damaged, OK, perfect)
AVAREIESS (dead, unconscious, asleep, awake, keen)
(ibid.)
In each of these scales the left hand term would be marked -10 and the 
right hand term +10 with intermediate terms having intermediate numerical 
value.
4.2.3 CD: Text representation.
Vith this apparatus, texts, in principle, can be represented in terms of 
causality, always supposing that unstated causal connections have been 
inferred and made explicit. CD, in other words, depicts an unbroken chain 
of states and events, each of which is the result or cause of any 
immediate neighbour. Schank and Abelson (1977:28) give the example in 
figure 8.
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C onsider the fo llow ing story:
9 John was thirsty. H e o p en ed  a can of b ee r and w ent into the den. 
There  he saw a new  chair. He sat down in it. S uddenly the chair 
tilted  over and John fell on the floor. His b eer spilled all over the 
chair. W hen his w ife h eard  the noise she ran into the den. She was  
very angry that her new  c h a ir  had been  ruined.
John T H IR S T Y  
« IR  
John DO  
•  r 
B eer O PEN
♦e J m
IN G E S T
John PTRANS John to den
John LO C  (in room)
♦ E
John M TR A N S  (ch a ir be)
« I R
John PTRANS John to chair 
♦ r E
John M O V E  John to (in chair)
C h air STATE C H A N G E  
♦E *e m
gravity PR O P EL John to floor 
* r
John LO C (on  floor)
noise 
♦  E
w ife M TR A N S  noise to C P(w ife) 
* I R
w ife P TR A N S wife to den 
♦ r E
gravity P R O P E L  beer to(on chair) 
*r
chair W E T  
*1
w ife  M TR A N S  'ch a ir W E T ’ to C P (w ife ) 
*R 
w ife A N G R Y
Figure 8: CD representation of a simple story (SPGU: 28-29)
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The linking of events Is one way of describing coherence though It does
not fully nocount for how these links are produced, 11 they are produced 
at all, by the receiver.
4.2.4 CD: Conclusions.
An obvious objection to this system Is that while It may be capable of 
handling the highly simplified and controlled texts of AI, it will be 
baffled by the complexity of human discourse. The problem may be not 
merely quantitative but qualitative as well. Success with simple texts 
does not imply that the same strategies will work on more complex ones. 
From an AI perspective, the important fact about the representations in 
figures 7 and 8, which is not apparent in their presentation here, is that 
tested rules exist for deriving such CD representations from text, and 
similar representations have actually been executed by machine. Nothing 
is proved, however, by concocting a representation of a given discourse 
into which inferred acts and states have been inserted. To do this is 
merely to use the analysts' inferences not explain them. The central 
problem for AI is the formulation of rules which will explain how a 
representation was derived. In other words, it must be procedural rather 
than declarative.
The status of CD as a theory of the human processing of natural 
discourse (as opposed to the machine processing of controlled discourse) 
therefore remains as speculative as any other theory of psychology and 
language. This judgement, however, cuts both ways, and its status is no 
lower than any other speculation for being unproved. (It is doubtful in 
any case what such proof might consist of. Even the total simulation of 
human text handling to a degree that would pass the Turing test for 
intelligence (Turing 1950 ),£>, accompanied by a full statement of 
procedures used, could still be dismissed as proof, as it is for example 
by Dreyfus (1987) and Searle ([1980] 1987).)
Our own view (which we develop in chapters 8 and 9) is that while some 
form of conceptual representation of content such as CD may play a part 
in human text processing, its role is only partial. Belief in some form of 
conceptual representation is consistent with the generally accepted 
findings that people remember content rather than form, but ignores the 
role of formal options in establishing that content. The AI leap from 
the observation that form is often forgotten to the claim that it can be
-101-
dispensed with entirely after a certainy a-iuei a certain stage in processing, is rather
glib.
AI, however, together with those who accept the computational paradigm 
in linguistics, does speculate that a CD representation, algorithmically 
derived from sense data or natural language, is at the heart of human 
discourse understanding. In effect, what we have presented here in this 
brief outline of CD is an image of AI gradually building up miniature 
schemata for each word. Again, there are obvious qualitative as well as 
quantitative limitations. Hot every word meaning can readily be captured 
by a reduction to constituent objects, acts and states, even if these 
include mental -objects’ and -acts’. -Kiss- - as Barr and Fiegenbaum 
observe (1981:214) - is not the same as 'MOVE lips to lips'. Clearly the 
complexities grow as the texts encountered approach those of natural 
language. If CD is to survive as a theory of human discourse 
understanding, it must cope with this. Schema theory is an attempt to do 
so. Before going on to describe a version of schema theory based on CD 
however, we shall briefly examine the relation of conceptual representation 
systems (such as CD) to semantics, and discuss some of the problems 
arising from the use of such systems as a component of a theory of 
discourse.
4.3 CD and semantics.
Superficially, a system of conceptual representation such as CD would 
seem to have a great deal in common with approaches to semantics which 
also seek to present a formal representation of the 'content' of natural 
language. It has certain similarities, for example, with 'truth-based 
semantics' (see Leech 1981:76ff; Lyons 1977:597), with componential 
analysis (see Leech 1981:89-123; Lyons 1977:414; Cruse 1986:16-22), and 
with case grammar (Fillmore 1968). It also has much in common with the 
semantic networks (Quillian 1968), which in turn have elements in common 
with the 'neural networks' of connectionism (Rumelhart and McLelland 1986).
Clearly, with its use of inferences, case relations and primitives, it 
has made borrowings, if only terminological ones, although its pioneers 
claim to have reached their conclusions independently (Schank and Abelson 
1977:11). Yet whether it may fairly be regarded as a further - and 
indeed, if one sees it in such terms, comparatively unsophisticated -
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variation of earlier systems of semantic representation is open to dispute. 
Woods, for example, (1975:36) and Pitrat ([19851 1988:3) are unequivocal in 
describing CD as a descendent of earlier semantic systems, but there are 
other commentators who do not regard it as semantic - in the sense of 
being 'about the world' - but describe it as a model of processing (McTear 
1987.33). To this, we might justly add, that it is no more 'about the 
language' than it is 'about the world'. It seeks rather to reproduce the 
processing strategies of an intelligence in dealing with the world or with 
language about the world. Closely allied to this is its concern with 
encyclopaedic knowledge, and thus, in so far as they can be separated, 
with analytic rather than synthetic truth, which is sometimes regarded as 
beyond the boundaries of semantics altogether (Leech 1981:69). In this 
sense it is in keeping with the paradigm shift described in 4.0 above, and 
if, along with similar systems spawned by that shift, it is labelled as 
semantics at all, then it is best distinguished as a type of 'procedural' 
rather than 'declarative' semantics (de Beaugrande and Dressier 1981:88)” .
Truth-based semantics is concerned with the static aspects of 
knowledge and with facts and inferences which are assumed to be true in 
all situations. As such it is the epitome of a declarative system. Such 
systems contrast with procedural systems whose central concern is how 
and when to use knowledge and in which situations. Procedural systems 
match knowledge with a given situation through such heuristic devices as 
'assuming a fact to be the case until proved otherwise' or 'trying a given 
inference' even in the absence of logical proof. Procedural systems, using 
techniques of matching and of spreading activation (Barr and Fiegenbaum 
1981:185; de Beaugrande and Dressier 1981:88), go some way towards 
avoiding the kind of combinatorial explosion which results from a 
procedure which tries every logical possibility. CD representations are 
derived from text by a combination of declarative representation and 
'procedural attachments': that is to say, they contain instructions 
capturing strategies which are likely to work in a given context (Barr and 
Fiegenbaum 1981:156; de Beaugrande and Dressier 1981:91; Anderson 1983). 
Though procedural representations have clear advantages over declarative 
ones when used to predict the contents of routine texts and situations, 
they will also have disadvantages in encounters with a situation or a text 
which is similar but subtly different from expectation. As this 
combination is a frequent characteristic of literary texts, which foster
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elements of surprise, and demand lateral or creative thinking, this
shortcoming of procedural systems will need to be born in mind in the
application of Schankian schema theory (which is a development of CD) to 
literary analysis.
Perhaps the most striking similarity between CD and truth-based 
semantic representations is that they both seek to convert natural 
language into underlying 'units of meaning' which centre upon a single 
action or state ('predicate', 'V' (in case grammar) , or 'primitive act'). 
To this action or state they append entities in varying types of relation, 
constrained by various rules. Truth-based semantics, like CD, can be taken 
further than this, and used to connect these units of meaning together, to 
create a propositional 'textbase', a semantic representation of text 
(Kintsch 1974); case grammar, like its transformational-generative and 
structural forbears, limits itself to sentences and has no pretensions to 
representing texts.
The crucial differences between these representational systems, however, 
is not in the details of their analysis and notation, but in their 
underlying philosophies and views of the relationship between mind, 
language and the world. Truth-based semantics, with its roots in the 
philosophical premises of logical positivism, eschews all study of mental 
states and mental phenomena, and espouses the behaviourist view of 
psychology. By so doing, it cuts itself off from the common-sensical view 
that language is the bridge between our inner states and the world. The 
only option open to it is to present semantics as a representation of the 
world 'as it is' and eternal truths existing independently of mind or 
language. Case Grammar, on the other hand, in the generative tradition, is 
unashamedly mentalist. Its evidence is native speaker introspection and 
intuition, and it is purportedly a description of semantic competence. CD, 
like any other conceptual representation in A I, is subtly different from 
both of these approaches, and cannot be described in terms of the familiar 
dichotomy between mentalism and empiricism. Its strong belief in the 
computational paradigm of human thought and language, whether as a literal 
equivalence or a metaphor, leads it to claim that mental processes are in 
effect accessible. The programs and the data of AI systems are open to 
inspection and experimentation and they are, if the paradigm holds, 
analogous to human procedures and knowledge. In this sense, AI systems 
are both behaviourist and positivist, but do not halt in their hypotheses
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at the frontier between mind, and wnr"M +. * ^ana woria (hence terms in CD like 'MBUILD'
and 'JITRAITS AI presents neither a representation of the world, as 
truth-based semantics does, nor of the language, as case grammar does. 
Its representations are rather representations of the-world-in-the-mind 
and its relation to language - representations, in other words, of the 
knowledge used in (and derived from) language processing. As such they 
can be used for further hypotheses (like Schankian schema theory) about 
the organization of knowledge and its application in human text 
processing. (One clear weakness of this, however, is exactly CD's heavy 
dependence on the computational metaphor of mind: for if that falls, so 
does the whole theory.)
4.4 Problems for conceptual representation as a component of a theory of 
discourse.
If a system of conceptual representation like CD is to play a part in a 
theory of discourse, it must come to terms with a number of problems 
concerning the relationship between the underlying representations which 
it proposes as an account of coherence, and their realization and use in 
discourse. In particular it must account for the principles behind the 
selection and omission of elements, for their ordering, and for the 
linguistic choices which bring them into varying degrees of focus. For a 
theory of conceptual representation to contribute to an analysis of the 
human handling of complex texts - especially literary texts - it must 
either incorporate some method of dealing with these problems or be 
compatible with a parallel approach which does. Ve shall now examine 
some of these problems, which apply to any attempt to represent 'the 
content' of text.
4.4.1 Problem One: prototypes and fuzzy concepts.
Though by no means prone to the extreme naivetfe of equating concepts 
with the words of a particular language, systems like CD do treat concepts 
as discrete entities, like counters which can be manoevred and combined in 
clear-cut mathematical ways. They are treated as though they were 
equivalents of the components of the meaning of words as described by 
componential analysis in semantics. As such they are open to the same 
criticisms.
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Research into word meaning conducted from an empirical psychological 
standpoint has long since questioned the componential approach. Though it 
may adequately describe meaning, componential analysis may not always 
mirror the way that meaning is perceived. Rosch suggests that we classify 
a perceived phenomenon, whether lexically or conceptually, by reference to 
a prototype (Rosch et al 1976). Her suggestion is that this applies not 
only to phenomena which are continua in the natural world such as colour, 
as had been suggested by Berlin and Kay (1969), but also to the most 
'discrete' categories such as biological classification. Thus neither the 
word nor the concept 'bird' is understood in terms of components such as 
'biped', 'feathered' and 'oviparous', but rather by the degree of 
similarity between a given instance and a mental prototype, or 'typical 
bird'. Experimental evidence on speed of identification supports this 
hypothesis; blackbirds are more readily and confidently classified as 
birds than emus. Though Rosch points out that concepts occur in 'clusters' 
with 'natural breaks' between them (most birds do in fact have features in 
common and there are comparatively few birds which lack these features) 
there is nevertheless the possibility of 'fuzzy' concepts which do not 
clearly belong to one category or another but are nevertheless assigned to 
one in practice12. This possibility has been vividly demonstrated by 
Labov. In an experiment in which subjects were asked to name the objects 
represented by drawings in which the features of a cup are gradually 
modified into those of a bowl, on the one hand, and a jug, on the other, 
there was contradictory and uncertain indentification (Labov 1973).
Conceptual dependency is both in harmony and in disharmony with this 
approach. On the one hand, it is extended in schema theory to build up 
elaborate prototypes, not of single concepts but of frequent or typical 
combinations of them. On the other hand, the components of schemata are 
discrete concepts which admit no 'fuzziness'. In this sense, schema theory 
can be made to contradict itself, and is ripe for Derridean deconstruction.
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4.4.2 Problem Two: level of detail.
But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? 
Vhat are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The bits of wood of 
which it is made? Or the molecules? Or the atoms? - 'Simple- means not 
composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no
sense to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair' <...) We use
the word 'composite' (and therefore the word 'simple') in an enormous 
number of different and differently related ways. (Is the colour of a 
square on a chessboard simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure 
yellow? And is white simple or does it consist of the colours of the 
rainbow? - Is the length of 2 cm. simple, or does it consist of two parts, 
each one centimetre long? But why not one bit 3 cm long, and one bit one 
cm long measured in the opposite direction.
Wittgenstein ([1953] 1968:21-22)
The representation of discourse as a series of propositions or acts 
says nothing about what we may refer to as 'the level of detail' of 
description. Most processes, actions and entities may be regarded as 
composed of constituent processes, actions and entities, or conversely as 
themselves being constituent parts of larger ones (Sanford and Garrod 
1981:30). Physical actions, for example, may be almost indefinitely 
reduced. Consider the action denoted by the sentence 'she drove home' as
At tUt bottDAA 04- tuflrepresented in figure 9. The constituent movements 1 n irhr right hauldiagram
~^luan could be further reduced and described in terms of the contractions 
of muscles. In principle the limit of such a hierarchy would only be the 
limits of the physical description of matter - i.e. at some molecular, 
atomic or particle level! This level, however, is only available to some 
people, and generally confined to particular discourse types. For most 
people the limits of reduction are reached relatively quickly.
Discourse analysis needs a principle to explain the level of 
description. Addressing this problem from the viewpoint of 
ethnomethodological conversation analysis, Schegloff (1972) suggests that 
we can only choose a level of description by reference to the needs and 
knowledge of the addressee. Whereas the answer 'in England', for example, 
though possibly true, would not be a helpful ripost to the question 'Where 
do you live?' in a conversation between two people who both work in
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= She 
(etc
She bent her elbow.+ 
She moved her arm. + 
(etc.)
Figure 9: 'Level of detail*.
= She opened her hand. + - She rotated her wrist. = 
She touched the handle. +
She closed her fingers. +
She rotated her wrist. +
(etc.)
Nottingham, it might well be an informative answer to the same question 
from a fellow passenger on an intercontinental flight. This perspective 
is by no means incompatible with conceptual representation as an approach 
to discourse, but it needs to be added to it. It points to an inadequacy 
of any mere representation of the facts of a text. Successful 
communication must distinguish between what is true and what is needed.
Interestingly, this problem, often ignored in AI, is. addressed by the 
Russian formalist Tomashevsky ([1925] 1965) and by Roland Barthes ([1966] 
1977:74-124). Ve shall return to these analyses when considering the 
compatibility of AI and literary theoretical approaches to discourse in, 
respectively 6.3.6 and 6.4.5.
4.4.3 Problem Three: principles for omitting inferred connection.
Ve have described how CD may aid the generation of inferences which 
have no realization in the text. Most of the elements of these 
representations are likely to be absent from discourse. This applies not 
only to connectives indicative of causal, temporal, and logical links, but 
also to entire acts: the movement of the spoon to the mouth in Figure 7 
for example; the eating of the poisoned meat by the dog in 2.4; the 
rotation of the wrist in Figure 9. Discourse analysis needs a principle to
She drove home. =
She opened the door. + She got into the car. +
grasped the handle. + She turned the handle. + She pulled the handle.
(etc.)
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explain the basis of omission and inclusion’3. One set of answers is 
provided by relevance theory which, operating with a psychological context 
very similar to a propositional textbase (Sperber and Wilson 1986:15-21), 
espouses the principle that what is mentioned is what is relevant, and 
defines relevance as the greatest contextual change for the least 
processing effort (op.cit. 46-50). Another set of answers which we shall 
go on to develop more fully is provided by schema theory.
4.4.4 Problem Four: failure to account for linguistic choices.
CD purports to express meanings which can be realized in different 
linguistic forms. The corollary of this claim is that it omits certain 
variations of linguistic form, and gives no account or explanation of these 
variations. Thus such linguistic features as FSP and passivizations, which 
topicalize or focus; deictic terms and article choice which reflect the 
sender's orientation to the semantic content; modals expressing the 
sender's attitude or Judgement; choices between subordination and 
coordination or between synonyms; density of cohesive ties; use of 
discourse markers to direct the receiver - all these are paid virtually 
no attention in CD, however crucial they may be in the creation and 
maintenance of coherence. Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983:10-18) in their 
global view of discourse comprehension suggest that recourse to a 
conceptual representation is but one of a number of strategies open to the 
receiver. The others include perception of rhetorical structure (or 
'schema' in their terms); knowledge of production (i.e. text generation) 
strategies; attention to stylistic cues; attention to non-verbal elements 
of the message; attention to conversational mechanisms. Some of these, 
especially those relating to style, rhetorical structure and conversational 
mechanisms, will be intimately involved with linguistic choice. In 
general, the notion of complementary strategies operating in parallel is an 
attractive one and in our view intuitively true. Yet it may also be 
possible, as we hope to suggest at a later point in our argument, that 
these approaches interact with each other, and that such natural language 
phenomena as thematization, style, rhetorical organization and discourse 
type, may affect or be affected by the conceptual representation which is 
derived from or used to generate a given discourse1A.
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4.4.5 Problem Five: charge of linguistic relativity.
At the heart of CD and of truth-based semantics is the categorization 
of concepts as acts, states and entities. The confidence of this division 
raises the vexed issue of possible linguistic relativity: the idea that the 
structure of thought is determined by the structure of language and is 
thus different for speakers of different languages (Vhorf 1956; Sapir 
[1949] 1956). This issue is in fact of little moment for CD, though it is 
of far greater significance for truth-based semantics, and the reasons for 
this may serve to illustrate the difference between the two. CD may 
justly claim that it is representing a structure used by a particular 
intelligence in the handling of text. In this sense it does not matter 
whether the concepts used are universally true or relative to a particular 
language. For truth-based semantics which seeks to represent the world 
and synthetic truth, or for generative semantics which seeks linguistic 
universals, the situation is far more serious. Yet conceptual dependency 
would do well to bear the possibility of linguistic relativity in mind - 
whether in a weak or strong version.
4.5 A version of schema theory: Scripts. Plans. Goals, and 
(Schank and Abelson <1977).
The introductory description of schema theory (ST) given in chapter one 
is highly simplified. Actual discourse is unlikely to be interpretable with 
reference to a single schema, but rather to activate several at once, each 
interacting with the other. In addition, as we have already hinted, there 
may be different types of schema, and these may be in varying types of 
relationship. A fuller version of ST must provide a typology of schemata, 
and elucidate the relationship of one type to another; it must show how an 
intelligence selects schemata, how it moves from one to another, how it 
uses more than one simultaneously, how it focuses on a 'sub schema' (say a 
'menu' within a 'restaurant schema'), and so on. Finally, it must explain 
the development and rearrangement of schemata, how new ones are built and 
old ones changed or abandoned. It is on one aspect of this last 
requirement that we shall eventually concentrate our attention in chapters 
8 and 9.
Ve need, therefore, a more elaborate version of the theory, and we shall 
provisionally adopt that proposed by Schank and Abelson in Scripts, PlaflS,
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(1977) (henceforth SPGU). Although this version 
has undergone severe modification as a model for AI programming, not least 
by Schank himself, it has a number of distinct advantages for our 
argument, which is concerned primarily to adapt a version of ST for the 
analysis of literary discourse. Firstly, it is still one of the most 
detailed, rigorous, well-known and influential versions of ST. Secondly, it 
is primarily concerned with text production and processing rather than 
intelligence in general. Thirdly, it concerns itself with human 
intelligence, not with artificial intelligence alone. Lastly, the version is 
self-contained, and makes scant reference to others, so by specifying this 
theory we shall avoid the kind of terminological and conceptual confusion 
referred to in 1 .6.
As the SPGU version of ST is the one we use for our argument and 
analyses in the next chapter, we shall present it here in some detail. 
Later, we shall also be concerned with the modifications of the system 
proposed in Schank's subsequent books Dynamic Mercnrv (Schank 1982) 
(henceforth DM) and Explanation Patterns (henceforth EP) (Schank 1986). 
These are, however, developments of SPGU rather than completely new 
departures. Their main contribution is the suggestion that schemata may 
be broken down in memory and then reassembled for processing, with each 
new experience modifying existing schemata, Their descriptive categories 
are, however, less satisfactory for analysis than those of SPGU. DM pays 
scant attention to the plans of characters in discourse (which are a major 
factor in SPGU). Plans are, as we hope to show below, a particularly 
useful category in interpreting coherence, and are widely used (see, for 
example, Appelt 1985:13-21; Reiser, Black and Abelson 1985; Litman and 
Allen 1987; Rist 1989). EP, though it does reinstate an emphasis on 
planning, is primarily concerned with the ability to explain events as an 
index of intelligence. Ve shall return to DM and EP in 8.1.2 below.
SPGU, DM and EP all purport to describe both human intelligence and 
actual and potential artificial intelligence. The sub-title of SPGU is 'An 
inquiry into human knowledge structures', of DM 'A theory of reminding and 
learning in computers and people' and of EP 'Understanding mechanically 
and creatively*. Clearly, if they are implemented in computer programs, 
then they are de facto descriptions of those programs - but that, as we 
have said above, is not our major concern. Their status as descriptions 
of human intelligence is of course highly speculative and disputable for
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reasons given in 4.1.1 and 4.2.4. it should, however, be pointed out, that 
even if the details of the model are inaccurate as representations of 
human intelligence, its basic claim may still stand. Ve take this basic 
claim to be that human understanding (and in SPGU specifically text 
understanding) can be represented as a hierarchy of levels in which 
failure to understand on any level can be referred to the level above. In 
production, the opposite is true, and what cannot be generated by one 
level, must originate in the level above. This does not, of course, deny 
the possibility that, in more automatized instances, the higher levels need 
not be involved at all’*. In fact the function of low-level schemata is 
precisely to by-pass higher level processing. The implications of this 
principle for a theory of coherence are clear. Failure of connection at a 
lower level may be referred to a higher one. As in any rank structure in 
which one rank consists of elements from the rank below and is to be 
explained in terms of the rank above, there is of course the problem of 
where to go when one reaches the top or the bottom of the model. The 
alternatives would seem to be either to extend the rank hierarchy 
indefinitely and thus simply postpone explanation, or to hand over the 
burden of explanation to some other academic discipline when the upper and 
lower limits of the hierarchy are reached. SPGU and DM suggest that 
explanation of the highest level in text processing must be sought in the 
neurophysiology of the brain (SPGU:148>. There is, however, no 
reductionist or materialist claim that mental processes can be explained 
in physical or biological terms (EP:12).
The levels postulated in SPGU are as follows.
THEMES
GOALS
SUB GOALS (INSTRUMENTAL AID DELTA GOALS)
PLAIS
SCRIPTS
CONCEPTUAL DEPENDENCY ACTS 
TEXT
Ve shall give details of these ranks and our own interpretation of them 
working through them as the authors do 'bottom up'.
4.5.1 Fro® text to CD.
An essential premise of SPGU is that an intelligence derives from a 
natural-language text a representation in another, more formal language,
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This CD representation depicts information as an unbroken causal 
chain of primitive actions (see 4.2.1 above). In this sense, a CD 
representation may be said to have -coherence- If the state resulting from 
each act is one which is, in the world (or the intelligence's perception of 
the world - for both text and knowledge may be wrong but internally 
consistent), the starting point for the next act. As already shown in 2.4 
and 4.4.2, many causal links are left unstated in natural language. These 
links are - or at least can be - filled in from the first schema type 
postulated in SPGU: scripts.
This leaves us with the problem, skated over in the last sentence, as 
to whether causal links ac£ actually filled in at some subconscious level. 
SPGU (38-39) suggests that the function of schemata is in this respect 
twofold: on the one hand they enable us to omit a sequence of well known 
causal links, thus saving time (SPGU:41), on the other hand they enable us 
to provide them if needed.
4.5.2 Scripts.
Scripts are structures "that describe appropriate sequences of events 
in a particular context... a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions 
that defines a well-known situation" (Schank and Abelson 1977:41). They 
fall into three main categories:
- Situational Scripts (e.g. restaurant, bus, jail)
- Personal Scripts (e.g. being a flatterer/ pickpocket/ spy/ jealous 
spouse)
- Instrumental Scripts (e.g. lighting a cigarette, starting a car, frying 
an egg)
As such, they are the closest of SPGU's categories to the general 
description of schemata given in 1.3. A script may have a number of 
'tracks', which are different but related instances of the same general 
category. In one of SPGU's examples, the restaurant script, the tracks are 
such instances as Fast Food Restaurant, Coffee Shop, Italian Restaurant 
etc. Each script is represented from the point of view of one of the 
participants and his or her role in it - in the case of the restaurant 
script, such roles as customer, or waitress, or owner. Each script has an 
'essential precondition' and 'a main consequence'. The essential 
precondition for a (customer's) restaurant script is 'wanting to eat', and 
the main conseqence is 'having eaten'. In addition, each script has a
-113-
number of slots (similar to the 'default elements' described in 1 .3 .1 ) 
whose realization can be assumed unless there is information to the 
contrary. Specifically, SPGO proposes that the slots in a script are:
- a number of props,
- the roles of participants,
- the entry conditions,
- results,
- scenes and their sequence.
The distinguishing feature of scripts, as a type of schema, is that these 
slots are instantiated by quite specific entities and events. If we 
imagine, for example, a trial script from the point of view of a judge, 
then the props will be a wig, a gavel and so on; the roles will be 
defendant, lawyers, witnesses etc.; the entry condition will be 'being 
appointed to hear the case'; the result will be punishment or exoneration 
of the defendant; the scenes will be indictment, plea, defence case, 
etc.1G. The script is therefore an example of specific rather than general 
knowledge, and though connected to general plans and goals, may run 
without reference to them. A script is dependent on personal experience, 
either of situations or reports of them, and will thus vary both between 
individuals and within individuals.
A script is activated by any one of a number of 'headers' concerning 
the preconditions (eg 'wishing to please someone' may activate a 'buying a 
present script'), the instrumental function of actions (taking the subway 
may activate a 'shopping' or 'work' script), a location habitually 
associated with the script ('The Loon Fung restaurant'), or explicit 
mention of the occupant of a slot in the script ('that rude waiter in the 
Loon Fung'). In text understanding, script activation enables details to 
be by-passed or provided by the default elements of the script as 
required.
There are of course a number of problems connected with the smooth 
running of a script in text processing and the description given in the 
paragraphs above is perhaps misleading, as in practice scripts which run 
without obstacles, errors or deviations are unlikely to be worth talking or 
writing about. A theory of script-based text understanding, though it may 
take the above description as an unmarked instance, will need to take into 
account a number of marked cases, for example:
- the incidental mention of potential 'headers' for other scripts;
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- the concurrent activation of rival scri^+e *,n -i*scripts which will then compete to be
the one used in understanding;
- the co.ourr.nt rmalng of -or. than one script, or of on. script a. part 
of another
- -headers* which may create 'scripts! ambiguity- (SPGU:59> as to which of 
a number of scripts which share them is the one to activate;
obstacles to the course of events which may necessitate either a loop 
back to an earlier point, or script abandonment;
- unexpected events which may lead to scripts being abandoned or held in 
abeyance until the event has run its course;
- movement from one script to another,
SPGU, as already stated, regards the contents of scripts as stored in 
some form of conceptual representation such as CD. As such 
representations may be derived equally from texts representing events and 
from events themselves, the account at this point in SPGU is often 
ambivalent as to which it is referring to, and in effect no distinction is 
made. Our own example, above, of the judge's trial script, would apply 
equally to the event and to a text relating the event from the judge's 
viewpoint. The description of script-based understanding says nothing 
about different linguistic realizations of the same CD content and the 
effect these may have upon the selection and running of a relevant script 
or scripts. This is a major issue at the heart of our own theory in 
chapter 8.
One further problem is that although knowledge about the sequencing of 
scenes is often cited as a crucial feature distinguishing scripts from 
other postulated schemata such as -frames', 'scenarios' etc, it seems likely 
that certain scripts, while they may specify scenes, cannot specify an 
invariable order for them. Let us suppose, for example, that individuals 
in the modern world have some sort of hospital script (from a patient's 
viewpoint), which contains many other dependent scripts (for example, a 
medical examination script), and that this hospital script contains such 
scenes as: doctor's visit, mealtime, visiting time, admission of new patient 
and so 'on. We would expect there to be variations in the ordering of 
these scenes. A doctor's visit, for example, may, and indeed often does, 
occur at any point. It will be seen, when we come to use scripts in 
discourse analysis, that not all scripts can include rigid scene-sequencing
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constraints. SPGU's insistent ™  +vthis aspect of script composition
results from the limited types of text with which it deals.
4.5.3 Plans.
Although much verbal and non-verbal experience is repetitive enough to 
be dealt with by scripts, there are also experiences which are sufficiently 
novel and unpredictable to demand interpretation with reference to a 
structure which is not so specific as to its constituent elements. Such a 
structure is postulated in SPGU as a 'plan1. This structure is a schema, 
in the sense that it consists of ordered 'slots', but is far less explicitly 
connected to specified places, individuals or locations. In terms of 
behaviour a plan is used to deal with situations for which the agent has 
no existing script. In terms of text understanding, assumptions about the 
plans of agents described in the text may create coherence when no 
relevant script is available in the understander's memory. In the case of 
texts, such as descriptions of landscape or objects, in which no agents 
are referred to, the function of plans in providing coherence is less 
apparent, and significantly such texts are conspicuously absent from AI 
work, including SPGU. It may be, however, that in such cases a reader's 
hypotheses about the plans of the author, or hypotheses about the author's 
attempt to influence the reader's plans, may contribute to coherence.
Plans, according to SPGU, realize goals, which may themselves be 
subordinate to higher goals. It is the recognition of the goal, or sub­
goal, and the stages of the plan realizing it, which establish coherence. 
Ve shall adapt one of the examples in SPGU by way of illustration. If the 
goal or sub-goal is to be in a state of having social control (CD 
abbreviation 'SOC-COIfT') of an object and there is no script available for 
doing this, then there may be a number of 'named' plans. SPGU 
hypothesises that the named plans to achieve this goal are: ask for17; 
invoke topic18; inform reason19; bargain object; bargain favour; threaten; 
overpower; steal. Each of these plans for achieving the goal of gaining 
social control of an object is realized by a 'planbox'. All planboxes 
consist of:
key action + controllable precondition + uncontrollable precondition + 
mediating precondition -> result
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he agents, things, places and information are not specified as in a
script, but can be adapted to variables. The constituents of the planbox
for 'ask for', for example, can be represented in conceptual dependency as 
follows:
e.g. Planbox: ASK FOR (realising sub-goal SOC-COFT)
key action = PTRAIS 0 to X
+ controllable precondition = X BE (ProxY)
+ uncontrollable precondition = Y SOC-COFT 0
+ mediating precondition = y VAFTS to PTRAFS 0 to X
# result = 0 BE (?LOC X)
where 0, Y and X are variables, standing for, respectively, the object, the 
owner and the asker, LOC means 'location' and PROX means ’near'. The 
planbox can be used in a situation whose constituent elements are utterly 
new. It can be adapted to very different situations. One might equally 
well use this planbox to ask someone for a coin for the phone, or for 
protective clothing after a chemical explosion. The difference between 
scripts and plans thus suggests two very different types of schemata: 
those in which slots are specific entities, people and events; and those 
which are more widely applicable to a greater variety of situations.
Recognition of planning by characters in a discourse may provide 
coherence to sequences of sentences. SPGU gives the following example:
(1) John was lost. He pulled his car up to a farmer who was standing by 
the road. (SPGU:75>
This is coherent because John's action can be seen as executing the 
controllable precondition of a planbox 'ask for' to obtain information. 
(This interpretation also makes use of 'scriptlike' knowledge that farmers 
are likely to be people who know the area20.) The following sequence on 
the other hand:
(2) John was lost. He noticed a chicken. He tried to catch it. (p.76)
is incoherent - unless we know of some way in which the catching of a 
chicken may execute a relevant planbox, such as 'find out', or unless we 
assume that the plan (suggested by our knowledge that people who are lost 
try to find out where they are), has been abandoned in favour of another 
plan. (John might be a pagan priest trained in augury through entrails, 
writing a thesis on chickens, or very hungry.) Our hypothesis is that
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when such sequences as (2) are encountered In actual discourse, people will 
read on as though the text is coherent, assuming that actions are parts of 
plans that execute goals, even when the goals are unknown. (This will be 
illustrated in our analysis of a passage from Crime and Punishment in the 
next chapter.) Tolerance of suspended goal revelation is accompanied by a 
growing demand for knowledge of the goal, which must be satisfied at some 
later point, if the text is not to be viewed as finally incoherent or the 
character as mad. (Surrealist texts form an interesting exception to this 
rule, although there, paradoxically, the unifying goal is that of the artist 
attempting to eschew goals altogether.)
Vith reference to the discussion in 2.3.3 and 2.4, it is interesting to 
note that, in examples (1 ) and (2) above, although both sequences are 
cohesive - through the anaphoric referents 'he' and 'it' - this is not 
sufficient to create coherence in (2).
The essential point about plans for text processing is that in cases 
where we cannot process by reference to a script and create coherence by 
assuming the default elements of that script, we may do so by reference to 
a plan, fitting the more specific elements of the text to the generalized 
goal-related elements of the planbox. Interpretation with reference to a 
plan will involve more effort and more time. Repeated exposure to the 
same situation (more than one chemical explosion, frequent overpowering of 
people to take their possesions) will lead to the replacement of plan- 
based interpretation by script-based interpretation.
It is important to notice at this point that the theory of scripts and 
plans makes no claim for their cultural homogeneity or universality. 
One may speculate about the degree to which the contents of scripts and 
plans coincide in members of the same culture. It might even be possible 
to define cultural identity for a given individual in this way. Yet these 
lines of inquiry are not pursued in SPGD, which, on the contrary, stresses 
variations, even within one community. Thus the specific contents of 
scripts and plans, and even whether a particular eventuality is dealt with 
by a script or by a plan, will vary between individuals and social groups. 
For an ambulance driver, for example, an accident will be dealt with by a 
script, while for someone less frequently involved in accidents, it may be 
dealt with by a planbox. Even for two people dealing with an accident by 
script, the details will be different, according to whether they are, for 
example, a priest, a doctor, or someone who faints at the sight of blood.
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Within the individual, moreover the i~rm+ *, the contents of plans and scripts will
change. (If a prime minister, for example .example, has a 'meeting-important-people
script it will have changed as ho nr-» he or she rose to power, and will change
again on M s  or her retirement.) Therefore some people will process . 
given text predominantly with referenoe to sorlpts. while others will 
activate a higher proportion of plans. A „„,.i about Hollywood love 
affairs .ay be interpreted through sorlpts by a Hollywood star, but with 
reference to plans by a British academic.
Ib literary analysis, individual differences in scripts and plans, and 
the consequent differences in the projection of scripts and plans on to 
characters, are highly relevant. This may be illustrated by the following 
account of differences in interpretation. A poem frequently analysed in 
British literary critical and stylistics classes is Wilfred Owen's 
wMch reflects upon a soldier's death from hypothermia in the 
trenches during the First World War. The text of the poem is as follows:
Move him into the sun - 
Gently its touch awoke him once,
At home, whispering of fields unsown.
Always it woke him, even in France,
Until this morning and this snow.
If anything might rouse him now 
The kind old sun will know.
Think how it wakes the seeds, - 
Woke, once, the clays of a cold star.
Are limbs, so dear-achieved, are sides,
Full-nerved - still warm - too hard to stir?
Was it for this the clays grew tall?
- 0 what made fatuous sunbeams toil 
To break earth's sleep at all?
The opening line of the poem is often explained as a futile or perhaps 
symbolic attempt to revive the soldier, a refusal to accept the death of 
the young. This is to interpret the imperative in terms of a plan vainly 
attempting to execute the goal of preserving life or dealing with death. 
While teaching this poem in an adult evening class, however, I encountered 
a rival explanation, significantly advanced by a First World War veteran. 
This elderly student explained how, in his experience, in the absence of 
burial facilities, the bodies of soldiers who had died of cold overnight 
were immediately removed from the trench, partly to avoid risk of 
infection, partly to satisfy some need for action, partly to maintain
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In tils reading, tie opening coMaad becomes the rough, routine
order of the officer la charge. This Is to interpret the opening la teras
of a script, ao doubt one which »as fa.lllar to nan, people at the tine.
Of these tvo readings, th. latter is the aore horrifying. Dealing with 
death is routine.
In this reading, however, we may glimpSe a phenomenon which we shall 
later develop further. In this interpretation, the sun is mentioned, 
almost accidentally, as a synonym for ‘the open air1; the subsequent musing 
on the sun takes this mention as a point of departure. A conceptual 
representation of this command would, however, regard the choice between 
synonyms as insignificant, both would in this context 'mean the same'. Yet 
it is only this lexical choice which links the script invoked by the 
opening line - let us call it a 'removing corpse script' - to the script in 
the next lines - a 'waking up at home script' (from the viewpoint of a 
young farmer). The anaphoric referent 'it', cohesing with a noun phrase 
which was not the topic of the preceding sentence, emphasizes the tenuous 
nature of the link. The conceptual links developed as the poem progresses, 
derive from the linguistic choice of 'sun'.
Another important and potentially confusing point about plans, which 
has become apparent to us when trying to apply them to literary analysis, 
is that they may form parts of each other, or even of scripts. In this 
sense, the hierarchical relation of SPGU's schema types to each other is 
recursive, and analogous to that of the ranks of grammar. (A clause, for 
example, although higher in the rank structure than a phrase, may yet be a 
constituent of a phrase.) Such structures as those in figure 10 are 
therefore possible, where 'daughters' realize slots of the schema at the
plan plan script script script plan
Figure 10. Hierarchical relationship of plans and scripts.
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'mother' node. A holldav script
P ’ example, may contain a scene slot ed by going h0MS, uUci may reaiUed u  airport
although if the airport 1. unexpectedly closed, this „.y activate a plan.
An important difference between the tree in m i  *** *4e iree lD and grammatical trees,
however, Is that the vertical connections represent alternative 
realizations. The plan or script at the highest node is realized through
the plans or scripts lower down T>He; ty own. rhis vertical movement downwards is
pursued as far as necessary T*f a. j.necessary. if this strategy fails, another line is
followed.
4.5.4 Goals and sub-goals.
Just as unconnected actions in CD representation can be explained at 
the level of scripts and plans, so scripts and plans need explanation at a 
higher level too. This next level, in SPGU, is that of goals, and these 
may be divided into two: main goals and sub-goals. If we assume that 
agents in a discourse have plans, although we cannot recognize what they 
are, yet we may be able to reconstruct them by reference to sub-goals, 
and, similarly, unknown sub-goals may be interpreted with reference to 
goals.
Consider a literary example. Lady Macbeth urges Macbeth to wash his 
hands of blood to avoid detection; she wants him to avoid detection to 
preserve his life; perhaps she wishes him to preserve his life to further 
her own status. In this interpretation, her goal is to further her own 
status. This is executed by the sub-goal of advancing her husband's 
status. This activates a plan to preserve his life, which in turn gives 
rise to the plan of avoiding detection. This last plan is executed by, 
among other things, an (instrumental) 'washing hands script' (although 
the usual slot filler 'dirt' has been replaced by 'blood'). Such an 
interpretation reveals a number of problems. It highlights the uncertain 
dividing line between goals and plans. It also reveals a growing 
uncertainty in interpretations at higher levels. Scripts are relatively 
transparent, as are plans. The goals behind them are at once both more 
mysterious and more interesting. (It is the ambiguity of Lady Macbeth's 
goals which attracts the greatest interest.) On the other hand, there are 
certain 'basic' goals of which we may be fairly sure for most people: the 
goals to survive, to protect offspring2’, to seek sexual satisfaction. It 
is the intermediate area between these most fundamental goals and the
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plans and sub-goals which execute them which are both most Interesting 
and most frequently concealed.
The five main goals proposed in SPGU are:
Satisfaction (of hunger, sex, sleep and addiction)
AchlevJ.Lt c'fJT''81; exercise, competitionAchievement (of possessions, power, job, social relationships skills)
ieal'h’01 safety’°f °f pe»p‘». of propit,Crisis handling (of accident, fire, storm etc.)
There are also sub-goals (divided into 'delta' or general planning goals 
and 'instrumental' or executive goals) employed in the execution of these 
main goals. The main goal of preserving one's own children, for example, 
might be realized through, among others, the delta goal of ascertaining the 
identity of a baby-sitter, and the instrumental goal of using that baby­
sitter. The instrumental goal will then be initiated by a planbox 'ask', 
which, if it fails, will create a recursive loop, leading to asking another 
baby-sitter, or a change of plan, perhaps to stay at home. Clearly, there 
are complex interrelations and preference rules between both goals and 
subgoals, and those which operate with enough frequency and predictability 
will be handled by plans and scripts. Subgoals, moreover, may have their 
own subgoals, and no limit is set to this recursion. Although this point 
is not explicitly stated in SPGU, we may regard main goals as types of 
schemata whose default elements are actual or potential sub-goals, and 
sub-goals as schemata whose default elements are other sub-goals and/or 
plans«
At this level, as at that of scripts and plans, there is much room for 
debate as to the degree in which goals are universal or specific to 
cultures, social groups or individuals. This of course may be the source 
of interest in reading texts concerned with other people’s goals. Many of 
SPGU's categories are specific to the culture and social class of its 
authors, and it might be unkindly observed that there are many ways in 
which the list reflects the goals of a male, middle-aged Borth American 
academic - though to be fair, the authors often show humorous recognition 
of this. It is easy enough to speculate on different classifications and 
identities of goals and, in sociology, psychology and anthropology, there 
are in fact many such attempts (for a discussion see Atkinson et al. 
1987:315-346), but the accuracy or inaccuracy of SPGU's specific
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suggestions co.cer»l.g main goals la no .ay i.validates the theory that 
goals of soma sort ooatrol the lower levels of both discourse and actio..
4.5.5 Themes.
Just as plans and scripts demand goals, so goals need explanation too. 
In text comprehension, if a goal is not recognized, or is unfamiliar, 
recourse may be made to some higher level. Whether or not there is a 
degree of universality in goals, it is indisputable that the priority given 
in conflicts between goals varies both within individuals, from individual 
to individual, and from group to group. Why will one person risk their 
Job for sexual satisfaction and another sacrifice sexual satisfaction to 
their Job? Why will one individual stop work to watch television and 
another stop watching television to work? And why, for that matter, do 
such preferences change within the behaviour of one individual? Once 
again reference to a higher level is demanded, and SPGU proposes the 
category - of themes, divided into three, as follows:
Role themes: Such as 'being a lawyer', 'being a garbage collector' etc. 
Interpersonal— themes: These are rated as clines on three scales of 
positive/negative; intimate/distant; dominant/submissive. They are 
realized in relationships such as 'lover:lover', 'father:son',
'boss: employee'.
Lilfi— themes: These are grouped under headings such as: personal 
qualities, ambition, life style, political attitude, approval, physical 
sensations. They are realised in such manifestations as: 'being a 
communist', 'liking luxury living', 'wanting to become rich'; 'being 
honest'. (SPGU: 131-150)
This process of explanation at higher and higher levels is potentially 
endless, but the explanation of themes, as SPGU points out, is beyond the 
scope of the investigation of text understanding. Further speculation 
would need to consider such issues as the interaction of the nature of 
intelligence with the neurophysiology of the brain, and the degree to 
which an intelligence is 'programmed' genetically or environmentally.
4.6 Conclusion.
In this chapter we have examined some of the claims of an AI approach 
to text understanding and the contribution they can make to discourse 
analysis as an explanation of coherence. In particular, we examined the 
suggestion that the facts of a text may be represented in a language other 
than a natural language, and we described and evaluated one such system:
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conceptual dependency theory. We examined see of the problem Inherent 
in the belief that a text can be represented in this or sillier ways. 
This is important in our argument, as II claims that the knowledge held In
schematic form in memory is represented In a system of this kind. The
theories in SPGU, DM and EP all «»»»»»« 4.all suppose that schematic knowledge is
represented as conceptual dependencies,
then described and evaluated the types of schema proposed in SPGU. 
Ve gave reasons for preferring this version over the later versions in DM 
and EP. So far however we have accepted this approach at face value and 
without criticism. Ve have yet to test it in the analysis of discourse. 
The texts on which the theory has been applied in AI are all of necessity 
simple. This is a necessary limitation for work which seeks to model the 
system on computer. In the next chapter, however, we shall make a more 
speculative application of the theory to complex discourse, as a step 
towards our own modification of schema theory and its peculiar 
relationship to certain kinds of discourse.
Votes to Chapter Four.
1. Ve do not at this point distinguish 'semantic' from 'conceptual* 
representations. The terms are often used interchangeably. For further 
discussion see 4.3 and also Garnham 1987:29-40.
2. A 'single fact' corresponds to a CD 'event' or, in truth-based semantics, 
a proposition: see 4.2, 4.3.
3. Halliday's conclusion that reference to one level must therefore involve 
"reference to others and therefore indirectly to all others" is reminiscent 
of the Derridean notion of 'diff6rance' (see 2.1.2).
4. The size of these chunks, however, may be much smaller than is 
popularly believed. This is true even in pre-literate cultures (Ellis and 
Beattie 1986:248-9). For discussion of the use of ready-made units in 
discourse see Bolinger (1974) and Cowie (1981).
5. Ironically, such units are well described in formalist analyses. They 
resemble Propp's 'functions' or Tomashevsky's 'motifs': see 6.3.6 and 6.4.
6. These failings are all, however, features of human 'intelligence' too.
7. Comparable systems of representation are 'semantic networks' (Quillian 
1968), 'propositional textbases' (Kintsch 1974), and 'mental models' 
(Johnson Laird 1983). Despite the bitter disputes that rage in AI 
concerning the differences between systems, they all share the belief that 
the 'content' of text can be represented in a way which will correspond to 
different linguistic realizations.
8. There is a good deal in common between this approach to word meaning, 
and that of the lexicologist Melchuk (see especially Melchuk 198g).
9. These terms are used much like case roles in Case grammar (Fillmore 
1968). For discussions of adaptations and uses of case grammar in 
computational linguistics see Vinograd (1983:311-328).
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impossible to ^ tell ^interaction ClaSS®d aS lntelllSent lf ** is
person or a machine (for further die *T °ne iS communicating wlth a 11 The same nhco^ a+7  further discussion see EP (Schank 1986:1-15)).
are true of ^emfntlc networks'' °f W°Fd1987‘23) The tpr-m i 4.' term is perhaps a misnomer (Garnham
correlation hotwo v * networks' ls also a misnomer - if it implies acorrelation between such systems and neurons.
•familv0tr e S h l ^ e°^y c°mPatible with the Vittgenstelnian notion of
startiL noint CRriAh borrows the term and takes the idea as a
belief fn 13 19?5)' Tils underlines the view that
odds (see F X Pr978:6r9e-P73e)entatl011 “ * * VlttS6nsteiai“  aPP— * *re at
Reasonsnr il Seneratlon- as opposed to text interpretation.Reasons for the choice of level of detail, which can be taken as given in
text processing must be considered more exactly. The shift of emphasis
towards text generation focusses the attention of AI on this problem .
14. There are discussions of the interaction of conceptual structure with 
discoursal choice. De Beaugrande and Dressier (1981:99) suggest, for 
example, that a concept which lies at the node connecting other concepts
n a semantic network is likely to be foregrounded in some way in 
discourse. This kind of principle is receiving more attention in recent AI 
literature on text generation (See Mann 1984, 1987; Dale 1988).
15. There is evidence that memory for swearwords and prayers can persist 
when other knowledge is lost (Ellis and Beattie 1986:262-263).
16. As a trial is a linguistic phenomenon these may be seen as parts of 
text structure too as in 3.4.
17. SPGU's term here is 'ask1, but we have changed the term to 'ask for' to 
avoid confusion with 'ask' in the sense of 'ask a question'.
18. SPGU's name for this plan is actually 'invoke theme', but there is some 
confusion here as the word 'theme' is used in a specialized sense later in 
SPGU (see 4.4.5) below. On the assumption that it is the general sense of 
'theme' which is intended here, we have changed the word to 'topic' to 
avoid confusion'.
19. 'Invoke topic' and 'inform reason' as a way of asking for something 
presumably - though SPGU does not mention this - rely upon pragmatic 
inference to interpret mention of the topic, or of the reason for wanting 
the object, as having the illocutionary force of a request or demand.
20. This 'piece of knowledge' - that farmers know the area - does not fit 
the definition of a script exactly. Ve shall develop the term 'scriptlike' 
further in the next chapter.
21. Significantly and 'unnaturally' Lady Macbeth specifically denies this 
goal, which would otherwise be attributed to her 'by default':
I have given suck, and know
How tender 'tis to love the babe that milks me:
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have plucked my nipple from his boneless gums,
And dashed the brains out, had I so sworn as you 
Have done to this. (Act One: vii: 54)
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Chapter Five.
Sche*. theory 2, aa appUcatloa. iaalyses , .llterar7. ^  ^  
literary' teat; a aodlflcatloa of the categories.
5.0 Introduction.
In this chapter, we shall attempt to use the schema types proposed in 
SPGU in the analysis of two complex pieces of discourse: an advertisement 
and the opening of a novel. Our purpose in doing this is:
1) to test the relevance of the approach to discourse analysis;
2) to see whether description of schemata can help account for coherence;
3) to see if these analyses suggest any differences between the two types 
of discourse in question. The results will of course be no more than 
suggestive, as there is no guarantee that features of these individual 
texts are characteristic of their genres in general. They can, however, 
point towards ways in which schema theory may contribute to the analysis 
and characterization of literary discourse.
Text one is a translation of the opening paragraphs of Crime and 
Punishment1.
On a very hot evening at the beginning of July, a young man left his
garret in S----- Lane, went out into the street, and, as though unable
to make up his mind, walked slowly in the direction of K-------
Bridge. He succeeded in avoiding a meeting with his landlady on 
the stairs. His garret, right under the roof of a tall five-storey 
building, was more like a cupboard than an apartment. His landlady, who 
sub-let the room to him, together with meals and the services of a maid, 
lived in a separate flat on the floor below. Every time he went out, he 
had to walk past her kitchen, the door of which was almost always wide 
open; and every time he walked past that door, the young man experienced 
a painful and cowardly sensation which made him wince and feel ashamed. 
He was up to the neck in debt to his landlady and was afraid of meeting 
her.
It was not as though he were cowardly or submissive. Quite the 
opposite. But recently he had been in an irritable, tense state - like 
hypochondria. He had withdrawn into himself and cut himself off from 
everybody so completely, that he was afraid of meeting anybody, not only 
his landlady. He was crushed by poverty, but even his impoverished 
circumstances had recently ceased to be a burden to him. He had lost 
all interest in daily affairs and could no longer be bothered with them. 
Actually he was not afraid of his landlady at all, whatever plots she 
might be hatching against him. But to have to stop on the stairs and 
listen to a lot of silly practical nonsense which was of no interest, to 
all those nagging demands for payment, to all those threats and 
complaints, and then to have to wriggle out of it and think up excuses
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b<rtt*r sl‘P downstairs
Text 2 (see figure 11! is a magazine advertisement for Gore-Te* fabrio.
Contrasting a literary translation with an advertisement will be useful 
in our later argument concerning the Jakobsonian definition of literariness 
(in Chapter 7). None of the linguistic choices of the original can by 
definition appear in a translation - though the translators may have 
sought equivalents for them, or compensated for their loss by adding 
•devices’ of their own. The advertisement, by contrast, contains word play 
( silver lining , Just the ticket") of a kind often associated with 
literature, and which would be impossible to translate without loss on 
some level. The position of these two puns at the beginning and end of 
the piece, moreover, gives it a structural symmetry which is only 
present on the linguistic level.
The texts and examples used in SPGU and in related work attempting to 
implement them2, are necessarily simple, in order that they may be 
processed or produced with the rigour needed in computer modelling, 
according to the capacities of AI. This simplicity of AI texts may be 
characterized as follows. They tend to be narratives, following a strict 
chronological sequence. The clause structure is simple and FSP unmarked. 
Vocabulary is limited and lexical cohesion is effected through denotation 
rather than connotation. The texts concern events within a limited world, 
initiated by a fixed number of actors with known goals. Coherence is 
achieved with reference to a fixed number of known schemata. Narrative 
stance is uncomplicated. There is no adaptation of a narrative persona 
with a consequent apparent limitation on authorial knowledge. 
Consequently, there are no complex changes of viewpoint such as ’slipping’ 
(Leech and Short 1981:340) between the points of view of author, narrator 
and characters.
Our texts, by contrast, are complex, and certainly unsuited to the 
capacities of AI. Events do not follow a chronological order. Clause 
structure is complex and sentence perspective often marked. Cohesion is 
complex. The interpretative schemata which we shall suggest for the texts 
are consequently both uncertain and open-ended. It is not always possible 
to distinguish with any certainty between scripts, plans, goals or themes. 
Uncertainty arises because interpretation may refer to readers' schemata, 
which will vary between individuals and groups, and also to speculation
Every cloud has a silver lining.
Rannoch Moor. Scotland The wind is howling down the tracks and the last 
train has gone the same way; be grateful you’re wrapped up in GORE-TEX8 fabric 
It's not only totally waterproof, it's also impenetrable to stiff breezes, gales and even 
hurricanes. In tact, the harder rhe wind blows, the more noticeable die insulation 
effect becomes.
And if you've worked up a good sweat trying to match the timetable, you'll still be comfortable 
Bccause of the unique membrane structure of Go re-Tex fabric, perspiration can escape freely, keeping 
you feeling fine. It's the most breathable weatherproof fabric ever invented, and is guaranteed to stay that 
way for at least two years.
And these days, Go re-Tex fabric is one of the most stylish as welL It comes in a choice of fashion colours 
and features in top ranges of leisure and sports wear.
All of which makes it ju st the ticker for travelling first class, however you plan to get home.
iore- fex'fihne consists erf an outer fabric a lining material and 
a skin-like me-ml iiaiir rharhas Wo fewer than 9  billion pores 
per square inch, each pore is 20.000 umeggywller than a 
raindrop but 700  limes larger than a molecule of 
■  perspiration. I hats why rain cannot pass
through, but sweat escaocs casly
in, Scotland. Td: 0S06-41252S. T«lc«: 727336
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about characters', Barrator's and author's schemata, which are tentatively 
constructed by the reader as the discourse progresses. Open-endednees 
arises fro. the activation of potentially huge scripts - , 'city script' 
for example or a 'holiday script'. There is an Inevitable eelectlveness 
and arbitrariness In decisions concerning the boundaries of schemata: 
whether, for example, knowledge of kitchens is part of knowledge of 
houses, or a separate domain of its own.
Our aim, therefore, cannot be to achieve the definitiveness of AI text 
analysis, and it certainly cannot be to produce an analysis rigorous 
enough to be used in any processing algorithm. Rather, we seek to 
suggest, tentatively, a passible network of a reader's schemata, activated 
or added to by the text, and of a reader's hypotheses about characters' 
schemata. Though speculative, however, our analysis may still have - it is 
hoped - the virtues of a preliminary reconnaisance. Inevitably, it must be 
to some extent an analysis for one reader (this one: the present writer), 
though the coherence of these passages for many readers, and the perceived 
'normality' of such textual clues to script activation as the use of 
definite articles for default elements (see 1.4.2), suggest that within a 
speech community, individual and group variation is not as significant as 
is sometimes supposed in reader-response literary theory*. This view of 
literary texts is strongly expressed by Short (1989c), when he writes of 
"the major fact"
that, though we are all different, we agree to a remarkable extent over 
the interpretation of texts. Indeed, if it were not the case, it would 
be difficult to see how communication could ever take place. (op.cit.:3)
5.1 TBIT OIE: the opening of 'Crime and Punishment' (translation).
Our procedure will be as follows:
1) assign schemata to the text (in 5.1.1);
2) list some of the contents of the schemata proposed, indicating both a 
selection of default elements, and new elements added to these schemata by 
the text (in 5.1.2);
3) discuss the analysis (in 5.1.3);
4) suggest connections between them which contribute to coherence, (in 
5.1.4)
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Ve shall then, In 5.2, repeat these stages <1-4) with Text 2. In 5.3 we 
shall contrast the two analyses and summarize our findings, so that In 
5.4., we can suggest a modification of the SPGU model.
5.1.1 Suggested schemata.
In assigning schemata to the text we use the following symbols:
$ = script 
IT = plan
r = goal ( sub-r = sub goal)
0 = theme
These symbols may be followed by a ’type* (for scripts and themes only), a 
'viewpoint' and a 'name'. The following abbreviations are used for script 
types.
SIT = Situational
PERS = Personal
INST = Instrumental
and for theme types:
ROLE = ROLE
INTERP = INTERPERSONAL 
LIFE = LIFE
The following abbreviations are used for viewpoints:
R = Reader
C (or name of character) = Character
R/C = Reader and character
In a sense all schemata are readers' schemata. Their autonomous 
existence for characters is illusory.
The name of the schema refers to its contents. Thus $ SIT LANDLADY 
CITY means 'a situational script about a city from the landlady's 
viewpoint'. Plans and goals have no type, but only a viewpoint and a name.
TT LANDLADY GET RENT means: 'the landlady's plan to get the rent*.
Text One is interpreted in terms of the following schemata:
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scripts
* SIT R SUMMER 
$ SIT R CITY 
& SIT R HOUSE
$ PERS YOUJJG MAS BEING A LODGER 
$ INST YOUNG MAN GO OUT 
$ PERS R/C ARGUMENT
goals
r YOUNG MAH UNKNOWN 
T LANDLADY STAY SOLVENT 
T YOUNG MAN STAY SOLVENT 
sub-r YOUNG MAN AVOID RENT 
sub-r LANDLADY GET RENT
plans
IT YOUNG MAN 
IT YOUNG MAN 
IT YOUNG MAN 
IT LANDLADY 
IT LANDLADY 
TT LANDLADY 
IT LANDLADY 
IT YOUNG MAN 
IT YOUNG MAN 
IT YOUNG MAN
themes
GO OUT
GO SOMEWHERE
AVOID LANDLADY
INVOKE TOPIC
DEMAND
THREATEN
COMPLAIN
EXCUSE
LIE
AVOID LANDLADY
6 INTERP YOUNG MAN BEING LODGER 
8 ROLE YOUNG MAN BEING COWARD 
0 LIFE YOUNG MAN UNSOCIABLENESS 
0 LIFE YOUNG MAN BEING POOR 
0 LIFE YOUNG MAN NERVOUS TENSION
Again, it should be emphasized that this list is highly speculative. There 
is not, and perhaps cannot be, any claim to 'correctness' or 'completeness'. 
In particular the above suggestions could be broken down into a larger 
number of small 'sub-scripts', for example, $ KITCHEN, $ STREET. There is 
also arbitrariness in deciding whether schemata are themes, goals, plans 
or scripts. YOUNG MAN GO OUT and YOUNG MAN AVOID LANDLADY for example 
might initially be regarded as plans, though on the evidence of the 
passage as a whole, it seems that they are so habitual for this character 
that they are better described as scripts. (Thus YOUNG MAN GO OUT is 
listed above as both a script and a plan.)
5.1.2 Analysis.
The following analysis attempts to link the proposed schemata to the 
unfolding of the text. Names of schemata are written in three lines above 
the text, the top line containing themes and goals, the second plans and 
the third scripts. We do not deal here with the problem of when and how 
a schema ceases to be relevant. In general we consider a schema, once 
activated, to continue. We do, however, repeat the name of a schema where 
we consider it to be brought back into prominence by the text. 
Inevitably, for reasons of space, not every potential minor schema which 
may be temporarily activated can be included. We name a schema when we 
Judge it to contribute significantly to understanding.
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............................ r YOUNG MAN UNKNOWN.........
$ R SUMMER....... ..................  ^ YOUNG MAI GO OUT .........
On » very hot 6ven,ns «  t i . " 'of July/' . young ».n left his
5 R HOUSE.............  $ g CITY . ........................
garret In S Lane, went out into"thestrwt,"'and','asthough"unable"to 
T YOUNG MAN UNKNOWN ............
...........young man go somewhere ............
make up his mind, walked slowly In the direction ’of ‘ k-------- Bridge.
r ,00,° ...........6 KOlE ™ ' «  « «  BBIHG i LODGES ...........  IT YOUNG MAN AVOID LANDLADY.......................
............... * PERS YOUNG MAN BEING A LODGER.....!..................
He succeeded in avoiding a meeting with his landlady on..the stairs’”
* R HOUSE ................................  ...........
His garret, right under the roof of a tall five-storey building, was more
0 LIFE YOUNG MAN BEING POOR ......................
..........  T YOUNG MAN STAY SOLVENT ........................................1..
....................* PERS YOUNG MAN BEING A LODGER.......
like a cupboard than an apartment. His landlady, who sub-let the room to
him, together with meals and the services of a maid, lived in a separate
.............. n YOUNG MAN GO OUT ................................
$ R HOUSE ........ $ INST YOUNG MAN GO OUT ................
flat on the floor below. Every time he went out, he had to walk past her
...........IT YOUNG MAN AVOID LANDLADY ............................
$ R HOUSE ..................................................
kitchen, the door of which was almost always wide open; and every time he
......................  0 ROLE YOUNG MAN BEING A COWARD ............
walked past that door, the young man experienced a painful and cowardly 
0 INTERP YOUNG MAN NERVOUS TENSION ..............................
sensation which made him wince and feel ashamed. He was up to the neck
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0 1'.^ E..YOU*r' BEI,G ra0I! 'e R0LE Y0D,G K U  BEIS<; * “ » « » ........
in debt to his landlady and was afraid of neetlng her.*...
...  0 ROLE YOUSG MAS BEIJfG A COWARD ...............
It was not as though he were cowardly or submissive. Quite the 
.............  6 ISTERP YOUSG MAH SERVOUS TESSIOS .................
opposite. But recently he had been in an irritable, tense state - like 
...........  9 LIFE YOUSG MAH USSOCIABLESSESS .....................
hypochondria. He had withdrawn into himself and cut himself off from
............ 8 ROLE YOUSG MAS BEISG A COWARD .....................
.........................  II YOUSG MAS AVOID LASDLADY............
everybody so completely, that he was afraid of meeting anybody, not only
............6 LIFE YOUSG MAS BEISG POOR .......................
his landlady. He was crushed by poverty, but even his impoverished 
..... 6 LIFE YOUSG MAS USSOCIABLESESS.............................
circumstances had recently ceased to be a burden to him. He had lost all
interest in daily affairs and could no longer be bothered with them.
0 ROLE YOUSG MAS BEISG A COWARD ..............................
IT YOUBG MAS AVOID LASDLADY ......  SUB-r LASDLADY GET REST......
Actually he was not afraid of his landlady at all, whatever plots she
..............................  $ R HOUSE ......................
might be hatching against him. But to have to stop on the stairs and
r LASDLADY STAY SOLVEST ........................................
IT LASDLADY IBVOKE TOPIC ........................................
listen to a lot of silly practical nonsense which was of no interest, to
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SOB-r LABDLADY GET REITT ..............
TT LABDLADY DEMABD .............. U LANDLADY THREATEB
$ R/C ARGUMENT ...............................  ...............
all those nagging demands for payment, to all those threats and.......
IT LANDLADY COMPLAIB ................. YOUBG MAS EXCUSE 11111111111111111111111.
complaints, and then to have to wriggle out of it and think up excuses and
H YOUSG MAS LIE ...... H YOUBG MAS AVOID LASDLADY..IT YOUSG MAS GO OUT
...............  S ISST YOUNG MAS GO OUT ...................
tell lies... no thank you! A thousand times better slip downstairs like a
0 YOUSG MAS SERVOUS TESSIOS ..............
TT YOUBG MAS GO SOMEWHERE................
cat and escape without anybody noticing.
5.1.3 Discussion of analysis.
Baming, classifying and assigning schemata in this way is highly 
speculative and highly problematic. Yet the problems encountered are 
illuminating. They provide insights into the system proposed in SPGU, 
into these particular texts, and potentially into the characteristics of 
the two discourse types: literary narrative and advertisement.
A major problem concerns the viewpoint in each schema. In processing, 
a reader will make use of existing schemata and build new ones. Some of 
these reader's schemata will contain characters' schemata, narrator's 
schemata and author's schemata. (For the author, one might speculate, the 
situation is reversed. Author's schemata contain reader's schemata.) Any 
section of narrative can be described from one or more of these 
viewpoints. In addition there is variation between readers. This can 
easily be illustrated with reference to the second schema postulated here 
S SIT R CITY, which, while it may be an accurate description for, say, most 
contemporary British readers, will be something more like $ SIT R 19th 
CEBTURY ST. PETERSBURG, for, say, readers who know in advance (from a $ R 
DOSTOEVSKY SOVELS) where and when the action takes place-*. And, even 
within broad groups of readers no $ CITY or $ ST. PETERSBURG will be 
exactly the same. (Readers with direct or vicarious experience of the 
beginning of July in Leningrad will know by default that these events take 
place during the 'white nights', when there is virtually continuous 
daylight, making people restless and wakeful, the author may well have
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assumed that Russian readers will supply this detail as a default element 
from their $ SUMMER and $ ST. PETERSBURG.)
Movement between the characters’ viewpoints, and interweaving of 
author's narrator's, characters' and reader's schemata is well illustrated 
in the meeting on the stairs. It is part of both TT LASDLADY GET RENT, 
and a failure of TT YOUNG MAN GO OUT. It also, we might surmise, realizes 
a plan of the author's: something like TT AUTHOR CREATE INTEREST THROUGH 
CONFLICT which in turn executes a goal, perhaps r AUTHOR VRITE A 
SUCCESSFUL NOVEL. Narrator's schemata are perhaps the hardest to 
characterize, existing in the interface between reader's, author's and 
characters'. The reader meanwhile is presumably adding each event to the 
scripts he or she is building about the character of the young man, the 
house and the landlady.
The choice among these possibilities in our own analysis is thus a 
considerable simplification. Ve have tended to emphasize reader's 
schemata and those of one character, the young man. This latter choice 
seems Justified by the predominance of reference to the young man, his 
goals and plans. The absence of information or suggestion about the 
higher goals and themes of the landlady also leads us to favour this 
choice. It is difficult to suggest a higher level schema for the landlady 
than STAY SOLVENT and GET RENT, both of which are likely to be defaults 
in an $ R LANDLADY. The narrative moreover frequently adopts the young 
man's view: "he was lucky to avoid a meeting with his landlady", "all this 
silly practical nonsense". In terms of FSP, the anaphoric 'he' is very 
often in the given (or topic) position®. 'Landlady' by contrast is not, 
and needs repetition, despite the absence of any other female character to 
cause ambiguity of reference. It is also possible that readers possess $ 
SIT R NOVEL PLOT in which a young man is more likely to occupy the 
central character slot than a landlady!
A further major problem is to differentiate instrumental scripts, 
personal scripts, sub-goals, goals, and themes. Key factors are the degree 
of habit on the part of a character, the permanence of a particular state 
of affairs, whether one action is subsidiary to another. Being a lodger 
may be a temporary script for some people, and a life theme for others. A 
reader's judgements must await further information, and may change as more 
details are provided. Much of the coherence and interest of this text is
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provided by the absence of motivation in the young man's initial exit from 
the house, and the lack of enough detail to reveal whether this action 
results from a plan or a script (readers will assume, of course, that the 
conscious actions of a human agent derive from some plan or goal). That 
the situation is initially seen from a reader's viewpoint is clearly 
indicated by the indefinite article in the phrase 'a young man' - he is 
neither named nor assumed to be known. Various possible goals and plans 
may be suggested by the interaction of a reader's schemata and the text, 
ranging from the desire to go out on a hot summer's evening (from $ R 
SUMMER) to the desire to escape a small uncomfortable room (from $ R 
HOUSE) to the plan to avoid the landlady (from $ R BE IMG A LODGER). 
Further explanations are then suggested in terms of personality or - in 
SPGU's terms - themes. Unsociableness, nervousness, depression, and being 
poor may all motivate the exit, and indeed each other. Finally, the young 
man's action is represented as one which is often repeated - hence our 
suggestion of the script $ INST YOUNG MAI GO OUT as well as IT YOUNG MAH 
GO OUT; the origin of the goal of avoiding the landlady, however, remains 
unclear, and may be caused by any - or any combination of - the 
suggested themes. Nor does the possibility of some other purpose 
disappear. That the young man has some darker intention - though not its 
exact nature - is revealed in the two paragraphs which follow this 
extract. Though we have not here postulated a $ SIT R YOUNG MAN, one 
might argue that the building of this script by the reader is potentially 
(provided he remains as 'central character') one of the major causes of 
coherence for the whole novel.
A further complication in the assignment and description of schemata 
arises from the apparent contradiction in the text between "he... was 
afraid of meeting anybody, not only his landlady" and "Actually, he was not 
in the least afraid of his landlady at all." Dostoevsky's writing is 
characterized by rapid and contradictory changes of viewpoint, a technique 
which led Bakhtin to describe his novels as 'polyphonic' and 'dialogic' 
(Bakhtin [1929 and 19633 1984: 5-47, 251-270; Bakhtin [19343 1981), and 
this is a case in point. Vhat we have here is the invocation of two 
contradictory themes, in the first of which the young man is a coward, in 
the second of which he is not. This causes the straightforward approach 
of the opening lines, in which narrator informs reader, to be disrupted in 
a shift of viewpoint, an apparent abdication of narrative control which is
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quite alien to the simple text types of AI. Here the cohesion affected by 
the colloquial 'actually- perhaps provides the clue, and the second 
version, we may presume, is the young man's own. Ve are thus presented 
with two sets of schemata: the first being the narrative view, the second 
the young man's own: his schema of his own schemata. Here we encounter a 
problem not dealt with in SPGU. Themes, though they are the ultimate 
source of scripts, are also a part of them. Our script about a character, 
and a character’s script of himself/herself, contains themes.
Bearing these immense complications in mind, we shall now attempt to 
give more detail about the possible contents of a selection of the 
suggested schemata.
5.1.4 Contents of schemata.
In the following, square brackets [] indicate default elements mentioned 
by the text; angle brackets <> indicate suggestions for further default 
elements not mentioned. For other symbols and abbreviations, see 4.2 and 
4.5.3.
Scripts:
$ SIT R SUMMER 
$ Type: situational
Viewpoint: reader 
Content: summer;
Headers in text: "a very hot evening at the beginning of July"
- scenes: [going for a walk]
(The number of possible props and roles is very large. It is difficult 
to specify an 'entry condition' or 'main consequence', the sequencing of 
scenes, or results.)
$ SIT R HOUSE
Type: situational
Viewpoint: reader 
Content: house
headers in text: "his garret" 
slots:
- a number of props: [little room], [several storeys], [S Lane]
- the roles of the participants: [lodger], [landlady]
- entry conditions: $ CITY ?
- results: ?
— scenes: [being in], [meeting other occupants], Shaving visitors^ , 
<sleeping>, <waking>, [eating], [going out], [being out].
(Again, it is difficult to specify either results or their sequence, or 
limit the number of slot fillers)
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S SIT R CITY
Type: situational
Viewpoint: reader
Content: city (Possible track: 19th Century St. Petersburg )
Header In text: "S----- Lane"; "K------ Bridge"
slots:
- a number of props : [houses], [streets], [bridges], <parks etc etc,>
the roles of the participants : <police>, <shopkeepers>, <students>
etc.,
- the entry conditions: ?
- results: ?
- scenes: [walking], <working>, [being at home].
(This script raises similar problems. It is difficult to specify entry 
conditions, results or a sequence of scenes.)
S> PERS YOUNG MAS BEING A LODGER 
Type: Personal
Viewpoint: Young man 
Content: Being a lodger
Header in text: "his garret right under the roof", "his landlady" 
slots:
- a number of props: [room], [rent], [meals]
- the roles of the participants: [lodger], [landlady], Cother lodgers>
- the entry conditions: possibly [0 BEIIG POOR] or [0 BEIIG A STUDENT]
- results: [possibly $ ARGUMENT]
- scenes and their sequence: [being in], [$ GO OUT], [$ MEET LAJDLADY] 
(Some of the slots are highly speculative and await confirmation. Some 
of the scenes relate to suggested scripts.)
$ IflST YOUNG MAN GO OUT 
Type: Instrumental
Viewpoint: Young man 
Content: Going out 
Header in text: "left his little room" 
slots:
- a number of props: [stairs], <front door>
- the roles of the participants: [landlady]
- the entry conditions: possibly£$ SUMMER] or [$ ROOM] or
[0 UNSOCIABILITY] or CTT AVOID REIT]
- results: [being in the street]
- scenes and their sequence: [going downstairs], [passing kitchen], 
[meeting or not meeting landlady].
There are numerous possible readers' scripts which may affect 
interpretation: e.g. $ SIT R DOSTOEVSKY NOVEL, $ SIT R YOUNG MEN etc.
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Plans. Ve suggest a possible planbox for one of the named plans.
IT YOUSG MAS AVOID LANDLADY 
IT Viewpoint: Young man (X);
Same: Avoid Landlady
Key action: SOT BE (PROX LASDLADY)
controllable precondition: X SOT IS (PROX Y) (where Y=landlady> 
uncontrollable precondition: Y NOT PTRASS Y (PROX X) 
mediating precondition : X KSOVS (LOC Y) 
result: Y HOT SPEAK X
Others could be constructed along similar lines. The distinction 
between plans and sub-goals is a difficult one to draw and this is 
illustrated by the fact that the sub-goals suggested may also be given 
planboxes as follows:
SUB-r LASDLADY GET REST 
Viewpoint: Landlady (X)
Same : Get Rent 
Key action: PTRASS REST X
controllable precondition: 
uncontrollable precondition: 
mediating precondition : 
result:
X BE (PROX Y) (where Y=lodger)
Y SOC-COST MOSEY
Y VASTS PTRASS REST X 
X SOC-COST MOSEY
Goals and themes have no content other than the viewpoint and subject 
indicated by their names, and the goals, plans and scripts they activate 
(see next section).
5.1.5 Diagrams of schemata as a representation of coherence.
Coherence is created (at least in part) when a reader perceives 
connections between schemata. These connections may be causal ( 0 LIFE 
YOUSG MAS BEISG POOR may cause SUB-r YOUSG MAS AVOID REST) or because 
one schema is contained in another ($ SIT R HOUSE is part of $ SIT R 
CITY). Connections can be represented diagrammatically. Ve shall do this 
in two ways.
The first diagram (figure 12) is a hierarchical representation of 
connections between schemata.
The second diagram (figure 13) employs a means of representation of 
connections employed by Reichman (1985) in her description of 
conversational 'context spaces'7. To show the relationships, she adopts a 
system of boxes, enclosing and excluding each other. In this diagram, 
numbers and arrows indicate the linear sequencing of schemata . Pervasive
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schemata which unify the passage as a whole are represented as enclosing 
boxes. These are F YOUNG MAN UNK and TT YOUNG MAN GO OUT. Reference to 
these begins and ends our extract and all other schemata are related to 
them. When they are invoked again at the end of the text they have 
changed considerably. The unknown goal is now to some extent clarified. 
What was initially perceived as a plan has become more like a script.
Figure 12 is a product view of the discourse (see 3.4 and 6.4); figure 
13 is a process view (see 3.5 and 7.4).
Both diagrams are highly speculative. This should only emphasize the 
fact that they are two among many other possibilities. One reason for 
this is that almost any schema may be both the container and the 
contained in relationship to another. Thus, for example, the city is part 
of the young man's life, but equally the young man is a part of the city.
5.2 TBIT TWO: Every Cloud has a Silver T.lnlng (advertisement).
The second text has been chosen for the contrast it provides with the 
first. Novels and advertisements are usually regarded as quite dissimilar 
types of discourse, attracting different attention and evaluation. It 
would, however, be a circular argument to dwell on differences in advance. 
Our aim is rather to examine the interplay of schemata and text, and then 
examine differences.
We shall, however, comment straight away on two relatively superficial 
differences which may affect our analysis.
Firstly, text one is an extract, the first of several hundred pages, 
while text two is complete®. Treating parts of a text in isolation can 
have a distorting effect upon perception of both cohesion and coherence 
(Cook 1986). We assume, however, that this hazard is less serious in the 
opening of a longer text, where, as reading progresses in a linear manner, 
a degree of coherence will exist at each point in the process, and some 
absence of connection will be tolerated on the assumption that it will be 
resolved by later information.
Secondly, text one is words only, while text two is accompanied by a 
picture (see figure 11) showing a healthy, young, handsome, stylishly 
dressed man wearing a Gore—Tex coat and - because of the camera angle - 
dominating the view of the small windswept station where he is sitting*. 
Clearly, in such advertisements, there is interplay between text and image
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and such features as the meaning of anaphoric referring expressions (such
as -he') and of exophorlc referring expressions (such as -you') may be
determined by the picture (Cook 1988). Slots for evoked schemata may well
be provided pictorially. Nevertheless, we shall deal with the text as 
writing only.
Ve shall now repeat the same stages of analysis as In 5.1.
5.2.1 Suggested schemata.
The text is here interpreted in terms of the following schemata:
scripts
S> SIT R/C HIGHLAJTD SCOTLAND 
$ SIT R/C BE OS HOLIDAY 
J INST C WEARING GORE-TEX
plans
TT R/C RETURN HOME 
TT R/C CATCH TRAIN 
TT R/C STAY WARM 
TT R/C STAY DRY 
TT R/C BUY TICKET 
TT R/C GORE-TEX
goals
T R/C SAVE MONEY 
T R/C BE MODERN 
T R/C STAY COMFORTABLE 
T R/C BE STYLISH 
T R/C MAINTAIN STATUS
Once again, it must be emphasized that this list and the following 
suggestions concerning the connections of these schemata in the text 
reflect one of many possible interpretations.
5.2.2 Analysis.
As no themes are suggested here, only two lines are used above the text.
Every cloud has a silver lining
............................  TT R/C RETURN HOME...................
$ SIT R/C HIGHLAND SCOTLAND. $ SIT R/C BE ON HOLIDAY.. TT R/C CATCH TRAIN 
Rannoch Moor, Scotland. The wind is howling down the tracks and the last
....................  T R/C STAY COMFORTABLE....................
............  TT R/C STAY WARM ... S INST C WEARING GORE-TEX..
train has gone that way; be grateful you're wrapped up in GORE-TEX fabric.
...TT R/C STAY DRY ......... TT R/C STAY WARM ........................
................. $ SIT R/C HIGHLAND SCOTLAND)......................
It's not only totally waterproof, it's also impenetrable to stiff breezes,
..... $ INST C WEARING GORE-TEX ................................
gales and even hurricanes. In fact, the harder the wind blows, the more
noticeable the insulation effect becomes.
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U R/C RETURN HOME.... H R/c STAY DRY r R/r qtay rnifTfniJT»BT tjU R/C CATCH TRAIN..........  .. .... ........ COMFORTABLE
And if you ve worked up a good sweat trying to match the timetable, you'll
still be comfortable.
. .................................... R/c STAY COMFORTABLE.....$ INST C WEARING GORE—TEX.... .............. . j[ r/q STAY DRY
Because of the unique membrane structure of Gore-Tex fabric, perspiration
........................  t INST C WEARING GORE-TEX ............ .
can escape freely, keeping you feeling fine. It's the most breathable
... r R/c BE MODERN ............. f r /c  SAVE MONEY............
.......................  II R BUY GORE-TEX......................
waterproof fabric ever invented, and is guaranteed to stay that way for at
..........  T R/C BE MODERN .......................................
IT R BUY GORE-TEX........................................... ..........
least two years. And these days, Gore-Tex fabric is one of the most
T R/C BE STYLISH...................................................
stylish as well. It comes in a choice of fashion colours and features in
T R/C MAINTAIN STATUS.........
top ranges of leisure and sports wear.
IT R/C CATCH TRAIN...........  T R/C MAINTAIN STATUS............
................ IT R/C BUY TICKET.....  IT R BUY GORE-TEX.....
All of which makes it Just the ticket for travelling first class, however
you plan to get home.
5.2.3 Discussion of analysis.
We have attributed most schemata to both reader and the character (the 
young man in the photograph) on the assumption that the male reader is 
invited to identify with him, or seek to imitate him. (The situation for 
women readers is discussed below.) The exophoric referent 'you' thus 
apostrophizes both the character and the reader. Interestingly, if we 
assume, as the advertiser does, that the reader does not yet own a Gore- 
Tex coat then the only script which does not reflect the viewpoint of 
both the character and the reader is $ INST C WEARING GORE-TEX. The only
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other schema which is not shared is IT R BOY GORE-TEI. This cannot be one 
of the character's present plans, as he is already wearing Gore-Tex, and 
has thus, presumably, already executed the plan in the past. The effect of 
the reader instigating TI R BOY GORE-TEX will be to eliminate it and create 
a new script $ INST R/C WEARING GORE-TEX, thus achieving complete 
identity between the schemata of character and reader.
A complicating factor in all this, is that despite the apparent 
apostrophization of the reader, the advertisement may also be read by 
someone who will buy the coat for a partner. (As advertisements appear 
exclusively to aim at, and depict people in, heterosexual relationships, we 
shall assume that such a reader is a woman.) In this case the process of 
identification is more complex, and the potential buyer must first 
empathize with the recipient of her purchase and then identify on his 
behalf with the character. Alternatively, she may be directly attracted to 
the character, and seek to make the recipient of her gift more like the 
character - by buying him a Gore-Tex coat. (In 7.2, in analysing an 
advertisement aimed at a woman, we encounter the opposite situation.)
As in the first analysis, there is a degree of arbitrariness about 
decisions concerning the distinction between scripts, plans and goals. A 
person who frequently returns home from this station might well handle 
events with a script - though if so they would be less likely to miss the 
train! In the absence of any information to the contrary we may assume 
that this is not a regular activity. The fact that there is only one 
character, with whom the reader is blatantly invited to identify, makes the 
assignment of viewpoint extremely straightforward, and there is absence of 
any direct reference to anything theme-like. There must be themes which 
motivate goals, such as 9 BEING ATTRACTIVE or 9 BEING SOCCESSFOL. The 
text presumably assumes that these are the same for reader and character: 
present by default and thus unmentioned.
An assumption which we10 have made about this text is that the young 
man (and 'you') must be in Scotland on holiday. Readers do not assume 
that he lives or works in the vicinity of Rannoch Moor and is simply on 
his way home, perhaps to a station a couple of stops down the line. This 
impression is partly created by the picture, in which the character is 
wearing hiking boots and sitting on a rucksack. It also suggests that for 
many (non-Highland Scottish) people a default element in their script S 
HIGHLAND SCOTLAND is that it is a place for holidays. This is why we
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have suggested 'need to return home1 In the results slot, and 'arriving, 
being there, and leaving* in the scenes and their sequence slot. If this 
hypothesis is true we have a good example of a phenomenon we shall term 
•double inclusion'. For many people Highland Scotland is part of their $ 
BEING ON HOLIDAY, and being on holiday is also part of their S HIGHLAND 
SCOTLAND. Another example of double inclusion is the relationship of * 
WEARING GORE-TEX, which may contain holidays as one of its scenes, to $ 
BEING ON HOLIDAY, which may contain Gore-Tex as one of its props. 
Similar relations have already been noted in text one.
5.2.4 Contents of schexata.
The conventions here are the same as in 5.1.4. In addition brackets () 
indicate additions to reader's scripts from the text. We shall speculate 
on the contents of the scripts we have suggested and on some of the 
planboxes executing plans. In general the contents are much easier to 
specify than in text one.
$ SIT R/C HIGHLAND SCOTLAND 
Type: situational
Viewpoint: reader/ character 
Name: Highland Scotland
Header in text: "Rannoch Moor, Scotland."
Slots
props: [the tracks],[the last train],[the wind], (Gore-tex), 
<sheep> ,<streams>
- roles: <tourists>, <residents>
- entry conditions: <desire, money and time to travel>
- results: [need to return home]
- scenes and their sequence:<arriving>,[being there],[being on holiday], 
[leaving]
$ SIT R/C BEING ON HOLIDAY 
Type: situational
Viewpoint: reader/ character 
Name: Being on holiday
Header in text: "Rannoch Moor, Scotland." 
slots:
- props: [sensible clothing], [tickets], [train], [railway], <restaurant>
- roles: [holiday maker], <waiters>, <hotel owners) etc.
- entry conditions: <time>, <money>
- results: [being comfortable/ uncomfortable]
- scenes: [travelling], <staying somwhere>, <swimming>,
(Like $ CITY in text one, these first two scripts are huge, and subsume 
many others, e.g. $ RAILWAY, $ TOURIST ACCOMMODATION.)
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$ INST C VEARING GORE-TEX 
Type: instrumental
Viewpoint: character 
flame: wearing Gore-Tex
Header in text: "you're wrapped up in Gore-Tex fabric"
slots:
- props: [wind], [stations], [moorland]
- roles: [traveller]
- entry conditions: IT C BUY GORE-TEX
- results: [being warm], [dry], [comfortable], [stylish], [high status]
- scenes: [walking], [running], [waiting]
TT R/C CATCH TRAIN (X = R/C)
Key action: X PTRANS X (LOC TRAIH)
Controllable preconditions: X BE (PROX STATION)
Uncontrollable precondition: DRIVER PTRASS (TRAIN) (LOC (STATION)) 
Mediating precondition: X SOCCONT TICKET
result: X BE (LOC TRAIN)
IT R BUY GORE-TEX (for the advertiser, the most important schema of all) 
Key action: X SOC-CONT (GORE-TEX)
Controllable precondition: X PTRANS X (LOC SHOP) 
Uncontrollable precondition: X SOC-CONT MONEY 
Mediating precondition: X VAST GORE-TEX
result: X SOC-CONT GORE-TEX
As in the text one, the names of goals reveal their contents. It is 
significant that there appear to be no themes necessary for processing.
5.2.5 Diagrams o f  schemata as a representation D f  coherence.
The interconnection of our proposed schemata are represented 
diagrammatically in figures 14 and 15, using the same methods of 
representation as in 5.1.5. The beginning and ending with a pun cannot 
be represented in CD. The link here is purely linguistic like that 
effected by the phrase 'the sun' in Futility (see 4.5.3).
F IG U R E  14: S C H E M A  R E LA T IO N S  IN  T E X T  TWO ( I )
r r/c r  R /C r  R /C r  R /C r i R / c
BE M O D E R N SAVE M O N EY BE S TY LIS H S TA Y R E T U R N  H O M E
C O M F O R T A B L E
n  r / c ( I r / c r i R / c
S TA Y S TA Y [fa i lu re ] C A T C H
W A R M D R Y T R A IN
n r/c n r/c
BU Y BU Y
T IC K E T T IC K E T
(FIR S T (SECOND
CLASS) C LAS S]
[meta >hor)
R BU Y G O R E-TE X
-147-
F IG U R E  15: S C H E M A  R E L A T IO N S  IN  T E X T  TWO [2 ]
*  R /C  H IG H L A N D  S C O T LA N D  [ I ]  *  R /C  B E IN G  O N H O L ID A Y  [2 ]
[~| R /C  R E T U R N  H O M E (3)
I- ] R /C  C A T C H  T R A IN  {F A IL U R E ) (4 ]
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5.3 Conclusions fran analyses.
The above analyses give rise to a number of conclusions concerning:
1) the usefulness of schema theory - and of Schankian schema theory in 
particular - in discourse analysis as an explanation of coherence;
2) differences between the two texts as possibly indicative of 
differences between two discourse types;
3) the categories of schema suggested in SPGD.
Ve shall deal with each of these in turn.
One basic hypothesis holds good: that the schemata in a coherent 
discourse are perceived as connected. One schema, moreover, is crucial to 
coherence, as all other schemata are related to it. In text one this 
schema is the young man’s goal. In text two it is the reader's plan to 
buy Gore-tex. There is a danger, however, that the inevitable subjectivity 
in decisions concerning the contents and type of schemata could attract 
the valid criticism that connections, and the identification of a central 
schema, are the product of the analysis rather than the texts. Against 
this we would argue that discourse itself is the product of analysis. 
There is no such thing as coherent text but only text which is coherent 
for given readers. Thus if we have succeeded in accurately describing our 
own perception of coherence, we have described one variant of coherence 
itself11. Description can only be made more global by adding to this one 
reader's viewpoint the viewpoints of others.
5.3.1 Literary and advertising discourse.
There are important differences between the roles of schemata in the 
two texts which suggest possible differences between the two discourse 
types they represent. Contrary to the Jakobsonian approach to 
literariness (discussed in 3.1 and 7.1) these are not differences in the 
use of linguistic form. In our view, the literariness of text one survives 
translation, which is a change of such form. The advertisement, on the 
other hand, though it makes use of word .play which is beyond paraphrase 
or translation, would not, in most people's estimation be considered
literary.
On the other hand, the schemata evoked by the two texts, and the 
kinds of connections which exist between them are very different. In the 
advert, goals and plans are both assumed, unquestioned, and therefore, 
presumably reinforced. The focus is upon their fulfilment through the
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purchase and use of the product, which is a slot filler in several 
scripts. In text one, on the other hand, goals and plans are disputable 
and themselves sources of interest. Viewpoint in text one is shifting and 
unclear, and this is tolerated. In text two viewpoints are more uniform, 
and where there is a difference, the communicative purpose is to remove it. 
In text one, there is a conflict between the plans of one character and 
those of another; in the advertisement there is no such conflict. In text 
one, slot-fillers1 in scripts serve to illuminate goals and plans; in the 
advertisement the focus is upon scripts for their own sake, and upon one 
slot filler in particular: the product.
5.4 A modification of the SPGU model.
This analysis has revealed a number of weaknesses and complications in 
the categories proposed by SPGU when used in the analysis of complex 
discourse. These are as follows:
- It is not possible to specify a sequence of scenes in all scripts
- It is not possible to specify entry conditions or results.
- At any point in a narrative, in establishing coherence, reference may be 
made to the schemata of the reader, the author or the characters. (The 
narrative stance can perhaps be characterized as an interweaving and 
Juxtaposition of these viewpoints.) This considerably complicates attempts 
to represent connections and multiplies the number of possible 
interpretations
- A schema may both contain and be contained by another schema. This 
applies both where the two schemata are of the same type (i.e. two 
scripts) and also across levels ( a script and a plan, a script and a 
theme etc.). This phenomenon of 'double inclusion' means that, even given 
a limited number of schemata, the possible permutations in representing 
connections are enormous
- A representation of schemata does not reveal connections which are text 
structural or which exist only through linguistic choice. The symmetry 
given to text two by the opening and closing puns is a case in point.
- Distinguishing plans from scripts, on the one hand, and sub-goals from 
plans, on the other, is not always possible.
- For these reasons we shall make the following modifications to the basic 
categories in further analyses.
1. We shall recognize nnlv three levels of schemata12.
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2. The first, corresponding broadly to scripts, we shall term 'scriptlike 
schemata' (symbol $S>. Ve shall define these as schemata whose contents 
whether in terms of objects, people or events, are specific. Such a schema 
will not need to specify results, or a sequence of scenes. Consequently, 
in future, we shall simply list a selection of the contents (defaults) of 
scriptlike schemata, indicating the relationship of each default element to 
the whole. In listing contents of scriptlike schemata, we shall employ 
some of the terms used in SPGU, such as 'props', 'roles' and 'results', 
though in a freer^and more selective manner. We shall indicate qualities 
and states by/use/'IS/ARE/BE' and 'HAS/HAVE' (see 4.2.1). The principle of 
double inclusion will enable us to list plans and themes as default 
elements of scriptlike schemata.
3. We shall make no distinction between plans and sub-goals, but have a 
single level called 'plans'. We shall no longer list the contents of 
planboxes in detail.
4. Similarly, we shall subsume the SPGU categories of goals and themes 
under a single heading for which we retain the name 'themes'.
5. ttoai— importantly ,— In future analyses, we shall emphasize connections 
established through linguistic and text structural choices which are not 
taken into account by SPGU.
Votes to Chapter Five.
1. The translation of this passage is by Guy Cook and Elena Poptsova-Cook. 
The analysis applies to the translation and not to the original. It might 
be said that the degree to which a schematic analysis is equally 
applicable to the original and the translation is a measure of 
'equivalence' and could be used to evaluate different translations of the 
same original (Cook 1984:61-75; Cook and Poptsova-Cook 1989).
2. Such as the 'Sam' and 'Talespin' described in Schank (1984), and 
'Moptrans' Frump, see EP (Schank 1986: 10).
3. As we have already observed in 3.6.2, this view is born out by 
empirical investigations. Van Peer (1986), for example, has correlated 
formal foregrounding and psychological saliency for a wide variety of 
readers. For further discussion of this controversy and its history, see
7.4 and 8.1.
4. Magarshak's translation (Penguin 1956) gives the name of a bridge 
(Kokushkin Bridge) and a street (Carpenter Street) although Dostoevsky had
only written K---and S----- . One might suppose that in Russia in 1866,
for a novel set in an unnamed city, the name 'St. Petersburg' would be 
provided by default.
5. This is true of the Russian original too.
6 . The Russian equivalent is perhaps not so colloquial.
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partT c^ ntsT hT ct TrT C°unter-clalms *ade by
8 . There is also the further V ^  *tS °f conversati°n '
triangular box which we ignore. ^  P °D °f Gore-Tex fabrlc in the
reveAalIdSlLt°itRtsn^  Statl°n durillS the course of this researchrevealed that it is not the scene of the photograph!
10. And a number of other people questioned on this point.
schemata^ctfva+Pd t M S  S  ^ at ** assumes that our intuitions about the schemata activated correspond to those which we actually used.
“ " <Schank 1982 > the number of levels is also reduced to three but
+roA  ® Way«/r°P^ ?  b6re <See 8'1'2)- In EP (Schank 1986:71) scripts are treated as fossilized plans"; -themes' are replaced by -beliefs’.
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Chapter Six.
Literary Theory 1: formal approaches to deviation.
6.0 Introduction.
The first five chapters have outlined the discourse-analysis approach 
to coherence and that of AI schema theory, hoping to show how the latter 
can contribute to the former. The approach was hierarchical, so that 
where coherence was not signalled by cohesion, or induced from conformity 
to text structure or pragmatically inferred, it could nevertheless be 
constructed through schemata. Schemata are themselves hierarchical and 
may be classed as scriptlike schemata, plans or themes. In this approach, 
coherence can be established by referring to as high a level as 
necessary. Failure to account for coherence at one level can be overcome 
by reference to the level above. Failure at the highest level will often 
lead to the attribution of incoherence or madness (though this Is as 
likely to reflect a failure of comprehension as of production.)
So far, however, inevitably, the approach has presented only a partial 
framework. It has been far more concerned with conformity to expectations 
than with deviation from them. It does, however, have the potential to 
classify an instance of deviation from expectations by identifying it with 
one of the given levels.
A further shortcoming of the approach so far is that it has viewed the 
construction of coherence as the interaction of a single isolated discourse 
with knowledge of the world; it has taken little account of knowledge of 
other texts, and of the complex effects which intertextual resonances may 
have on the overall effect. It has also neglected discourse as a mode of 
action, affecting - or attempting to affect - the lives of others, and the 
consequent effects of different narrative stances. Related to both these 
omissions is the crucial role of choices between linguistic and text 
structures: the many ways in which the same conceptual content can have 
different functional or temporal arrangements, the number and nature of 
overt signals of this arrangement, the demands of knowledge of similar 
structures in other texts, the level of detail, and the subsentential 
linguistic choices. Indeed, the conceptual content itself may be affected 
or dictated by structure.
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Our aim in this chapter will be to elaborate the approach -in ways 
which will enable it to cope more fully with literary discourse, and to 
develop its potential as a description of readers' experience of deviation. 
In so doing, we shall begin to incorporate the notion of discourse 
structure (already touched on in 3.4). As a preliminary to this expansion, 
we shall examine ideas from a body of knowledge which, despite its 
heterogeneous nature, is now widely characterized as 'modern literary 
theory , seeking for additional insights and contributions. This 
examination is essential for a number of reasons if schema theory is to 
contribute, as we intend, to a theory of discourse deviation and of a 
function of cognitive change in certain discourse types (suggested in
3.2.3).
These reasons may be summarized as follows. Firstly, there are 
literary theories which voice objections to some of the premises of schema 
theory, and these objections must be answered. (In particular, we must 
examine the relationship between schema theory, which stresses knowledge 
and interpretation as to some degree separate from form, and theories 
which stress linguistic and textual form as all important.) Secondly, 
there are theories which, though couched in different terminologies, 
derived from different sources and applied in different fields, are 
nevertheless compatible with schema theory, and in fact develop it and 
amplify it. (One of our claims is that sophisticated versions of schema 
theory exist, under different names and unacknowledged by AI, in the 
writings of avant-garde theorists of earlier decades.) Thirdly, there is a 
considerable literary theoretical literature on the nature and function of 
linguistic and text-structural deviation which may both benefit from and 
add to schema theory. Fourthly, there is a comparatively small body of 
literary theoretical writing which is explicitly aware of, and uses, AI 
text theory.
Our aim then is to try to draw relevant insights from literary theory 
and AI text theory together, and to use them in a theory of discourse 
deviation. The first task, however, is to say something of the nature of 
modern literary theory in general.
6.1 The rise of 'modern literary theory'.
One of the commonplaces of post-modernism is its exploitation of 
Nietzsche's observation that, contrary to common sense, cause follows
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rather than precedes effect (Nietzsche (ed. Schlechta) 1966:804). When we 
sit on a pin we feel the pain first and then seek the source afterwards; 
only when we perceive the pin as the source does the source, as source, 
exist. The idea is fertile and iconoclastic. Thus Derrida reasons that, 
contrary to the orthodox view of linguistics, writing precedes speech, both 
ontogenetica1ly and philogenetically, for the concept of speech can only be 
grasped through writing, and only in writing can people begin to 
understand that the source of writing is speech (Derrida [1967] 1976). So 
too, Hayden White reasons that historical events come into being through 
the descriptions which they apparently have caused (White 1973). The same 
argument may be applied to 'product' views of grammar, text and discourse 
such as those described in 3.4 above, and 6.4 below.
Aptly, the concept of 'modern literary theory' might be characterized as 
a similar p o st factum creation. In recent years a multiplicity of 
university courses, anthologies and introductions (Jefferson and Robey 
[1982] 1986; Eagleton 1983; Davis 1986; Rylance 1987; Lodge 1988; Rice and 
Waugh 1989) have brought together, under this single title, an imbroglio of 
diverse writings, categorized them, related them one to another, and 
generally, in Barthian terms, 'closed them down'. To say, therefore, as we 
have done in chapter one, that 'modern literary theory' ignores or is 
unaware of AI text theory, merely reflects the arbitrary choices and 
categories of the latter-day creators of the discipline. AI text theory 
could easily be included within the field. Its lack of specific attention 
to literature need not preclude it, as anthologies and courses frequently 
include writings (for example, by Marx, Freud, Saussure and Derrida) which 
though considered relevant to literature, do not often address it directly.
Despite this rather arbitrary and post factum nature of the field, and 
notwithstanding the diversity and incompatibility of approaches which the 
term subsumes, modern literary theory may broadly be characterized as 
writing about literature which does not merely accept and comment upon a 
literary canon, but rather seeks to understand the rationale behind the 
canon. Its aim is to understand, not particular literary texts per se, but 
the nature and function of literature in general. In so doing, however, it 
may, and frequently does, employ analyses of individual texts and provide
considerable insights into them.
Within this general framework, particular theories and groups of 
theories may be identified by their concentration upon one element, or
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upon combinations of elements in the model of communication in figure 16. 
Other theories and groups of theories may be characterized by their 
rejection of the terms of such a model, arguing for example that the 
reader only exists through the text (Voloshlnov [Bakhtin] [1929] 1973;- 
Barthes [1970] 1974), or that the author is a culturally determined and 
thus dispensible concept (Barthes [1968] 1977; Foucault [1969] 1979). The 
hanging of theorists and their writings on to the pegs of this model - or 
something similar to it - yields a finite number of labels which are then 
conveniently used for the chapters of introductory texts,
SOCIETY
AUTHOR --------TEXT— 2^ (PERFORMER)-DREADER
TEXTS LANGUAGE
Figure 16. A simple model of literary communication.
the sections of anthologies, the weeks of courses, the titles of books In 
series. In the anthologies and introductions referred to above, the 
following categories are the most favoured: formalism, structuralism, 
linguistics, psychoanalysis, Marxism, feminism, reader-response, post- 
structuralism. The attachment of each of these 'movements' to an element 
of figure 16 may be listed as in table 4.
Ve may detect, in this categorization, a nascent rigidity and uniformity 
in which individual theorists who do not profess allegiance to one 'school' 
or another are nevertheless lumped together under the nearest heading. 
Others, such as Bakhtin, whose stature has only recently been acknowledged 
in the Vest (see Clark and Holquist 1984; Terras 1985:34-36; Lodge 1987; 
Cazden 1989; Hymes 1989), are left stranded, while theorists like Barthes, 
whose thoughts have developed idiosyncratically through temporary 
attachment to different philosophies, have their work fragmented and 
misrepresented. In addition, certain elements of communication receive 
short shrift. There is little attention to the author, other than a 
negative critique of literary biography and scholarship. The intermediate
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role of the performer in drama and recitation is almost entirely ignored 
(a fact which is underlined by the almost universal reference to the 
•reader' in preference to the 'audience'). The perception of linguistics is 
limited to Saussurean semiotics, Jakobsonian functionalism, and an 
occasional reference to Chomsky; there is litle awareness of developments 
of text theory in discourse analysis or the computational (including the 
AI) paradigm. Related to this - as linguistics has now taken decisive 
steps towards cognitive psychology - is the absence of theories of the 
cognitive role of literature1. The presence of psychology in the literary 
theoretical canon (for a canon is what - ironically - it has become) is 
limited to psychoanalysis and phenomenology.
AUTHOR
PERFORMER
SOCIETY
TEXT
TEXTS
LANGUAGE
READER
literary scholarship and biography (rejected), 
acting theory (not included).
Marxism, feminism, 
formalism, linguistics, stylistics, 
structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruction, 
linguistics, stylistics.
feminism, psychoanalysis, reader response, reception theory,
post-structuralism.
THEORIES WHICH CONTEST THESE CATEGORIES: Bakhtinian criticism, post- 
structuralism, post-modernist feminism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
deconstruction.
Table 4. A typical correlation of 'schools' and elements.
In the following discussion of literary theory, despite these 
shortcomings, we shall provisionally adopt these widely disseminated 
categories. Our aim,however, is not simply to add another heading to the 
list: 'AI text theory', which could then be appended to future anthologies 
or inserted into new editions. Ve seek rather to maintain an awareness of 
the dangers of this rigid categorization, while also using it as a guide to 
this enormous and complex area, Ve hope to conclude, however, that ideas 
which can contribute to AI schema theory occur in the writings of many 
different and apparently incompatible schools, and that 
compartmentalization disguises similar and mutually fertile ideas. Above 
all, we hope to show that AI text theory has a considerable contribution 
to make to attempts to describe literariness as deviation.
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In the terms of the communication model in figure 16 our primary 
interest is in the relationship of author, reader, text, related texts and 
language, and the issue of whether these categories are valid. For this 
reason, and for reasons of space, we shall exclude those schools whose 
emphasis is primarily on the relation of the literary text to its social, 
political and historical context, or whose approach introduces features of 
author, reader, text(s) and language which are not of central concern to AI 
text theory. We shall not then pursue feminist, Marxist or psychoanalytic 
theories further. Our exclusion of these approaches is purely practical, 
and does not imply that they have no contribution to make to the 
application of schema theory to literature. Bor does it imply that the 
categories of figure 16 are any more than a descriptive convenience: no 
author, reader or text can be rigorously separated from the social and 
historical context in which, and through which, they exist.
Our first concern shall be to trace theories which characterize 
literariness as a deviant or patterned use of language - as, in other 
words, a particular type of text. From the ultimate failure or 
incompleteness of these theories we shall progress to some of the literary 
theories which regard literariness as a relationship between texts and 
readers, and are thus more readily compatible with schema theory.
6.2 Theories of pattern and deviation.
From this ravelled skein of complex and often contradictory writings, 
we shall attempt to pick out a single thread of thought which sees in 
literature a tendency to deviate from expectation2. In so doing, we must 
follow also a parallel strand which attempts to describe the nature of the 
expectations which are overturned, for talk of deviation must remain 
impressionistic and intuitive if it cannot describe the plain backcloth of 
normality against which the brighter stitches of deviation stand out. 
(For discussion of a psychological rather than formal approach to the 
terms see 1.2 above.) 'Bormality' and 'deviance' are an instance of a 
mutually defining binary pair, in which neither term can 'mean' without the 
other (Cixous and C16ment 1975:115). Although post-modernists (like 
Cixous) regard such pairs as a means of ideological control, and seek ways 
of escaping or at least of reversing the value judgements they encapsulate, 
we shall adopt this particular pair as a useful tool for the moment. It 
may be that in literature, the deviant is elevated to the normal, and one
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of the functions of literariness in discourse is to reverse the perceptual 
placing, in a move akin to deconstructionist readings of binary 
distinctions in established philosophical and scientific writings.
In attempting to trace these theories of deviance, we shall pick out, 
from among the categories of theory described in 6 .1 , a developing 
tradition which runs from Russian formalism through structuralism and 
Jakobsonian functionalism to stylistics, reader-response and reception 
theory. We shall highlight theories within this tradition which echo or 
foreshadow schema theory and can contribute to it. In so doing, we should 
not ignore the arguments advanced against the tenets of these approaches 
by post-structuralists, and in particular remember that we may, in the 
manner referred to in the opening paragraph of this chapter, be imposing 
our own conceptual structure after the event. Nevertheless, in so far as 
earlier theorists explicitly occupied themselves with the nature of 
deviance and normality in discourse, their area of enquiry inevitably 
touches that of schema theory, for schemata are expectations, and the 
essence of schema theory is that discourse proceeds, and achieves 
coherence, by successfully locating the unexpected within a framework of 
expectation.
6.3 The formalist theory of defaalliarizatlon.
Although the term formalist may be generally applied in literary theory 
(as it is, for example, by Davis (1986:45) and Rylance (1987:31)) to any 
who seek to study the literary text as an autonomous object divorced from 
the specific circumstances of its creation and creator, and from the 
historical and social context of its reception, the term is most generally 
associated with the 'Russian formalists', a group of critics who were 
active in Moscow and Petersburg in the years immediately prior to and 
after the Bolshevik revolution. It was a 'school' which recognized itself 
as such, willingly accepted the label 'formalist' (though it was initially 
applied as an insult) and indeed met as a group in the shape of the 
'Opoyaz' and 'Moscow Linguistics' circles (Bennet 1979:18; Eikhenbaum 
[1926] 1978:32; Terras 1985:151-154). It also came to a relatively neat 
historical end, for despite its initial sympathy with the Bolshevik 
revolution and with Marxism, it soon fell foul of the growing dogmatism of 
Soviet ideas of literature. It was criticized both by Lunacharsky, the 
first commissar for the arts, and by Trotsky who referred to the
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formalists as 'followers of St John* (Terras 1985:134), Implying 
(ironically with an analogy later taken up by deconstruction) that the 
formalists, like the fourth evangelist, were believers in the 'logos1, a 
metaphysical root of language. Though Shklovsky, one of the school's 
founding members, lived and worked in Moscow until the 1980s (Clark and 
Holquist 1984:340-343; Terras 1985:407), the activities of the group ceased 
fairly abruptly after his forced recantation of the formalist approach in 
19303 . The movement can be defined in terms of its personnel (the most 
prominent figures are Eikhenbaum, Jakobson, Tomashevsky, Tynyanov, 
Shklovsky and Brik) or more fittingly (in keeping with the formalists' own 
rejection of the author) in terms of its ideas. As these ideas contain the 
seeds of the major theories of subsequent movements which we wish to 
integrate with schema theory, we shall describe them here in some detail.
Like many movements, formalism began, and defined itself initially, in 
terms of its polemical and iconoclastic rejection of the critical status 
quo. Firstly, it scorned the biography and scholarship which dominated 
the study of literature at the time: "a history of general"', as Tynyanov 
(C19291 1978:66) mockingly characterised it, preoccupied with such petty 
biographical questions as "did Pushkin smoke?" (Brik [19231 1977:90). 
Provocatively, it declared the author's individual circumstances irrelevant 
(Tomashevsky [1923] 1978). Even if Pushkin had not lived, it was 
suggested, his poetry would still have been written (Tynyanov [1929] 
1978). "There are no poets or literary figures; there is poetry and 
literature" (Brik [1923] 1977:90). Secondly it rejected the current 
symbolist definition of art as “thinking in images" (Eikhenbaum [1926] 
1978:11), and the perennial Aristotelian view of art as mimesis: a view 
which was cruelly to reappear and wreak revenge on the formalists in the 
doctrine of socialist realism. Opposition to the notion of art as 
reflection cost many their freedom, health or lives.
From the initial wild attacks on the critical establishment emerged a 
new and radical aesthetic, the cornerstone of which is the notion of 
'ostranenle': a neologism which nominalizes the Russian adjective for 
'strange' and prefixes it with a morpheme denoting a process. This term 
is most frequently translated into English as 'defamiliarization' or 
'making strange', expressing the idea that the function of literature is to 
restore freshness to perception which has become habitual and automated: 
to make things strange, to make us see them anew.
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becomes"pCTceptlble^,°ls^thalT artificiality1ar+ a t*v «.nmftT4ri . , tuiciaiity which, in our opinion, creates
rather, the method ^ o f * s u c h " * I ”* w  Percelvable> or.. . , ° suci dimmed perception, is what I call
r ® as opposed to 'seeing1. The aim of imagery, the aim of
creating new art is to return the object from 'recognition' to 'seeing'.(Shklovsky [19403 1974:114) B
the fate of the works of bygone artists of the word, is the same as the 
fate of the word itself: both shed light on the path from poetry to 
prose; both become coated with the glass armour of the familiar. 
(op.cit.:6 8 )
This 'making strange', however, was not conceived as taking place at the 
level of content, as it would in a theory regarding literary language as a 
transparent or reflective medium through which 'reality' may be perceived. 
It is rather at the level of form, that 'the glass armour of the familiar' 
is shattered. Shklovsky unequivocally rejected the reigning critical view 
that 'new form comes about to express new content', replacing it with the 
assertion that
New form comes about not in order to express new content but in order 
to replace an old form that has already lost its artistic viability. 
(Shklovsky, quoted by Eikhenbaum [1927] 1978:29)
With this radical new view of "Form conceived as content itself" (ibid.), 
the centre of critical attention shifted away from the relationship 
between the literary text with the world or with its creator, and towards 
internal formal relationships, either within one literary work or between 
literary works. Defamiliarization in literature is viewed as operating 
either intertextually or intratextually Csyn-functionally' or 'auto- 
functionally' in formalist terms (Tynyanov [1929] 1978:68)). It is 
achieved through formal 'devices', and it is to the study and 
classification of devices to which the bulk of detailed formalist analysis 
is devoted. This, the formalists believed, would help to define 
'literariness', the object of their study, and pave the way to their 
ultimate goal, the establishment of a science of literature (Bennett 
1979:48). This goal, together with their early historical position, places 
them firmly, in spirit if not always in execution, at the beginning of the 
'scientific' tradition of text theory discussed in 2.2.2. At the risk of 
repeating well documented material, we shall now describe in detail some 
of the formalist devices of defamiliarization so that we may later discuss
-162-
their relationship to th. »ore recant nppronches to discourse in 
discourse sndlysis snd AI sclieina "theory.
6.3.1 Impeded fon.
Shklovsky proposed that a characteristic feature of literary writing is 
'impeded form', or difficulty for its own sake. This
increases the difficulty and length of perception, because the process of 
perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged
(Shklovsky [1917] 1965:12)
The attention and slowing down which this entails will in itself prevent 
automatized perception. Characteristically, little distinction is drawn 
between the levels at which this impediment may take place; Shklovsky's 
own examples concentrate upon discourse organization. We will assume for 
the moment that it may take place at any of the levels suggested by 
discourse analysis or AI schema theory: at the text-structural level 
certainly, but also at the level of world knowledge, the sub-sentential 
level (including even at the graphological or phonological level). We will 
not assume, however, that impediment at one level necessarily entails an 
impediment at higher levels. Many advertisements, for example, impede 
processing at the sub-sentential level (through puns, ambiguities, word- 
class conversions and so on) while remaining conspicuously simple at the 
levels of text structure and world knowledge (see 5.2 and 7.3). 
Handwriting which is difficult to read does not imply interesting content. 
The reverse, however, may not be true. An impediment at world-know ledge 
or text-structural levels, however, may sometimes entail an impediment at 
the subsentential level. These are points to which we shall return.
The notion of the device of impeded form encapsulates a common sense 
psychological principle expressed in sayings and proverbs such as "the 
grass is always greener on the other side". What is hard to come by, 
attracts both interest and value. There is always room for disappointment 
after attainment, however. There are literary experiences, such as - in 
many people's estimation - Flnsegans— Vat6 , where the effort seems 
disproportionate to the reward.
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6.3.2 Bared form.
In some senses, no fiction is more 'real' than another. Yet 'realism'
and its illusion of verisimilitude, may be defined as that which
successfully distracts the reader's attention from its own devices
(Jakobson [19211 1978; Tomashevsky [1925] 1965:80). In opposition to the
criterion of realism, which praises art for the success of this
distraction, much formalist analysis concentrates upon writing which
deliberately draws attention to its own fictionality and the processes,
conventions and illusions of its own genre. This is referred to as 'bared
form' (Tomashevsky [19251 1965:84, Eikhenbaum [1927] 1978:20). The
classic analysis is Shklovsky's commentary ([1921] 1965) on (the classic
example of bared form) Tristram_Shandy. It is a rich approach of wide
applicability to any instance where the reader's or audience's attention is
drawn to the artistry rather than the illusory subject matter. lor is its to
relevance confined / works which are as 'modern' in spirit as Tristram 
Shandy. Consider, for example, the effects of Shakespeare's plays within 
plays, or Chaucer's tales within tales, on any nascent "suspension of 
disbelief" (a prerequisite of realism) in their perceiver (see 6.4.2).
Ironically, by these definitions, the great 'realist' oppressor of 
formalism, 'socialist realism', is a misnomer. Rather than distracting 
from its own devices, it rather manipulates painfully bare conventions, 
though lacking the impeding of form to promote interest. (In this sense it 
is highly formalist, and arguably owes more to the traditions of Russian 
orthodox iconography than to either socialism or realism (Achildiev 
1989).)
6.3.3 Canonization of the junior branch.
The literary work, according to the formalists, inherits the 
characteristics of its uncles, aunts and grandparents, but rarely of its 
parents. Literary traditions proceed oedipally, each new work establishing 
its ascendancy by destroying the assumptions of the generation before, 
incidentally often taking on the characteristics of the generation before 
that (for a later Freudian version of this theory see Bloom 1973). In 
this sense defamiliarization is achieved intertextually: expectations 
created by an established group of writers are overturned by rising stars. 
Clearly, here, the formalist desire to treat the text as autonomous and 
independent of history and authors runs into trouble, for the corollary of
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this theory is that defamiliarization is not a feature of text, but of the 
interaction of t©xt witli context.
One of the means by which this rejection of the earlier generation is 
achieved is, according to the formalists, the elevation of a genre 
accorded low status by the previous generation to be a vehicle for the 
highest art. This they termed the 'canonization of the junior branch* 
(Shklovsky, quoted by Eikhenbaum ([1927] 1978:32)). Thus, for example, 
Dostoevsky elevated the detective story in Crime and Pin.lBl>«»T.t (ibid.). 
Like the theory of impeded form, the idea, once perceived, is ubiquitously 
borne out. Thus Wordsworth and Coleridge elevated the ballad, Blake the 
children s song, Capote the newspaper 'human interest story', Orwell the 
children's story, Bob Dylan the country and western song, and so on. The 
rise of vernacular literature in the renaissance, or of the novel in the 
nineteenth century, may be seen as wider instances of the same process. 
Perhaps the institutional nature of literary study, and its innate 
conservatism, blocks the perception of similarly far-reaching 
canonizations in our own time. The status of the poem and the novel have 
fallen, while that of the song, television programme, and film have risen. 
Within literary studies, writers like John le Carr6 and Raymond Chandler 
are still often excluded because of the apparently Junior status of their 
branch.
6.3.4 *Syuzhet' and 'fabula1.
One of the best known and longest lasting devices Identified by the 
formalists is the 'syuzhet'. This word describes the narrative ordering of 
the plot and is opposed to the 'fabula', the sequence of events as they 
happened - or rather, if we are talking of fiction, apparently happened. 
Where syuzhet and fabula coincide, there is a straightforward chronological 
narrative, which we might regard as the unmarked form of story telling: 
the kind of narratives most easily handled in AI (see, for example, the 
narratives discussed in 2.2 and 4.2.3). Syuzhet is in many ways the text- 
structural equivalent of the sub—sentential phenomenon of FSP (described 
in 3.6.2.).
Again the theory is extraordinarily productive, and useful for 
describing such literary narrative devices as 'cl iff hangers' (commonly used 
by Dickens for example), 'flashbacks' (as in Silas Karner), 'interleaving' 
(as in MflHflniP Bnvarv. Dsnar and Lucinda), description of the same event
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from another narrator's point of view (The Sound t,. or
apparently random Jumping backwards and forwards in time to create 
thematic juxtaposition or connection (as in Eveless 1» it ffiay also
be used to characterize a whole genre, as it is in Todorov’s structuralist 
analysis of the detective story (Todorov [1966 and 1971] 1988). Here 
Todorov describes the genre's typical 'double' narrative in which the 
fabula is completely reversed, so that the initial event is described last, 
while the order of events in the investigation moves backwards into the 
events of the crime. (Todorov (1966b), incidentally, together with Erlich 
[19551 1980, was instrumental in introducing Russian formalist ideas in 
the Vest.)
The distinction of syuzhet and fabula is conspicuously absent from AI 
text theory, both in the work on production described in Chapter 2, and in 
more recent work on text generation (KcKeown 1985; Danlos 1987; Patten
1988). A typical AI syuzhet slavishly follows its fabula. A current 
program, asked to write a 'whodunnit', might well begin by telling the 
reader exactly that!
6.3.5 'Skaz'.
'Skaz' is perhaps the most general of all the formalist devices. Though 
there is some disagreement over the use of the term by the formalists, and 
the relation of their use to other meanings (Terras 1985:420), we shall 
take it to mean the manner of narration, the apparent attitude of the 
narrator.
Possibly the nearest equivalent of 'skaz' is 'yarn'. Technically, a 'skaz'
is a story in which the manner of telling..  is as important to the
effect as the story itself. (Lemon and Reis 1965:67 footnote)
As such it overlaps with the other devices described above, but it may 
also be used as an element in distinguishing what contemporary theory 
would describe as different discourse or text types, or speech events 
(Bakhtin [1929] 1978; [1936] 1986; Hymes [1964] 1977; Gregory 1967; Brown 
and Yule 1983:61-2; Dimter 1985; Cook 1989:95-99). A police report, a poem 
and a personal anecdote may all describe the same incident, but their skaz 
will be radically different. Again, the concept is productive in literary 
analysis. If discourse is partly classified by identification of the 
sender, consider what defamiliarizing effects are achieved when a fictional
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narrator is quite outside of a reader's previous experience. Shklovsky 
<[1917] 1965) drew attention to the defamiliarizing effect of the narrative 
by a horse, who perceives familiar human events as extraordinary in 
Tolstoy's story Kholstomer; Tomashevsky <[1925] 1965) to the description 
by a child of an adult council of war in a chapter of Var and Peacp. Such 
odd points of view are by no means unusual: Benjy the 'idiot' in the Sound 
and the Fury, the unborn foetus in Praver before Birth <or the Jimi 
Hendrix song Belly Button V lnflnw)., the neanderthal man in The Tnharitnrg-*. 
the dying man in Elncher Martin, the corpses in Dostoevsky's Bobok, a 
child too young to understand adult intrigues in Vhat Malsle Knew, an 
amnesiac in Other People. A related means of defamiliarization is to use a 
narrator who would normally be excluded from the social milieu of the 
reader: Genet's prostitutes and petty criminals, Burroughs' junkies, 
Dostoevsky's convicts in parts of Botes from the Dead House. Huckleberry 
Finn. The list is potentially endless.
Bakhtin, though not a formalist, was to take the idea further and to 
describe the novel, in distinction from other discourse types, as having a 
'polyphony' of voices in 'dialogue' with each other <Bakhtin [1934] 1981, 
[1929 and 1963] 1984: 251-270). The voices may be those of different 
characters, or indeed the 'voices' of other discourse types. In this way 
parody is born. In Tom Jones, for example, are both the voice of the 
moralizing sermon and the voice of the ribald tale, in The Rape of the 
Lock the voice of the epic and the voice of gossip, in Don Quixote the 
voice of realism and the voice of romance. Ve have already illustrated 
the presence of more than one voice in our analysis of the opening of 
Crime anri PimlshmPTit.. and contrasted it with the single voice of the 
advertisement in which narrator, character and reader are all assumed to 
have the same goals and knowledge.
The notion of skaz is in fact so all embracing that it covers almost 
every aspect of discourse. It also has a good deal in common with the 
approach to discourse which incorporates speech-act theory (discussed in
3 .3 ), in which understanding of what the sender seeks to do with an 
utterance is all important to the construction of coherence. Yet again, 
however, an understanding of 'skaz' is rather painfully absent from AI 
theory, even text generation theory, whose variation of the relationship 
between discoursal choice and events is limited to the omission of 
knowledge assumed to be already known. This is not the same thing at all.
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6.3.6 Thene and not if.
There are other endeavours, however, in which the interests of 
formalist analysis do seem to foreshadow those of AI text theory. 
Tomashevky's theory of 'thematics' investigates what he terms the 'theme' 
of a literary work: "the idea that summarizes and unifies the verbal 
material" (Tomashevsky £19251 1965:67). Each work as a whole, and at the 
same time each part, will have a theme. The themes of a work may thus 
be hierarchically described. There is however a limit to this reduction:
parts that are irreducible, the smallest particles of thematic material: 
evening comes', 'Raskolnikov kills the old woman', 'the hero dies', 'the 
letter is received' and so on. (ibid.)
These he termed 'motifs'. From this starting point, he proceeded to 
examine the motivation for the inclusion or exclusion of 'motifs'. If we 
summarize a story, for example, we will exclude some and Include others 
depending on the length of the summary. In Tomashevsky's view 'motifs' may 
be subdivided into two types: 'bound' and 'free', or, to put it another way, 
those which are essential to the narrative (Macbeth killed the king®) and 
those which are optional (house martins nested on Macbeth's castle). A 
further division is between 'dynamic' and 'static' motifs, those which 
change the situation (Gertrude drinks the wine) and those which do not 
(Hamlet picks up the skull). Clearly, bound motifs and dynamic motifs are 
less readily omitted than free motifs and static motifs: in a tree of 
motifs and themes, those at the higher nodes must always survive those 
lower down. The theme at the highest node would be equivalent to the 
'dominant' or unifying theme (Jakobson [1935] 1978). The problem, however, 
Is to explain the 'motivation' for the inclusion of 'free* and 'static' 
motifs in the first place, and for the ordering of motifs and themes in 
general. Three categories of motivation are suggested6 .
1 ) 'realistic motivation' which yields motifs fulfilling expectations of 
life in the real world, thus fostering an illusion of verisimilitude;
2 ) 'compositional motivation' which yields motifs creating a particular 
discourse structure (an interlude between periods of action, for example),
3 ) 'artistic motivation' yielding motifs contributing to
defam i1iar ization.
In our terms, if a motif is not motivated, the text becomes incoherent.
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From the above description, the coincidence of approach between 
thematics and AI text theory should be quite apparent. Both are concerned 
primarily with narrative, which they arrange into a hierarchy of units; 
both talk of irreducible units (motifs or CD events) as the building 
blocks of this structure. Tomashevsky is in fact dealing with the 
principle for the exclusion and inclusion of events, with the problem of 
the level of detail as we described it in 4.4.2. Schema theory explains 
omission and inclusion in terms of slot filling in schemata: a point which 
is absent from the theory of thematics, as Tomashevsky did not realize 
that an event may be essential to the plot but not mentioned because it 
can be inferred. On the other hand, a schema-theory approach to discourse 
would be greatly enriched by Tomashevsky's theory.
6.3.7 Conclusion: formalism as a theory of deviation.
In retrospect, it is easy to point out that there is a good deal that is 
confused, omitted or inconsistent in formalist theory. The formalist 
concept of 'defamiliarization' and the various devices which realize it, 
concern departure from expectation, and consititute a theory of literature 
as deviation from a norm. Yet it fails to identify the norm by which that 
deviation is defined. This is largely because it focused its attention 
almost entirely upon literary discourse in isolation, rather than alongside 
non-literary discourse. It is, in fact, odd that formalism, which was in 
many ways so revolutionary and iconoclastic, never sought to question the 
existing literary canon, or the concept of literature as a distinct form of 
discourse, but accepted both uncritically. The theory would be hard 
pressed to account for the defamiliarization which occurs in many other 
discourse types. It might escape by labelling such occurrences as 
instances of literariness within non-literary discourse, but with this line 
of argument the definition of literariness becomes hopelessly circular and 
diffuse.
Another central weakness is the failure to distinguish between three 
areas of defamiliarization: sensory perception, text structure and 
linguistic form. It is strange, considering formalism's rejection of 
imagist, mimetic, realist and reflection theories of art, that it should so 
easily make the jump from defamiliarization in the sense perception of 
objects to defamiliarization in text structure and language. One might
-169-
argue that the former is a metaphorical description of the latter - 
alternatively, the theory may be simply confused.
Undoubtedly, the cause of this confusion is the absence of a rigorous 
linguistic theory. Saussure's work was known in Russia in the early 1920s 
(Kholodovich 1977), but it had not made a great impact, and was rejected 
by Bakhtin (Voloshinov [1929] 1973:57-63). Bakhtin himself, whose theory 
might have become as influential as Saussure's, did not publish his first 
major work on linguistic theory, under the name of Voloshinov, until 1929 
(Voloshinov [1929] 1973). (Bakhtin was in any case a stalwart critic of 
formalism for its attempts to isolate language from its senders and 
receivers (Bakhtin under the name of Medvedev [1928] 1978) He may 
further have antagonized the formalists by the superficial compatibility of 
some of his theories with the orthodox Soviet Marxism of the late 1920s 
(though with his faith in the Russian Orthodox Church and his hatred of 
regimentation he was anything but a Marxist-Leninist supporter of 
Stalin7 ).
The absence of a linguistic theory perhaps accounts for the creativity 
of the formalists' work on text structure and the sparseness of their work 
on language (with the exception of prosody, which we have not mentioned 
here). The result is a granary of fertile ideas, but the foundation is 
weak. In particular, the claim to deal with texts as autonomous objects 
does not fit with the notion of defamiliarization which, far from being a 
fixed feature of an isolated text, is a variable which cannot be separated 
from the psychology of the reader or from the particular and changing 
social and historical context which conditions it. Bakhtin was right, in 
his critiques of formalism, when he wrote that it is not possible to 
divorce language wholly from its senders and receivers. Language is, in 
his words, "like an electric spark" which can only exist between two 
terminals (Bakhtin [Voloshinov] [1929] 1973:103). Quite how the formalist 
thinkers might have reacted to this problem, or to what extent they could 
have made use of Bakhtin's theories of language and discourse, must remain 
a matter for speculation. By the end of the twenties they were scattered 
and silenced. Bakhtin too was arrested, exiled and forced into a relative 
obscurity. Jakobson, in Prague and later in the USA, turned his attention 
almost exclusively to the formal linguistic aspects of literature (see 3.1 
above and 7.1). The work which the formalists and Bakhtin had begun on 
the deviant discoursal features of literature thus lay dormant, buried
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under an exclusive attention to the formal system of language, until the 
revival of interest in discourse in the 1970s. •Scientific1 approaches to 
literature had split into two directions: the rigorous attention to 
subsentential form of Jakobson and stylistics; and the search for 
conformities to text structural patterns - rather than deviations from 
them - of the structuralists (see 6.4).
Yet the formalists, despite the weaknesses of their theory and its 
abrupt end, had introduced a number of important theoretical concepts 
which are often overlooked in the AI approach to text. Though it may seem 
odd to ask contemporary high-technology scientists to return to the 
works of 1920s literary scholars, AI would do well to reach back to these 
theories over the intervening decades. The formalists had described a 
type of discourse (which they, perhaps wrongly, wholly identified with 
literature) whose salient characteristic is deviance from expectation, but 
whose deviance is neither solely linguistic nor a function of the 
relationship of a text to events in the world. To explain this phenomenon 
they had introduced the important concepts of intertextuality, internal 
discourse structure, discourse type and narrative attitude, all of which 
were to become major concerns in discourse analysis, and should be major 
concerns in AI. What they did not do was try to describe the norm 
against which deviation is defined, or say quite why readers find such 
deviation so attractive and important, often according literary texts a 
higher status than any others produced by a society. Our claim will be 
that an answer to these questions may be provided by bringing together 
the insights of schema theory with the fundamental concept of formalism: 
defamiliarization. Firstly, however, we shall look at further development 
of theories of literature as deviation.
In western Europe, after (and sometimes unaware of) Russian formalism, 
the 'scientific' approach to literary discourse divided into two. Both 
approaches were profoundly affected by the growing influence of the 
Saussurean description of language, but the uses which they made of this 
description were very different. The French structuralists, taking the 
categories of Saussurtan description almost metaphorically, largely ignored 
the sub-sentential linguistic system, and searched instead for 
'grammars' and structures at the higher levels of narrative and text 
organization, presaging the interest in 'story grammars' in AI and 
discourse analysis (see van Dijk and Kintsch 1983:55-59). Jakobson on the
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other hand and later Anglo-American stylistics turned back to the
linguistic code, searching for 'literariness* at the sub-sentential level.
These two approaches may both throw light on, and benefit from, schema
theory as an aid to literary analysis. They may also elucidate the
difficult problems involved in describing the intuitive categories of
'norm', 'pattern' and 'deviation'. Ve shall turn our attention now to each 
approach in turn.
6.4 Patterns in discourse: structures and structuralism.
Another interesting fact from an evolutionary point of view is the 
following. A work is correlated with a particular literary system 
depending on its deviation, its 'difference' compared with the literary 
system with which it is confronted. (Tynyanov [1929] 1978:73)
In its description of devices like syuzhet and fabula, skaz, motif and 
theme, Russian formalism had touched upon something which is 
conspicuously absent in any comparatively sophisticated form from AI text 
and schema theory as we have described it so far. This is the point that 
the same conceptual information may be represented in different text- 
structural and linguistic forms, and that these different natural language 
representations, far from being marginal and relatively unimportant, may 
in fact dominate the conceptual content in the perception of the reader. 
(If we watch a comedy about a particular battle, for example, and then 
read a lyric poem about the same battle, the genre may be more salient 
than events which are, in the world schemata derived from them, the same. 
Similarly the syuzhet of the account of a murder may dominate the world 
schema derived from it, helping to distinguish, for example, a police 
report and a detective story.) Different ways of presenting the same 
conceptual content exist at both sub-sentential level, where there are 
choices between various FSPs, discourse markers and cohesive ties, and at 
the supersentential level where there are choices in the arrangement of 
(in Tomashevsky's terms) motifs and themes. As well as the world 
schemata described in chapter four, there are also text schemata and 
language schemata. The relationship between the three is undoubtedly 
complex, but cannot be avoided. Ve should not assume that the influence 
of one upon the other is uni-directional. Choices among sentence and text 
schemata may directly affect world schemata.
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The Identification and classification of text schemata is a similar 
endeavour to the structuralist approach to literature. Any theory of 
literary discourse as a particular kind of discourse deviation or 
patterning will need to take account of the substantial body of theory 
this approach has produced®. Structuralist critics sought, by analogy 
with the methods of Saussurean linguistics, to identify the underlying 
structure (analogous to the langue) of a genre or group of texts, expressed 
sometimes only partially - in particular texts (analogous to parole). 
Within this structure, again by extension from Saussure, they have tried to 
reveal how elements take on meaning through opposition, paradigmatic 
substitution, syntactic ordering, deletion, insertion and transposition 
(Barthes 1977:79-125; Culler 1973, 1975, 1975b:4-54; Lyons 1973; Robey 
1973, Lentricchia 1980:102—156; Genette [1982] 1988). In this they have 
drawn heavily on structural anthropology, which had sought to discover the 
underlying 'langue' of myths (L6vi-Strauss 1955, 1957) and kinship systems 
(L6vi-Strauss [1949] 1962), and Barthes' structuralist sociology, whose aim 
was to unmask the grammars of contemporary cultural artefacts such as 
fashion (Barthes 1967) and a whole range of contemporary 'myths', such as 
those concerning meat eating, washing powders, striptease, wrestling and 
so on (Barthes [1957] 1970).
The terminologies, units and objects of study in structural analyses of 
literature may vary, but fundamentally the procedure (the underlying 
structure of structuralism itself!) remains the same: to identify the 
minimal parts of a genre (almost always in practice a narrative genre) and 
to elaborate rules of paradigmatic substitution and syntagmatic 
combination. So Propp ([1928] 1968) in a seminal work significantly 
called The Morphnlngy of the Folk Tale, worked out formulae which showed 
that the 'functions' (as he called the minimal units of the 449 tales he 
studied) are finite in number and identical in sequence. L6vi—Strauss 
broke down myths from a variety of sources to 'mythemes' and, by 
describing their various combinations, arrived at a typology of myths 
(Culler 1975b:40-54). Todorov ([1969] 1987) did the same for his 'minimal 
schemata' of Thp Decameron and, as we have already mentioned (6.3.4), the 
detective story, drawing up a 'grammar' which enabled him to define the 
difference between this genre, the 'thriller' and the suspense novel. 
Greimas, whose minimal units 'semes' combine into 'classemes' which 
combine into 'isotopies', has done similar work on a wide range of texts
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from Mallarm6 and Bfludfilsiro ■u _ _oauaeiaire to bar-room jokes (Greimas 1966:53; see
Culler 19751)j75—95). Eco (197Q 1 vae ~ i jhas analysed Superman comics and the
James Bond novels, then reversed the process by using his semiotic
analyses to generate a work of fiction (Ihe Name nf t.h» whlch he
has then analysed himself (SaflectinTW on 'Th* ffainQ of ths (Eco
1989). The list of extant analyses is vast.
6.4.1 TEXTS THREE: Adventure stories.
Rather than repeat the details of one of these well-known narrative 
grammars, we shall briefly present two of our own, hoping to illustrate 
some of the problems and the weaknesses of the approach.
Our first group of texts is one which intuitively appears to be 
homogeneous: six adventure stories from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries with boy heroes: Treasure Island, Kidnapped. Moonfleet.. 
Huckleberry— Elan.! Kin, Ian— Brown's Schooldays. Analysing the plots of 
these six novels we might hypothesize the following elements:
(1 ) a 'boy' lives peacefully at home -*
(2 ) his father dies -»
(3) an event disrupts this peace -»
(4) he leaves home with an older male (not his father) -»
(5) he seeks for a precious object ->
(6 ) he learns a new language -»
(7) he is imprisoned in an enclosed space 4
(8 ) he finds the object -»
(9) he returns home as a 'man' -»
and a syntagmatic structure as follows:
1 -» 2 (or 2->l) -» 3 -» 4 -* (5 -» 6 -» 7 in any order) -» 8 -* 9
These in Tomashevsky's terms are the 'motifs'; the main 'theme' (or 
'dominant') is initiation. From the specific plots we might make 
paradigmatic substitutions of particular events. Thus, the older male (4) 
in Treasure Tsland is Long John Silver, the precious object (5) is the 
treasure, the language (6 ) is swearing, the enclosed space (7) is the 
apple barrel where Jim learns of Silver's treachery. In Kldssppsd the 
older male (4) is Alan Breck, the precious object (5) the title deeds to 
David Balfour's inheritance (5), the language (6 ) the dialect of the 
Jacobite rebels, the enclosed space (7) the ruined tower to which David is
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sent under false pretences by his uncle. In Huckleberry the older
male (4) is Jim, the precious object (5) is Jlffi.s freedom) the language (6)
is Jim’s ’nigger talk', but (7) occurs only in the earlier tale Tom
SaWyer (where the b°ys are lost in a cave). In Moonfleet the older male
(4) is Elzevir, the precious object (5) is the diamond, the language <6 ) 
is the smugglers’ argot, the enclosed space (7 ) is the crypt which leads 
to the caves, and then again a prison cell.
Against this proposed regularity, whose occurrence identifies each book 
as one ’speaking the same language’, we might identify ’deviations’: in 
terms of the linguistic analogy, marked patterns. Thus in Kim for 
example, though there is one dark space (Lurgan’s shop) many of the other 
features of our ‘grammar’ are multiplied. Thus there is not one older man 
but three: Mahbub Ali, the lama and Creighton. And each of these men 
teaches Kim a new language: horse-dealing slang, mystic rules and the 
jargon of espionage respectively. There are two precious objects (the 
Russian plans sought by Creighton and the healing stream sought by the 
lama) and Kim must choose between them at the end. In Tom Brown's 
Schooldays there is a different kind of 'deviation'. The hero is himself 
the older male who guides the younger one through his initiation, and here 
the journey and the enclosed space are dreamed rather than physical, the 
language and the precious object spiritual rather than material.
This 'langue', moreover, like many 'uncovered' by structuralism, is not 
only confined to literary texts. Similar events are key features of many 
tribal initiation ceremonies (van Gennep [1908] 1960:65-115; Frazer [1922] 
1949: 692-693; Kirk 1970:71). A boy is taken into the care of an older 
male; he leaves home and goes into a dangerous place; he learns a new 
language; he is confined in an enclosed space; he finds the object; he 
returns home. A similar initiation ritual, for that matter, may be found 
closer to home in modern industrial society. University examinations 
(though their personnel are no longer exclusively male) have all the 
features of this ritual!
6.4.2 TBITS FOUR: Concentric narratives.
Another recognizable narrative structure is that of a narrative within 
a narrative within a narrative - and so on. Ve shall term such narratives 
'concentric'. Our ’data’ will be six literary works which seem, 
intuitively, to have this structure: The Canterbury Tales, Heart Q i
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Darknesa, EntheriaR Heights, Sotes frn. ^  Hnirr and Thp t.,™ nf thQ 
Sere*. In ttia,ring Heights and HSari_oOJaEiflfi£a  for example, a narrator 
gives an account of a tale told by someone else, and within this tale 
there are further narratives. The movement 'inwards' at the beginning is 
complemented by a movement outwards at the end, a return to the original 
narrative relationship. We might regard this as the 'unmarked' structure, 
in much the same way, and with as little reason, as we described the 
sentence John ate fish and chips' as the unmarked sentence perspective in
3.6.2. A formula for the structure would be is set out below:
(Narrator 1 addresses reader 1 [=the reader ] (narrator 2 addresses 
reader 2 [-narrator 1 + the reader ] (narrator 3 addresses reader 3 
C-the reader + narrator 1 + narrator 2 ] ( narrator 4 addresses reader
4 [=the reader + narrator 1 + narrator 2 + narrator 3] ( ....)
narrator 4 addresses reader 4 [=the reader + narrator 1 + narrator 2 
+ narrator 3]) narrator 3 addresses reader 3 [=the reader + narrator 
1 + narrator 2 ]) narrator 2 addresses reader 2 [=narrator 1 + the 
reader ] Narrator 1 addresses reader 1 [=the reader])
Or more simply, giving each level of narrative a number:
(1 ( 2  ( 3 ( 4  (....) 4 ) 3 ) 2 ) 1 )
In addition we say that each narrator is a character in the narration of 
the narrative outside it, narrator 1 being a character in the discourse of 
the author, thus:
Narrator x = character (x-1).
Moreover, the readers (i.e. receivers, though not necessarily addressees) at 
each level will include those at all outer levels, thus:
readers x = reader/s x + reader/s (x-1) + reader/s (x-2 ) etc.
(providing no result < 1 )
Many concentric narratives are variations upon this theme. The Canterbury 
Tales, for example, proceeds, generally speaking as follows.
*  (2 <3 (4 ) 3) 2 (3 (4) 3) 2 (3 (4) 3
Chaucer Sir Topas Pilgrim Characters in tale
though there are also rapid transitions embedding the whole formula in 
miniature within one tale (I.e. level 4), as when, for example, the Friar
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Interrupts the S t o n e r ' s  tale (Canterbury Tnles. Ced. Koblasoa) line 1760) 
yielding the following:
(1 <2<3 <4 (3 ) (4 5 ))
Summoner Characters Friar Characters
Jotes from the Dead House provides another variation on the theme. The 
narrator reports how, on moving to Siberia, he met a reclusive ex-convict, 
Goryanchikov, working as a tutor to local children, and how, after this 
man died, the narrator was given his notebooks. The inner narrative is 
the story, told in the notebooks, of Goryanchikov's four years' 
imprisonment. Within this narrative there are further narratives: stories 
told by the other prisoners. Yet, despite one brief interjection by the 
narrator of the outer narrative, there is no return back to this layer of 
narrative at the end, leaving the structure open as follows:
<1 <2 (3 ) 2 ) 1 (2
Outer narrative Notebooks Prisoners' stories interjection Notebooks
This device of leaving the progression literally open-ended is arguably 
commoner than its opposite; it is also present in Canterbury Talpg and 
Turn of the Screw (discussed in detail in 9.2). It has also, if we accept 
the return stage by stage back through the levels to that of the first 
narration as the norm, an analogue in sentence grammar. Embedded 
subordinate clauses, in which the reader loses his or her way, forgetting 
to expect a main verb and a complete main clause, are rather like the 
structure we are describing. Blake's Ah Sunflower is a single vocative 
noun phrase with no main verb.
Ah (Sunflower weary of time 
[Who countest the steps of the sun]
[Seeking after that fair golden clime 
<[Where the traveller's journey is done]
[Where < (the youth [pined away with desire])
And (the pale virgin [shrouded with snow])>
< (Arise) (from their graves) and (aspire)
[ Where my sunflower wishes Cto go]]>]>3)
So powerful are the inner units, however, that the absence of a main verb 
may pass unnoticed. Similarly, in the riveting complex of stories within 
stories in Tntas from tl)° House, the reader may simply forget the
outer structure of which they are a part.
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In the strong structuralist view, the waning of each exemplar of a 
structure cannot be found in isolation, within one text, nor in the 
relationship of one text to the world. The argument is that each story 
takes on meaning, like the Saussurean sign, through its difference or 
similarity to others. Meaning is, to use one of L6vi-Strauss‘s explanatory 
images, like an orchestral score where there is not only the horizontal 
melody of an individual realization, but also the vertical harmonies and 
disharmonies of comparison (L6vi-Strauss [1955] 1972:176). Alternatively 
it is like a card index, in which we put a pin through the patterns on one 
card to see how they correspond with those on the others (ibid.:182).
6.4.3 Weaknesses of the structuralist approach.
The failures and weaknesses of the structuralist approach have been 
often rehearsed. Indeed, twenty five years after the heyday of 
structuralism, they may seem rather painfully obvious. Notably, despite 
pretensions to a cold empirical objectivity, there is often a marked 
arbitrariness in the choice of an object of study - a set of texts for 
example - as well as in the definition of units, the rules of combination 
and the selection of significant features. There is certainly none of 
the rigour of the subsentential grammars to which structures are supposed 
to be analogous. Barthes in his later post-structuralist work candidly 
acknowledged this shortcoming, defining his new minimal unit, the 'lexia', 
as a category arbitrarily imposed according to the insight of one reader - 
himself (Barthes [1970] 1974, [1981] 1988).
There is also often considerable confusion as to the nature of the 
structures defined. It is not clear, for example, whether a structure is 
to be found in one manifestation (a kind of prototypical Instance 
analogous to those posited by Rosch in lexico-semantics (see 4.4.1)) or 
whether it is an abstract applying equally to all instances (analogous to 
components of meaning in semantics). If the latter is the case, it is not 
clear how many examples are needed before the abstraction can be made, 
and whether this abstraction corresponds to some psychologically real 
processing structure or has come into being through the analysis. It is 
true that similar problems exist at the linguistic level in the definition 
of langue and parole, but the structuralist objects of study, being often
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trans-cultural and ’tr‘ans—li,no‘iii‘^+ilnSui=tic, are even more slippery than natural
languages.
Above all, the closed introverted nature of the systems of strong 
structuralist hypotheses, in which meaning is conceived wholly in terms of 
systemic variation, make it hard to see quite what the significance of the 
structure, or variations within it, may be. If a given structure is not 
related to another system outside itself - language or thought or history
then it seems to have no meaning other than itself, and the activity 
becomes a dead end. In many analyses, it is not clear whether structures 
are regarded as culturally and historically determined, or the reflection 
of universal mental structures independent of history and culture. In a 
study such as Propp's, where the data is from one fairly homogeneous 
cultural source, there are grounds for the first hypothesis; but in the 
work of L6vi-Strauss, which ranges freely across cultures, there seems 
little option but to accept the second. In fact, L6vl-Strauss, adopting a 
similar argument to that propounded by Chomsky (1965) in explanation of 
universal 'deep' syntactic structures, suggests that myths reveal 
universal structures of the mind. At times he even suggests that they may 
reflect structures of the brain (L6vi-Strauss [1962] 1972:212,222). Yet 
without some explicit means of linking these vaguely defined mental 
structures to those revealed by analysis of behaviour, there seems little 
point in such hypothesizing®.
Furthermore, as structuralism proceeds by analogy with Saussurean 
semiotics, Derridean objections apply equally to both activities. Meaning 
is achieved by difference, but as each sign evokes another from which it 
differs, meaning is endlessly deferred. The writing of structural 
analyses, moreover, creates a new set of texts which may themselves be 
structurally analysed, initiating a process which is potentially infinite. 
In this interpretation, the attempt to establish a single structure 
unifying and giving meaning to a discrete and finite number of instances 
is yet another attempt to bring this endless 'play' of meaning to a halt. 
Proposed abstract structures are merely 'centres' (Derrida [1967] 
1988:109), through which an attempt is made to 'close down' the irreducible 
and ungraspable interconnections. Explaining the deep structures of 
language or myth, as Chomsky and L6vi-Strauss do, as universal 
genetically inherited mental structures, creates another kind of centre, to 
which all meaning relates, and beyond which interpretation cannot proceed:
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a centre analogous to a fundamentalist's 'god' or 'creation'. Though we may 
crave the stability such centres bring, it is perhaps more rewarding to 
let meaning remain in flux. It is interesting to note the resemblance 
between these philosophical objections to structuralism and Bakhtin's 
much earlier theory of the novel (Bakhtin [1929 and 19631 1984). In this 
view, the novel is polyphonic, an intertwining of points of view from 
which no controlling single authorial voice can be disentangled (see also 
Barthes [1968] 1977:142). No single voice has a higher status than 
others. In the same way, perhaps, though there are structures in a set of 
texts, there is no single structure.
In practice, moreover, as a theory of literature, a structuralist 
analysis is often disappointing. Despite elaborate terminologies and 
procedures, the analyses themselves remain often quite simplistic, and 
limited, inevitably, to the most stereotypical texts. Eco (1979), echoing 
Barthes' ([1970] 1974:10) distinction between 'writerly' and 'readerly' 
texts, makes a distinction between texts which conform to structures (his 
own examples are the James Bond novels and Superman stories) and those 
which depart from them. These he terms, respectively, 'closed' and 'open' 
texts. The pleasure to be derived from the first category lies precisely 
in their safe and predictable nature. The pleasure of the second lies in 
their novelty - though they are never entirely novel, but rather deviations 
from the closed structure. Total novelty would presumably be 
incomprehensible (de Beaugrande and Dressier 1981:139-162). The new must 
always attach itself to the known in order to mean. This applies at the 
linguistic level, in the bipartite structure of the clause described in
3.6.2, and at the level of world schemata (described in Chapter 4).
The problem is that description of text structures is a powerful tool 
in the analysis of closed texts, yet far less powerful in the analysis of 
open ones. (Similar problems exist in discourse analysis with 'product' 
analyses like those of the Birmingham School; they work for socially rigid 
'closed' discourse types, but not for open ones like conversation (see 3.4; 
3.5).) Yet texts regarded as literary are often of the open type. 
Moreover, as closed structures are not only found in literature, but also 
in behaviour (for example initiation rites and examinations, see 6.4.1), 
and in non-literary texts as well, it is clear that the recognizable 
presence of the structure is unlikely to reveal those features which have
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led to an open text being elevated to literary status. Deviation from the 
norm may be noted, but the significance of its details remains unexplored.
Take for example, some simple elements of the structure of a story - 
that there should be an end and a beginning, central and peripheral 
characters. Then take instances of stories which, in these terms, are 
deviant. In Bunuel's film The Discreet Charm nf the Bourgeois^ there is 
no central character whose fate provides a unifying theme or dominant; the 
narrating camera, apparently randomly, picks out a peripheral character in 
one scene and follows his or her fate in the next, making connections seem 
arbitrary and unstructured. Similarly, in Julio Cortazar's Rayuela 
(Hopscotch ) there is no fixed sequence of chapters: they are to be read in 
different orders to produce different stories. The French 'nouveau roman' 
eschews endings. What can be said of these aberrations except that they 
do not conform to structural expectations? There seems no way to explore 
their detail for its own sake except by positing them as prototypes of a 
new structure.
What, for example, are we to make of concentric narratives deviating 
from the formula set out at 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 - providing of course that we 
accept that formula as the norm in the first place? It seems that the 
'meaning' of such deviations lies not merely, introspectively, in their 
difference from expectation, but also, looking outward, in connections 
which the reader may build between this perceived difference and other 
value systems. Thus we might judge the 'meaning' of The Discreet Charm of 
the Bourgeoisie (though Bunuel would no doubt have objected (Bunuel [1982] 
1983:174,222)) to be a rejection of hierarchies of characters in 
traditional stories and of hierarchies of people in general, as well as a 
rejection of coherence10. The 'nouveau roman' may be judged to 'mean' that 
events do not come to neat endings. Kotss— from— Ihfi— Qsad— Hous.fi may lay 
bare (in formalist terms) the automatic trust we place on a narrative 
first person, by denying us the narrator's final judgement, defamiliarizing 
the convention of trust in narrative authority. (A similar point is made 
by Agatha Christie's The Murder nf Roger Ackroyd in which the first person 
narrator is the murderer, but does not confide this to the reader.) tin 
may reveal that choice of adult models is not always imposed and may be a 
fusion of several. The meaning of the 'open' text, in other words, is often 
perceived to lie not only in its difference from the pattern of closed 
text, but also in the specific nature of that difference, and its
-181-
cooaectiou outwards to otter e,6tra, of ,Mnllg (Me 6,4.5 belou). ^
interpretations deiaad More than a catalogue ol closed structures and 
deviations from them.
Textual structures, then, are undoubtedly significant, but their full 
significance can only be realized when they are related outwards, to 
linguistic systems on the one hand, and to conceptual representations 
(schemata) on the other. It is true that in a sense this is only to place 
one kind of structure inside another. The interrelation of world knowledge, 
text schemata and language may simply form another, bigger, but equally 
closed structure. As such this larger structure might seem to be, not an 
escape from structure, but one step in another Derridean system of 
Infinite postponement and play. Yet arguably, this larger structure 
encapsulates the totality of human experience of discourse, and its study 
will bring us closer to understanding discourse than the study of any of 
its components in isolation.
6.4.4 Text structures and text schemata.
This section began by observing that the notion of a recurrent 
structure is very similar to the notion of a text schema. It is true that 
various elements of a structuralist approach have been assimilated into AI 
text theory (see for example Sanford and Garrod 1981:34; McKeown 1985:53). 
An important difference, however, is that while the ontological status of a 
structure is rather unclear, that of a text schema is far more specific 
and adaptable. Vhereas structures, if they exist at all, belong in some 
vague neo-Platonic or quasi-Jungian landscape of immutable cultural, mental 
or even cerebral universals, text schemata are the constructions of a 
given individual used very practically in text processing11. As such they 
may be born and perish with individuals; they may be wrong, idiosyncratic, 
distorting, Their important feature in communication is not their truth 
but the degree to which they are shared, and to which that shared nature 
is successfully exploited. In Derridean terms they are not an absolute 
centre, but a centre of convenience. In practice this difference may seem 
of little relevance, and a •structure’ posited by a -hard1 structuralist may 
be converted to a 'text schema' for the saying so. Yet the difference 
plays an important role in making schema theory essentially compatible 
with the literary theories of reader response and reception theory, to 
which we shall turn in 7 .4 , and in general psychologically more plausible.
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One other important difference is that while structuralism was contented 
with aspects of the question of how literary meaning is achieved through 
structures and deviations from them, it makes no attempt to ask why 
recurrence or deviation, as evidenced in literary texts, should attract 
the high social and personal evaluation that it does. Schema theory, as 
we hope to show in chapter eight, can at least attempt an answer to both 
the how and the why of pattern and deviation.
6.4.5 Roland Barthes' The Structural Study of Narratives; <[1966] 1977).
In this section we have caricatured structuralist analysis as ignoring 
the details of language on the one hand and of conceptual representation 
of the world on the other. Ve have presented it, in other words, as a 
contributory but limited endeavour within discourse theory. This 
caricature might with justice be regarded as unfair. There are 
structuralist analyses which attempt to make connections, both between 
structures and language on the one hand, and between structures and 
conceptual representations on the other. Notable among such attempts is 
Barthes' Introduction to the Structural Study of Narratives, an analysis 
which is remarkable for the breadth of its view of discourse, and its 
attempt to integrate approaches which are in danger of remaining separate.
Barthes proposes a hierarchy of discourse levels for narrative situated 
between the levels of linguistic description and the systems of the 
extra-linguistic world. Thus he describes structural analysis of 
narrative, not as an activity of intrinsic and self-contained worth, but as 
a means of linking the levels of description below it to those above.
Narration can only receive its meaning from the world which makes use 
of it: beyond the narrational level begins the world, other systems 
(social, economic, ideological) whose terms are no longer simply 
narratives but elements of a different substance (historical facts, 
determinations, behaviours,etc.) Just as linguistics stops at the 
sentence, so narrative analysis stops at discourse - from there it is 
necessary to shift to another semiotics. (op.cit.:115)
Showing full awareness of formal linguistics approaches to discourse (for 
example Harris 1952, see 2.2.1), he sees structural analysis of narrative 
as taking over where linguistics description leaves off. Sentences, the 
highest units of linguistic description, realize 'functions' and 'actions', 
the lowest units of his description of narrative. Barthes also refers to 
Tomashevky's theory of theme and motif (op.cit.:89), and there is some
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connection, though not necessarily a one-to-one equivalence, betweeen his 
use of the term 'action' and Tomashevsky's 'motif' (see 6 .3 .6 ) 
Functions12 are the minimal components of actions. The action of 
•lighting a cigarette' for example consists of the functions 'striking a 
match', 'putting a cigarette in the mouth' etc. Functions combine into 
actions, and actions into the narration. (It is thus a system which, like 
Tomashevsky's, can deal with the problem of the level of detail (see
4.4.2.) which remains unsolved by schema theory.) Once the narration has 
been described it may be linked to a system of narrative (or structure). 
After this there are two directions for analysis beyond the description of 
the discourse in question: one to discover the 'langue' or system behind 
individual narrations, the other to step outside of language altogether and 
to examine non-linguistic systems. Barthes' hierarchy is shown in figure 
17.
(the world) 
(The system of narrative)
Narration
Actions
Functions
(Sentence)
Figure 17. Barthes' levels of discourse.
Here, structural description is not seen as an end in itself, but as a 
mediator between language and representations of the world. Such a view 
is deeply compatible with schema theory, adding to it a level of 
description between successions of sentences and conceptual 
representat ions.
6.5 Conclusions.
In this chapter we have examined Russian formalist and structuralist 
approaches to literary discourse. These provide important ideas 
concerning text structure, narrative stance, conformity and deviation. 
With notable exceptions, however, these theories have a number of 
limitations. They tend to ignore subsentential features on the one hand, 
and the representations of the world made by readers on the other. Their 
contribution to discourse analysis and literary theory, however, is 
immense. The notion of defamiliarization is, in one form or another,
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perhaps the single most persistent element in contemporary literary 
theory. Ve shall accept it wholeheartedly, and attempt to build upon it. 
Our aim in the following chapters will be to show how formalist and 
structuralist ideas may combine with linguistic description on the one 
hand, and description of world schemata on the other. In doing so we hope 
to suggest ways in which defamiliarization may take place, not at one 
level in isolation, but in their interaction. Ve shall term such 
interaction 'discourse deviation'.
Votes to Chapter Six:
1 The final section heading 'Cognitive literary scholarship' in Lodge 
(1988) is in this respect misleading.
2. Vhat de Beaugrande (1987:58) describes as the principle of 
'alternativity'.
3. He later moved away from these views more voluntarily. (Shklovsky 
1966:298)Shklovsky was also still publishing and expressing certain 
aspects of formalist theory in 1940: see the following quotation in the 
main text.
4. Grammatically, The Inheritors is in the third person. Neverthelss it is 
very much from Lok's point of view (Halliday 1973:103-138). Vhat Ma-lsle 
Knew is also in the third person, but limited to what Maisie perceives.
5. The examples from Shakespeare are our own, not Tomashevsky's.
6 . An interesting parallel could be drawn between these three categories of 
motivation and Halliday's three functions of language discussed in 3.1.1.
7. There is a good deal of controversy over whether Bakhtin was a Marxist 
or simply paid lip service to Marxist ideas to avoid persecution. If the 
latter, he was not in any case successful, as he was arrested and exiled 
for religious activities in 1929. Forgacs (1982:160) assumes that he was 
a Marxist, as does Bennet (1979:75-82) and Hymes (1989). Clark and 
Holquist (1984:38) on the other hand and Terras (1985:34-36) convincingly 
suggest that though he may have shared some of the anti-capitalist 
aspirations of the October revolution, he was never a Marxist, and deeply 
though warily anti-Stalinist. Generally Bakhtin's position remains an 
enigma. There is a simple explanation of the scholarly controversy. 
Marxists and non-Marxists, united in their esteem for Bakhtin, both wish 
to prove that he shared their point of view.
8 . The need for AI to pay closer attention to the long history of 
structuralism is well illustrated by Sanford and Garrod's (1981:34) 
'howler' in believing that Propp [1928] is a work of recent linguistics 
published in 1968 (the date of the translation).
9. This reductionist view of the mind is rejected by AI but accepted by 
many of its opponents. Searle ([19803 1987), for example, accepts the 
argument that intelligence is indissolubly wedded to the biology of the
human brain. , , , ...10. Bunuel and his friends themselves made structuralist analyses of films,
constructing grammars predicting likely outcomes (Bunuel [1982] 1983:132)
11. This also applies to the mental models theories of Johnson Laird and
Garnham,
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SWar Sl«| to "£) « 0Trsh*r,s ,b°u”d "otits' ”e' *£3ssr f ™ + «  nf +* I ,are anal°g°us to the obligatory and optional elements of the sentence in grammar. The logic of the level of detail to 
be included is therefore that catalysers must be included, although it may
^  1  . f  JneVicd6Dt Tthat they are catalysers. To give an example of our o n. in the film Sex , Lies and Vldeotapp one of the characters loses 
an ear-ring while in bed with her sister’s husband. When her sister later 
finds the ear ring she takes it as evidence of the adultery. The loss is 
thus a catalyser, though this is not immediately evident.
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Chapter Seven.
Literary theory 2: Jakobson's •poetic function*. Stylistics and schema 
theory analyses of a 'literary* and a ■sub-literary' text.
7.0 Introduction.
Ve have criticized structuralist approaches to literature for 
concentrating upon text schemata to the detriment of language and world 
schemata, and to the detriment of any theory of the interaction of these 
three areas. The literary theory of Roman Jakobson, exhibits a 
complementary, but equally limited, concentration upon language, to the 
exclusion of the other two. The potential application of the formalist 
theory of defamiliarization to all three levels of discourse was thus not 
realized by this approach either. (Ve shall regard the parallel 
development of Jakobson's literary theory and structuralism as essentially 
distinct, a bifurcation of the formalist legacy; we do this despite the 
fact that Jakobson's theories are sometimes classed as 'structuralist' (de 
George and de George 1972) and he himself sometimes worked with more 
'mainstream' structuralist analysts (Jakobson and L6vi-Strauss [1962] 
1972).)
In this division of the ways, the relevance of non-linguistic knowledge 
representation in discourse processing was to all Intents and purposes 
ignored, and even denied. This was in harmony with developments in 
philosophy, psychology and linguistics during the central decades of this 
century; it coincides with the fall from favour of theories of conceptual 
representation, such as Bartlett's, which are the basis of schema theory 
and which we have described in 1.5.1. and of phenomenological literary 
theories such as those of Roman Ingarden (see 7.4.1 below). One famous 
refutation of the validity of postulating a conceptual level independent of 
language is Vittgenstein's argument against the existence of private 
languages (Vittgenstein [1953] 1968:94-96). The view is also implicit in 
behaviourism, and though Chomsky's theories restored the notion of 
psychological structures underlying language behaviour, they did so only 
for the subsentential formal level and not for discourse. Only with the 
reinstatement of a belief in conceptual representation systems existing 
independently of natural languages has a holistic approach to discourse 
and to literature again become possible. Precisely such a reinstatement
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has followed from the work In psychology, linguistics and AI of the last 
two decades. (For an argument in favour of conceptual representation 
systems and against Wittgenstein see, for example, Fodor 1976.) What we 
are concerned with in this section, in the poetics of Jakobson, is work in 
a tradition which isolates language both from the larger issues of 
discourse structure and from the psychology (conceptual representations) 
of its users.
Among the formalists, Jakobson's interests had always been more 
markedly linguistic than discoursal. It was he who had coined the term 
'literariness' and definined it as:
the organized coercion of language by poetic form. (Quoted in Erlich 
C19553 1980:219 (our underlining)).
In 1920 he left Moscow for Prague where he worked as a translator and 
Soviet Cultural attach6 for the Red Cross. In 1926 he was one of the 
founding members of the Prague School of linguistics and stayed on, for 
fear of Stalin, in academic jobs in Czechoslovakia until 1939 when, fleeing 
from the Nazis, he moved first to Scandinavia and thence, in 1941, to the 
U.S.A. (Terras 1985:208). Thus, through his personal history, he was able 
to bring together the approaches to literature and discourse of Russia, 
Western and Central Europe and the USA over a period of eighty-six years.
In Prague he worked with Mukarovsky, whose views on the matter of 
literary language were, if anything, even more extreme:
The distortion of the norm of the standard is..  of the very essence of
poetry (Mukarovsky 1932 (Quoted in Burton 1980:5)).
The two men shared, in other words, a view of literariness as a deviant 
use of language. Together with other linguists of the Prague School, they 
developed the notion of linguistic foregrounding, though the roots of the 
idea go back to earlier formalist work (see O'Toole and Shukman 1977.34; 
van Peer 1986:5-26). With this increased emphasis on language as opposed 
to textual form, the formalist interest in longer stretches of discourse 
began to be forgotten: a fact reflected in the increasing substitution of 
the novel, drama and epic by lyric poetry as the object of study.
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7.1 Jakobson and stylistics: poetic function and poetic form.
Jakobson was to continue developing these ideas throughout his life. 
In 1958, at a conference in Indiana, he summed up his views (and the 
conference) with a particularly lucid and elegant paper (Jakobson 1960) 
which is undoubtedly the single most influential and often cited 
contribution of linguistics to literary analysis this century (Carter and 
Simpson 1989:1; Fabb et al. 1987:1) and has dominated Anglo-American 
stylistics ever since. Its clarity and lack of equivocation makes it also 
a useful target for those critics who wish to reject a scientific formal 
linguistic approach to literature altogether (see 7 .4 ).
Jakobson's proposals and their place in the history of functionalist 
theories of language have already been discussed in 3 .1 for their relevance 
to discourse analysis. The theory will serve as a means of characterizing 
either individual utterances or even particular types of discourse. This 
application to discourse typology does not belie the claim that Jakobson's 
proposal ignores discourse structure, for he seeks to define a discourse 
type by its formal linguistic features, showing how in certain discourses 
and utterances one function dominates the others (see also Jakobson 
[1935] 1978). In literature the dominant function is the poetic. Meaning 
is carried not by the relations of signs to the world, but rather by the 
relation of signs to each other, either inside or outside the text - by, 
in other words, the specific linguistic choices, their deviations from the 
norm and the patterns which they create. In the words of the most famous 
sentence of this paper, italicized by Jakobson himself:
The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis
of selection into the axis of combination. (Jakobson 1960:358)
In many ways the objections which may be made to this thesis of 
Jakobson's concerning the language of literature are similar to those 
which may be made to the structuralist thesis about text structures. Ve 
have already touched upon the weaknesses of the implication that 
literariness can be found at one level in isolation. In Jakobson's 
argument, the concentration on language and the exclusion of other levels 
is vulnerable at many points. Jakobson writes of 'reference' and 'a 
principle of equivalence'. Yet it is not clear what this 'reference' and 
'equivalence' are to. It cannot be, in the case of language with a poetic 
function, equivalence to some other linguistic form, since the uniqueness
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and unparaphrasable nature of literary linguistic choices is exactly 
Jakobson's point. Presumably, though the explicit statement of this 
inference is carefully avoided, the 'equivalence' is to some conceptual 
representation in the mind of its users - but this is not clear, and 
understandably so, since to introduce individual readers, and therefore the 
notion of individual variability, would undermine Jakobson's point that 
literariness is to be found in language itself without any reference to the 
world or the people in it. Related to this is the difficult problem of the 
whole issue of norms and deviations. Definition of a deviation depends on 
the definition of a norm. What is normal will vary with individuals and 
in history. There is thus a degree of arbitrariness in the choice of the 
yardstick of normal language, just as there is in structuralist choices of 
standard patterns extant in some texts on which others are variations, 
formality is relative to a system as a whole and thus vulnerable to 
changes within that system; a literary text will in fact - to be 
deconstructionist about the issue - even shift the norm by virtue of its 
own existence, for it too is a part of the totality of language. Norms and 
deviations will exist not only through comparison with the language as a 
whole, but also through comparison with the expectations and patterns set 
up by the text itself (Halliday [19641 1967; Burton 1980:7; Leech and Short 
1981:55-56). The characterization of literariness as a particular use of 
the code is moreover dependent upon showing that such uses do not occur 
in 'non-literary discourse'. Yet it is not difficult to demonstrate that 
non-literary discourse is also full of patterning and deviation. Werth 
(1976) demonstrated as much for a Sunday Times article on pest control. 
(The counter-claim that such instances are merely examples of 
'literariness' within non-literary texts is blatantly and hopelessly 
circular). It is also true, as Culler has observed (1975b:55-74), that the 
patterns and deviations discovered by Jakobson are not absolutes, 
engendered by a total and objective linguistic description, but functions 
of the linguistic elements he chooses to look for in the first place.
7.1.1 Stylistics and 'representation'.
Yet all these objections notwithstanding, it is indisputable that the 
Jakobsonian approach has spawned a vast number of perceptive and valuable 
studies of individual works of literature, not only in the many analyses 
by Jakobson himself but also in the sizeable literature of stylistics
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which developed during the sixties, seventies and eighties (see especially
Fowler 1966; Fowler 1975; Leech 1969; Viddowson 1975; Ching, Haley and
Lunsford 1980; Leech and Short 1981; Carter 1982’). In the stylistics of 
this period:
there is never any real doubt expressed about the fact that in order to 
write about style in a linguistically justifiable way, we must be able to 
relate the language used in a text, or by an author, to the conventions 
of the language as a whole. All practical stylistics papers carry this 
assumption. (Burton 1980:5)
In this respect, stylistics was based upon Jakobsonian premises. The main 
differences from Jakobsonian analysis are perhaps a reluctance to state 
overtly that literariness can be defined as a feature of the code on the 
one hand, and a readiness to connect formal linguistic features to 
interpretations on the other. This latter practice may be summed up by the 
term 'representation' (Viddowson 1984:150-160). A simple example would be 
the claim that a breakdown of normal syntax reflects a breakdown of order 
in the fictional world or the mind of a character, as it might be said to 
do, for example, in the novels of William Burroughs. Another would be to 
say that the morphemic and tonal alternation of 'see' and 'saw' in Dylan 
Thomas' words "see-sawing like the sea" 'represents' the alternating motion 
of both a see-saw and the sea (Under Milk Vood 1954:7). Yet whereas 
Jakobson was in the habit of listing, with a claim to inclusiveness, the 
formal patterns and deviations in a work without comment, a practitioner 
of stylistics is more likely to select a few linguistic features and 
demonstrate their connection to a particular interpretation. This exposes 
stylistics to the charge that its apparently scientific nature is a sham, 
that there is no rigorous basis to the selection of features. (For a 
discussion of this challenge, see Carter 1982b.) It can be said that the 
interpretation does not derive from the linguistic analysis, but rather 
that the linguistic analysis is used, post hoc, to support an intuitive 
interpretation (Fish 1980: 68-97; 246-268), and that stylistics selects 
only those texts which bear out its own assumpions. Many of these 
problems have been more recently acknowledged in stylistics, which in the 
eighties has begun to move away from the rather rigid claims of Jakobson 
and to assimilate a wider view of literature as discourse which must 
embrace both context and its users (Leech and Short 1981:257-287; Carter 
1982b; Carter 1989; Carter and Simpson 1989:1-20; Short 1989c; Short and
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van Peer 1989). This, It seems, is a wise direction, for the Jakobsonian
and stylistics approach is so rick, that its theoretical shortcomings ar.
far better remedied by building upon it, than by rejecting it out of band.
In the analyses which follow „e „pply ti. Jakobeolll„
methodology to two texts: the first nflirsx 01 which Is presented as an
advertisement, the second as a poem. Our analyses Ignore the Issue of
establishing linguistic norms and deviations, and assume this to be
unproblematic. Ve shall then contrast these stylistic analyses with
descriptions in terms of interpretative schemata. By so doing we hope to
illustrate some of the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches and
also ways in which they interact.
7.2 TBIT FIVB: BUflfllxrth Taylor's (advertisement), (see figure 18)
This nine word text contains an extraordinarily concentrated 
exploitation of every linguistic level, in a way which not only reinforces 
and represents the message, but, in the best traditions of stylistics, is 
inseparable from, and identical to it. It is a gift to formal stylistic 
analysis, and if such matters were simply quantifiable - a ratio of 
stylistic points to words - would be a great lyric poem.
7.2.1 Graphology.
On a graphic level, the displacement of the second of the four lines, 
allows the text to reproduce iconically the hexagonal shape of the 
perfume bottle which is pictured above it. In this way, the advertisement 
makes use of a graphological device which is occasionally - though rarely
- used in poetry. (Each stanza of George Herbert's Easter Vlngs for 
example represents the shape of an angel's wings; Lewis Carroll's 'Mouse's 
Tale' in Alice In Wonderland is written in the shape of a mouse's tail; 
Apollinaire has r.al n  grammes whose letters picture their subject: a 
mirror, a train, a night sky, falling rain.)
7.2.2 Phonology.
In a Jakobsonian view, the patterning of stressed and unstressed 
syllables to create rhythm and of phonemes to create rhyme, alliteration, 
consonance, assonance and the other sound effects of verse, is at once both 
a deviation from the code and an imposition of order upon it. It is a 
deviation - the argument
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goes - because in other more 'normal* uses of the code where the focus Is 
on meaning rather than form, such sound effects occur at random. It Is an 
Imposition of order because It enables the language to be analysed by a 
set of prosodic rules which, like the rules of phonology, grammar and 
semantics, can both predict and restrict possibilities.
Leaving these arguments temporarily aside, and assuming that phonic 
regularity is unusual, literary, and a feature of text, we (and contrary to 
Fish (1980:309) we believe that other English speaking readers would also) 
analyse the stress patterns of the advertisement as follows:
y  ^  y  ^  \J U  ^  U  \J yjBe touched By I the fragrance I That touches I The woman
Its rhythm, in other words, is absolutely regular. It consists of four 
amphlbrachs. And as an amphibrach, which consists of a single stressed 
syllable between two unstressed syllables, has the quality of being the 
same backwards and forwards, it follows that a succession of an equal 
number of amphibrachs can be divided into two halves, of which the second 
half is a reversal, an exact mirror image, of the first. (We shall return 
to this point in 7.2.5.) The name
Eliza I beth Taylor
moreover,is also amphlbrachlc, and the rhythm of the advertisement thus 
mimes the name of the product, in much the same way as its shape 
reproduces the shape of the bottle.
7.2.3 Lexis.
The advertisement exploits lexical ambiguity, both at the relatively 
fixed semantic level of denotation, and at the discoursal level of meaning 
In context. Thus, at the semantic level, "touches" means both "to bring or 
be brought into physical contact with" and also to arouse positive 
emotion". "Woman" means both "adult, female, human being" and also 
"femininity" (as it does in a sentence like 'it brings out the woman in 
you'). Both of these lexical items, when taken in the context of the 
pictorial part of the advertisement, and in the context of its function of 
persuading a reader to buy a product, take on further meaning. The noun
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phrase -the woman", with its definite article assuming a specific 
identifiable referent, can now mean either "the woman in the picture" (i.e. 
Elizabeth Taylor) or "the woman reading the advertisement" (i.e. you, the 
reader), and in fact invites identification by the reader with Elizabeth 
Taylor, presumably on the assumption that readers will wish to take on 
certain of her qualities. Here the advertisement makes use of a common 
discoursal ambiguity in advertising whereby the second person pronoun is 
used to refer to both the addressee, the reader, and also to a character in 
the advertisement. (Something similar occurs in songs "Veil it ain't no 
use to sit and wonder why babe/ If you don't know by now" (Bob Dylan); 
Nothing compares to you" (Prince)). A further complication is introduced 
by the fact that the reader may be a potential buyer of the product for 
somebody else, rather than for personal use. Indeed, luxury items such as 
perfumes are often bought as presents - hence their intensive advertising 
in the weeks before Christmas* As perfume is often a token of sexual 
attraction, and as advertisements seem to assume an exclusively 
heterosexual world, the targetted reader may also be a man, buying it for 
a woman (see 5.2). Thus "the woman" comes to mean "your actual or desired 
female sexual partner" and "touches" appeals to the reader by suggesting a 
means - albeit vicarious - of emotionally or physically touching the 
desired person. In this case "the woman" may perhaps even take on an 
extra dimension of meaning: "the female part", "the vagina". Interestingly, 
these latter discoursal ambiguities are only present when the text is read 
as an advertisement. They are not formal features of text, in the 
Jakobsonian sense.
7.2.4 Grammar.
Grammatically, as phonically, the text is both deviant and patterned. 
Using the nul sign '0' to mark the ellipsis of the pronoun 'you', its 
grammatical structure may be analysed as:
[ 0 (Be touched) (by (the fragrance [(that) (touches) (the woman)]))] 
KC1 RC1
The deviance is in the use of the passive imperative: an exceedingly rare 
form. ('Be seated' is an exception, but 'be kissed', 'be killed', 'be seen', 
'be amused' would be similarly odd.) The patterning is in the clause 
structure, for the relative clause which post-modifies the noun "fragrance"
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Gxactly reverses the main clause nfciause of which "fragrance" is a part. Indeed,
if we write in the ellipted 'you' as •mmr you as you, the woman' and replace the
relative pronoun "that" bv the nnim w  jy ne noun “  stands for ("the fragrance"), then
"the relative clause is a back transfnr'Tna+'inr. +v jg sansiormation of the passive main clause to
its original active form.
[Woman, be touched by the fragrance] is a transform of 
fe [The woman is touched by the fragrance] is a transform of 
*- [The fragrance touches the woman]
This is odd, because the usual function of a relative clause, as of any 
modifier, is to add information which will help identify the referent of 
the head word. Here the relative clause simply repeats the meaning of the 
main clause. This creates a grammatical mirror image. The embedded 
relative clause reflects the main clause, as illustrated in figure 19. The 
break between the two clauses
[ 0 JBe^tou c h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t h ^  fragrance
[ (that) (touches) (the woman) ] ) ]
Figure 19. Grammatical parallelism in Text Five.
coincides with the half way point in the rhythm which is also reversed 
after the half-way point. The grammar is mimed by the sound which mimes 
the grammar - (to use the same device). The woman is touched by the 
perfume which touches the woman.
Hote also that the active clause is subordinate to the passive clause.
7.2.5 Representation.
The language of this advertisement, then, reveals regularities, 
similarities, ambiguities, polysemies of the kind revealed by classic 
Jakobsonian analyses. The point is, however, that it is not difficult, in 
the traditions of stylistics, to go further than mere formal analysis and 
suggest ways in which these exploitations of the code reinforce, amplify 
and add to the meaning, ways in which they are that meaning in a manner
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which would be lost if paraphrased into semantically equivalent instances
of the code. The reader is invited to become like Elizabeth Taylor through 
the use of a bottle of perfume. Perfuine) as a substance whlch> when used
for seduction, enables the wearer, after the initial adornment, to attract 
by doing nothing more, is concerned with an unusual relationship of 
passivity and activity. It is also, as something used before the mirror in 
the privacy of the bathroom or bedroom, concerned with narcissism, 
reflection, and contemplation of the self. It is also, being bodiless and 
verbally indefinable, akin to an abstract concept, while being 
simultaneously, as something sexually attractive and perceptible at the 
most intimate distances, inherently sensual and physical, concerned both 
with romantic and with sexual love. In this perfume advertisement, as in 
many others, the perfume is seen, not as attractive in itself, but as 
something which releases a dormant attractiveness in the wearer. All of 
these features may be related to the linguistic features described above: 
the imitation of the bottle's shape by the graphic form and of the 
filmstar's name by the prosodic unit, the reversible rhythm and 
grammatical structure, the ambiguous lexis denoting both the physical and 
abstract, the confusion of referents, the embedding of the active within 
the passive, the redundancy of meaning.
7.2.6 Schemata.
So far, following Jakobson, we have analysed the formal subsentential 
features of the advertisement. Ifo mention has been made of the plans or 
the goals of the author, the character (Elizabeth Taylor) or the reader. 
Yet for the advertisement to function as a coherent communicative act 
rather than to be merely a superfluous and meaningless (if grammatical) 
bit of text (see 2 .2 ), certain themes and plans must be recognized by the 
reader, if only subconsciously. At this level there is even less certainty 
than there can be concerning norms of language and significant deviations. 
Hypotheses reflect the introspections of one observer (the present writer) 
in the hope that they are shared by others. Allowing for the usual 
fuzziness in distinguishing themes, plans and scripts, we interpret 
relevant schemata to be:
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0 A SELL PRODUCT
TT A ATTRACT ATTENTION
IT A SUGGEST PERFUME FULFILS 9 R
0 C (LIZ TATLOR) BE ATTRACTIVE 
9 C (LIZ TAYLOR) BE SUCCESSFUL
IT C (LIZ TAYLOR) WEAR PASSION PERFUME (already executed)
9 R (FEMALE) BE ATTRACTIVE
9 R (FEMALE) BE FEMININE
9 R (FEMALE) SEXUAL SATISFACTION
TT R (FEMALE) IMITATE ATTRACTIVE WOMEN (LIKE LIZ TAYLOR)
$S R (FEMALE) WEARING PERFUME
9 R (MALE) SEXUAL SATISFACTION
TT R (MALE) TOUCH WOMAN
TT R (MALE) BUY PERFUME
TT R (MALE) GIVE PERFUME
No explicit mention of these plans and themes is made in the text, and in 
asserting them we can appeal to no more than our own intuition and 
cultural knowledge. This is in the advertiser's favour, for should he or 
she wish to deny the interpretative use of such themes and plans it is 
very hard to prove their existence. (This avenue of retreat is often 
exploited to deny sexual suggestiveness in advertisements, by attributing 
it to one reader's mind.) But we are assuming that readers with a similar 
cultural background will have the same intuitions about how the 
advertisement works. In fact, it is the advertiser's assumption that we 
all share and recognize these themes and are susceptible to the suggestion 
that they may be fulfilled by buying the perfume, which enables them to go 
unsaid. They are - in every sense - schematic, stereotypical and 
predictable.
7.2.7 Conclusions.
Ve hope to have shown that in this text the formalist notion of 
defamiliarization operates only at the linguistic level, aoi at the 
schematic and discoursal level. In so far as this text is classified as 
an advertisement and not as a work of literature, that classification 
appears to view the schematic level as more important. This Judgement, 
however, will vary with the schemata of the reader.
A way of avoiding this conclusion would be to say that the defining 
feature of advertisements in terms of the six Jakobsonian functions is 
that the conative function (see 3.1) is the dominant. In contradiction of
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this, we would argue the conative function also Involves reader
interpretation and is thus also scheaatlc. I, ls also vulnerable to
changes outside the teat, lf the product cease. to he available tor
purchase, the conative function will be Invalidated, though the 
advertisement may endure (Cook 1988).
7.3 TBIT SIX: glrst World Var Prat.fi by Edward Bond.
The text of this poem is:
„ , , Line no.You went to the front like sheep Q)
And bleated at the pity of it
In academies that smell of abattoirs
Your poems are still studied
You turned the earth to mud (5 )
Yet complain you drowned in it
Your generals were dug in at the rear
Degenerates drunk on brandy and prayer
You saw the front - and only bleated
The pity! (ID)
You survived
Did you burn your general's houses 
Loot the new millionaires?
No, you found new excuses
You'd lost an arm or your legs (15)
You sat by the empty fire 
And hummed music hall songs
Vhy did your generals send you away to die?
They saw a Great Var coming
Between masters and workers (20)
In their own land
So they herded you over the cliffs to be rid of you 
How they hated you while you lived!
How they wept for you once you were dead!
Vhat did you fight for? <25)
A new world?
lo - an old world already in ruins!
Your children?
Millions of your children died
Because you fought for your enemies (30)
And not against them!
Ve will not forget! 
Ve will not forgive!
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This text, arguably, Is, both linguistically and schematically, the 
polar opposite of the advertisement analysed in 7.2. Linguistically 
conformist and unoriginal, it is innovative and disruptive at both the 
text-structural and conceptual levels. (Again as in 7.2, these judgements 
are those of one reader, the present writer, but assumed to hold for some 
other readers, on the assumption that certain schemata are shared.) Our 
argument is that this text is literary without being linguistically deviant 
or patterned, while the previous text is not literary, despite a 
significant concentration of both patterning and deviation. As such, our 
argument can be instantly demolished by the claim that this is 'not 
literary or not a poem'. Against this we can say only that it is 
presented as a poem by writer and publisher (in the 'poems' section of a
book entitled Theatre— Poems_and Songs) and that this classification is
accepted by bookshops and literature courses. It is also graphologically 
set out as a poem in that line change is effected before the margins and 
lines are grouped into stanzas. There is also an absence of conventional 
punctuation, fairly common in twentieth century poetry. Thus, though there 
may well be readers who reject its pretensions to be poetry, we shall 
proceed as though (and Indeed we believe that) it is.
To say, as we do of this text, that a stretch of language shows no 
significant deviation or patterning is open to challenge from two 
directions. It assumes, first of all, consensus about linguistic norms, 
where no absolute consensus exists. Secondly, it is a negative claim, and 
thus hard to demonstrate, being vulnerable to refutation. Nevertheless, it 
seems reasonable. As with the advertisement in 7.2, we shall, following 
Jakobson, assume the issue of linguistic norms to be relatively 
unproblematic.
7.3.1 Graphology and phonology.
On the graphological level the only features of note are those already 
mentioned above: the conventional lineation and stanza divisions of poetry, 
the absence of conventional punctuation. On the phonic level, there is 
little regularity. Line by line, the syllable count is as follows: 7, 9,
11, 7 ; 6 , 7, 9, 10, 9 , 3 ; 3, 8 , 6 , 7, 7 , 7, 6 ; 11, 7, 7, 4, 14, 8 , 9 ; 5, 3,
10, 3, 6 , 9, 5 ! 5, 5- Although there is a tendency towards six and seven
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syllable lines, there arc many other lengths too. Similarly, though there 
are lines which fall l.to metrical pate„ s  renlalsoeht of »or. 
conventional poetry
There is no rhyme except the (possibly accidental) half rhyme in 7 and 8 
between "rear" and "prayer", perhaps in 12 and 14 between "houses" and 
"excuses", and the internal echo between "generals" and “degenerates".
The overall effect is thus of language whose phonic regularity is no 
greater than that of discourse types (for example bureaucratic prose) 
where attention is traditionally supposed to be on meaning rather than 
sound, and less than that of other discourse types excluded from the 
literary canon (see 2.3.1, 7.2). Arguably, however, there is Just enough 
patterning - in syllables, prosody and rhyme - for expectations to be set 
up and immediately dashed: a feature which is reinforced by the contrast 
between the traditionally 'poetic' graphology and the lack of 'poetic' 
phonology. That, at least, is how it seems to us.
7.3.2 Grammar.
Grammatically, the situation is much the same. Occasional glimpses of 
patterning or 'poetic' syntax serve only, in our view, to highlight their 
absence elsewhere. Thus there is a degree of parallelism (see 2.3.1) 
between sentences beginning with the subject 'you . There is also 
parallelism in the two lines
How they hated you while you lived!
How they wept over you once you were dead.
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which both follow the pattern
s P Od a S p
« c i V “’" 7 rhey> ,P<P1ST> .rVi c j™ * 1’ g* t * ' 11
the second of the two lines having, within the adverb clause at *
C
(dead)
AjP
This adjective phrase, though It has no syntactic parallel with the 
preceding line, Is semantically linked to "lived" (see 2.3.4). Such 
parallelism Is, however, found often in political rhetoric (see 2 .3 .1), a 
discourse type with which this polemical diatribe, by virtue of its subject 
matter, has much in common. There is also fronting of a prepositional- 
phrase adjunct in lines three and four: a construction much favoured in 
poetry. Interestingly, this comes, like the syllabic and prosodic 
patterning referred to above, near the beginning of the poem, and thus 
establishes a hint of convention, making its later absence more marked.
Given the length of the poem though, syntactic patterning and deviation 
are not intense.
7.3.3 Lexis.
The lexis is 'ordinary' rather than 'poetic'. To talk of lexis as 
'ordinary' demands appeal either to word counts in corpora related to 
particular discourse types, or to intuition. Ve favour intuition2 . Almost 
the only lexical cohesion of note Is the collocational chain3 created by 
the sustained metaphor of sheep: "like sheep", "bleated", "abattoirs", 
"bleated", "herded". But this comparison is a clich6 : a fact which, 
paradoxically, makes it deviant in poetry, where, traditionally, cliches are 
avoided. Lines like the following, are in fact far more 'normal':
Their feet are four-leafed clovers 
that leave a Jigsaw in the dust.
They grin like Yale keys that tease
us with Joke shop Niagara tonguesCraig Raine The Behaviour of Does.
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The only other metaphor in the nno» ,,poem is another standard one - that of
drowning in mud - about which we have more to say below.
7.3.4 Intertextuallty.
Poor in prosodic, grammatical, lexical and metaphorical innovation, the 
poem is rich in intertextual meanings. These, like schemata, must be 
described with a specified reader in mind. This reader has observed the 
intertextual allusions listed in table 5. For other readers there may well 
be more, but we would assume those listed to be shared by any British 
reader exposed to the intense institutional retrospection which followed 
either the First or Second World Wars, and by anyone who has had a 
Christian education, focussing upon the New Testament.
Evoked reference !Irigger' in poem
"My subject is war and 
the pity of war." Wilfred Owen 
([1920] 1931:40)
"He was brought as a lamb 
to the slaughter." Isaiah 53:7
"Guttering choking drowning"
Wilfred Owen: DuIce et Decorum Est
"The whole herd rushed down the 
steep bank into the lake and died 
in the water." Matthew 8:28-32
"We will remember them."
Laurence Binyon: For the Fallen
"Then Jesus said, Father forgive 
them for they know not what they do."
(Luke 23:34) 
"Father forgive." (War Memorials)
"Lest we forget." (War Memorials)
"bleated at the pity of it" 
"only bleated/ The pity"
"like sheep....abbatoirs"
"You turned the earth to mud 
Yet complain you drowned in it."
"they herded you over the cliffs 
to be rid of you"
"We will not forget" 
"We will not forgive"
Table 5. Intertextuality in Text Six.
7.3.5 Schemata.
Here again hypotheses must relate to particular readers. Let us 
specify then British readers who received a Christian education during the 
twenty-five years following the Second World War. For these readers, a 
good deal of time and emotional intensity would have been devoted to:
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- study of the First Vorld „ r  po6ts CespeclMly Vllfrsa
study of the t o  T M t e M s J  <1, the Authorized or Revised stand.nl 
version)
” finnufll remembrance service
- study of nineteenth and early twentieth century poetry.
Ve can therefore hypothesize that the intertextual references listed above 
will evoke the following schemata. In fact, it was the intention of the 
educators to inculcate such schemata. For each schema, we give only a 
selection of default elements.
0 R/C/As MAKE LIFE BETTER.
SS R FIRST VORLD VAR.
in execution of (misguided) plans: II BRITA15 DEFESD EMPIRE.
TT BRIT A IS HELP FUTURE GENERATIONS., 
TT BRIT A IS BUILD *SEV VORLD'.
Events: Slaughter of young men; maiming of young men.
Results: Sympathy for veterans/ invalids.
Var poetry (see $S VAR POETRY).
Second Vorld Var.
TT AVOID REPET IT IOB.
$S R VAR POETRY.
TRACK 1: 'Patriotic' poets: Rupert Brooke, Laurence Binyon and others. 
TRACK 2: 'Anti-Var' poets.
Roles: Vilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon, others.
ARE Sensitive, brave, good, wasted.
Events: writing poetry about $S A FIRST VORLD VAR.
Results: Sympathy for soldiers,
'Anti-war' feelings.
TT R STUDY 'ASTI-VAR' POETRY.
Result: helps prevent war.
TT R REMEMBER VAR DEAD, 
result: helps prevent war.
TT R FORGIVE ESEMIES.
result: brings reward, makes life better.
TT R MAKE SACRIFICES, 
result: better society.
$S R POETRY (A TEXT/ LASGUAGE SCHEMA).
HAS: Rhythm, rhyme and other sound effects, elevated language, figurative 
language, original language.
The poem challenges every element in the scripts and plans (as we have 
described them), its poets and their poetry, and the efficacy of
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remembrance. It also represents (in the sense defined above in 7.1.2) a 
contradiction of Script 2: Poetry. in formallst terms lt defamlllarlzes
received ideas of war, war poetry, and poetry in general. Thus, possibly, 
it suggests a connection between the conventions of poetry, the 
conventional philosophy of proponents of war, and conventional anti-war 
views. It acts out, in its own poetic form (or lack of it), the revolution 
which it advocates in the political sphere. Yet, paradoxically, it also 
very obviously, and presumably self-consciously, does what it criticizes: 
bleats and does not act. In this sense it is iconic and 'self-reflexive*.
The literariness of this poem can not then be described in simple 
Jakobsonian terms as a deviation from linguistic norms, or as a patterning 
of elements which would otherwise occur at random. In fact in purely 
textual terms it is singularly lacking in linguistic interest per se. Only 
with reference to schemata, (including text and language schemata), can an 
argument be made for its literariness at all. Interestingly, one of the 
schemata it breaks is precisely that which demands that literary language 
be innovative.
7.4 Incorporating the reader.
The analyses in 7.2 and 7.3 point clearly to the limitations of 
Jakobson's attempt to identify and characterize 'literariness* at the 
linguistic level in isolation. The density of formal patterning and 
deviation in the advertisement will not raise it, in most people's 
estimation, into the literary canon. The poem, by contrast, lacks formal 
patterning and deviation, yet may still be regarded as literary. Whether 
it is. so regarded will depend upon the reader, and it is precisely the 
kind of poem which, because of its viewpoint and technique, will arouse 
very different Judgements. Such Judgements will vary with the political 
outlook, world and text schemata of the reader, and the degree to which 
the attempted disruption of them is valued. On the other hand, both the 
advertisement and the poem are vulnerable to reclassification as audiences 
change. It is not difficult, in the contemporary world, to imagine a
readership which might reclassify both.
This reader-dependency of 'literariness' was overlooked by Jakobson, 
despite the fact that the terms in which he chose to express his theory 
imply very strongly the presence of the reader. If language has a poetic 
•function' then it must do something frn somebody. - the reader - and if
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that function reflects a 'set towards the message-, then it must be a 'set' 
by somebody - again the reader. Unlike the Jakobsonian approach, much 
recent literary theory has shown acute awareness of reader variations, and 
their effect on interpretation. Dimensions of inter-individual difference 
(such as class, gender, culture, age and education) have been brought to 
the fore, as have intra-individual differences (such as mood, the context 
and purpose of reading, and age). Vhlle rejecting formalist, structuralist 
and Sew Critical approaches to reader variation (see Vimsatt [1949] 1954), 
the movement can point to the centrality of the reader in much older 
approaches. The Aristotelian view of tragedy, for example, is couched in 
terms of effect upon the reader, while Vordsworth's view of poetry as 
"heightened sensation" or Coleridge's dictum of the "suspension of 
disbelief" both appeal to the relation of reader and text, rather than to 
features of text in isolation. In the 1920s and 30s, I.A. Richards 
stressed 'response' to poetry, though the response, as he termed it, "of 
the right kind of reader" (Richards 1926:10). This last remark betrays a 
confident belief in the reading of the academic establishment as the 
correct reading, privileging one group of readers over others, bestowing on 
it a right to 'correct' the 'wrong' readings of others (Richards 1929). It 
is a view still present, half a century later, in Culler's notion of 
'literary competence', an ability (analogous to Chomsky's linguistic 
competence) which can (and in Culler's view should) be transmitted 
institutionally (Culler 1975:113-131; Culler 1988:3-57). These approaches 
accept and justify the critical status quo. Other approaches to the 
reader, however, influenced by the deconstructionist attack upon all 
centres and 'transcendental signifiers', have emphasized the equality of 
all readings, or tried to shift the centre from one social group to 
another: from the middle to the working class, from a patriarchal to a
feminist readership.
The diversity of reader-centred approaches is thus vast, both
synchronically and diachronically, and it is not our intention to attempt 
to survey them. From among the many reader-centred approaches, we shall 
isolate two contradictory tendencies relevant to our own discussion. The 
first tendency is one which seeks to incorporate reader variation as an 
element in the construction of discourse, but regards the reader's response 
as delimited by the nature of the text in question. The second, influenced
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by deconstruction, is one which rejects the existence of autonomous text, 
reversing the apparent direction of communication from author through text 
to reader, and regarding text and even author as the creation of the 
reader. This second view rejects - often ingeniously, sometimes playfully 
the approaches of discourse analysis, formalism, structuralism and 
linguistics. These two opposing approaches to the role of the reader are 
well summed up by the debate between Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish. The 
former likens the perception of text to the perception of stars in the 
sky:
Two people gazing at the night sky may both be looking at the same 
collection of stars, but one will see the image of the plough, and the 
other will make out a dipper. The "stars" in a literary text are fixed; 
the lines that join them are variable. (Iser 1974:282)
The latter is summarized by Fish's rejoinder to this analogy in which he 
claims that the reader supplies
everything: the stars in a literary text are not fixed; they are just as 
variable as the lines that Join them. (Fish 1981:7)
This leads Fish (1980:21-58) to attack both linguistics and formal 
stylistics, suggesting a new 'affective stylistics'* which will replace the 
traditional dichotomies such as text/reader and subject/object with a 
monistic view in which there is no text separate from the reader (Fish 
1972). Even 'linguistic fact' such as parallelism is in Fish's view 
interpretation. (We shall look in more detail at an example of Fish's 
rejection of stylistics in 9.1.)
Iser, and other 'reception theorists', on the other hand, though they 
emphasize both the reader and the process of reading over the text and the 
product of reading are prepared to accept text as a component in the 
reading process. In this they trace their roots back to the work of the 
Polish literary theorist Roman Ingarden, and particularly to the work he 
published in 1931. As Ingarden's work and its continuation in reception 
theory has certain elements in common with the approach we are 
advocating, we shall give a brief outline of it here as it is expressed in 
this most influential work. We shall regard reception theory, despite the 
many other influences upon it, as, fundamentally, a continuation of his
work.
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7.«.1 Eomam Inprntenfe Ite Ynr> nT t|, ((I9311 l m >
Ingarden was a pupll tlle Huessrl ^  (Me ts ,
common influence with the gestalt tradition In psychology, in which his 
contemporary Bartlett developed the first ideas of schema theory (see
1.5.1). In fact Ingarden even uses the word 'schema’, as we explain below, 
though in a rather different sense. (Both Bartlett and Ingarden had 
perhaps inherited the term indirectly from Kant.)
In Ingarden's view:
What is essential and valuable in the literary work of art is considered 
to be what develops in the reader under the influence of the reading <op 
cit: 18-19) ° r
and "what develops in the reader" is the product of four strata. The first 
of these is the stratum of 'word sounds' and 'phonetic formations' and the 
higher orders built upon them. The second stratum is that of meaning 
units. The third that of 'schematized aspects of the text' and the fourth 
that of 'represented objectivities'. The first two of these strata 
essentially encompass, though in less detail, the area marked out by 
modern linguistics and acknowledge the objectivity of the text (though 
Ingarden worked outside the Saussurean tradition, and was also dismissive 
of the formalists (Grabwicz 1974 :xv)). With an argument which could be 
used against Fish today, Ingarden simply observes that if there were no 
shared intermediate level between substance and reader, then every copy of 
a book would be a different text (op.cit.12). Thus:
One may not (...) foist upon the literary work various objects which are 
altogether foreign to it .... the view that the literary work is nothing 
but a manifold of experiences felt by the reader during the reading is 
(...) false and its consequence absurd. (op.cit.:15)
In explaining the third stratum, that of 'schematized aspects , Ingarden 
employs gestalt and phenomenological theories of perception, observing 
that in perceiving something, we never see it in totality, but only 
'aspects' of it which we combine to make a 'concretization' of the 
experience (op.cit.255-264). To make this concretization we make use of 
existing 'represented objectivities', previous experiences of the same or 
similar experiences. It is the same, in his view, with reading. The 
discourse presents meaning units provided by the first two strata, in such 
numbers and combinations that they enable the reader to make 'individual
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concretizations1 (op.cit 265). Thus if, for example, the action of a novel 
takes place In Rome, the reader will provide details from a -represented 
objectivity of the real Rome (op.cit 30)®. Successful 'concretization' thus 
depends on the representation of previous experience and, in this sense, 
Ingarden's theory resembles schema theory. Similar ideas can be seen in 
later developments of 'reception theory', most especially in the notion of 
•the horizon of expectations-: "an intersubjective system or structure of 
expectations, a 'system of references' or a mind-set that a hypothetical 
individual might bring to any text" (Holub:1984:59).
The similarities between Ingarden's views and those of schema theorists 
like Bartlett should be clear from the above. The terminology, however, is 
confusing. Schemata' in our sense correspond most closely to Ingarden's 
'represented objectivities', while in our terms Ingarden's 'schematized 
aspects' are best described as discourse features triggering schemata in 
the reader.
Vhat is inspiring in Ingarden's work, however, is its attempt, for all 
its many omissions and obscurities, to present a balanced and holistic 
view of the literary work, which neither excludes the individual reader, 
nor denies the text7. His arguments against both extremes are as valid 
today as they were fifty years ago. Like schema theory, with which they 
have a good deal in common, these arguments have undergone a long period 
of eclipse, before resurfacing again in recent decades. There is not space 
here to explore contemporary versions of these theories in full, but we 
recognize here the similarity of the endeavour, and the following words of 
Ingarden's sum up very well the kind of approach to which we adhere in 
the next two chapters:
only a detailed analysis of both the individual strata and the kind of 
connection arising from them can disclose the peculiar structure of the 
literary work (op.cit 33)
7.4.2 Schemata,'Alternativity' and 'Super-coherence': de Beaugrande (1987).
Ve have presented the theories of Roman Ingarden and subsequent work 
in reception theory which derives from them as essentially compatible with 
an approach to literature combining schema theory with formal description 
of discourse, text structure and language. This is true in so far as they 
recognize that literariness is to be found in the interaction of reader 
variables with relatively fixed features of language and text. They are
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not, however, based upon the same _ . ,,or even similar) approaches to the
description of text and discoursp +.>.„_„ ,uiscourse as those we have elaborated in chapters
1-6 .
One approach which does make usa of such a synthesis is that of do 
Beaugrande <1987), aad we shall gl.8 , brlsl 01rtllM of lt k<r8 
conclusion to this section.
Making explicit use of schema theory, de Beaugrande proposes an 
approach to literature which combines the individual psychology of readers 
with formal linguistic and textual description. He argues against the 
abandoning of the quest for a definition of literariness which has 
resulted from a general disillusion with the Jakobsonian approach, and 
proposes two principles which he regards as characteristic of all 
literature. The first principle is that of ,alternativity\ Literature, he 
argues, allows us to enter alternative worlds in which alternative 
schemata, including alternative language and text schemata, are used in 
processing. These schemata, though similar to those used in the real 
world, are quite distinct from them. The second principle is that of 
'super-coherence'. According to this principle, the details of a literary 
work all fit together and are components of the schemata which interpret 
them in a way which is quite unlike the real world. Everything in a 
literary work is significant. (The paradigm case, he suggests, is the use 
of detail in the Sherlock Holmes stories.) It may be, he suggests, that 
the literary text thus compensates for the illogicality, lack of connection 
and disorder of the real world. This view echoes Tomashevsky's view that 
certain motifs (6.3.6) (and Barthes' view that certain functions) must all 
contribute to the overall theme (6.4.5 and Chapter 6, note 12). As Chekov 
put it: there is no point in having a loaded gun on stage unless it is 
going to go off.
7.5 Conclusion.
In this chapter we have discussed Jakobson's attempt to characterize 
literariness as linguistic patterning and deviation, and the adaptation of 
those ideas by stylistics. By analysing an advertisement which fits this 
Jakobsonian definition and a poem which does not, we have attempted to 
highlight some of the limitations of the approach. The analyses suggest 
that linguistic deviation and patterning is no guarantee of literariness 
but must be taken in conjunction with their effect on the schemata of the
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We have briefly looked at attempts to relate 'literariness' to
readers, and drawn a distinction between reader approaches which reject
formal descriptions of language and text, and those which try to
incorporate them. The theories of Ingarden and reception theories are of
this latter kind, though they employ different methods from those of
linguistics, discourse analysis and AI. De Beaugrande does use these
methods, and provides the useful concepts of alternativity and super­
coherence.
In the following two chapters we hope to demonstrate further how 
schema theory can reconcile reader variability with formal description of 
the text and language of literature, showing how a particular kind of 
interaction between the two is a frequent characteristic of literature.
lotes to Chapter Seven.
1. Throughout this period, there is a growing attention to discoursal as 
well as linguistic features. Thus, for example, though Leech and Short 
(1981:1) has in its own words "the same aim" as Leech 1969, it takes more 
account of discourse and language context.
2. For discussions of the merits of the two approaches see Fillmore 
(1989); Cowie (1989).
3. In Hallidayan terms, see 2.3.4.
4. Making a positive use of the term used so disparagingly by Vlmsatt 
([1949] 1954).
5. It is this process, which in Ingarden's view leads to a 
"characteristically pulsating mode of experiencing" literature (op.cit.: 
269), "as one reads, objects appear vividly only from time to time in 
momentarily actualised aspects".(op.cit.: 268)
6. 'The horizon of expectations' also derives from Gadamer (see 2.2, and 
Holub (1984:58-63)).
7. "Here we see once again that a literary work is a schematic formation. 
In order to see this, however, it is necessary to apprehend the work in 
its schematized nature and not confuse it with the individual 
concretization that arise in individual readings." (op.cit.:265)
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Chapter Bight.
i theory of dlsoooree deviation l: Bchena disruption end refreshment; 
a function of cognitive change.
8.0 Introduction: the argument so far.
In the preceding chapters we have attempted to suggest a number of 
inter-relations between three fields: discourse analysis, schema theory and 
literary theory. In the second and third chapters, on discourse analysis, 
we examined approaches to establishing the causes of coherence in 
discourse in general, while simultaneously observing some of the 
inadequacies of these approaches to the characterization of one type of 
discourse, namely literature. In the fourth chapter we described in 
detail one version of schema theory and the contribution it can make to a 
description of coherence. In chapter five, by demonstrating this 
contribution in the detailed analysis of two texts (the opening of Crime 
and Punishment and an advertisement for Gore-Tex fabric), we suggested 
that a difference between these two discourse types may reside in the 
types of schemata they evoke and the kinds of relationships between them. 
Using the schema types described in SPGU, we showed that, while the 
advertisement achieved coherence through the interconnection of schemata 
containing catalogues of specific physical entities (scripts), the literary 
discourse focussed much more on the plans and goals of characters'. 
Another difference was that the advertisement relied on well-established 
schemata which it did not seek to change, while the literary discourse 
necessitated changes to schematic organization. However, as we have been 
at pains to point out, there are two important provisos to these 
observations. Firstly, they derive from two texts only, and while highly 
suggestive, cannot necessarily be generalized to other examples of these 
two broad discourse types. Secondly, they are dependent upon the 
acceptance of the processing schemata which we propose. These schemata 
do not necessarily hold for all readers, and, as introspection can mislead, 
they may not even be the most important schemata used by the present 
writer.
In chapters six and seven we examined some of the approaches to the 
characterization of literary discourse which are now commonly grouped 
under the heading of 'modern literary theory'. In particular we described
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the Russian formalist notion of n+o»-=+,lterature as defamlllarlzatlon resulting
from a deviation from readerum reaaer expectation at various levels. The three
main levels at which this defamlHar-H^-n  ^,iamiiiarization may take place are those of
language, discourse and sense Dercen+i nn d j , ,.perception. The Russian formalists
concentrated most of their attention on discourse. Bringing different 
terminologies together, these levels at which defamiliarization may take 
place correspond to those of language schemata, text schemata and world 
schemata (though the last of these may be derived from discourse as well 
as perception.) Ve described the post-formalist 'scientific' approach to 
literary discourse as dividing into two, with each direction concentrating 
upon one level of the literary work in isolation. The structuralist 
approach concentrates upon conformities and deviations from postulated 
text structures, without reference to reader variation or linguistic 
realization. It also treats discourses as products rather than processes. 
The Jakobsonian approach, concentrating upon linguistic form below the 
sentence, attempts to characterize literariness as patterning and 
deviation at this level only, again without reference to reader variation. 
In chapter 7, by again analysing two texts, one literary (First Vnrld Var 
Poets) and one an advertisement (Elizabeth Taylor's Pass-trm), we 
attempted to demonstrate the weaknesses of the Jakobsonian approach in 
isolation, and the greater power of a linguistic description working in 
concert with a description related to certain reader-specific schemata. 
Despite these limitations, however, formalism, structuralism and 
Jakobsonian stylistics do present examples and working definitions of 
'text structural deviation' and 'language deviation', and we shall make use 
of these terms throughout this chapter.
Following our discussion of formalism and its legacy, we briefly 
described other attempts in literary theory to take more account of the 
reader, but noted that these are marked either by a rejection of 
linguistics, discourse analysis and other formal descriptions of text 
(including, by implication, AI text theory) or by use of some other formal
descriptive framework.
In the remaining two chapters, we shall attempt to bring together 
insights from the various approaches described so far, and to propose a 
theory of literariness as a dynamic interaction between linguistic and 
text-structural form on the one hand, and schematic representations of the 
world on the other. Ve shall call this dynamic interaction 'discourse
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deviation'. Our aim is to use schema theory as a way of taking account 
of reader variation and non-linguistic knowledge, though without 
abandoning the insights and descriptive apparatus provided by discourse 
analysis, formalism, structuralism and Jakobsonian stylistics. In
particular, we wish to suggest that in certain types of discourse, change 
in high-level schemata takes place through linguistic and text-structural 
deviation, but that (as is notably the case in advertisements) such 
deviation is no guarantee of such change. This approach, however, of its 
nature, can never assign the quality of literariness, once and for all, to 
a given text, but only to a given discourse.
8.1 The need for schema change.
In chapters two and three, we have tried to demonstrate that schemata 
are an essential element in the establishment of coherence. We need 
schemata in order to understand discourse. Yet as well as helping 
understanding, schemata may also hinder and prevent understanding if they 
are too inflexible. It seems reasonable to say that human beings need to 
adapt to new situations, to experiment with new possibilities, and that 
rigid, unchanging schemata would not always be helpful.
In our description of schema theory so far, we have emphasized the role 
of schemata in creating coherence during the processing of texts. The 
influence described has been one-way. Schemata have been represented as 
relatively fixed structures acting upon texts to create discourse. There 
is, however, another side to this process. Texts may change schemata. 
The interaction may be not one-way, but reciprocal and dynamic. Our 
theory is that while any interaction with new experience or text may be of 
this kind, and effect changes in schemata while simultaneously using them 
in processing, there may also be experiences and discourses whose primary 
function2 is to alter schemata, making the mind better equipped for 
processing in future. A particular relation between schemata on the one 
hand, and language and text structure on the other may effect exactly this 
kind of change. Many works which are regarded as literary may stimulate 
this kind of relation. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
discourse which functions in this way should not be intimately concerned 
with other functions of language such as efficient cooperation in
„ , I , . nr the establishment and maintenancemanipulation of the physical world, or we
, o o When these functions are dominant, itof social relationships (see -i.d.-i) ■ Wfleu
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»ay be better to keep to established patterns rather thaa esp.rl.eat «lth
ae» ones. (Repairing the brakes oa a car or sre.tlns a» old friend are
not "times to try out hgw DrnrprtMTQc  ^ <rv ,/ u*. procedures.) Thus a type of discourse removed
from immediate practical and snr-iai v  ^ ,r ciai tunctiono is best suited to changing
schemata.
8.2 Theories of schema change.
Before proceeding with our own theory, we shall discuss the approach to 
schema change in the works of the two major schema theorists, Bartlett 
(in 8.2.1) and Schank (in 8.2.2), while also noting two important 
weaknesses in their approach (8.2.3). These weaknesses are: the failure to 
take account of the effect on schemata of different linguistic and text- 
structural arrangements of the 'same' conceptual 'content'; the failure to 
comment on discourse types with the primary function of effecting changes 
in schemata3.
8.2.1 'Turning round upon' schemata: Bartlett (1932).
Awareness of a need to describe a dynamic and reciprocal interaction 
between schemata and new experience, so that both process each other, is 
present in Bartlett’s seminal work Remembering (Bartlett 1932). Though in 
general concerned to show the role of schemata in the processing of new 
experience, whether textual or sensory, Bartlett at several points voices 
an engaging awareness of his theory's need to account for influence in the 
opposite direction, and of its inadequacy in this respect'*.
THEME
(----  = path between schemata)
Figure 20: non-serial connection in a Schankian hierarchy-.
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Drawing together the findings of his research into a 'theory of 
remembering- (1932:197-215) he voices constant concern about the rigid 
temporal sequencing of events in schemata as he describes them. (His 
theory contains no Schankian hierarchy which will enable an intelligence 
to connect one schema to another through a schema at a higher node, thus 
jumping over schemata at the same or intermediate levels (see figure 20).) 
His comments on this type of rigidity, apply to a non-hierarchical schema 
theory in general, not only to the Issue of temporal sequencing. These 
comments are so much to our present purpose, so emblematic of the 
concerns we wish to pursue in this chapter, that they are worth quoting 
here at length:
In remembering, we appear to be dominated by particular past events 
which are more or less dated, or placed, in relation to other associated 
particular events. Thus the active organized setting looks as though it 
has somehow undergone a change, making it possible for parts of it 
which are remote in time to have a leading role to play. If only the 
organism could hit upon a way of turning round upon its own schemata 
and making them objects of its reactions, something of the sort might 
perhaps become possible.(op.cit.:202)
An organism which possesses so many avenues of sensory response as 
man's, and which lives in intimate social relationship with numberless 
other organisms of the same kind, must find some way in which it can 
break up this chronological order and rove more or less at will in any 
order over the events which have built up its present momentary 
schemata (....) If we could only understand how an organism achieves 
this, we should have advanced some way towards solving certain of the 
problems of memory (...) (op.cit.:203-4)
A new incoming impulse must become not merely a cue setting up a series 
of reactions all carried out in a fixed temporal order, but a stimulus 
which enables us to go direct to that portion of the organized setting 
of past responses which is most relevant to the needs of the moment. 
(...) An organism has somehow to acquire the capacity to turn round on 
upon its own schemata and to construct them afresh. This is a crucial 
step in organic development. It is where and why consciousness comes 
in; it is what gives consciousness its most prominent function. wish 
I knew exactly how it was done. (op.cit.:206)
But that orientation must be dominated by the immediately preceding
j To hroflk away from this tlie schsins mustreaction or experience. To breas away uum .
Z i ,  of purely ply.lcl or physiological
9 9 M F  Hoy £  m  p * *  I  -
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towards the massed effects nf a * ^enacts 01 a series of past reactions. (op.cit.:208)
And he leaves us at the end nf * t.*oi tnis section of his discussion, not only
with conclusions, but with a auestinn- «h™  «a ^uesxxon. how are our active organized
settings, our schemata, developed?" (op.cit.:212)
8.2.2 The theory of dynamic memory: Schank (1982).
To some extent an answer to this open question of Bartlett's is 
suggested by Schank in further developments of the theory of schemata 
types advanced by SPGU (Schank and Abelson 1977, described in chapter 4). 
These new ideas are stated most fully in the book Dynamic Memnrv (DM) 
(Schank 1982), though their origin is in an earlier paper (Schank 1980). 
During the 1980s, the ideas of SPGU have been developed and applied in a 
number of other areas too: for example, to teaching reading (Schank 
1982b); to translation (Lytenin and Schank 1982); to news analysis (Schank 
and Burstein 1985). Explanation Patterns (EP) (Schank 1986) deals with 
the ways in which the task of explaining unusual events can both develop 
intelligence, and demonstrate it. As such it is perhaps over-concerned with 
refuting arguments against AI (see 4.1.2). It is DM, however, which is at 
the heart of the developments of the theory, and most pertinent to our 
concerns. Where SPGU centred very much upon text processing, DM deals 
more with experience in general. As in Bartlett's work, conclusions are 
presumed to apply in a similar way both to direct experience and to 
textual experience. This is in our view a weakness, but we shall return to
this point in 8.2.3.
SPGU, as we have seen, is an explanation of how various types of schema 
may be applied in text processing. DM deals with the reverse of this 
process and describes how schemata may be constructed and changed. 
Schank's starting point is the observation that the phenomenon of being 
reminded of one experience by another, though frequent and important in 
people's lives, is inadequately and rarely dealt with in the psychological 
literature (DM:19). He suggests that an investigation of the connections 
which evidently exist between apparently disparate experiences may help in 
the understanding of memory and schematic knowledge (DM:19-36).
Schank gives many examples from his own life of odd instances of 
reminding (see for example DM:47). These illustrate how connections are
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»ade between quit, disparate scripts or plans by reference to a cc.on 
goal or theme (see figure 20). Schank's approach is, like Ingarden's, 
heavily phenomenological, in that he is prepared to admit introspection 
into his own mental life as evidence. The fact that our own experience of 
reminding is similar to Schank's bears out, in our view, the validity of 
this approach. (Our general acceptance of this method is already apparent 
in our use of introspection to describe the schemata used in processing a 
given discourse (see 5.2., 5.3, 7.2, 7.3)). Rather than repeat one of 
Schank's many examples, in illustration of the connections between 
schemata suggested by reminding, we shall give a similar one of our own. 
(It seems sensible here to abandon the more academic 'we' for 'I'.) Vhile 
hurriedly leaving work recently to start on a long car Journey, and 
dealing with some last-minute business in the general office of the 
university department where I work, I noticed that someone had left a 
letter addressed to a student lying on the counter of the office, in a 
place where the student would be unlikely to find it. Three hours later, 
while driving in dark and rain on an empty stretch of a major road in 
Scotland, I saw a plank in the road in front of me, which, not having 
time to avoid, I drove over. The plank reminded me of the letter! The 
'low level' explanation that they were both rectangular objects lying on a 
surface is not convincing. The world is full of such objects and I had 
already encountered many of them in the intervening period - a briefcase 
on the back seat of a car, a sandwich on a plate - without being reminded 
of the letter. An explanation of the reminding is provided more 
convincingly (through a combination of introspection and Schank's theory) 
at a 'higher level'. This is that both objects evoked in me a common 
theme and plan. The theme is to act in a socially responsible manner. 
This theme would instigate a suspension of more self-centred plans - to 
leave work quickly, to reach my destination - and the substitution of more 
altruistic plans. In the first case this would have involved putting the 
letter in the right place, in the second, stopping the car, going back and 
removing the plank. (As it happens, I did neither.)
According to Schank, such strange remindings provide us with a glimpse 
of connections through higher levels of schemata. In EP he suggests that 
the task of explaining unusual events - whether to others or to oneself - 
may provide us. with similar glimpses. Reminding and explanation reveal 
the kind of connections which provide the basis for changing and
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reconnect ing schemata. Like Bartlett, Schank is aware that schemata 
cannot be too rigid. They must change and re-form. On this basis he 
proposes modifications of the 1977 theory. These changes are not so 
great, however, as to invalidate our own analyses in chapter 4, or our own 
modification of it (in 5.4) which we use in chapter 9. The basic 
hierarchy of scripts, plans and themes remains. Ve shall not therefore go 
into the theory in the same detail as we did with SPGU. It will be enough 
simply to highlight those features which enable the basic Schankian 
hierarchy to cope with the idea of a reciprocal interaction between 
schemata and text.
There are two fundamentally new ideas in DM. The first is that re- 
fflembered experiences are dls-membered in the mind, and the parts stored 
separately (our pun here is significant!), DK suggests that dismembered 
parts are stored in a new category of schema: Memory Organization Packets 
(MOPs). These are very much like the goals and named plans of SPGU. They 
generalize memories as much as possible into broad categories. Each MOP 
contains a number of 'scenes' (defined as "physical settings that serve(s) 
as the basis for reconstruction" (DM:15)) connected to goals. Scripts are 
then reconstructed by bringing together several MOPs. Usually three types 
of MOP are needed to construct a script: one concerned with personal 
needs, one concerned with social interaction and one concerned with 
physical entities. MOPs are thus not themselves text-processing schemata, 
but a means of constructing text-processing schemata. Schank suggests, 
for example, that the schema used for a visit to the doctor is composed of 
three MOPs: one containing scenes about Health Protection (personal) , one 
containing scenes about a Professional Office Visit (physical, abbreviated 
to 'POV') and one containing scenes about making a contract (social) . 
Each of these contains ordering rules for its own scenes. Brought 
together, these three MOPs yield a sequence of scenes which when read 
horizontally are very much like a script as described in SPGU (see figure 
21 ) .
There are several advantages in this description over that in SPGU. It 
is at once more economical and more fluid. It explains why it is that 
people may remember a part of a script without generating the whole (for 
example that something happened in a waiting room, but not which waiting
v Qvnorlpnces remind us of others (they areroom) and also why some experie
, J wnpc) It also remedies a number of the problemsorganized in the same Murs).
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created by the large and rigid nature of scripts, enabling the construction 
of new ones and more leeway in the ordering of events. MOP's are in 
Schank's view very much like the goals and plans of SPGU. In fact he 
seems to suggest that goals and plans are so similar as to be conflated 
into this one new category (we have already noted the difficulty of 
distinguishing goals and plans in 5.4). The greatest change then is in 
the conception of scripts. Although the possibility of large ready-made 
scripts is still accepted, the idea is far more that the majority are 
assembled as needed. Corresponding to the demotion of large rigid 
scripts, is a far greater emphasis on goals and plans.
M -H EALTH -PRO TECTIO N
Problem Fixer Appt There] Room O ffice Back]
Figure 21: Construction of script through MOPs (DM:89).
The second important innovation of DX concerns the lowest element of 
its modified hierarchy: scenes. Here, Schank is much more specific about 
the construction of new schemata and the rearrangement of old ones. Again 
the smaller units allow for greater fluidity. Changes do not have so many 
repercussions on other elements of the script (which are stored 
elsewhere). A scene in this new formulation is a single location or 
process associated with a goal (MOPs are collections of scenes which share 
the same goal). Buying a ticket is, for example, a scene associated with 
the goal (or plan) TRAVEL; boarding a bus is another such scene. Both 
would belong to the same MOP. Two similar experiences are ’mushed* 
together into the same scene. Ve may remember, for example, that 
something happened while we were boarding a bus* but not - if we have
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dcme this many times - on which specific occasion. Significant departures 
from the expectations generated by a scene - for example 'the time I 
boarded a bus but it broke down' - are retained together with the scene. 
These are 'failures’ of the predictions generated by the scene. Vhen the 
same failure occurs twice, a new scene is generated. In our example here, 
this new scene would be a 'bus break-down scene'. Elements which this new 
scene has in common may then link up (we do not pretend to explain quite 
how) with the same element in another scene or MOP. In our example this 
might be a MOP containing scenes of frustration or scenes of mechanical 
failure. Similar links are manifested by the mental phenomenon of being 
reminded.
In Schank's view, schemata and memory are one and the same thing. The 
general picture of memory in DM - as the title suggests - is one of 
schemata in constant flux: schemata which are used in processing but also 
changed by processing. Each new experience creates new scene 
combinations through the bringing together of MOPs, but this very process 
creates new scenes which are then filed away under new MOPs. One scene 
may of course belong to several MOPs - a fact which explains many odd 
instances of reminding, like the one described above. The elements of 
schemata are constantly being broken down and reformed into new schemata. 
Introspection into instances of reminding affords us glimpses of the kind 
of process this is. Connections are achieved very much by reference to 
goals and plans, though these, as Schank emphasizes, are often mysterious 
and the subject of speculation rather than certainty. This is because the 
goals and plans and specific experiences of individuals vary widely. 
There can therefore be no final description of the processing of a given 
experience or of its effect on the schemata used in that processing. 
There can only be descriptions valid for particular individuals and even
then there is an inevitable uncertainty.
In the context of Schank's theory of reminding, it is interesting to 
note that our analyses of literary and advertising discourse have 
suggested that connections between schemata in literary discourse are at 
higher levels, whereas in advertisements connections are established 
through one prop (the product) at the lowest level. If the theory in DM 
is correct, connections at higher levels provide the greatest potential for
schema change.
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8.2.3 A weakness In schema theory.
Both Bartlett and Sc hank recognize the need for human beings to change 
and reorganize schemata. Schank provides a substantial account of how 
this may be done. Yet neither theorist pays much attention to the role of 
language and text structure in this process. Both have a tendency to 
treat direct sense experience of the world and experience of a (real or 
fictional) world through language as the same. For Schank in particular, 
the building blocks of schemata are conceptual dependency representions, 
and the linguistic or text structural origin of those representations is 
abandoned once it has been 'translated' into the new language. Thus, 
though there are times when he recognizes the role of a lexical choice in 
creating a link (DM:25, 111) or of the role of schema theory in 
disambiguating anaphoric reference (SPGU:38-41) or even of text structure
(in discussing why West_Side_Story reminds people of Romeo and Juliet
(DM:33)), Schank does not develop the role of language or text structure in 
any detail. This tendency remains in EP, where 'sentences' are treated as 
equivalent to 'facts'. Significantly, though he several times refers to 
jokes as manifesting strange connections between schemata (DM:25,32-37; 
EP:16,20), none of the jokes which he cites in evidence rely heavily upon 
wordplay or linguistic innovation. Similarly, on a text-structural level, 
all the stories used by both Bartlett and Schank have, in formalist terms, 
unmarked syuzhet. Their ordering of event, in other words, is that of 
their fabula (see 6.3.4).
Related to this is the two theorists' attitude to the discourses they 
adduce in evidence: myths in Bartlett's theory, Jokes and anecdotes in 
Schank's. Both note that these discourses effect schema change, yet 
neither suggest that this change may be the primary function of such 
discourses7.
In the remainder of this chapter, and in chapter 9, we shall develop 
and apply a description of how deviation at the linguistic and text- 
structural level may be linked to changes in schemata, creating an 
overall effect of discourse deviation.
8.3 A third function of discourse: cognitive change.
In the Schankian view, the ability to break down existing schemata, 
reassemble new ones and draw new connections is synonymous with 
intelligence and adaptability. Yet in the picture he draws of this
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constant and dynamic interaction, the process of renewal is viewed as a 
consequence not a motivation of experience. The experiences he describes 
are still primarily sought out for social and material ends. Any change 
they may effect in schemata exists as a side product. He does not 
consider the possibility of there being experiences whose primary and 
perhaps unique function for the individual is to effect changes in 
schematic organization. This oversight is connected to Schank's failure to 
draw a diotinction between linguistic and direct sensory experience (see 
8.2.3.). Direct interaction with the world or with other people does not 
always allow the maximum and most creative degree of play. Its 
consequences are too important and affect the individual too closely. For 
these reasons change is best effected through a kind of linguistic 
experience which, though it may describe interaction with other people or 
the environment, is not itself part of that interaction.
Linguistic experience which is written®, rather than spoken and 
performed, enables the individual to withdraw from social interaction, and 
this too may ensure greater freedom and experimentation. Though there are 
institutionalized events which allow people to come together to experience 
such playful uses of language communally - comedy shows, plays, 
performances of songs9 - the act of reading to oneself, by its very 
nature, is private10. The mass literacy which has come to Europe in the 
last two hundred years (Hobsbawm 1975:191-192) has thus changed the 
nature of discourse processing, diminishing the stature of the communal 
experience and raising that of private experience. Comedy and song have 
largely been demoted to the status of sub-culture; poetry is increasingly 
treated as written rather than spoken text; the novel - once a junior 
branch - has been canonized (see 6.3.3); the popularity of drama has 
waned. Television and film can in this respect be regarded as either 
communal or private. Many people watch television alone, often as a 
substitute for company, and film (in the cinema, not on videotape), though 
it involves the gathering of crowds, is - because of its non-reciprocal 
nature, and because it is experienced in the dark - essentially private:
more like reading a book than going to a play.
Taking all of this into account, in what follows we deal mainly with
written discourse, read silently. Vith this qualification, let us return to 
the issue of the difference between linguistic and sensory experience.
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Experlence may be divided into three types: that which is perceived 
directly without the mediation of language (though it may also include 
language); that which comes to us entirely through language, but we believe 
represents an independent reality; and that which exists only through 
language, with no accessible corresponding reality in the world, though it 
creates an illusion of one. Much literary discourse is of the last type. 
This is not only true of fiction. Even literary discourse derived from 
and representing independent 'facts' is unlikely to have the same immediate 
impact upon the reader as a discourse reporting a situation which directly 
affects the reader, or in which the reader can intervene. The boundaries 
here are fuzzy. Some discourses apparently derived from an independent 
reality (a memorandum, for example, or a summons to court) may directly 
involve their reader, while others (for example, newspaper reports), though 
also representing reality, may be so far beyond the reader's control or 
experience, that they are to all intents and purposes of the same status 
as the illusory world of a literary discourse. Ve must also bear in mind 
the post-modernist notion of the retrospective effect of discourse in 
creating 'facts' from which they apparently derive, the reversal of cause 
and effect (discussed in 6.1.).
Despite this fuzziness and complexity, and the issue of the differences 
between communal and private experiences of discourse, it seems reasonable 
to identify a group of texts of no Immediate practical or social 
consequence. Ve propose that the illusory experience offered by such 
texts provides the individual with the opportunity to reorganize schemata 
without the fear of unpleasant practical or social consequence.
In this definition, it is important to stress the word lamed late- The 
reorganization of schemata may have eventua l social and practical 
consequences. Crime and Punishment may change our attitude to various 
phenomena in the world: to the murder of old women for money, to religion, 
to prostitution, or to poverty. It may also change our attitude to 
language and discourse: to detective novels, narrative viewpoint or the 
structure of the clause” . But its effect on future action is delayed. 
One can read a literary work in order to solve an immediate problem, of
.-i 4t. Hrii- definition, that would not be to read it as. a course, but arguably, in our
literary work.
V. shall treat ohanges in scheaat. as having three aspacts (see figure 
22). Bxlstlag sheaata aay be destroyed. I.» ones aay be constructed.
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DISCOURSE
ADDISG DESTROYING CONSTRUCTING CONNECTING
Figure 22. Discourse effects on schemata.
New connections may be established between existing schemata. (This last 
phenomenon is referred to by Schank as ‘multiple indexing' and described 
as "One source of our intelligence and ability to learn" (DM:122).) Ve 
shall refer to these three processes as 'schema refreshment'. (Ve shall 
also use the term 'schema disruption' to describe a general effect on 
existing schemata. Disruption is a pre-requisite of refreshment.)
Our claim is that the primary function of certain discourses is tfl 
effect a change Id the schemata of their readers. Sensations of pleasure, 
escape, profundity and elevation are conceivably offshoots of this 
function. So too is the high social esteem afforded to discourse with no 
other apparent social or practical function. Conversely, it seems that 
discourses attempting this function but failing (for a given individual) 
are not simply ignored, but often violently attacked by those individuals 
and dismissed as boring or even harmful. (Consider the opprobrium and 
vitriol attracted by a 'bad joke' or 'unsuccessful novel'. The Edward Bond 
poem analysed in 7.3, for example, attracts very strong disapproval from 
some people.) The degree of schematic change, and thus the assignment of 
esteem, will depend upon the schemata which the reader employs in 
interpretation, and on his or her own receptiveness, and ability or wish 
to change. There are discourses rejected because they seek to cause too 
sudden and too drastic a change: hence the frequently negative initial
i ar+ Which is later elevated to a very highreception of revolutionary art w m
, +lTnps when people have good cause to resiststatus. There are of course times y r
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changeo suggested by a particular di<?rniircQ v. vdiscourse. Though change in general may
be desirable, there is nothing inherently commendable in accepting a 
particular change. For these reasons our claim that certain discourses 
are 'schema refreshing' can never specify the quality in particular texts. 
The quality of schema refreshment is reader-dependent. Nevertheless, a 
given text may possess this quality for a large number of people. Ve are 
referring to discourses possessed of this quality as schema refreshing. 
Ve may contrast schema-refreshing discourse with discourse which is 
schema preserving and discourse which is 'schema reinforcing'. Sometimes 
discourse may simply add to existing schemata, while preserving their 
basic structure intact. This is the case with the addition of Gore-tex 
fabric as a new prop in scriptlike schemata representing Scotland or 
holidays in 5.2.
The category of schema-refreshing discourse, whose primary function is 
to effect change in schemata, will include many of those discourses 
described as literary. This is not to say, however, that all literature is 
schema refreshing nor that all schema-refreshing discourse is literature. 
The borders of the two types are not absolutely co-terminous. (Nor for 
that matter are they precise.) Certainly, there are many discourses, which 
are not generally accepted into the canon of literature, but whose primary 
value is the disruption of schemata. These perhaps may be divided into 
two types. Those which disrupt schemata through conventional (even 
'ready-made') text and language structures, and those whose disruption of 
world schemata is matched by deviant text and language structures12.
The former category will include, among other instances, scientific and 
journalistic prose which disrupts rigid and strongly-held schemata. (In 
connectionist terms (see chapter one, note 5 and 4.1), this will mean 
schemata held in neural connections with exceptionally strong 
weightings13.) Consider, for example, the following passage from a serious 
work of popular science:
At first I believed that disorder would decrease when the universe
. thought tut the uhtvors. :b.d to :r,tur»
to , smooth order*, state . It ^ " t i  t“K-rev J Sfof “ u
that contractlngptasewo  ^„ould Uve tielT Uvss
expanding phase. People in the con g ^  y0unger as the
backward: they would^die before^ th y+_ ^  ^  ^  {HawkillR 1988:i50) 
universe contracted. From A BrlQl History uj.
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Here wg seem to tiave v _ j.treme schema disruption: a serious and learned
suggestion th&t time csin cro bsckwarric vn+ j+ j00 ftU Dac£Waras. Yet it is apparently expressed in
the most unremarkable, lucid and 'transparent- prose, in a book with a very 
conventional text structure. (It is in fact the interaction of the serious 
genre with its conceptual content which makes this book schema disrupting. 
In science fiction, such ideas are already banal.) It is worth noting, 
however, that the apparent separation between disruptive content and 
disruptive form is not as simple as it seems. Firstly, the expression of 
new scientific ideas often leads to innovative uses of language. Examples 
are phrases like 'cosmic soup', used to describe the early stages of the 
universe, 'cosmic censorship' to describe the inaccessability of 
information in a black hole, the attribution of 'charm' to particles with 
particular properties. The passage above in fact contains such an 
innovation in the phrase 'the time-reverse*. Secondly, the 'weird' findings 
of modern science are often verbalizations in natural language of findings 
originally expressed in formal languages.
The latter category of non-literary schema-disrupting discourse 
includes many jokes, comedy routines, graffiti and possibly some 
advertisements. The exclusion of these discourse types from the literary 
canon may be attributed to a number of causes (Cook 1990b). Firstly, 
though they share many features with literary discourse, they often have a 
dominant function considered alien to literature, for example to establish 
group identity or give voice to taboo. Secondly, they are often concerned 
with communal rather than individual creative identity, which, in a 
literate culture, is often regarded as inferior. Thirdly, they are often 
disruptive of language and text schemata, while preserving or reinforcing 
world schemata. This last feature, as we have seen in 5.2 and 7.2, is 
particularly true of advertisements. Our two analyses of advertisements 
have highlighted subsentential patterning and deviation, but there is also, 
on occasion, deviation from expected text structure. If, for example, the 
expected text structure of a television commercial reflects the 'rule' that 
it begins, runs continuously for approximately twenty five-seconds and 
ends, then a number of advertisements are text-structurally deviant. 
1989-1990, for example, British television carried an advertisement for 
Gold Blend coffee, telling a story in instalments. Completion was 
continuously delayed. (In formalist terms this canonizes the junior branch 
of advertisement, making it closer to the senior branch, in television
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terms, of soap opera.) A building society ran parallel advertisements - 
one 'gloomy' version, one 'cheerful version - on two commercial channels 
simultaneously, advising viewers to switch channels according to 
preference. In the USA, a firm ran a series of parody advertisements for 
spurious products, interrupting each one with a cartoon rabbit advertising 
its own product . Ve shall make use of these examples in the next 
section.
Conversely, there are arguably discourses within the literary canon 
which are far from 'schema refreshing'. It might be said, for example, 
that the novels of Jane Austen evoke, maintain and indeed reinforce quite 
rigid schemata about acceptable and desirable behaviour. On the other 
hand, it might validly be claimed that this view is retrospective; we have 
only to compare Jane Austen's depiction of the behaviour of the rural 
middle and upper classes in say, Emma (published in 1816) with Fielding's 
depiction of the same classes in say Tom Jones six decades earlier (1749) 
to appreciate how 'schema breaking' the world of her novels may have been 
in its own time. Literary discourses which were once schema refreshing 
become schema reinforcing. This applies as much to text schemata and
language schemata as it does to world schemata. Thus Lyrical_Ballads,
which once disrupted schemata of poetic language and subject matter, 
rapidly became the stereotype of poetry. In our own century, departure 
from conventional punctuation in poetry, though once innovative, has 
become banal. This lack of a perfect fit between the literary canon and 
the category of 'schema-refreshing discourse' is hardly surprising, as the 
canon tends to be defined, not for specific readers, but for - and by - a 
dominant social group speaking in institutions at a particular time in 
history. The concept of schema-refreshing discourse, on the other hand, 
must be related to as many variations as there are between epochs, 
individuals and social groups. (That is why what we have just said about 
Jane Austen is highly personal and disputable, and can never have the 
status of a fact.) Educational institutions, however, have a tendency to 
be a step behind. They canonize what was once (and exclude what is 
currently) schema refreshing. Yet despite the emasculating effects on
literature of institutions, time, and fame, the literary canon does provide
_vir\cr h-i ^course. and we shall treat it as the many examples of schema-refreshing di
major source of such discourse.
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This feature of literature - +v=+ a-a ^that it is often primarily schema
refreshing - accounts for the inability of many approaches to discourse 
analysis to cope well with the coherence of literary discourse. Accounts 
of coherence at the linguistic or text-structural level are only partial. 
Pragmatics, adopted in discourse analysis to remedy this inadequacy, works 
best with the discourse of 'the bulge': civil exchanges between 
acquaintances whose relations are neither too intimate nor too disparate 
in power (see 3.2.1.2). There is thus a tendency to interpret the primary 
functions of all discourse as either co-operative (manipulating the 
environment together with others) or polite (creating and maintaining 
social relations) (see 3.2). The function of schema refreshment comes 
under neither of these headings. Added to these two, it effects a third 
major function of discourse (as already suggested in 3.2.3).
To some extent it is true that any discourse alters schemata. A 
discourse which did not would be both totally superfluous and utterly 
boring, realizing the most catastrophic misjudgement of the interlocutor’*. 
There are two apparent qualifications to this general truth. Firstly, 
there is the paradox that statement of the obvious arouses a particular 
kind of interest. Encountered in the surreal dialogues of the Theatre of 
the Absurd, for example, it stimulates a search for the goals behind such 
extreme failure of communication. The second qualification concerns the 
deliberate re-processing of a discourse. People re-read a favourite book 
or poem, watch a film that they have seen many times before. It might be 
argued that in these cases there can be no further change of schemata, as 
whatever changes the discourse may encourage have already taken place. It 
is more likely, however, that each repetition yields a new interpretation, 
especially as an individual reader changes between readings. 
Alternatively, subsequent readings may yield the same changes as the first 
reading, but serve to reinforce them. If the reader likes the changes, 
this may be seen as desirable. (In connectionist terms this last effect 
is equivalent to increasing the 'weightings' of connections.)
Yet, although most discourse effects some change in schemata, there
. , hack over the texts we have analysedare differences of degree. Looking oa
I. earlier chapters, we .ay *M. tor example, that the biography of Brnest 
Hemingway provides <ior its projected reader) a good deal of new 
Information about Its subject, it adds to the scrlptllhe 'Brnest Bemlngway 
schema' which we may presume any educated Bngllsh-speahlng adult to have
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available. It may also add (through ‘double inclusion*, see 5.2.3, 5.3.2) to 
schemata concerning reporters, the First World Var, Italy and so on. 
Similarly, the advertisements for Elizabeth Taylor's Passion, and for 
Gore-Tex may provide new information about Elizabeth Taylor and 
Scotland16, or about what to wear when we wish to be attractive, 
comfortable or stylish. Yet they effect no radical change in schemata. 
These discourses are instances of schema addition rather than refreshment. 
They affect the level of scriptlike schemata, but not of plans or themes. 
The advertisements confirm the unremarkable facts that most men and women 
wish to be attractive and comfortable. Similarly, the Hemingway biography 
only confirms our expectation that writers are independent people who lead 
varied and exciting lives. In contrast, the description of Raskolnikov, 
even in the opening paragraphs of Crime and Punishment, demands 
reorganization of assumptions about human behaviour and motivation. It 
begins to build new schemata which are incomplete, mainly because the 
themes and plans behind them are unknown. The Edward Bond poem stands 
or falls by its challenge to deeply ingrained high-level assumptions about 
poetry, poets and the war dead. (Many would say it falls, but it is worth 
noting that it may do so in two ways: either because it fails to evoke 
acceptance of the changes it advocates, or because its attempt to demolish 
and rebuild schemata is not perceived - in which case it is simply 
considered to be bad poetry or insensitive.)
All the examples are perhaps extremes. The Hemingway passage is a 
plain presentation of biographical facts, the advertisements embody rigid 
unquestioned values. Crime and— Punlshffleat■ by contrast, is for many 
people, one of the most rewardingly disturbing discourses of all. The 
Bond poem attempts to overturn sacred assumptions. Such examples have 
been chosen deliberately. In general, we might expect the distinction 
between schema-refreshing discourse, and discourses which are schema 
preserving or reinforcing to be more 'fuzzy', and best represented by a 
cline. In terms of prototype theory (see 4.4.1), Crime attd Punishment is 
prototypical of schema-refreshing discourse, as are the three literary
texts analysed in the next chapter.
v e?n far both in our analysis of approaches toIn all that we have said so far, ooxn ±u uu ,
a U  onr summary of literary theory, we have discourse analysis, and in our y
* mainr levels in discourse (whetheracknowledged the existence of three major xeveis
1 ThpS(3 iD the broadest terms, are the levels literary or non- literary). These, in
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of language, text structure and knowledge. Ve may relate these to the 
approaches described as in table 6. Ia this table, cohesion, being both 
sub- and super-sentential belongs to both levels 2 and 3. For the sake of 
completeness, we have included grammar as a level of discourse, though in 
our summary of discourse analysis Id chapters 2 and 3, we only touched 
upon it directly in our description of parallelism (in 2.3.1) and FSP (In 
3.6.2). The equation of the role of knowledge (in discourse analysis) 
with that of the reader (in literary theory) may seem strange, but is 
valid on the grounds that in a sense - the sum of a person's schemata
is that person, and, conversely, schemata are as variable as readers.
SCHEMA THEORY DISCOURSE AIALYSIS LITERARY THEORY
1. (Vorld) Schemata Knowledge The Reader
2. Text schemata Functional Structure 
(defined pragmatically)
Structure 
(defined intertextually)
j^ Formal links (cohesion)j
3. Language schemata Grammar Message (.pace Jakobson: 
i.e. linguistic form)
Table 6. Correlation of levels in schema theory, discourse analysis and 
literary theory.
Ve have stressed an understandable but regrettable tendency in various 
approaches to focus on one of these levels to the detriment of the others. 
This is most evident in literary theories where the legacy of formalism 
has fragmented into an exclusive emphasis on language (Jakobson) on text 
structure (structuralism) and on the reader (in those reader-response 
theories which deny an autonomous text). Literary theorists of these 
schools have tried vainly to identify literariness in terms of deviation 
and conformity at one and only one of these levels. In discourse analysis
this atomizing approach is less in evidence. The inability of purely
i to mne with coherence has been recognized,formal and textual approaches to cope wixa
. tj ka defined as the attempt to bringDiscourse analysis could indeed
together knowledge, text structure and language. Yet it is also true that 
in discourse analysis the schematic organization of knowledge has often 
been regarded as fixed. Schemata are brought to bear upon the
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interpretation of discourse rather than affected by it. For this reason 
pragmatic and text-structural approaches to discourse, though they work 
well for discourse primarily motivated by the politeness and co-operative 
principles, are weak in dealing with literary discourse. AI text theory , 
on the other hand, falls into the opposite trap from structuralism and 
Jakobsonian stylistics. While it pays attention to knowledge, it has a 
tendency to ignore the complexities created by differences in linguistic 
and the text-structural form.
8.4 Discourse deviation.
If it is the primary function of a particular category of discourse to 
effect the refreshment of schemata, it seems likely that that refreshment 
will take place, not at one of the three levels discussed above, but in the 
relation between them. The 'world' of a literary work, whether or not it 
originates in or relates to some external world, is an illusion brought 
into being through the language and text structure. It is reasonable 
therefore to suppose that the schemata it evokes through these two levels 
may also be refreshed through these two levels. Literary theoretical 
approaches concentrating on deviation and patterning at the linguistic and 
text-structural levels, and the Schankian approach concentrating on the 
schematic level, all fail to show how patterning and deviation at one level 
affect patterning and deviation at another. Just as discourse and its 
quality of coherence can be described only as the interplay of levels and 
not at any level in isolation, so can the elusive quality of 'literariness'. 
Where t.har» at pup nr both of the linguistic and tSXL
structural levels, and this deviation interacts with a reader's existing 
fir.hp™t.a t.n rai.cc r-cfrPshinoT't.. there exists a phenomenon whlch-aa
shall term 'discourse deviation^
Thl, definition Is complicated by the fnct that schemata, In the 
broadest sense, inclod. no. only sche.ata of the world but also sche„ata 
representing text structures and the language Itself <1e=rt scheaata' and
i The highest level, in other words, 'language schemata respectively.) 8
T+ ic thus feasible that schema refresh ment, contains the other two. It is thus ieas
. „  text structure, may on occasion beeffected through language and
+e»v+ Q+ructurG. In o"th©r words w©refreshment of schemata o£ language
* « recourse with our mental representation of the may come away from a discours
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language altered (as the first reader- T wreaders of labberwnnkv came away with the
»ord 'burble') or with eo»e ne» notion of text structure <»s tie first
readers of The Mysteries nf Udolpha came away with the genre of the
Gothic novel, or the first readers of Freud with the genre of the
psychoanalytic case study (Foucault [1969] 1988:206)). These new
linguistic and text structural schemata will in turn have effects upon
representations of the world. A further complication is that the
deviations at the linguistic and text structural levels effecting schema
refreshment may not be deviations at that level only but rather in their
choices at that level in relation to one of the others. Thus The Rape nf
thfi— Lock is an instance of discourse deviation not for its structure and
linguistic form la Isolation, nor in schematic representation of the events
it describes la Isolation, but in the mismatch between the two. Deviation,
moreover, whether defined at one level or as an interaction between levels
is never absolute, but always relative to the expectations of a specified
reader. Literature students, for example, who commonly have no direct
experience of the epic form which mock-epic parodies, do not initially
find The Rape of the Lock either disturbing or amusing. The same is true
for fforthanger Abbey (another favourite on literature courses) when
readers have no experience of the Gothic novel.
The texts we have analysed reveal the futility of analysis at one level 
only. The sub-sentential patterns and deviations of the perfume 
advertisement neither cause, nor derive from, any schema refreshment. In 
the Bond poem it is the lack of sub-sentential patterning and deviation, 
interacting with a degree of stereotypical poetic text structure and 
combined with an attempt at schema refreshment, which constitute discourse 
deviations.
The tacir nf a t.hanrv nf discourse deviation must therefore be to Shaw 
how schema refreshment is affected through laaffuase and text structure t lo 
relate nng-.Hs-Hr and t.oYt-strurtnrai features to particular changes— la 
There are reasons why a complete description of these relations 
is impossible. The quantity of relations would clearly be vast, a 
multiplication of whatever complexities might be described at one level in 
isolation. Limitations, moreover, are not only quantitative but 
qualitative. Firstly, the description must involve a description of the 
relevant pre-existing schemata of a specified reader. As such the 
description remains speculative and open-ended (the number of potential
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readers, or of schemata employed by any particular reader, being virtually
infinite and inaccessible). Secondly, it is in the nature of the literary
beast to be unpredictable. Predictions are schematic. Schemata are
predictive. The relevant effect is schema disruption. What could be 
predicted would not be disruptive.
Nevertheless we may speculate both about the effects in general of the 
interaction of linguistic and text-structural deviation with schemata, and 
also about particular interactions in given literary texts. In the 
remainder of this chapter we shall undertake the first of these tasks. 
The final chapter is devoted to the analysis in terms of discourse 
deviation of three well-known and frequently analysed literary texts.
8.4.1 Possibilities of interaction.
Let us start in a simplified way and discuss the possible interactions 
of deviation and normality at the three major levels. If we represent 
these levels with the letters S for schemata evoked by the discourse (a 
notion which is elaborated below), T for text structure, and L for 
language, and follow each with + for norm and - for deviation (where 
'norm* means "conformity to schematic expectation" and 'deviation' means 
"difference from schematic expectation"), we have the possible combinations 
listed in table 7 (next page).
A number of points need to be made in glossary of each of the 
combinations and examples.
1) The biographical sketch adds new defaults to schemata, but there is no 
fundamental rearrangement. Stereotypes of writers are reinforced.
2) The combination of 'poetic' language and lineation with the schemata 
evoked by an advertisement may once have been itself schema refreshing. 
(There is a paradox here: that the means of schema refreshement, deviant
language, when combined with an absence of schema refreshment, was -
, _ itself Odd and therefore schemathe early days of advertioing
i-n other words, the absence of schema refreshing. In a given context, in o
refresh-ebt is itself schema refreshing. This .a, be cae of tb. reasons
that advertisements on occasion evoke such hostility. The, set up an
 ^ i. hv adoDtinff its means. But the promiseexpectation of schema refreshement by P 8
is unfulfilled! + iiv deviant advertisements were3) This and similar text-structurally
 ^ x. i _ _r.a nerhaDS immured to word play indiscussed above. Now that people P
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1) S+
■ A .S  i U i
T+
U 1  l
L+
j ^ - U i . e a e r v a T . i n ^
5) S- T+ L+
2) S+ T+ L- 6) S- T+ L-
3) s+ T- L+ 7) S- T- L+
4) s+ T- L- 8) S- T- L-
These may be related to texts we have analysed as follows:
1) s+ T+ L+ is exemplified by: Ernest Hemingway biography (in 3.6.2)
2) s+ T+ L- II U Elizabeth Tavlor's Passion ( " 7.2)
3) s+ T- L+ N II Gold Blend advertisement ( " 8.3)
4) s+ T- L- II II NO EXAMPLE
5) s - T+ L+ II N World Var One Poets ( " 7.3)
6) s - T+ L- U M The Tvger ( “ 9.1)
7) s - T- L+ II II The Turn of the Screw ( •' 9.2)
8) s - T- L- II II The Vindhover ( * 9.3)
Table 7. World, text and language schemata.
advertisements, such text-structural devices are an effective option. 
(This change is reflected in a move from linguistic to discoursal concerns 
in analyses of advertising. Compare, for example, Leech (1966) with 
Vestergaard and Schrader (1985).)
4) The difficulty of providing an example suggests a causal connection 
between the combination of linguistic and text-structural deviation and
change to world schemata.
5) This M a . p l .  is complex. T M  contrast of W M b  » « h  a 
conventional poetic layout »»d Iconoclastic sentl.ents Is potentially
deviant, but only In tie co.61n.tlon of these features. The poe. presents
a r?) It is the absence of text structural andthe opposite paradox to (2).
u j with the expectations set up by
linguistic deviation which, co
* . schema refreshment advocated by the poem,poetic form, 'represents the IB . ,, -l here is "the extract from &—griQX.
Another example which might be
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Hlstary-Qi Time discussed in 8.3. This scientific example is, as we have 
already noted, not as straightforward as it seems. Paradigm-breaking 
scientific prose may employ more linguistic innovation than popularly 
believed. These severe qualifications, and the general difficulty of 
finding an example to fit this category, suggests (like the absence of an 
example in (4)) that there is a connection between formal deviation and 
changes to schemata.
(6), (7) and (8) are dealt with in detail in chapter 9.
This relatively simple model may be made more complex in a number of 
ways. If we accept the existence of the three schemata types: world 
schemata, text schemata and language schemata (represented respectively 
by: S(V), S(T), S(L)) we can assume that all of these are present in the 
mind of any reader. A reader's feeling that the text structure or 
linguistic choices of a given discourse are normal or deviant derives from 
a comparison of its text structure (T) and its language (L) with the 
reader's pre-existing text schemata S(T) and language schemata S(L). The 
interaction of these interactions creates the illusion of a 'world' in the 
discourse (V), which can then be compared with the world schemata of the 
reader, yielding a judgement as to the normality or deviance of that 
illusory world. Judgements about the normality or deviation at any of 
the three levels in the discourse are not, then, as simple as table 7 
suggests. They arise from the comparison of the schemata at each level in 
the reader with the three levels of the text. The 'world' of the discourse, 
however, can only come into being through the interaction of its language 
and text structure with the language schemata, text schemata and world 
schemata in the reader. Let us represent this stage by stage (though 
without any implication that these stages are chronologically the stages
of interpretation).
Each reader possesses schemata at each level ( S(V) S(T) S(L>>. A 
given discourse has language and text structures (L, W  . (Ve have 
already discussed our view of the relationships between the language of a 
text and its structures, and the degree to which they are autonomous or 
reader dependent, in chapters 2 and 3. Accordingly, we shall talk about 
text as autonomous and separate from the reader in the sense defined in
2.1). None of these levels are discrete; they interact with each other as
, , , 1 _r<= a riescriDtion of tliein must shuntin figure 23. As in linguistic analysis, deocnpxion
(see 4.1).
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Reader Text
S(V) S(T) S(L) L T
= interaction
Figure 23. Schemata, text and language (1).
The comparison of the language of the discourse with the language schemata 
of the reader, and of the text structure with the text schemata of the 
reader, yield Judgements concerning the deviance or normality of the 
language and text structure , as in figure 24.
Reader Text
T +/-
S (V) S(T)
L +/-
Figure 24. Schemata, text and language (2).
These Judgements, however, and the extensions of them described below, 
are of course not final for a whole discourse. They will change with each 
stage in the process of reading (see 3.5, 7.4) and be different at 
different 'places' in the product of reading (see 3.4, 6.4). Also, they 
may describe any feature of the language or text structure and any 
possible combinations. They will also change on re-reading and within and
between readers. Deviation and normality, moreover, are not absoluteL be decrees of either. Bearing all thisconditions, and clearly there can »
+Hrmc of the descriptions provided here are in mind, the possible permutations
clearly immense.
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The interaction of world schemata S(V) with the interaction of S(T), 
S(L), L and T produces an (illusory) world (V) (which may change or add 
to existing schemata or yield new ones) as in figure 25. (Each figure 
adds to the previous one.)
= additions to previous figure.
^ = change
Figure 25. Schemata, text and language (3).
This world in the discourse is compared with the reader's world schemata 
S(V), allowing a Judgement of the deviance or normality of the world of 
the discourse, as in figure 26.
V +/-
Figure 26. Schemata, text and language (4).
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So far, however, the interaction is one way. Schemata are applied to text,
creating discourse. An experience of deviation, however, will rebound upon
the schemata which were used to establish it in the first place. A
deviant text structure, for example, will alter a reader's text schemata, as 
in figure 27.
V -
Deviant language may change language schemata. A deviant world may 
change world schemata (figure 28).
— ----V -
Figure 28. Schemata, text and language <6).
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There will also, we believe, be instances in which a deviant text structure 
or use of language will directly affect the world schemata of the reader, 
as in figure 29. This is discussed further in chapter 9.
In fact, as the 'world' of a discourse comes into being only through 
language and text structure, it may be that in discourse (as opposed to 
direct experience) only by altering text and language schemata can we 
alter world schemata. That is to say: the overall interaction of all 
elements will yield an effect of deviation from expectation and consequent 
schema change. It is this phenomenon which is discourse deviation, and we 
hope to illustrate it in the next chapter. Our analyses of advertisements 
on the other hand illustrate that textual and language deviation is no 
guarantee of discourse deviation. The process we are describing 
diagrammatically, in other words, does not go beyond figure 26. The 
potential for discourse deviation can only begin after that point.
The process we are describing is dynamic, as when schemata change, 
the whole process begins again with the newly formed schemata. This may 
explain the phenomenon of re-reading which we discussed in 8.3.
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As these relations apply at anv 0+=™ #•y y stage in a reading, they would be more
truly represented in three dimensions (figure 30).
The suggestion that changes in text and language schemata can affect 
world schemata, or that world schemata can change text and language 
schemata, implies a degree of belief in linguistic relativity (see 4.4.5), 
in that it sees S(V)s as being potentially affected by language and text, 
and vice versa. This seems to us reasonable. Lastly we might say that 
it is through the interaction of existing schemata and text which creates 
discourse that the reader infers the world schemata of the discourse. 
These are usually attributed to the author or narrator.
Reader Text Author/Barrator
V +/-
Figure 31. Schemata, text and language <8).
Introduction of further distinctions within the levels world, text 
structure and language would proliferate the possible combinations and 
interactions. Ve might, for example, distinguish S(V)s which are 
scriptlike schemata, plans and themes. In the next chapter, we shall 
attempt to illustrate some possible interactions through the analysis of
three literary discourses.
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8.5 Defaniliarization revisited.
The idea of 'schema refreshment' through discourse deviation is 
essentially the Russian formalist concept of defamiliarization restated in 
the light of AI and discourse analysis. From AI it borrows the idea of 
schemata, and from discourse analysis the idea that discourse is a reader- 
variable process of relating knowledge, text structure and language, 
rather than any of these in isolation. Formalism, discourse analysis and 
AI all have contributions to make to each other.
Although the formalists had taken the idea of a defamiliarization of 
reality and direct sense perception as their starting point (see 6.3), they 
soon moved away from this approach to deal with defamiliarization nnlv at 
the level of text structure and linguistic form. If the idea of the 
defamiliarization of the non-linguistic perception persisted in formalist 
theory at all, it did so only as a metaphor of the defamiliarization of 
text structure and language. To all extents and purposes description of 
this aspect of defamiliarization was abandoned as a matter of principle. 
Having narrowed the field by inflicting this exclusion upon themselves, 
the formalists were further limited, as Bakhtin points out, by the lack of 
a rigorous theory of language (Bakhtin [Voloshinov] [19291 1973:78; Bakhtin 
[Medvedev] [1928] 1978)17. In addition they sought to exclude both author 
and reader, the sender and receiver of the literary message, whose 
presences - as we have seen in the chapters 2 and 3 - are so essential 
for any satisfactory explanation of coherence. For these reasons, the 
formalists tended - or intended - to concentrate upon text structure (see 
6.3). Yet much of their work, ironically, far from being about the 
impersonal objective form of autonomous texts, does describe the 
interaction of text structure and reader, pointing the way towards 
resulting changes in a reader's representations of the world. (Here, we 
treat the world and representations of the world as the same.) Thus an 
inconsistency between formalist theory and practice produced some of their
best work and ideas.
It is in fact difficult to see how the concept of defamiliarization can
, M H  +n a aualitv of text rather than to a quality exclude the reader, and refer to a q y
, ii rpntral weakness in the theory is suggestedof discourse. Ironically, this central
|LJ| as true of the Russian wordby the word itself. (These points are as
nf 1+s EnKiish translation.) Though a neologism, 'ostranyenie' as they are of its Bngii!=>u
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the word 'defamiliarization' mav be ronnr.i...! , ,y regarded as a nominalization of a verb.
This verb would be transitive anH always predicate an object, with an 
optional adjunct "for x". The text defamiliarizes something for someone. 
The 'something' is the world (though in a sense which includes texts and 
language) and the 'someone' must be the reader. The use of the nominal, 
however, enables the formalists to avoid both implications. 
Defamiliarization is in fact reader-dependent: a relationship between a 
reader and an object of perception (even if that object of perception is 
another text or the language itself). This is why many of the formalist 
devices can only be identified for specific readers. Canonization of the 
junior branch, for example, assumes a point in history; what is junior for 
one generation of readers is not so for the next. Skaz relies on the 
notion of a narrator different in identity or attitude from the reader. 
Impeded form would be better described as 'impeding form', for it impedes 
the perception of the reader, which in turn depends upon the reader's 
experiences: familiarity with a particular language or genre will surely 
result in easier processing. Bared form is bared to, and dependent upon 
perception by, the reader.
Ve are brought back to the Bakhtinian adage:
Meaning does not reside in the word or in the soul of the speaker or in 
the soul of the listener. Meaning is the effect of interaction between 
speaker and listener produced via the material of a particular sound 
complex. It is like an electric spark that occurs only when two 
different terminals are hooked together. Those who ignore theme (which 
is accessible only to active, responsive understanding) and who, in 
attempting to define the meaning of a word, approach its lower, stable, 
self-identical limit, want, in effect, to turn on a light bulb after
having switched off the current.
(Bakhtin [Voloshinov] [1929] 1973:102-103)
In his own practice, Bakhtin went on to examine the effect on readers 
of text-structural and linguistic devices and their role in discourse. He 
never separated his analyses from historical periods and particular 
readers, a particular state of the world. In this sense he was not a 
'formalist', and disavowed the term. Unlike the formalists, who were 
forced mostly into minor editorial and philological work (Terras 
1985:60,407,480), Bakhtin, with considerable mental agility and 
managed to keep on producing theoretical writings throughout the Stalin
■fM-n-o defending a doctorate implying criticism ofperiod, even successfully deienai g
. , nn+hic ideology (Clark and Holquist 1984:263,295-hegemonous and monolithic laeuiujw
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It is impossible to tell how the relationship between Bakhtinian
and formalist criticism might have matured and developed in different
circumstances. The friendship which developed between Bakhtin and
Shklovsky in their old aare in the
J  u xn xne x may be some indication of the
potential for reconciliation and mutual benefit between the two trains of 
thought (see Shklovsky 1966:298; Clark and Holquist 1984:340-343).
The irony of the situation then is that while the formalists had 
rejected the relationship of literature to the world as naive, and also 
avoided the issue of the reader-dependency of literary effect, they left 
behind them an impressive body of analyses and a theoretical framework 
describing exactly this interaction of world and reader through unfamiliar 
form. Concepts like skaz, syuzhet, canonization, bared form are already a 
stage beyond text-structural deviation, as they begin to relate textual 
features to readers. It is but a short step further to describe (as we 
attempt to demonstrate in the next chapter) how this interaction changes 
readers’ schematic representations of the world (including schematic 
representations of texts and language). In a similar way, Jakobson's work 
on literary language provides an unrivalled descriptive framework, but 
fails - for reasons which can only be described as dogmatic - to take the 
next step, and describe the effect on readers, allowing for all the 
possible variations which that step involves. The formalists' and 
Jakobson's insistence on 'defamiliarization1 as an aspect of form alone 
restricted them. They describe the means of defamiliarization but not its 
result. Nevertheless, their descriptions of these means remain as potent 
as ever.
Our thesis is that schema theory provides a way of attempting at least 
a partial description of readers. The idea that certain discourses have a 
primary function of refreshing schemata reaffirms, in new and potentially 
more precise terms, the formalist concept of defamiliarization. It rescues 
the concept from some of its own internal contradictions and remedies its 
narrow focus. No-one, however, should belittle the genius of the original
concept of defamiliarization. It is more like the culmination of research
j ij+QrarTf lanffuajte. than an idea advanced into discourse, schemata and literary g 8
. . +>,„„ fields in this century had been before all the major work in the-=e
,„n+vor rase of cause and effect reversed. It undertaken. It is perhaps another
 ^ first like a conclusion based onis the genius of the idea that it came
evidence which had yet to be gathered.
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Votes to Chapter Bight.
1. As these analyses were carrier! r«,+. . 1 xv  ^ earned out m  the terms of SPGU. we shall
continue to use the terms ‘scripts*, -plans' and -goals' when referring to 
them, though we have suggested our own levels of schemata in 5.4.
2. Function is again used primarily in the sense of "effect on the 
receiver rather than "intention of the sender" (see also chapter one, note
3. Edwards and Middleton (1987) point out that Bartlett frequently uses 
conversation as evidence but fails to pay direct attention to conversation 
as a discourse type. The same could be said of Schank‘s use of jokes.
4. Though writing before Popper, he is, in his frank admission of this 
weakness, a model of Popperian rigour,
5. Here again we use the terms of SPGU, but this makes no difference to 
the point we are making, as what matters is the hierarchical arrangement.
6. This is our own example. Transportation in Schank's examples is 
invariably by rented car or aeroplane.
7. Bartlett's and Schank's choices of texts are perhaps significant. Some 
myths and jokes, like advertisements, serve to reinforce schemata rather 
than disrupt them. In EP (124-134) Schank deals at length with proverbs, 
which perform a similar function.
8. Or at least heard in private.
9. Recording can make listening to songs a private experience too.
10. In the modern world, we take reading to ourselves for granted. In 
antiquity it was not so. St. Augustine is reported to be the first person 
to have read silently to himself. For further comment on the effects of 
literacy on experience of discourse see Steiner (1972); Buchan (1972); 
Halliday (1985:xxiii-xxv); Ellis and Beattie (1986: 231, 248-249.)
11. Dostoevsky frequently appears to change view in mid-clause, often 
through the insertion of a parenthesis. This is an effect which can 
survive translation, as in the following:
The aged General Ivan Drozdov, a former friend and fellow-officer of the 
late General Stavrogin, a most worthy man (in his own way of course), a 
man we all know to be extremely stubborn and irritable.. (The Devils.
translated Magarshak : 38)
12. For discussion of ready-made units in language see Bollnger (1974) and
Cowie (1990). _ , ..
13. This comment assumes that connectionism is a psychological as well
as a computational theory. ___ . j . .
14. The series of US advertisements were shown in the BBC television
programme Saturday Night Clive in November 1989.
15. For discussion of an AI view of what makes discourse interesting, and 
the role of a reader's attention focus in processing, see Schank
(1982), Grosz (1986). as'nwi-w +l,a+
16. This information is in fact misleading. s Gore-Tex 
Taylor wears such a cheap perfume, an e p_c 5 Qote 
advertisement is not a picture of Rannoch attempting to limit their
17. Similar criticisms of the 1973:lxv- 
concerns to the textual level, were ^  lingulstics for isolating 
lxvii). Bakhtin also critic:ized■ a duallst view. In this, he 
language from its users and enc g g . fortv years, 
predates similar views in ® ^ ern ', on carnival culture of
18. Bakhtin's thesis, 'F. Rable v ™ biiShed as a book Rabelais and 
the Middle Ages was later expand , P orthodox Marxist-Leninist views his Vnrld [1965] 1968. While expressing orthodox na
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Church, Tts8chMpionSg o f f  +th6 R°man Catholic 
g "  authority caul! be interpreted allegorTalTy as Tcriticism&of
Chapter line.
Application of the theory: discourse deviation in three literary texts.
9.0 Introduction.
In the previous chapter, we have advanced a theory of discourse 
deviation and schema refreshment. The description has, however, been made 
in the most general terms. This generality is inevitable, both for reasons 
of quantity - the possible interconnections of formal features and 
schemata being virtually infinite - and for reasons of quality - the 
essential feature of discourse deviation being its defamiliarizing 
unpred ictab i1ity.
The theory, however, cannot remain so hypothetical. In this chapter, we 
shall apply it to three texts, hypothesizing about the relations between 
formal features and schemata. The overall effect of these relations is 
discourse deviation and their outcome is schema refreshment. These 
analyses are intended to show examples of the kinds of interconnection 
which may exist. They make no attempt to be exhaustive descriptions, 
either of discourse deviation or of the texts themselves.
The three texts chosen are all notorious as battlegrounds of 
interpretative disagreement. They have each been analysed many times 
over, according to the tenets of very different critical approaches. The 
disagreement is in our view an advantage. First of all it suggests the 
richness of the texts themselves, their ability to affect in different ways 
a wide variety of readers. Secondly.it provides an opportunity to contrast 
our way of reading with others we have described before.
The texts chosen are:
1) Tho Tvger by Villiam Blake,
2) The Turn nf tha Screw by Henry James,
3) Tho windhover, by Gerard Manley Hopkins.
In each of our interpretations, It is Important to emphasise the 
reader-dependency of interpretative schemata, of new schemata or schematic 
connections generated by the reading, and of Judgements of linguistic and
. , B B S  They hold true for one reader (the presenttext-structural deviation. mey ,_.
r. sB intuitive conscious access to schemata, writer) and assume successful
r j  wlll Droduce new readings. Nevertheless, it 
Differences among readers wil p
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seems likely that the readings here will hold true for other readers whose 
experience of language and the world is sufficiently similar.
9.1 TEIT SEVEI: The Tygcvr.
The text of the poem is as follows:
THE TYGER
Tyger! Tyger! burning bright 
In the forests of the night,
Vhat immortal hand or eye 
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?
In what distant deeps or skies 
Burnt the fire of thine eyes?
On what wings dare he aspire?
Vhat the hand dare seize the fire?
And what shoulder, & what art 
Could twist the sinews of thy heart?
And when thy heart began to beat,
Vhat dread hand? & what dread feet?
Vhat the hammer? what the chain?
In what furnace was thy brain?
Vhat the anvil? what dread grasp 
Dare its deadly terrors clasp?
Vhen the stars threw down their spears, 
And water’d heaven with their tears,
Did he smile his work to see?
Did he who made the Lamb make thee?
Tyger! Tyger! burning bright 
In the forests of the night,
Vhat immortal hand or eye,
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?
9.1.1 Earlier controversy.
In an eloquent plea for the reader-dependency of Interpretation and tie
Inability of any on. Interpretation to be absolute, Stanley Fish 0 M . 4 N .
has mockingly listed some of the rival Interpretations which this poem
v , + ripcades. Thus Raine (1954), adducinghas generated over the last fe
. j evidence, concluded that the tiger is Evil obscure cabbalistic writings in e
a decisive 'Jfo'. Hirsch (1964) in
and the answer to the final ques 
contrast saw the tiger as 'holineoo becau
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cs *°r a “s
verses, top. cit.t 247, ,„ot,d 'by FisT w l o i3“  >
Taking up this refrain, other critics have regarded the tiger as both good 
and evil; others still as beyond good and evil. Hobsbaum (1964) regarded 
the tiger as a mystery; Doxey (1970)', citing biographical evidence that 
Blake was apprenticed to an engraver who made engravings for astronomers, 
thought the tiger must be a stellar constellation. Stevenson (1969), in a 
New Critical vein2 decides that the tiger is the poem itself, and the 
answer to- the last question therefore 'the poet', Blake. Sardonically, Fish 
points to the foolish finality of all these readings, observing simply that 
they cannot all be true. Amusingly, he picks out the presence of some 
dogmatic phrase such as 'there is no doubt' in each reading, at exactly the 
point where the critic is being most speculative and presenting the 
critic's own view as a final truth, elevated above all others. Thus
"The answer to the question is beyond all possible doubt. No." (Hirsch) 
"There can be nn doubt that The Tvger ... is a poem that celebrates the 
holiness of tigerness." (Eaine)
"It is qn-ltp evident that the critics are not trying to understand the 
poem at all." (Hobsbaum)
(All quoted by Fish op.cit.: 340; our underlining.)
Ironically, and possibly self-consciously, Fish also uses such a phrase in 
pointing this out:
Whenever a critic prefaces an assertion with a phrase such as 
doubt' or 'there can be no doubt', you can be sure you are within hailing 
distance of the interpretative principles which produce the facts 
presents as obvious, (ibid.) (our underlining.)
Jokingly, he observes that the subject of the poem might as well be
interpreted as 'indigestion' caused by eating tiger meat instead
v- v jfno' in view is true only for one reader or lamb (op.cit. 348). Each reading in hi® view is> j
v o w *  values and interpretative strategies: an a group of readers who share values
.. T_ . senSe, all the interpretations above are interpretative community. In a sen ,
Thev all share a belief in the possibility those of one such community. They
of a single interpretation supported by evidence.
ahnve is from our point of view, Fish's attack on the readings listed .
more easily accepted than the attack he makes in anot er essay 
W t S L i  o» the W L W  U U *  ° f  * * •  *  EPSt,‘” "
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This is because Epstein makeQ 4-vmates use of the supposedly rigorous and
scientific approach to the language of the poem as text which we have so
far taken for granted in our approach to both discourse analysis and
literary theory. In contrast to Epstein's method, the other readings
listed above, seem from our point of view arbitrary and intuitive. Fish,
however, dismisses this linguistic approach for being quite as arbitrary
as any other: the reading of one more interpretative community, presented,
quite wrongly, as fact.
Epstein catalogues a number of deviant linguistic features, which in 
his view create the ambiguity of the poem and its power to generate so 
many rival interpretations (op.cit.:63-69). Thus he points to the 
uncertain grammatical analysis of a number of phrases in the poem. (We 
shall present Epstein's analyses using our own grammatical notation 
system.) In the first stanza, "burning bright", for example, may be read in 
three ways. "Bright" may be an adverb modifying the participial adjective 
“burning" which post-modifies the noun "tyger". This reading is equivalent 
to an analysis of the noun phrase as
(Tyger, tyger [ (who) (is burning) (brightly) ]).
Alternatively, by analogy with such phrases as 'boiling hot' and 'hopping 
mad', the word "bright" may be read as an adjective post-modifying the 
noun "tyger". The adjective is itself modified by the participle burning . 
In this reading the meaning is equivalent to
( (burning bright) tyger)
OK (Tyger, tyger [ (who) (is) (burning bright)])
A third, subtly different reading, is made by analogy with such clauses
SLo
•the candle was burning blue' and 'the moon was shining bright'
Here the candle/ moon is burning and becoming bright because of it. The 
verb phrases are, in Epstein's words, 'quasi-predicative':
(the tyger) (is burning) (bright)
A similar ambiguity exists in the phraoe.
(in (the forests (of (the night)))).
m m  -in" nay .lttar i M » s 4  1“*,8ral »“ * °f' *“
IS kydrogs« 1. water') or W * -  ,, trt I *  P-. ™
x TMa*‘h+M mav be read “to mean that the fish in the water'). "Forests of the night may
vj v ^nrcoeeps forests. Alternatively, by
tiger is burning in the night w c wnpfui
H  as 've of little faith', 'the knight of the woeful analogy with phrases such as y
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countenance’ or 'the lady of the lake-, it may be read to mean that the 
tiger is burning in the forests which have the quality of the night. The 
first reading might mean something like "in the thick tangled night", the 
second something like "in the dark forests". A combination of the 
threefold interpretation of "burning bright" with the double interpretation 
of the "forests of the night" yields six possible readings. In terms of 
discourse analysis we might add to this the observation that there is no 
disambiguating context for the poem.
Having made these linguistic points, Epstein continues to make a 
discoursal one (op,cit.:69-74). He explains the power and disturbing 
quality of the poem's questions by relating them to an analysis and 
typology of English questions, showing how the form of questions is 
dependent on the shared knowledge of questioner and answerer. 
Distinguishing 'yes/no' questions, which ask for an assertion of the truth 
of the whole proposition, from 'wh' questions, in which an interrogative 
word replaces the unknown element of the clause, he goes on to point out 
three levels of the latter category, distinguished by what he describes as 
the 'ignorance factor'. By way of exemplification he asks us to imagine 
the following dialogue:
Q1 Vhat do I press? PRIMARY QUESTION
AI The button.
Q2 Vhat button? SECONDARY QUESTION
A2 The red button.
Q3 Vhat red button? TERTIARY QUESTION
A3 The red button marked 'start'.
This sequence is a co-operative 'homing in' on the required information, 
the increasing specificity of the noun phrase gradually pin-pointing the 
required answer. (In this respect it is reminiscent of the given/new
structure of discourse described in 3.6.2.) The questions of The Iygsr
nf „ secondary and tertiary kind. They are, as Epstein observes, of a s y
+vp nrimarv sequence and a degree of disconcert because they assume the p
shared knowledge which the reader does not have
On what wings dare he aspire?
Vhat the hand dare seize the fir .
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More interesting than the immediate answers to these questions would be 
knowledge of the primary questions and answers from which they derive. 
More interesting still would be to know who is talking to whom.
9.1.2 Applying the theory.
Fish's attack on Epstein reflects an unfortunate parting of the ways 
between formal description of a literary text and a pluralist 
acknowledgement of reader variation. The two need not be mutually 
exclusive. Relatively stable formal features interacting with varying 
knowledge and preconceptions will yield as many valid interpretations as 
Fish could desire, In this section, we shall attempt to describe a 
possible interaction of the poem with a reader's schemata, and the way in 
which changes in these schemata may be effected through the poem's formal 
features. In this we shall, unlike Fish, accept the linguistic and 
pragmatic analysis of Epstein as valid for all speakers, but, unlike 
Epstein, we shall attempt to show some ways in which these features create 
interpretations. To do this we need first to speculate about the schemata 
evoked by the poem.
Vhat follows then is not an interpretation, in the literary critical 
sense, but a description of how such interpretations may be produced. 
Interpretations derive from the interaction of schematic predictions 
about language and text structure as well as the world - with the 
specific linguistic and text structure of this poem. Different 
interpretations derive from differences in schemata (or possibly from 
slight differences in text and language schemata-). The power of the poem 
lies in its openness to interpretation through different initial schematic 
assumptions. If, for example, we assume that many people, perhaps the 
majority, regard the poem as being in some way about cosmic creation and
destruction and the forces of good and evil, then in our judgement the
H L  widely different schemata of thesepoem will not exclude people with wiaeiy
differences in religious beliefs and forces and events, reflecting di
I E  stiv wav imply anything about Blake's knowledge. This does not in any way imp y y
n v KaH a vprv literal idGa of crGation, schemata. He might, for example, have had a very
believing that God made animals in the sky, but if so, neither this, nor 
aay other speolilc religious o p t i o n ,  Is so precisely present1., «ie 
poem that it would e,olude * reader with dliferedt sch.„ata .Pout
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creation. We might compare, for PTaimio ^example, the poem with the creed in the
Anglican  Book of Common Prayer, which contains such lin e s  as:
I believe in God the Father Almighty maker of heaven and earth and in 
Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord. ... 1 believe in ... the Holy 
Catholic* Church; "the Communion of Saints.
This statement is too explicit to be accommodated into Moslem, Jewish or 
atheist schemata, or even into the schemata of other Christian sects. 
This is not true of 'The Tyger'-V
9.1.3 A reader's interpreting schemata.
Let us postulate the following, scriptlike schemata ($S), and list under 
each $S name the words and phrases from the poem referring to defaults, 
and the relationship they have to the main concept. Words listed under 
each S$ are all 'headers in the text' in the sense used in 5.4. Following 
our decisions in 5.4 we no longer list default elements under each of the 
headings, as in Schank's description of scripts. The important feature of 
a scriptlike schema is only that it contains quite specific defaults. In 
the contents of the scriptlike schemata described below there is a 
dominance of qualities and attributes (IS) and actions (event). It is 
often shared attributes and actions which create a metaphoric link from 
one schema to another. Furnaces, stars and eyes are all bright. Spears 
and starlight both move fast and straight.
1. $S TIGER.
Props : Locations "forests".
HAS "heart", "sinews", "brain", "eyes .
tS EYES: ARE "bright".
IS "deadly", "fearful".
Results : "deadly terrors".
2. $S FORESTS.
Prop: HAS "tyger" .
IS dark .
3. $S NIGHT.
IS dark.
IS like "deeps".
Props: HAS "skies".
HAS "stars" UGHT: K0VBS.
IS "bright".
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4.SS BLACKSMITH .
Props: HAS/ MOVES "hand" -eye- "shoulders" "sinews".
Instruments: "hammer"."chain", "furnace", "anvil" "fire".
Events: "grasp", "beat", "clasp". $S F1RE 1 IS "brlght"'
Result: "work".
5. $S ARTIST .
Props: HAS/ MOVES "hand", "eye".
Results: "symmetry", "art", "work"
6. $S GOD.
IS "immortal", "dread", "fearful".
RESULTS: "deadly terrors".
TRACK: $S PAGAS GODS.
ARE "stars".
IISTAICE: Thor/ Zeus .
IS blacksmith (see $S BLACKSMITH). 
Prop: Instrument: bolts 
Event: throws .
SUB SCRIPT: Greek gods.
7. $S SPEAR THROWER.
Instrument: "spears".
Event: throws.
B. $S TEARS.
9.1.4 Plans and theses.
The above scriptlike schemata fall into two groups. The schemata for 
tigers, forests and night may each contain the other two (a case of double 
inclusion, see 5.4). This group, however, has no immediate connection to 
the remainder, the schemata for blacksmith, artist, God, spear thrower, 
tears. In terms of the higher-level schemata proposed in SPGU and DM we 
may suppose that, for many readers, these lower-level schemata associate 
with each other in various ways through a common plan or theme of a 
character, or of the reader. Thus schemata of a blacksmith, an artist and 
God all share the common theme of creation (and perhaps the use of fire), 
the tiger and certain manifestations of God share the theme of
destruction. Tiger, forests, the night, god and spenr throwers o n  .11 he
j the reader a theme of self-preservation,frightening and may invoke in
executed through a plan of escape.
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9.1.5 Schema connections
Each of the lower-level schemata will include elements which find no 
mention in the poem. (Blacksmiths work on horses for example). The 
contents evoked in the poem however yield a number of cross-references. 
Thus both the tiger and the blacksmith have sinews. The tiger's eyes are 
like fire, which a blacksmith uses, and, being points of light, like stars. 
Forests are dark like the night which contains stars which are associated 
with the gods. One of the gods (Zeus or Thor) was a blacksmith who threw 
thunderbolts. Starlight, which is part of the night, is like the throwing 
of spears. And so on.... The fact that some of these connections may be 
peculiar to this reader does not invalidate the principle of this kind of 
connection.
The overall effect of the poem then, is to bring together these 
schemata either by choosing elements which they already have in common, 
or through establishing new links between them. The result is the 
creation of a new and unique composite schema, drawing together elements 
of the original ones. (It is tempting to use the poem's own imagery of 
the forge - but this is perhaps too near to interpretation.)
This interweaving is not only, however, achieved through the choice of 
items shared by the different schemata, nor through their linear mixing, 
nor through the evocation of shared higher-level schemata (plans and 
goals) of either characters or readers. It is also effected through the 
use of ambiguous 'deviant' linguistic structures of the kind observed by 
Epstein, writing, we may observe, in the stylistics tradition which derives 
from the formal approach to literary language of Roman Jakobson (see 7.1). 
Thus, for example, the opening lines:
Tyger! Tyger! burning bright 
in the forests of the night.
bring together into a single noun phrase words which evote three
scriptlike schemata, and which can later be linked to a god and the
blacksslth. They also, through the tor.al ambiguities described by
Epstein, allow various hierarchical connections between those schemata.
Thus, if we read -in" as -within- ®  an Integral part of) we .a, regard
the tiger as part of *S FOREST or K  » * ■ »  ’>"* no*
+T-0»+ it as a separate schema. The two readings part of ("among") we may treat it as P* FORESTS or
of -forests of the night- will - M *  ***** »  *  * 
forests to be a part of $S SIGHT. The same hold-
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stanza. Here "the fire of thine eves" tB eyes allows fire to be part of eyes, or
eyes to be part of fire, and it is this second option which seems to be
taken up in the final line, where the image of a fire that may be seized
triggers $S BLACKSMITH. Vhether or not these comments hold true for a
significant number of readers, we might suppose that the kind of
Jakobsonian detail catalogued by Epstein effects some degree of schema
refreshment along these or similar lines.
Bor is this linking effected only through grammatical ambiguity or 
lexis shared by different schemata. Sound effects such as rhyme, 
alliteration assonance and consonance will create links between words 
which reinforce or contradict their semantic connections. Thus "bright" 
connects with "night", "frame" with "fearful", "skies" with "eyes" and so on.
9.1.6 The adjectival presence of God.
One strange feature of the poem, which might with reason be used 
against our analysis, is that there is no lexical item referring to three 
of the major scriptlike schemata we have proposed $S BLACKSMITH, $S 
ARTIST, $S GOD. The same is true of the script like schemata which depend 
on them: $S PAGAI GODS, $S SPEAR-THROVER. These are evoked, not by a 
lexical item referring directly to them, but by reference to elements of 
the schema. For example, "hammer", "furnace", "anvil" evoke $S BLACKSMITH. 
In the case of SS GOD the evocation is even less direct, effected through 
adjectives which commonly collocate with God: "immortal", "dread", "fearful" 
and effects which God produces "deadly terrors". The dependent schemata 
are evoked through association with other schemata: Thor/ Zeus was a 
blacksmith, using an anvil, associated with the stars from which he threw
spears/bolts.
This merely implied presence need not however weaken our claim for the
v /t+ was in any case never an absolute claimvalidity of these schemata. <It was in any
but supposed true for certain readers.) Tie absence of a word referring
to these scripts as a whole »lght be taken as leaving their contents
M m w M m  In addition their presence through floating free for recombination.
ill and more mysterious. Again, we
implication makes them both mor p , .ixrc^ c "fchouffh this time of itsmay make use of Epstein's stylistics ana y ,
J acnects Just as the use ofpragmatic rather than its linguistic aspec .
I the primary questions from whichsecondary and tertiary questions makes the pri y 4
« „„0,fioner and questioned, more remote, so 
they derive, and the identity o q
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too cLogs this evocation of ■Dartc n-f j. ....P of schemata without reference to their
unifying concept. It is this vagueness which gives the poem the power to 
yield many interpretations, and which underlines the uncertainty and 
reader-dependency of the schemata we have tentatively advanced.
9.1.7 Text structure and text schemata.
For speakers of a given language, textual schemata are perhaps more 
reader variable than either (world) schemata or language schemata. They 
depend very much upon experience of other texts, and this, we hypothesize, 
is more likely to vary between individuals than experience of the world or 
of the language. A given text, for example, may appear highly unoriginal 
to a particular individual but highly original to another, if the former 
has experience of other texts with the same structure, while the latter 
has no such experience.
The Tyger is no exception to these general principles. It is one of a 
series of poems, the Songs of Innocence and Experience, and also a poem 
which is (like many advertisements) presented together with a picture. To 
a reader who knows the series of poems, or the picture, its meaning will 
be effected by interaction. Arguably, this effect on meaning is part of 
its text structure, for the poem itself is part of a larger whole, and 
takes on meaning through its relation to other parts of that whole.
The poem may also take on meaning through its relation to other known
and relevant text structures. It is presented as a 'song', and its
structure may be compared to that of a song. Its first and last stanzas,
through their repetitions, are like refrains, and they frame the
intermediate stanzas in way which is often found in ballads (Buchan
1972:chapters 6-8). The questions too are also 'ballad like1. (Another
possible parallel is with the unanswered questions of The Boofc Qi Iflk
(Epstein 1975:63).) Here however, we cannot examine the text structural
level in isolation from the language level. For the questioning is
conveyed by the interrogative clause structure. The refrain is not exactly
a refrain: "Could" has become "Dare". Significantly, this difference
between first and last stanzas, was made by Blake at a late stage in the
ri962] 1986:2489-2490). If it isdrafting of the poem (Abram
-l<5 a relevant text structure, then significant, and if the ballad or song is a
+n nreeise linguistic choice would It Is worth noting that such attention to precise ling
x w  ^Hadeer in a pre-literate culture. In such a not be available to the ballad
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tradition, despite modern assumptions ahnu+ , -^ DS about verbatim memory, the words
were most likely never repeated „j epeaxea exactly (Ellis and Beatty 1986:248-251;
see also discussion in 8.4 above). There is a tension between Blake's use
of features of song and ballad form and his precise attention to
linguistic detail, evidenced by a comparison of the final and earlier
drafts. The ballad form was a genre whose social status diminished with
the coming of literacy. As a pre-literate genre at a time on the verge of
an explosion of literacy it was also doomed to change and die (Buchan
1972). Blake both exploits the form, changes it and elevates it6. It is a
classic case of the formalist device 'canonization of the Junior branch’.
It is genre defamiliarization.
Thus we hypothesize that for certain readers a text schema is evoked 
for ballad or song. By varying the refrain and leaving questions 
unanswered the poem deviates from the expectations created by this schema. 
This schema is thus refreshed. The deviation at text-structural level in 
turn suggests or points to deviation at the level of (world) schemata. We 
might even suggest that if some new (world) schemata have come into being 
through the first five stanzas in ways which we have been at pains to 
describe above then the virtual repetition of the first stanza may 
highlight how the schemata it evoked the first time round have radically
changed by the time it recurs.
Paradoxically, the above comments, while they may have been true of 
readings by Blake's contemporaries, or of literature specialists today, are 
not likely to hold true for the majority of readers. Blake's poetry - and 
this poem in particular - is so widely anthologized and known that it has 
itself become a model, a stereotype and a source of a text-structural 
schema. By contrast, the ballads and the Book of Job are less well known. 
The poem's ability to defamiliarize through evoking and departing from 
text-structural expectations is thus weakened - if not destroyed. This 
only illustrates a degree of reader dependency in discourse deviation. To 
some extent, it is at the mercy of reader variation.
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9.2 TEIT EIGHT: lire Turn nf the fir™- Introduction.
Superficially, Henry James' novella The Turn nf the Srrew and Vllllam 
Blake's The Tyger are very different kinds of text. The former is an 
extended piece of narrative prose, whose grammar, though elaborate, could 
be described as 'non-deviant', while the latter is a short lyric poem, in 
rhymed rhythmic verse, containing linguistic deviations of the kind 
outlined in 9,1.1. In Bakhtinian terms, the former has the many narrative 
voices of the novel, the latter the single narrative voice of the short 
lyric poem. Despite these differences they are both classed as literary, 
both are widely read and studied, and both have attracted a great deal of 
critical attention, resulting in bitter dispute and widely different 
interpretation. These differences of form, and similarities of response, 
make them a useful contrast from our point of view. In our analysis, they 
are both instances of discourse deviation, though the schemata they 
'refresh* and the formal means they use to effect this are rather different 
(though not perhaps so different as might at first appear).
9.2.1 Skaz and schemata.
It is a truism that any author who opts for an exclusively first person 
narrative accepts the inevitable limitation of the single point of view. 
Within the terms of the fiction, no events can be related which are not 
known, either first or second hand, to the narrator. Yet the first person 
narrative also involves an unstated contract with the reader: that the 
story-teller will, in Gricean terms, be co-operative: clear, true, relevant 
and as brief as necessary (see 3.2.1). Departure from this contract is 
perceived as 'deviant' and defamiliarizing. The obscurity of narratives 
such as those in Beckett's trilogy is viewed as remarkable. The same 
deviation is perceived when narrators' assumptions and knowledge lead them 
to state the obvious at great and defamiliarizing length. This is the 
point made in Shklovsky's formalist analysis of Tolstoy's story 
(Shklovsky [19171 1965), where the narrator is a horse who explains as
I V inQtitutions and behaviour already coated withnew the nature of human institu ,
3  armour j  I *  a - ® * -  «- to*“  ‘S“ 1°7S*7
lOTtM. see 6.3,. <Oth,r 1— * >“ ” *■", h00n cited in 6.3.5 above.) Above all,
defamiliarizing effect have a re , ^
world, the narrator is assumedperhaps, within the fictional
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truthful. Though a fictional world is n-f h+o18 of its nature m  one sense untrue,
nevertheless it is possible for a narrator to tell untruths within that 
world, to withold a fact, mislead or give contradictory reports (Short 
1989). That is why Agatha Christie’s The Murder nf Rno-ar ArVrnyri (a 
detective story whose first person narrator does not confide in the reader 
that he is the murderer) has such a defamiliarizing effect: it makes us 
examine again our schematic assumptions about the reliability of 
narrators. We assume that the narrator has told us not only the truth, but 
the whole truth. (Again we are here generalizing from our own response in 
the belief that it is shared by others.)
In general, this reliability of narrators is overruled only where the 
demands of the co-operative principle are outweighed by those of the 
politeness principle (cf 3.2.2), in particular when narrators feel it 
incumbent upon them to be modest and withhold information concerning, for 
example, their own attractiveness or honesty. In this case, however, the 
reader may resort to the view of other characters expressed within the 
narrative. A good example of this is Hick Carraway, the narrator of 
Great Gatsbv. who, though extremely self-depreciating, has his reliability 
established by the confidence he evokes in both Gatsby and Daisy, and his 
attractiveness attested by the attentions of Jordan Baker. This is a kind 
of parallax, the fixing of an object by observation from two points of 
view at once: a relativist scientific notion significantly mused upon at 
length by Bloom in Joyce's Ulysses6- Where the narrating voice is to be 
doubted, we resort to that of a character. In a first person narrative, 
this is of course an illusion, because the evidence for the apparently 
withheld truth is in fact presented by the voice which appears to withhold 
it. It is, however, a convention which works. Information is also 
withheld to create suspense, though in this case, the deprivation is only 
temporary. A more difficult kind of unreliable narrative is that of the
- cnurce of truth, is yet untrustworthy,person who, while being our only
x narrators in literature, some of whom weThere are many examples of such
a ThP first narrator in the The Sound and— tli£ have already mentioned. The nr
IlL-ow deficient, another narrator in the same Fury, for example, is mentally
V L  J  Ruslan, is told by an aggressive and violent
novel is a racist. j. ,•„+ nf wHew - very common among guard dog. From a certain sexist point of view v y
I nf the maln part Of Ite-Tnrn nf the Seres, being a
readers - the narrator of th , , narrators'■ia in this category of unreliable narrators.
young and unmarried woman,
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Yet the reader who does hot totally question her reliability (and therefor, 
her representation oi other characters,, relj t0 s0„ 6 upon
parallax: the viewpoints of other characters,
The Turn ..Of the Screw is a concentric narrative of the kind analysed in
6.4.2 above. As such, for many readers, it conforms to a known text 
schema and sets up certain expectations. The degree of embedding - the 
number of narratives within narratives - is, however, unusual, The book is 
written by Henry James but adopts a first person narrative 'I' (though he 
begins, significantly, by talking about ‘us’: a group of people assembled 
together on Christmas Eve). Within this narrative is a further narrator 
'Douglas' who gives an account of how he came by the journal of a young 
woman. This journal is then presented in its entirity, and forms by far 
the greater part of the novella - 114 pages of 121 in the Penguin edition. 
Within the first person narrative of the journal, are the narratives of 
other characters. Miles, the little boy, gives an account of his school; 
Mrs Grose, the housekeeper, relates various facts and opinions of her own. 
(This structure is presented diagrammatically in figure 32.) The novella 
finishes with the end of the journal. There is no return to the narrative 
of 'Douglas' nor the 'I' of the opening pages. In this respect it is the 
same kind of incomplete concentric narrative as Notes from the Dead House 
(see 1.4.2).
The journal itself is the young woman's account of how she was 
employed by a "person ... in Harley Street" (p.ll7) to act as governess for 
his two children, Miles and Flora. The governess recounts how she became 
aware of the presence in the house of the ghosts of two servants, Quint 
and Miss Jessel, how the children were also aware of their presence, and 
indeed possessed by them. The governess tells of her struggle with the 
ghosts for possession of the children and of her efforts to convince the 
housekeeper Mrs. Grose of the ghosts' existence. The story ends with the 
death by heart failure of the boy Miles in his governess' arms as she
struggles to persuade him not to look at the ghost of Qui
In addition to being, quite literally, a number of voices inside other
voices, each layer of the narrative differs in discourse type and medium
_ - t + i a  iournal inside a ghost storyfrom the layer above and below. -
inside a hovel. As such it is writing P ^ t e d  through speech press. ed 
through wrltihg. Moreover, and slgnlilca.tly 1. ter.s oi
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preconceptions of many readers, it is the voice of an emotional and hasty 
young woman inside that of a reticent and serious middle-aged man.
novel
ghost story 
journal 
speech (of characters)
medium:
WRITING
SPEECH
WRITING
SPEECH
EQicg,: pronoun used
author/narrator 'we'/ *f< 
man 'I'
woman *§*
characters 'we'
Table 8: Layers of narrative in The Turn nf tho
a person in Harley Street
Mrs Grose "the half dozen 
maids and men"
JamesI
■I'
unnamed governess
Figure 32: narrators and characters in The Turn of the Screw.
9.2.2 The hearsay principle.
lt The Tvp-er. has attracted a good deal of
critical controversy. Rival Interpretations centre mostly, with a quite 
startling naivety. on the question of whether the ghosts esist! Edmund 
VIIson ([19341 I960), for eaample, with dogmatic certainty, expounded an 
argument, citing various pieces of evidence fro. her narrative, that the 
governess 1, suffering fro, a neurosis inspired by the suppression o her
sexual feelings towards her eaployer, that the ghosts are a flgaent of her
.v of the children her doing. Forty years later,imagination and the death of to refute the argument detail by Sheppard (1974) is at passionate pains to B
v are real and the children evil. Thedetail, insisting that the ghosts
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fifteen studies in Villen's (I960) anthology of critical essays on the 
story, and the twenty one in Scura's (1979) anthology, almost all debate 
the issue in the same terms. Quite apart from the primitive assumption of 
the reality of the fictional world, such readings ignore the embedded 
narrative structure, and the consequent uncertainty created by the 
interplay of levels: an interplay which makes the interpretation doubtful 
even if we treat this fictional world as real (which it is not). Just as 
the linguistic structure of The Tyger prevents a decisive interpretation, 
so does the text structure of The Turn of the Screw (Culler 1975b:137). 
Such a view is perhaps reflected - though the author's view carries no 
more authority than any other - in James' own frequently quoted 
description of the work as an "irresponsible little fiction.... a piece of 
ingenuity pure and simple" (Sheppard 1974 5).
The futility of attempts to give a definitive judgement on the truth of 
the embedded narrative is a result of what we shall call 'the hearsay 
principle'. This we explain by analogy with the approach to the truth of 
narratives in court. It is a well-known legal principle that while a 
witness is bound to tell the truth, on pain of prosecution for perjury, 
that witness’s evidence about somebody else's evidence is unreliable, even 
if the witness believes it to be true. It is hearsay evidence and 
inadmissible. The witness may be honestly reporting the account he or she 
heard, but that account may itself have been untrue. If this is so at one 
remove, for every further remove the uncertainty increases. In The Turn Qi 
the Screw we have a narrative inside a narrative inside a narrative inside 
a narrative: evidence about evidence about evidence about evidence. At so 
far a remove, even if we treat the account as one of fact instead of 
fiction, it is quite impossible to be sure of anything. The reliability of 
any one narrator in the chain may be undermined by the unreliability of 
any other. For the story to be true, it must be true at every level.
Hat in this insubstantial quicksand of Ironically, many readers may feel that m  xnis
L  0  that of the character Mrs. Grose thevoices, the most reliable voice i=»
+ rclain clean wholesome woman" (p.15): a down-housekeeper, a "stout simple plain nerson whose views are to t>eto-earth, matter-of-factual* common
thP self-indulgent, more impressionable trusted far more than those of the sen a
a hv her own romantic readings and preconceptions . governess, influenced by her
x theory such readers might say that the(In the terms of schema theory, in an olu House Dy v her to expect ghosts mgoverness s schemata lead ne
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default.) Reliance on Mrs. Groses vuiuses testimony, however, quite inverts the
removes of the narrative. For her voice exists only within and through 
the voice of the governess. Everything she says is hearsay at the 
furthest remove. The most reliable voice, and the one we can hold most 
accountable, must be the closest to us. Our Judgement should rely most 
heavily on the outer narrative, the 'I* with which the novel opens, 
speaking confidently for ‘us1, or - if he is unavailable - perhaps 
■Douglas'. (Interestingly, in Vutherlng Hpipht.g a similarly
stereotypically reliable housekeeper is to be found in one of the outer
levels.) Yet the end of Xhs— lum_of the Screw offers no return voyage
back through the circles of this narrative solar system. The tale 
finishes abruptly with the death of Miles. Ve are offered neither the 
opinion of the narrator, nor Douglas - nor even of Mrs. Grose.
9.2.3 The Turn of the Screw as discourse deviation.
In our view, for the reasons outlined above, there can be no solution to 
the problem of the veracity or sanity of the governess’ narration. Like 
The Tvger it is the form of the text which, in interaction with reader 
schemata, will create differing interpretations. And as in The Tyger., it 
is a form which may interact with widely different schemata, causing their 
disruption and refreshment. (As always we preserve the tentative modal 
‘may’, for who knows how frozen and familiar any text may become for us 
or future readers.) The defamiliarizing effect of The Turn ol the Screw is 
far more a question of the interplay of (world) schemata with text 
schemata and the skaz of the various narrators, than is the case in Lhe 
Tvger where deviation relies far more on lexical combinations and 
grammatically ambiguous sub-sentential structures. Th* Turn ai the Serea. 
leads to the disruption of schemata about the very act of story-telling
itself.
Let US hypothesize that It, reading Till' Turn nf the S e w  a n»„ber of
, . ji-I h(? activated, from the very inception of relevant processing schemata will
n that schemata activated in thethe framing narrative. (It may well be that scnem
to persist throughout.) The bookopening of a discourse have a tenden y
b6gillS‘ I +hfl flrei sufficiently breathless, but
The story had held us, round hjt some( as> on Christmas eve in 
except the obvious remark t essentially be, I remember no
an old house, a strange ta  ^ that, it was the only case
comment
ie suu W
uttered till somebody happened to say
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he had met in which such a visitation had fallen on a child. The case,
^  °f an aPPari'tion in Just such an old house as 
®-, h . °T e °ccasion - an appearance, of a dreadful kind, to 
a little boy sleeping in the room with his mother and waking her up in 
the terror of it; waking her not to dissipate his dread and soothe him
0 s eep aga n, u to encounter also, herself, before she had succeeded 
in doing so, the same sight that had shaken him. It was this 
observation that drew from Douglas - not immediately, but later in the 
evening - a reply that had the interesting consequence to which I call 
attention. Someone else told a story not particularly effective, which I 
saw he was not following. This I took for a sign that he had himself 
something to produce and that we should only have to wait. Ve waited 
in fact till two nights later; but that same evening, before we 
scattered, he brought out what was on his mind. <[1898] 1969: 7)
Let us suppose that this opening activates schemata (among others) 
concerning: Ghost stories, Ghosts, Narrations, Men. The following pages 
relate how Douglas goes on to produce the Journal of the young woman, 
which he then reads to the assembled company. (Bear in mind that the 
fact that Douglas' 'tale' is written may - though not necessarily - make it 
seem more reliable as a true account of the governess' words than a mere 
verbal report. Note also that the initial use of 'we' in the outer 
narrative suggests plurality and consensus, contrasting with the singular 
and correspondingly isolated 'I' of the Journal. The fact that there are 
two children, leads to a further contrast of 'I' and 'we'.) The Journal 
begins:
1 remember the whole beginning as a succession of flights and drops, a 
little see-saw of the right throbs and the wrong. After rising, in town, 
to meet his appeal, I had at all events a couple of very bad days - 
found myself doubtful again, felt indeed sure I had made a mistake. In 
this state of mind I spent the long hours of bumping, swinging coach 
that carried me to the stopping-place at which 1 ”as be mf  ^  da 
vehicle from the house. This convenience, I was told, had been order
which I had sunk. I suppose I had ^pected or n 1969:14)
so melancholy that what greeted me was a good surprise.
ar+ivates schemata concerning: Journals,Let us suppose that this opening i_r.jTr9i bv a vouns woman at a countryGovernesses/Young Vomen, Summer.
v horived from the conventions of the
house may also evoke text sc em course, . ovnved and their contents will of course
Gothic novel®. The schemata > those listed
i But supposing that those listedvary considerably between individuals.
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here are posdble, indeed likely, we may observe that they fall into three 
main categories: schemata about the world and schemata about narrators 
and schemata about discourse types. (Ve shall refer to schemata about 
discourse type as text schemata-; we shall also, in what follows, treat 
schemata about narrators as world schemata.) There are also schematic 
connections between the categories: ghost stories are told on Christmas 
Eve for example. Relevant schemata are:
(Vorld) schemata:
SS GHOSTS (relevant plans: TT R/C SEEK EVIDENCE)
$S CHRISTMAS EVE (relevant plan : TT A/C ENTERTAIN)
$S SUMMER
$S MEN (relevant plans: TI C JUDGE, II C ADVISE)
$S GOVERNESS (relevant plans: IT C PROTECT CHILDREN, IT C PERFORM DUTY)
Text schemata:
$S GHOST STORIES (realizing plans : TT ENTERTAIN, IT FRIGHTEN)
$S NARRATION (realizing plans : TT INFORM/ TT ENTERTAIN)
$S JOURNALS (realizing plans : TT REMIND/ TT RECORD FACT)
Within this framework the potential for interplay, contradiction and 
variation is quite immense. The contents of a (World) schema $S GHOSTS, 
for example, varies widely. For some people, who do not believe in ghosts, 
$S GHOSTS can only exist as part of $S GHOST STORIES. Gender stereotypes 
cause similar divergence. For some people $S YOUNG WOMAN will contain 
such default attributes as •unreliable1, •romantic1, -credulous1, and $S MAN 
will contain their opposites. Other people will not share these
preconceptions.
Each schema about narrators and discourse types will contain a default 
attribution of reliability. The combination of schemata in The Turn 0i thfi 
fin™, however, leads to contradiction: writing is more reliable than 
speech - but journals are more reliable than ghost stories - but middle- 
aged men are often considered more reliable than young women.
Knowledge ol what types of evidence ere reliable Is of crucial
,. , , i Tn raii assumptions into question is to importance to an individual. To c
, i r.-tve>n the particular combinationsundermine the basis of all knwoledg .
* +>,o crrew it is quite simply impossible of these elements in The Turn nf the Screw.
to E J  all the relevant schema Intact. One or another be
wrong, li the Journal Is .ore reliable than the ghost story, then
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DISCOURSE TYPE:
Governess^
journal R+NARRATOR: young woman R-MEDIUM: writing R+TEXT SCHEMA : inner narrative R-GOAL: truth R+
WORLD : ghosts exist OR
(R+ = a schema default of reliability;
R- = a schema default of unreliability.)
Dauglas
ghost story R- 
middle aged man R+
speech r-
outer narrative R+
entertainment R-
ghosts don't exist
Table 9: Reliability associated with schemata.
young woman is more reliable than the man. Let us look at the 
contradictions which exist between the pointers to reliability in Douglas' 
narrative and the governess's narrative as set out in table 9 .
One relatively simple effect of this is to disrupt schemata attributing 
unreliability to young women or non-existence to ghosts. Readers have to 
choose between world and textual schemata. (Edmund Wilson, revealing more 
about himself and his time than the story, chose to treat the telling of a 
ghost story as fact and a journal as untrue, but preserve a schema in 
which young women are unreliable.) The doubt resulting from the 
irreconcilable demands of different schemata might perhaps be referred 
finally to the authoi— ity of the author (the pun is significant) or the 
parallax views of characters, especially Mrs Grose. It is the story's 
refusal to conform to the text schema for concentric narratives, setting 
up an expectation that doubt will be resolved through a return to the 
outer narrative, which makes schema disruption inevitable and irresolvable. 
Figure 33 attempts to describe the relationships between schemata and the 
inevitable circularity of a reader's attempts to solve the question of
whether the ghosts exist.
In T>“» Turn nf the Sere* world schemata and text schemata are in a
dynamic interaction. Each disrupts the other. The only way to solve the 
problem is to change one set of schemata or another. Without this
, the oroblem must remain unsolved: andrefreshment of existing schemata, t p
v __ -fnr it is surely a default of a puzzle, that too would violate a schema,
. JHcmnrse is the totality of text and that it must have a solution. A
f L J f i J  station, this #■ * * * *  "°r* * * *  “
described as discourse deviation tban for.al deviation.
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FIGURE 33: INTERACTION OP A READERS r w~*i ii~ m  n t  n ■ k
SCHEMATA IN THE TURN OF THE SCREW
S *  R OUTER
NARRATOR
IS MORE RELIABLE
A/C ENTERTAIN
S * R JOURNAL 
IS RELIABLE 
IS FACTUAL 
HAS
CHARACTERS
S * GHOST STORY 
IS UNRELIABLE 
IS ENTERTAINING 
HAS CHARACTERS
$ S CONCENTRIC 
NARRATIVE
Nol 
Avails Ible \ 
NoVv 
\ Availabl
S  S R
CONTRADICTIONf ] R  WAIT FOR ENO
[""] R CONSULT AUTHOR/ 
NARRATOR reliable
^NatveLReadinga
SC R  MIDDLE S S R GOVERNESS
AGED MAN IS YOUNGER
INSTANCE 'DOUGLAS" IS INDECISIVE
IS OLDER IS MOODY
IS RETICENT HAS
HAS 0  C PROTECT
PI C ENTERTAIN CHILDREN
B C HAVE 
ADVENTURE 
(” | C WRITE 
JOURNAL
f l  R ASSESS 
FACTS
FI R ASSESS 
NARRATORS
[ I  R SEEK EVIDENCE
9  R BE ENTERTAINED
S S CHRISTMAS
EYE______
TRACK 1 
S S GHOSTS AE
S S SUMMER
TRACK 2
* S GHOSTS AS FACT
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9.3. TBIT JUTE: The VindWoy
The Windhover 
To Christ our Lord
I CAUGHT this morning morning's minion, king- dine
dom of daylight's dauphin, dapple-dawn-drawn Falcon, in 
his riding
Of the rolling level underneath him steady air, and striding 
High there, how he rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing 
In his ecstasy! then off, off forth on swing, 5
As a skate's heel sweeps smooth on a bow-bend: the hurl and 
gliding
Rebuffed the big wind. My heart in hiding 
Stirred for a bird,- the achieve of, the mastery of the thing!
Brute beauty and valour and act, oh, air, pride, plume, here
Buckle! AND the fire that breaks from thee then, a billion 10
Times told lovelier, more dangerous, 0 my chevalier!
No wonder of it: sh6er plod makes plough down sillion 
Shine, and blue-bleak embers, ah my dear,
Fall, gall themselves, and gash gold-vermillion. 14
Like Thp Tyger and The Turn of the_ScrfiSL, this poem has attracted
considerable critical attention and controversy. Dunne <1976) lists 
seventy-three studies devoted exclusively to this poem, and it figures 
prominently in general works on Hopkins. Most studies, however, are 
mostly concerned with meaning, interpretation and the relationship of the 
poem to Hopkins' other works, or to his ideas, rather than upon linguistic 
detail <an exception is Milroy 1977: 210-213). Our own analysis 
concentrates upon the interaction of the grammar and lexis of the poem 
with a reader's interpretative schemata, and a consequent effect of schema
change.
9.3.1 A reader's schemata for The Windhover-
that this poem triggers scriptlike schemata Let us suppose that tms Fuejil 00
I r ' f f  n “ rut, morning, » knight, . f.l=o», . skater, firs ploughing.
These D  to be th. most prominent schemata In onr o„. rending of the
, Q +he assumption that such schemata are likely poem, and as before, we make th P ,, wlth a similar cultural background, to be similar to those of readers wit*
i - elements in these schemata, quoting words
Below we suggest some defaul featuresf,' these elements. The assignment of features
from the poem corresponding
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to these si* schemata is Justified the dlscusslou which follows, is i,
Tte IyBBr tiere are a Iar8® number of connections between schemata
through props, attributes and result* tw, v,results they have in common. These
connections are indicated by cross references "see $S X".
$S CHRIST
Header in text: "To Christ our Lord"
IS eldest son, like "dauphin" (see $S KNIGHT)
IS like "dawn" (see $S MORNING)
IS a champion like "chevalier" (see $S KNIGHT)
Events: rose in the "morning" (see S$ MORNING) 
talks of a "kingdom" 
sheds "gall" and blood from "gash"
Results: "kingdom", "ecstasy", "mastery" (see $S KNIGHT), "beauty" (see S$ 
CHRIST)
$S MORNING
Header in text: "this morning/ morning's"
IS "dapple"
Events: "dawn"
Results: "daylight"
$S KNIGHT
Instance: dauphin (eldest son like Christ: see $S CHRIST)
: "chevalier"
IS a "minion"
Props: Location: "kingdom"
"drawn" sword, "plume", "falcon" (see $S FALCON)
Events: "riding"."striding", "rung upon the rein"
HAS: "mastery", "valour", "pride"
Results: "gash"
$S FALCON:
Header in text: "Windhover", "Falcon"
Props: Location "air"
IS »high""W "nf  bird" " a thing", "brute"” , "blue-bleak" "gold-vermillion—  
HAS "plume"
Events: -gliding", ,3 OKHT> 1S SKATER)
Results: "mastery", "beauty" see ($S CHRlbl, **>
$S SKATER
Events: "sweeps smooth on a bow bend 
$S FIRE
Results: "embers"
ARE "blue-bleak" . s$ FALCON) like "gash" (see $S KNIGHT,Events: glow "gold-vermillion (see
$S CHRIST)
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$S PLOUGHING
Props: "plough", "sillion" ' 3 
Events "sheer plod"
Results “plough down sillion shine"
These schemata may well, before the reading of the poem, be relatively 
unconnected. Interpretation will be a relationship between them 
established in the reader. One interpretation, for example, (influenced 
by knowledge of Hopkins* religious beliefs) is that the ecstasy caused in 
the narrator by the beauty of the bird gives way to a control over that 
beauty, a submission to the will of Christ, echoing the control of the bird 
over its element, air (metaphorically expressed as the control of a 
knightly rider over a horse), and an acknowledgement of a higher authority 
(again expressed metaphorically through the knight, though this time 
referring to his subservient position in the kingdom, as "minion" and 
"dauphin"). This is the reading which we shall describe here, not in the 
belief that it is an only reading, but in illustration of possible 
interactions between linguistic features and schematic representations. 
The poem foregrounds elements which the schemata we have detailed have in 
common, thus drawing the different schemata together. Christ, like the 
knight and the falcon and potentially the narrator, has mastery. Like the 
knight and potentially the narrator, he submits to a higher authority.
Ve hope to show that, significantly, these scriptlike schemata also 
relate through highei— level schemata: life themes of appreciating beauty 
and serving Christ. flew connections effect in the narrator (in this 
interpretation) a change of the plans which execute these themes, changing 
them from plans of passive contemplation to plans of work and control. 
The narrator is no longer content to be mastered by natural beauty, but 
must master it as a sign of obedience to a higher authority. These 
changes are expressed through lower- level associations between schemata 
suggested by lexical and grammatical deviation and ambiguity, 
interest must be in how these different schemata are brought together and 
how the change of plan is reflected in the process of the poem. As it 
develops, the poem appears to change the high level schemata which give it
coherence.
Ve shall consider relevant high-level schemata to be:
<-«#» 1517 vaqttiIJTiD BY BEAUTY j 0 MASTER BEAUTY THEMES: 0 SERVE CHRIST ; 0 BE MASTERED
PLANS: II REJECT BEAUTY; IT VORK HARD; TT ATTAIN CONTROL
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9.3.2 Phonological and graphological features.
The Vlmttowr, unlike ls highly ldlosyncratlc at 6very
linguistic level: in Hopkins' own words "original, counter, spare, 
strange"1*. The rhythm, line lengths and line breaks are unorthodox and 
though there is a rhyme scheme, the grammatical unit at the end of which 
the rhyme occurs is constantly changing1B. There is also marked use of 
graphological devices, notably capitalization of whole words, hyphenation 
and stress marks. These, it might be argued are only present when the 
poem is experienced visually. On the other hand they are clues to stress 
and emphasis.
As we have said, our major concern will be with the connections between 
the grammatical features of the poem and changes in the schemata of a 
reader. Nevertheless, with a poem of such marked phonological and 
graphological structure, and with such a marked relation between this 
structure and the grammar, it would clearly be foolish to leave this 
aspect of the poem out of account. For this reason, we have described it 
in detail above, and will refer to it where necessary in the following 
analysis.
The rhythm of the poem is represented below. Stressed syllables are 
capitalized. In table 10 the overall rhythm is represented line by line 
with +s (stressed syllables) and -s (unstressed syllables). Table 11 
lists some overall patterns.
i CAUGHT this MORning MORning's MINion, KING-
dom of DAY light's DAUphin, DApple-DAVN-DRAVN FALcon, in
Of the ROlling LEvel underNEATH him STEAdy AIR, and STRIding
HIGH there, how he RUNG upon the REIN of a WIMpling WING
In his Ecstasy! «pi OFF, hurl and
As a SKATE'S HEEL sweeps SMOOTH on a buw
GLIding j T1TJ.
ReBUFFed the BIG WIND. My HEART HfcWJng
STIRRed for a BIRD, -the achlEVE of, the MAStery of the
BRUTE BEAUty and VAlour and ACT, oh, AIR, g^^on
BUckle! and the FIRE that BREAKS from thee THBI^a
TIMES told LOvelier, more DANgerous, y
,o  voider =f It: SHEER ■  SIU1°"
SHIHE, and BLUB-bleai EUtos JB my ^  ^
FALL, GALL themSELves, and GASH GULU v
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Table 10: stress patterns in
line syllables stresses i
1 10 5
2 16 7
3 16 6
4 14 5
5 11 5
6 15 7
7 10 5
8 9 or 10 5
9 14 8
10 13 5
11 13 or 14 5
12 12 or 13 5
13 9 5
14 10 6
Table 11: orthographic
ellision rhyme:
disrupting
word
phrase
clause
clause
clause
clause
clause
NOSE
clause
phrase
NONE
clause
clause
NONE
A
B
B
A
A
B
B
A
C
D
C
1
C
D
graphological
features:
capitalized word 
/word break 
word break/hyphens 
capital
capitalized word 
stress marks
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9.3.3 The Yindhnvpr as discourse deviation.
It is not intended, nor is
P ble, to give an exhaustive account of 
all the linguistic features of this poem ^  nay ^  ^  ^
disruption and refreshment of the schemata we have hypothesized, or of any 
others. This poem is so rich and so complex that such an attempt could 
take up another thesis, while still aot doing full Justice to the poem's 
potential to mean. Of necessity we shall select a small number of 
linguistic features and speculate on their effect upon reading. Ve shall 
concentrate most of our attention upon the opening lines. One possible 
grammatical analysis of these lines is
[ (I) (CAUGHT) (this morning) < (morning's minion) (king-dom of daylight's 
dauphin) ([dapple-dawn-drawn] Falcon (in (his riding (Of (the rolling 
level underneath him steady air))))) and [[(striding) (High) (there)]
(how) (he) (rung) (upon (the rein (of (a wimpling wing)))) (In (his 
ecstasy))] >]
Ve must emphasize that this analysis is one of many possibilities. Ve 
have, for example, treated "how" as an adverb, initiating the clause "how 
he rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing in his ecstasy". Yet "how" could 
also be treated as an exclamation, making this clause an interpolated 
exclamation. Ve have treated “striding high there" as embedded within 
this clause. But it could also be incorporated into the prepositional 
phrase "in his riding of the rolling level underneath him steady air" as a 
co-ordinate of "his riding...". (Support for this reading is perhaps given 
by the semantic and phonological connections between "riding" and 
"striding", and "underneath" and "high".) There are also many alternative 
analyses of "dapple-dawn-drawn" and "the rolling level underneath him
steady air" which we discuss in detail below.
In L  M l  «. out above, tbe predictor "CAUGHT" bn, four objects:
three noun pbreses of growing conpleslty whlcb .re 1. npposltlon to each
I  n-rrtl-nated with these three appositional noun other, and one noun clause co ordina
phrases.
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S P A
[ (I) (CAUGHT) (this morning)
DIRECT OBJECT 1: (morning's minion)
AFFQSITIQBAL DIRECT OBJECT 2: (kingdom of d a r t ' s  daushin)
APPOSITIOBAL DIRECT OBJECT 3: (daDDle-ri*™ 8 I , dauphin)o. vaappie dawn-drawn Falcon in his riding Of
rolling level underneath him steady air) and J
CO-ORDIBATED DIRECT OBJECT 4: [[stridi™ n.... viitoT-riamg High there] how he rung upon the
rein of a wimpling wing In his ecstasy]]
The final noun clause, describing the bird's action, is treated 
grammatically in the same way as the noun phrases which precede it, as 
though it were another appositional noun phrase. What the bird is doing - 
a process - is treated in the same way as the bird itself. In this sense 
this fourth clausal object could be treated as another unit in apposition.
A further multiplication (indeed explosion) of valid analyses arises 
from doubt over the end of the first sentence. In the above analysis, we 
have treated the exclamation mark after "ecstasy" as the end of this 
sentence, although there is a case for incorporating all the lines before 
the first full stop. This would raise a host of new problems. Is "then 
off" to be interpreted as a new beginning, or in co-ordination with "rung" 
through an ellipted 'went': i.e. "I CAUGHT... the falcon...and I CAUGHT how he 
rung upon the rein .... and I CAUGHT how he then went off ? But if we read 
it in this way, how are we to cope with the potentially autonomous SPOd 
clause: "the hurl and gliding rebuffed the big wind"? Such syntactic 
complexities and switches of direction do not yield easily to a grammar 
designed for more sedate and conventional structures. They are, by the 
norms of such grammars, deviant. A loose stylistics reading might well 
claim that they iconically represent both the sudden changes of the bird's 
activity, the wind, the excitement of the beholder and - eventually -
change of heart.
Let us concentrate our attention on one or two features. The first Hue
exploits lexical Mtlguity, syntactic mobility, souad patterning,
highly unorthodox ■  breah 1» -Id-ord. to bring together .U of
major schemata we have suggested, and presage the change of
.Tf-H^cinlined control which is - in this
unbridled excitement to self P -iTi+rmiuees they "I" immediately introduces the
reading - the „  eiplolts the ,any meaning. of
understand", "to gain control of , bu
the verb: "to catch sight of , to
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also "to be infected by". it -ic
y is thus an action in which the "1" may be
either the ageat or the patleat, active or passive. I le  uouo„al J
verbal positioning of the adjunct -this .ornlng- allows it to bo associated
alliteratively with the following direct «•«° cx object noun phrase - it would, in
final position, otherwise be delayed by the string of appositional 
objects17. The highly idiosyncratic line break in the middle of the word 
“king/dom" allows it to be - for a split second in the process of reading 
the word king (for this last point see Viddowson 1987:245). The first 
two appositional noun phrases both delay the noun "Falcon", which is the 
literal - as opposed to metaphorical - direct object, and while doing so 
bring all of the major schemata together. The falcon is the servant of 
the morning, and is a prince and eldest son (like Christ), heir to the 
kingdom of daylight: and all this has been "CAUGHT" (captured?) by the "I", 
or has “CAUGHT" (infected) him. The effect is a fusion of these disparate 
schemata, a foregrounding of the elements they have in common, giving each 
the potential to disrupt and change the other.
The growing complexity of the noun phrases leading up to the word 
"Falcon", with ever longer and longer premodification, followed by a sudden 
switch to lengthy post-modification after it, foregrounds this word 
syntactically. The grammatical structure may be illustrated as follows:
Modifier type Pre-modifiers Head Post-modifiers
DETERMINER (this morning)
IIOUJ! + ‘s ((morning) 's minion)
NOUS PHRASE + 's (kingdom (of daylight))'s dauphin)
CLAUSE ([ dapple- dawn- drawn!* Falcon
(in (his riding (of (the
COMPLEX rnllin<r level underneath him
PREPOSITIONAL PHRASE steady air)))))*
* for alternative analyses see below.
"Falcon" stands out, balanced between eighteen
we are to believe thepremodified appositive noun phrases leading up 
syllables of complex postmodification after ^
psycholinguistics claim that left 1977:213), this change will
right branching (for this point see ^  foregrounding of
mark a processing release of tens on Qa.T.rmndinfc (-+-+-+-+_+_-its rhythmic foregrounding
“Falcon" is echoed, moreover, in
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4— I— H— h++---f---1— ) and i+<~
.. °r graphic foregrounding through the
capitalization of its initial letter m**-
e is also a change of rhythm,with a greater mean number of unctr/^  j°f UnStressed syllables between beats after the 
climactic syllable "Fal". it ic Jo nard to imagine how more emphasis could
fall upon a single word.
The last and most complex of t>>o jpremodifiers in this introductory
succession of noun phrases is "dari-nici—  ^ ■F 1S aaPPle-dawn-drawn". This may be analysed
as either
(dapple- [dawn-drawn] Falcon) or (I (dapple-dawn) -drawn] Falcon)
Where a single hyphen would have disambiguated, the repeated hyphen 
supports either reading. The fronting of a relative clause to function as 
a premodifier is, by most grammatical descriptions, deviant 10 ; but it 
allows the creation of a number of effects for a reader who is open to 
them, all of which unify the schemata we have suggested. The two analyses 
above explain how "dapple" may modify either "Falcon" or "dawn". "Drawn", 
like "CAUGHT", has many meanings, in which the agency of the action is 
different, and the bird more or less active or passive. It may mean 
"attracted to" (drawn towards), "pulled by" (drawn out by), "unsheathed" 
(drawn), "sketched" (drawn against) - this last meaning applies if the 
bird is visualized in silhouette against the morning light. Had the phrase 
employed the more normal post-modifying relative clause construction, it 
would have been difficult to create all these multiple readings together, 
as the distinguishing prepositional and adverbial particles of the phrasal 
verbs disappear only when the clause is fronted. Combining this lexical 
and grammatical ambiguity, we find, when we re write the premodifying 
relative clause in a post-modifying position, that it may mean (at least) 
all or any of the following.
(The falcon [which was drawn towards the dapple dawnD
(The dapple falcon [which was drawn towrs e n])
(The falcon [which was drawn out by the aapp ^
(The dapple falcon [which was drawn ou y dappie dawn])
(The falcon [which was drawn by the aapp
(The dapple falcon [which was drawn J  . dawn])(The falcon [which was drawn against the aapp
(The dapple falcon [which was drawn ag
"drawn", on its own,
W aM  This frrammatical structure enables in the sens of "unsheathed . ^  the maj0r
+n brinsc togetherwords "dapple-dawn-drawn
(Here "drawn out" is in the sense of “attracted to • the
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interpretative sche„at.: *s m n i K , ts KK1GHT and »  F1LC0». This UIlt,
is reinforced by the sound parallells-s <t„e Alterative ,d/ and the
assonantal lO'l ) which are also »aHo ,are axso made possible by this construction. (Ve
have already mentioned in 2.3 l thatttat Hopkins himself used the term
•parallelism1 in its modern sense (House and Storey 1959:108-114).)
Taken together, these grammatical features of the opening lines create 
a unique interconnection of the schemata we have suggested. Our claim is 
that they also facilitate changes in the highest levels of schemata. 
Firstly, the potential for multiple interpretations creates a general 
atmosphere of openness, fluidity and potential for change. More 
specifically, particular ambiguities represent particular changes in themes 
and plans. The passive and active meanings of "CAUGHT" and "drawn" 
represent different and contradictory attitudes to natural beauty. Is it 
something to master, or be mastered by? The inclusion of a clause 
describing a process (as though in apposition to a series of noun phrases 
describing an entity) reflects the fluidity and changeable nature of the 
poem's perception. This is a poem about change and interconnection, but 
these motifs are present, not only at the most abstracted conceptual level, 
but at the level of linguistic detail. It is as though linguistic choice 
directly penetrates and changes the highest abstractions - themes and 
plans - without any recourse to the intermediate stages of representation 
described in schema theory (see chapter 4). The qualities we are 
describing are thus functions of particular linguistic choice, SOT (to 
borrow one of Hopkins’ orthographic devices) of an abstracted 
representation in 'another language' like Conceptual Dependency. In this 
respect the poem's blurring of the distinction between events and entities 
is significant, for this distinction is the basis of CD. The combination
v 4 wH+h a reader's schemata and a resultant of these linguistic choices with a reaae
change in those schemata is an instance of dl^ ° ^ e ^  advertisement
M l  —  -  -  " i r - l e l  -  -  “ *
Elizabeth Taylnr'q Passim) nor is P el) 
which ^  occur in
In illustration of this, ^  ^ t e s  in .Icrocos. an
•rolling level underneath U .  s «  , ^  as consisting of
effect of the poe. as a whole. ; mden>eath hi.-, -steady"
three adjectival premodifiers ro , r>remodifier consists
. »_lr- The second adjecxiv* r 
" and one head word air
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0f a head word level - which is itself post-modified by a
prepositional phrase, "underneath him". Because this analysis is deviant 
in terms of existing grammars it is difficult to represent using our 
notation, but our reading is most nearly captured by 
(rolling (level (underneath (him))) steady air).
This is also semantically deviant, for how can a single entity, "air", be 
at once rolling and level and steady. (Such semantic contradiction we may 
recall (see 2.2) led Rumelhart to rule that the discourse in which a 
balloon had both burst and not burst was not "well—formed".) One answer 
to this problem is to say that the three premodifiers represent a process 
rather than a state: the air changes within the duration of the phrase. 
The deviation of this is startling, for usually such a change of state 
would be conveyed with several phrases not within one. This construction 
disrupts both our schematic expectations about the language AND about 
narrative voice, for we expect the perception of the narrator to be more 
certain, rather than changing, as it were, in front of our eyes. (The 
effect is similar, in this respect, to the simultaneous assertion and 
denial of Raskolnikov's cowardice in Crime and Punishment, see 5.1.) This 
change in mid—phrase, however, prepares us for the change of attitude 
which takes place within the poem as a whole. It is a formal device 
enabling an apprehension of changing perception within, rather than prior 
to, the linguistic formulation. This effect could not be rendered in a 
system such as conceptual dependency. It exists within the interaction 
between the deviant linguistic form and a schematic preconception: that 
the situation described by a noun phrase has been analyse.! and perceived 
before its description. What happens here creates an illusion of access 
to the perceptual processes of the narrator, before their verbalization.
The process rendered by the semantic contradiction between the 
modifiers in this phrase may be rationalized if the reader perceives
air from the bird's point of view. As the kestrel rolls sideways, levels
, . jii (uc. Vpstrels do* see 9.3*4 below), out and comes to a hovering standstill
tvp bird. The narrator thus becomes in the quality of the air changes for the
mnre explicit statement of this merger this phrase the bird, preluding the P
\ stirred for a bird" (interpretingIn one reading of "My heart in hiding stirr
■t0,  L  » *  -  —
* ^  u — n : r r  -  - —
(at least for this reader) an image
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Voices here merge and the narrator t a w  *0 taies on whatever qualities of the bird
may seem relevant to the reader • ,J • 1XS mastery of the air and its ‘•pride";
or its obedience to the "Lord" explicit in the dedication, and Implicit in 
the description of it as "dauphin" or "minion", and in the schema of the 
knight. This ambiguity is emphasized by the double meaning of the 
preposition "of" in the phrase "the mastery of the thing". This may mean 
either "mastery belonging to the thing" or "mastery over the thing" by 
someone else, presumably the narrator. The surprisingly dismissive and 
derogatory tone of thing", echoed by the negative connotations of "brute" 
in the following line, suggest to us the latter reading, and mark a radical 
change in attitude to the bird. $S FALCON here changes radically, the 
connection is no longer to the human, admirable $S KNIGHT, but to 
inanimate objects and inferior animals.
The grammatically simple noun phrases of the first line of the second 
stanza are in contrast with the complexity of the opening lines:
Brute beauty and valour and act, oh, air, pride, plume 
They evoke (depending on reader schemata) associations with all the major 
schemata. "Here" becomes ambiguously either "within the bird" or "within 
the narrator’s heart"; "buckle" brings together (like "CAUGHT" and "drawn") 
a host of relevant meanings. "Buckle" may mean "to collapse under strain", 
"come together", "become obedient", or as a nonce verb derived through 
class conversion and back formation19 from the noun 'buckler' (a kind of 
shield), "to defend oneself as with a buckler". (The extreme foregrounding 
of the word through the ellison and the repeated stresses of "air, pride 
plume here buck" make it parallel to the word "Falcon" in the first 
stanza.) All of the meanings of "buckle" may contribute to an 
interpretation of the remaining lines as referring to the beauty which 
comes from striking opposed surfaces ("the fire that breaks") hard work 
("sheer plod makes plough down sillion shine") or from the end of a fire 
("blue bleak embers.... fall gall themselves and gash gold vermillion").
This last image contains another - a metaphor within a metaphor
, j £j rtescribfid ss 3 wound, in lsnjufljfi which the glowing of the dying fire
, • _4. rrncc The verb less "no wonder
evocative of the wounding of Christ on
4-v „ ia=+ lines may be interpreted either as a of it" which introduces these last lines y r
. . or as a command to the self do notcomment ("it is not surprising ) or a
*++4tude is suggested by the regretful
wonder at the bird"). A change of. v Anar-" In Bakhtinian terms, what seems to 
interjections "oh",M0" and ah my
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be happening here, is that the voice of the opening stanza is present in 
the closing two stanzas, though defeated and regretful. Conversely, the 
more disciplined, active voice of the second stanza in present in the 
first, in the active senses of "CAUGHT" and of "the mastery of the thing". 
The change of voice reflects changes in the schemata through which the 
beauty of the bird is interpreted, and the plans which this beauty 
inspires. The original theme of being mastered by beauty has changed to 
one of mastering beauty. New plans have appeared in fulfilment of the 
theme of obedience to Christ: to reject ecstasy, to work hard, to control 
beauty. In this sense the poem deviates from the usual single voice of the 
lyric poem. Interestingly the interjections in the second stanza are more 
easily described as features of discourse than grammar, as is the 
dedication "To Christ our Lord", placed outside the poem as a whole.
The poem as discourse is text interpreted through a reader's schemata. 
It enters, however, into dynamic interaction with these schemata, both 
being interpreted through them, and simultaneously disrupting, recombining 
and refreshing them. The narrator becomes the bird but also rejects the 
bird, the bird is like Christ but is also opposed to Christ; it is like a 
knight, who is like Christ. The bird is both controller of the narrator 
and of its own element, but also controlled, by the morning and finally by 
the poet. The bird is like a human - a knight, a skater - but also a 
"thing" of "brute beauty". The whole experience is fluid and changing, 
both physically in the flight of the bird, and emotionally in the mind of 
the observer and reader. Linguistic devices, such as those described 
above, convey the process of perception, itself a deviation from norms of 
narration. The overall effect of the interaction of these schemata is a 
disruption of plans and themes. In our reading the relevant plan 
perceiving of beauty changes from wonder to control, from des 
mastery to acceptance of submission. The process of this change is 
effected through low level devices, grammatical deviations, multiple
meanings, ambiguities.
Vhat »  have attested to describe Is a «•*» P»« g |  °f
the fomatlon of ah ihterpretatioh. Ve certaiaiy do hot propose the above 
as a fixed readihg. Differed ihitial sohe.ata of course 
different results.
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9-3.4 The Windhover: an ornithological schema.
An interesting but neglected aspect of this poem, which well illustrates 
the dependency of interpretation on the schemata available to a given 
reader, is its ornithological accuracy. •Windhover' is a dialect name for 
•Kestrel' (Fitter and Richardson 1952:71), a small and common falcon. 
(Another dialect name is 'Standgale' (Frohawk 1958:252) a word motivated 
by the species' ability to fly accurately in strong winds.) The most 
distinguishing behavioural characteristic of this bird is its "habit of 
protracted hovering" (Peterson, Mountfort and Hollom 1974:99). This is 
"the best pointer" (Heinzel, Fitter, Parslow 1979:94) to identification, a 
perceptual trigger in schema terms for the activation of a 'kestrel schema' 
for an ornithologist. While hovering, the bird hangs virtually stationary 
with extraordinary control, keeping its position through minute movements 
of its tail and primary feathers. Between hovers it flies to a higher 
point, then rolls away before braking to a standstill. In the words of 
one field guide, (a text whose function is to communicate an appropriate 
schema of the species to those who do not have it) the kestrel "flies with 
rapid wing beats, occasional short glides and frequent periods of hovering, 
head to wind; slants steeply down to catch mice, beetles etc." (Peterson, 
Mountfort and Hollom 1974:99). The colour of the sexes is different, but 
the male bird (and Hopkins' bird is a 'he') has "spotted chestnut upper 
parts, warm buff upper-parts with scattered black spots" (Peterson 
Mountfort and Hollom 1974:99) and a "blue-grey head and tail" (Fitter and 
Richardson 1952:71; Heinzel, Fitter, Parslow 1979:94).
The above description gives default and trigger elements of a 'kestrel 
schema'. The availability of this is, however, far less widespread than the 
other schemata we have suggested, as it will only be present in those 
obervers with ornithological knowledge. We presume that Hopkins himself 
had this schema available. He may wrongly have assumed it to be available 
to readers. He was an accurate observer of wildlife, including birds, as 
the many references in his journals and papers make clear (House and 
Storey 1959). (We reject here the formalist and new critical dogma of 
..king no reference to biography.) The accuracy of the description is 
moreover unlikely to be coincidence. Hopkins correctly describes the bird 
as a falcon <ln marked contrast to another literary representation o 
this species, &K, which wrongly describes it as a 'hawk',. The phrase
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have already analysed "rolling level underneath him steady air" follows the 
stages of a kestrel's flight pattern, as does "striding high" and "then off, 
off forth on swing . "Rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing" captures the 
sudden stopping, the Immobility and control of the hover, "wimpling wing" 
the slight movements of the feathers. The habit of flying into the wind 
is present in "rebuffed the big wind". Lastly, the colouring of the male 
bird is evoked by "dapple", by "blue-bleak" and by "gash gold vermillion". 
These last two compounds - which also refer to the image of the dying 
embers, and by association with the wounds of Christ - are rather better 
descriptions of the species colouring than the ornithological descriptions 
cited above.
The extreme discourse deviation effected through phonological, 
orthographic, syntactic and lexical innovations with changes in schemata 
is thus set firmly within a schematic framework which represents an 
aspect of the world 'as it is': predictable and true to form. The radical 
disruption of the usual (thematic) response to natural beauty is 
contrasted and replaced with a new plan - control, hard work and 
obedience. This major change takes off from this everyday sight. The 
process of change itself is conveyed through the syntactic choices: 
disturbingly for those used to a more stable narrative. The default 
elements of the kestrel schema evoke through association and ambiguity 
other schemata, interact with them and refresh them. In the terms of SPGU 
this poem represents the replacement of one life theme with another, but 
it is the disruption of linguistic norms and a very specific scriptlike 
world schema which both describe and institute this change.
9.4 Conclusion.
. io+tarc nn this natte were suddenly to shift, Suppose the black, specific 1 Qr that ln lts fright, and
each one going off licke y p ord just a lot of meaningless
there wouldn't be a sln8le r“ °g it/ Vell, that's just the way
pi: igh. for IzigiLt, for Jickety sjm
the crowd in the street was... ... [19241 1970:198)(Sfi by Yevgeny Zamyatin
attempted to show how these three complex In these analyses we have attemp . #
change combine and refresh the schemata of
“  T T S J  do this, tta. the oh.hg.s they eet le 
reeder. That they do 1> ^  ^  „ltae6ssa by the
motion are both dynamic
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controversy and interest they have all provoked. Though they may 
represent aspects of the world, and of non-linguistic perception of that 
world (as IHft. Vlayover accurately describes a kestrel), the changes they 
cause to high level schemata are effected through linguistic and text- 
structural choices which are beyond expression in any other form. In 
this, our analyses bear out the formalist and Jakobsonian insistence on 
the primacy and uniqueness of form. Yet the forms of such discourses as 
these are most valuable to human beings, not in themselves, but for the 
effect they may have on schemata: though those schemata may be text or 
language schemata as well as schemata of the world. It is as though the 
minutest details of forms of these discourse can reach through the 
intervening layers of the interpretative hierarchy to change our most 
fundamental approaches to language and to life. Thus the linguistic and 
pragmatic ambiguities of The Tyger fuse contradictory views of the cosmos 
into one, leaving doubt where there was certainty; in The Turn of the 
.Screw, the Juxtaposition of text types and the exploitation of a standard 
narrative sequence disrupt our expectations of other people, of the nature 
of truth, and of the act of story telling itself; the patterns and multiple 
meanings of The Vlndhover can represent and cause a change of 'life theme' 
from passivity to activity: a change effected through such devices as the 
dual senses of the verb "CAUGHT" or the modifying phrase "of the thing". 
In this poem, the very process of change is captured in the altering 
perspective of a 'deviant' noun phrase: "the rolling level underneath him 
steady air" which, while accurately describing the bird, also defies both 
schematic expectations about noun phrases, and schematic expectations
about the stability of perception and attitude.
The degree of change caused by such discourse will vary with the
schemata which a reader brings to it. Discourse deviation exists in the
v _.j.. r-n+hor than in either one in isolation. A interaction of form and schemata, rather
, j fnmflllst analysis answers the chargescombination of schema theory and form
the validity of formal description.of reader-response criticism against
i i nf texts such as these suggests thatYet the wide popularity and impact of
higher level scheme ere perhaps not so Individual as la so.atl.ee
supposed. l s t l c  and text-structural deviations
As we have tried to show, ling h
j. ln themselves any guarantee of schema 
from expectation are not loy them to no greater effect
refreshment. There are discourses
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than the addition of Blnor props to rigid social stereotypes. There ar.
others, especially lathe contemporary world, which use poetic devices to
reinforce rather than break down tho _as prejudices and preconceptions which
limit our intelligence-. For these reasons, a formalist analysis of
discourse needs to hypothesize about effects on schemata, Just as much as twe
AI approach needs, when dealing with discourse deviation, to take account 
of form.
Though intelligence may need schemata to interpret and bring coherence 
to the world and the texts it perceives, it must also be capable of change.
And change may be effected through form.
lotes to Chapter Vine.
1. Doxey's interpretation is not cited by Fish, though it is by Epstein 
(1975: 66, footnote). It is, however, similar in kind to the literary 
critical and scholarly interpretations cited by Fish.
2. Remniscent, for example, of Brooks (1947) analysis of Donne's The 
Canonization in her book The Veil Wrought Urn in which she suggests that 
the poem is itself like the "well wrought urn" which Donne describes as a 
better monument than "half-acre tombs". This New Critical principle is in 
fact inherited by Epstein (1975) - discussed at length in this chapter - 
in the title of his paper: 'The Self-Reflexive Artefact'.
3. The words "dread" and "terror", for example, have shifted their meanings 
since the writing of this poem. They no longer collocate so readily with 
"God".
4. The Lamb - especially when written with a capital letter - is a Judaeo- 
Christian symbol of the Messiah (Isaiah 53:7). (The same symbol is used 
in the Edward Bond poem discussed in 7.3.) It is also the title of the 
sister poem in the Snngs of Innocence. In our view the connotations are 
not so specifically Christian or Jewish as to exclude other readings.
5. No patronizing depreciation of the ballad as an art form is intended by
this remark. „ __6. Ulvsses itself provides several examples of parallax. Bloom, 
enterSTthe library is suddenly seen as though by Stephen and Buck 
Mulligan, and described as follows: patient sillhouette waiting, 
listening", "a bowing, dark figure" (U922] 196|j257).
7. Page references are to the Penguin edit on •
.. Significantly, the governess fre^n. y refers “
"history" (29, 72) and to her own reading (p.oo , g
^vIsnTifjustTstorybook over which I ^d^fallen a-doze and a-dream? 
No; it was a big, ugly. antique, ?wt c^ven ^  ^  ^  ^  
Z J S Z A .  relative kept In 
Mrs. Grose, on the other hand, is, significantly, illiterate.
a
as a
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S r ° tly dra™' SkSPPard <lg74i42-61> *«™tes ?  w h ^ ^ t i T t o l h "
10. Ve use the term 'text schema' here fnr +hQ , a
™ r tripartii.tetdi',i%ion °f “ hMat» *“ <*»!**■ o».reserved the tern, for schemata represeatlag text structure. »e fee? 
however, that terms such as 'Journal' ,ad .ghost story should, strtotl, 
speaking, be described as discourse types' as they must take account of 
such factors as sender, communicative purpose, context, graphology and 
physical substance (Cook 1989:95-102 ). (The discourse type 'road sign' 
for example must be a metal board placed on the side of a road by an 
authoritative body with the purpose of informing or warning motorists.) 
In this we disagree with Dimter (1985) who uses the term 'text types'
11. The oddity of the words "brute" and "thing" are discussed below.
12. Our reasons for treating "blue-bleak" and "gold-vermillion" as 
properties of the bird as well as of embers and the "gash" are discussed 
below in 9.3.4.
13. The choice of a word of French origin (French 'sillon,= furrow) 
associates it with "chevalier".
14. From the poem Pied Beauty.
15. For Hopkins' own comments on rhythm and scansion see Hopkins (ed. 
Gardener and Mackenzie (1967: 255-6) and House and Storey (1959:100-109, 
267-283).
16. The representation in table 11 follows the orthographic lines as they 
are set out on the page. Table 12 treats the very short orthographic 
lines as part of the preceding line, following the line numbers in 9.3.
17. For comment on the effect of adverb fronting in another Hopkins' poem 
Inversnaid see Short and van Peer (1989:54).
18. Vhen the fronted clause is several words not one, as in 'disused mine'. 
Though in this case 'disused' can be treated as an adjective. So too can 
'drawn' in the phrase 'drawn sword'.
19. Vord-class conversion in literature is often remarked upon by 
stylisticians (see for example Viddowson 1975:15).
20. There is a paradox here of course, which may be easily deconstructed. 
The theory of schema change through formal deviation is itself schematic, 
and should itself be disrupted and refreshed.
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Appendix A: Literary works referred to.
(Works are listed alphabetically, by title. Where the work is discussed in 
detail, or quoted in full or in part, the edition used is given in the main 
bibiliography.)
Sunflower. William Blake.
In Wonderland. Lewis Carroll.
Animal Farm. George Orwell.
ThP Behaviour of Dogs. Craig Raine. 
pi oak House. Charles Dickens.
Bnbok. Fyodor Dostoevsky.
f^ n grammas. Guillaume Apollinaire.
ThP Canterbury Tales. Geoffrey Chaucer. 
r.rlmp and Punishment. Fyodor Dostoevsky.
ThP Decameron. Boccaccio.
The Devils. Fyodor Dostoevsky .
Dnn Quixote. Miguel de Cervantes.
Du Ice et n^nnrum Est. Wilfred Owen.
Raster Wings. George Herbert.
Emma, Jane Austen.
Eyeless In Gaza. Aldous Huxley.
v'ukJ.a.ov 
Finnegans Wake. James Joyce.
First Worl<j War Poets. Edward Bond.
The First Circle. Alexander Solzhenitsyn.
For the Fallen, Laurence Binyon.
Fnr ¥Hmn V *  ToIla‘ Brnest HeBinsway•
Futility. Wilfred Owen.
The GarijqT) nf Love. Villi*® Blake.
Tha r.re,t. r.atsb*. F. Scott FitzGerald.
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Hamlet. William Shakespeare, 
peart of Darkness. Joseph Conrad.
Homage to Catalonia. George Orwell.
Huckleberry Finn. Mark Twain.
Tn Cold Blood. Truman Capote.
The Inheritors. William Golding.
Jane Bvre. Charlotte Bronte.
Kes. Barry Hines.
Khnlstomer. Leo Tolstoy.
Kidnapped. Robert Louis Stevenson.
Kim. Rudyard Kipling.
T.a Peste. Albert Camus.
The Last Enemy. Richard Hillary.
The I-ong Goodbye. Raymond Chandler.
lyrical Ballads. Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth .
Macbeth. William Shakespeare.
Madame Bnvarv. Gustave Flaubert.
Meeting at Might. Robert Browning.
Missing Dates. William Empson.
Moonfleet. J. Meade Falkner.
The Murder nf Ackrovd. Agatha Christie.
The Mysteries pf Hdolpho. Ann Radcliffe.
The Mame of the Rose. Umberto Eco.
MorthaT)gpr Ahbey. Jane Austen.
ffnt.es from House. Fyodor Dostoevsky.
Oscar and T.ncinda. Peter Carey.
Other People. Martin Amis.
Pled Beauty. Gerard Manley Hopkins. 
Plncher Martin, William Golding.
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Playback. Raymond Chandler.
Erayer before Birth, Louis MacHeice.
The Rape of the Look, Alexander Pope. 
Ravuela. Julio Cortazar.
A Red. Red Rose. Robert Burns.
Robinson Crusoe. Daniel Defoe.
The Secret Agent, Joseph Conrad .
Silas Marner. George Eliot.
Sons and Lovers, D.H. Lawrence.
The Sound and the Fury, William Faulkner.
The Tempest. William Shakespeare.
Tess of the D'Urbevllles. Thomas Hardy. 
Th6r6se Desqueyroux. Francois Mauriac. 
Through the Looking Glass. Lewis Carroll. 
Tom Brown's Schooldays. Thomas Hughes. 
Tom Jones. Henry Fielding 
Tom Sawyer. Mark Twain.
Tristram Shandy. Laurence Sterne.
Treasure Island. Robert Louis Stevenson. 
The Tvger. William Blake.
What Maisle Knew. Henry James.
The Windhover. Gerard Manley Hopkins.
The Towers of Silence. Paul Scott.
The Turn nf the Screw. Henry James.
Ulysses. James Joyce.
Under Milk Wood. Dylan Thomas.
War and Peace. Leo Tolstoy.
Ste, Yevgeny Zamyatin.
WutheHng Heights. Emily Bronte.
You fit Into m e . Margaret Atwood.
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Appendix B: Films referred to.
The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie, directed by Luis Bunuei. 
She Gotta Have It. directed by Spike Lee.
Superman, directed by Richard Donner.
Seat,—Lies—find—VldeQtspe, directed by Steven Soderbergh.
Appendix C: Songs referred to.
Rellv Button Window, by Jimi Hendrix.
Don't Think Twice. It's All Right, by Bob Dylan.
Nothing Compares to You, by Prince (performed by Sinead O'Connor).
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